THE STRATEGIC DEFENCE REVIEW PROCESS
The Aim of the Review
1. The Strategic Defence Review was announced in the Queen's Speech on 14 May 1997, and subsequently launched by the Defence Secretary at a press conference on 28 May:
"Its aim is clear cut; to build on the developing consensus on defence and to establish the widest possible shared vision about Britain's future security needs and the tasks of its Armed Forces . . . . to provide Britain's Armed Forces with a new sense of clarity, coherence and consensus."
The Nature of the Review
2. It was fundamental to the Government's approach that the Review would be foreign policy-led. The Ministry of Defence and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office would work together to establish a policy framework upon which the Review would build. The process would be open and inclusive, not conducted in secret behind closed doors. It would include consultation with the widest possible range of outside expertise and opinion. More generally, the Defence Secretary encouraged and welcomed suggestions and ideas from any source. He explained that:
"I want our conclusions to have been formed and tested in a wider forum, and to be accepted as the right defence policy for Britain . . . . No-one should be able to claim at the end of the Review that they were not given the opportunity to have their say."
Parameters
3. The Review did not start with a blank piece of paper, but operated within parameters set out in the Government's General Election manifesto, including strong defence, security based on NATO, and retention of Trident combined with multinational arms control. The Defence Secretary also stressed the vital importance of people:
". . . . although our ships, tanks and jet fighters may appear impressive, it is the men and women who operate, maintain and support them who really make the difference. This Government will give its full support to Service personnel, their families, and our civilian staff."
4. Within these guidelines, the Review took a fresh look at all aspects of defence policy and programmes.
5. The Review was conducted in overlapping stages as shown in FIGURE 1.
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6. Throughout this process, we were guided by the principles of:
- openness - keeping our own people, Parliament, our Allies and partners, the wider defence community and the public in touch with progress;
- maximum use of existing structures - drawing on the expertise of our in-house staff, rather than setting up a separate Review team;
- the widest possible involvement within the Ministry of Defence, the Government as a whole and more widely.
7. Most of the work was carried out in working groups, comprising military and civilian personnel and representatives of other Government Departments, under an overall structure managed by the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff and the Second Permanent Secretary. Examples of the working groups are at Annex A. The results at each stage were synthesised for discussion by a range of senior committees, up to and including the Defence Council. This approach was based firmly on the principles set out above, drawing upon the Department's existing structures and working practices where appropriate.
The Policy Framework
8. The first stage of the Review was conducted jointly by the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. It assessed our national interests, commitments and responsibilities, and considered potential risks and challenges in the decades ahead, and set out the overall role of defence in support of Britain's foreign and security policy, to provide the framework for subsequent stages of the Review. This work is summarised in the essay on the Policy Framework.
9. To inform this work and test emerging conclusions, the Foreign and Defence Secretaries held two open seminars on 3 and 11 July 1997, in London and Coventry. These were attended by Members of Parliament, academics, representatives of non-Governmental organisations, and the media, in addition to Ministers and officials.
10. The Policy Framework was endorsed by Ministers as a basis for further work. We subsequently considered publishing it as a separate document. But our conclusion was that this work could not easily be separated out from the Review's later stages. The Defence Secretary decided nonetheless that it would be right to make public the broad conclusions we had reached so far, and the main themes were set out in his speech to the Royal United Services Institute on 18 September 1997, and in the Defence Debate in the House of Commons on 27 and 28 October 1997.
Planning Assumptions
11. Planning assumptions convert policy into detailed guidance for defence planning. They cover the activities our forces need to be able to undertake, and the context in which they will undertake them. The assumptions then inform further work to identify the specific force structures, capabilities, equipment and support required. This phase was carried out in broadly-based working groups. The main elements of the planning assumptions are summarised in the essay on Future Military Capabilities.
Conventional Forces
12. On the basis of the planning assumptions, our requirements for conventional forces were considered, in two main phases. Firstly, the eight missions identified by the planning assumptions were developed further into 28 Military Tasks, and additional work was carried out on the future development of specific capabilities and the impact of technology on future military equipment and capability. This work was again conducted in working groups, and took account of external submissions made to the Review and a third seminar, held in the Ministry of Defence Main Building in November and attended by outside experts and members of the public.
13. The second phase assessed the forces, capabilities, equipment and support needed to conduct the Missions and Military Tasks. It was by some margin the largest phase of the Review. The working group structure was retained, but a number of senior officers and officials were given responsibility for ensuring that the work of the groups rigorously analysed the issues and considered imaginatively the options which might be pursued. Ministers directed that no options should be ruled out.
14. The process was iterative, with issues and options considered at various stages by senior committees and Ministers, including a Steering Group chaired by the Minister of State for the Armed Forces. Once the full range of options had been established they were costed. The outcome of this phase of the Review is covered in most of the following essays.
Nuclear Forces
15. The Government's undertaking to retain Trident provided one of the pillars of the Review. Against this background, work on nuclear forces reassessed all aspects of our nuclear deterrent posture in the light of our essential security interests and defence needs. Working groups looked at the long term worst case requirement over the lifetime of Trident and considered how our nuclear deterrent capabilities and requirements for conventional supporting forces could be adjusted to meet Britain's needs in the changed strategic environment. Their conclusions are addressed in detail in the essay on Deterrence, Arms Control and Proliferation.
Procurement Policy
16. On 30 July 1997, the Defence Secretary announced that the Strategic Defence Review would include a "Smart Procurement" initiative to ensure that future equipment procurement was faster, cheaper and better. Ministry of Defence staff worked with industry to identify a package of measures to lead to speedier, more coherent processes, improve the operation of the Department's internal organisations and mechanisms, and improve its relationship with industry.
17. In order to get maximum benefit from Smart Procurement, the initiative included a fundamental review of the process by which MOD acquires equipment, and the way the Department is organised to conduct that process. Every facet of the procurement process was examined, drawing on a wide range of outside expertise and experience, including the National Defence Industries Council and Trade Associations. There was also an open seminar at Didcot. Work was overseen by a Ministerial Group chaired by the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, and is described in the essay on Procurement and Industry.
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Efficiency and Assets
18. Although the Review was firmly policy-led, it also took a hard look at how the Department could ensure best value for money from defence resources. Every area of defence business was examined with the aim of seeking out new efficiency savings. One of the main aims was to make financial headroom so that we could rectify shortfalls in capability and meet new requirements identified in other areas of the Review. To this end, a specific strand of work was established to maximise the efficiency of our organisational structures and working practices, especially in the support area. This work was overseen by the Ministerial Efficiency Steering Group chaired by the Minister of State for the Armed Forces. The process is illustrated in FIGURE 2 and is described in detail in the essay on Support and Infrastructure.
External Inputs to the Review
19. Ministers directed that maximum use should be made of the knowledge and expertise of our military and civilian staff. To reinforce this, we actively sought ideas and suggestions from all sources. The aim was an open, inclusive Review which would encourage a better informed debate on defence issues and help build a wide consensus on defence policy.
20. The Strategic Defence Review was a unique exercise in consultation on defence. In addition to the open seminars described elsewhere in this essay, the Secretary of State invited anyone with an interest in or a view on defence to make a submission to the process. Over five hundred submissions were received, from MPs and Peers, local authorities, academics, industry, interest groups, journalists, and members of the public. They were circulated to staff dealing with the subjects to which the submissions related. All were interesting and some had a significant impact on our work. Correspondents received an acknowledgement and will receive substantive replies in the light of the results of the Review.
21. Submissions were also encouraged from Service and civilian personnel, to ensure that we took advantage of the experience and imagination of staff who might not be directly involved in any of the Review's work processes. About a hundred such submissions were received.
22. In a related initiative, the Secretary of State set up a panel of eighteen outsiders with a range of interests and experience in defence and other areas. His purpose was to seek advice from different perspectives, and to test the conclusions emerging from the work. Several of the members also made valuable contributions to the work on efficiency, assets and procurement. Membership of the expert panel is shown at Annex B to this essay.
23. To spread the net even more widely, a series of informal discussions was held with former Defence Ministers, retired senior officers and officials, industrialists, trade unionists, academics, former and current MPs, Peers, scientists, non-Governmental organisations and environmentalists. These occasions promoted free and wide ranging discussion, and the views expressed were fed into our work. FIGURE 3 shows the inputs to the SDR.
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Consultation and Information
24. The Department sought to maintain a two-way flow of information on the Review with all interested parties. Parliament had opportunities to express views, in the House of Commons Defence Debate on 27 and 28 October 1997, and in the House of Lords on 6 November. There was also an adjournment debate in the House of Commons on 25 February 1998. Copies of outside inputs were placed in the libraries of both Houses of Parliament (subject to their authors' consent). The House of Commons Defence Committee received briefings to keep them up-to-date with emerging findings. During this period, Defence Ministers also answered over one hundred and fifty Parliamentary Questions on the Review, in addition to correspondence and enquiries from MPs and Peers.
25. From the outset we were committed to keep our NATO Allies and other partners informed of what was happening. The NATO and WEU Secretary Generals, Defence Ministers of NATO Allies, and Five Power Defence Arrangements and Gulf Co-operation Council countries were all kept informed in letters, and at a broad range of NATO and bilateral meetings.
26. Throughout the Review process a range of methods were used to keep the wider public in touch with progress. The Defence Secretary made keynote speeches at the Royal United Services Institute on 18 September 1997 and at Chatham House on 12 March 1998, and wrote an article for The Independent on 30 July 1997. Regular press releases were given to the national and regional press, and the text of key speeches and summaries of the seminars were made available on the Ministry of Defence Internet site [http://www.mod.uk]. A BBC television documentary on the process was broadcast on 31 May.
27. To keep Service and civilian staff up to date regular articles were published in our various in-house journals. These were supplemented in February 1998 by a short leaflet issued to all personnel with their pay-slips.
28. A key part of the consultation process was the establishment of a liaison team to talk directly to military and civilian personnel throughout defence. The team was led by a Group Captain and included representatives from all three Services and the Civil Service. They listened personally to views expressed by individuals at all levels, who were encouraged to speak frankly, and reports were made directly to the Defence Secretary. It was impossible for the team to speak to every employee, but their visit programme provided over 7,500 staff with an opportunity to discuss the Review and make their views known. It also gave Ministers a valuable insight into many of the issues of most immediate concern to Service personnel and civilian staff.
29. The MOD engaged the Trade Unions fully in this process of consultation. They were invited to put forward general views at the outset, and officials kept them informed of developments throughout the Review, including through the MOD Whitley Council machinery. Trade Unionists were also actively involved in other aspects of the consultation process, including informal meetings and seminars. In March 1998 the Trade Unions were given a broad indication of emerging conclusions, and this was followed up with a meeting with the Defence Secretary on 7 April 1998 where they were able to feed in their views before decisions were taken. When final decisions are implemented the Trade Unions will be fully consulted in accordance with normal Departmental procedures.
Synthesis and Decision-Making
30. Options generated by the Review were submitted to Ministers after consideration by the various official bodies described above. Other Government Departments remained involved in this process, including through an inter-departmental group chaired by the Cabinet Office.
31. In the early part of 1998, the Defence Secretary held a series of meetings with his Ministerial colleagues, the Chiefs of Staff and senior officials, to consider the costed options identified by the working groups and to discuss the issues with those who had led the work in each case. The purpose of these meetings was not to take immediate decisions, but to discuss the issues with senior advisers, particularly the Chiefs of Staff, to commission further work where required and, progressively, to rule out options.
32. This rolling process enabled the Defence Secretary to ensure that the working groups had addressed the issues rigorously and imaginatively, and that the inter-connections between them had been properly identified and understood. As a result, the Defence Secretary and his most senior advisers were able to put together a coherent package of measures.
33. The Defence Secretary submitted these proposals to the Prime Minister on 27 March 1998. They formed both the output of the Strategic Defence Review and the MOD's input to the Government-wide Comprehensive Spending Review.
Announcement
34. We aimed to announce the conclusions of the Review as widely as possible. The main vehicles were a White Paper setting out the Government's defence policy and plans, and this volume of supporting essays. Allies and partners were fully briefed, and the Review's conclusions were also issued through press releases to national and regional press, set out in writing to a similarly wide range of people as contributed to the Review, and lodged on the Internet. Particular importance was attached to the internal MOD and Government wide announcements. Within MOD, 4,500 packs of information containing specially written information sheets were prepared to inform military and civilian staff of the main conclusions of the Review and how those conclusions would affect their particular area of business. Much effort was made to ensure that internal briefing followed as closely as possible on announcements in Parliament.
Conclusion
35. This foreign policy-led, open and inclusive process clearly distinguishes the Strategic Defence Review from previous reviews. The results demonstrate the value of harnessing the knowledge, experience and ideas of the many rather than the few. We believe that this approach has produced a clear and coherent future for Britain's defence, and one which should command a broad consensus, not only amongst defence professionals but with the British public and our friends abroad.
ANNEX A TO SDR PROCESS ESSAY
EXAMPLES OF WORKING GROUPS
Planning Assumptions -
- future defence missions
- Allies and other partners
- potential theatres of operations
- capabilities of potential future adversaries
- scale and concurrency of operations
- readiness requirements
- sustainability and recuperation
- basing issues
- military crisis management
- rapid deployment forces and NATO reaction forces
Force Structures and Capabilities -
Nuclear Forces, including
- warhead and missile requirements
- Trident submarine operating posture
- nuclear disarmament/arms control
- fissile material management
- future warhead capability programme
Conventional Forces -
Utility of the present and planned force structure in relation to planning assumptions and military tasks, together with studies into specific areas such as:
- underpinning defence diplomacy
- a British contribution to UN standing forces
- Caribbean Presence
- Search and Rescue/Fishery protection
Size, shape and readiness, including:
- Force Structure requirements, particularly to provide Joint Rapid Reaction Forces
- Readiness
- Reserve structures
- Training and operational cycles and levels of separated service
Logistics Support, including:
- Logistics support to expeditionary and joint operations
- Sustainability
Organisation and Basing, including:
- Army Organisation
- Basing of the Army in the UK and Germany
- Command and Control of Contingency Forces
- Ground-based air defence and Nuclear Biological and Chemical defence
- Organisation of battlefield helicopters
Forward Equipment Issues, including:
- The forward equipment programme
- Strategic Lift
- Carrier-based aircraft, carriers and future offensive air systems
- Information and communication systems
- Future medium surface to air missile & ballistic missile defence
The return on our Investment in People
ANNEX B TO SDR PROCESS ESSAY
MEMBERSHIP OF THE EXPERT PANEL
- Sir Michael Alexander (UK Ambassador to NATO 1986-92, Chairman of RUSI)
- Janet Bruce, Lady Balfour of Burleigh (Consultant and Author, including Editor of The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister 1964-70 by Richard Crossman; Chairman of Cable and Wireless Resource Ltd.)
- Janet Cohen (Director of Charterhouse Bank Ltd and Governor of the BBC)
- Professor Lawrence Freedman (Professor of War Studies, King's College, University of London)
- Air Marshal Sir Timothy Garden (Former Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, now Director of the Royal Institute of International Affairs)
- Lord Gladwin of Clee (Former Regional Secretary GMWU; Member of the Employment Appeals Tribunal)
- Dr. James Gow (King's College, University of London; Expert Advisor to the Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (1994-97)
- Professor Colin Gray (Director of Security Studies, University of Hull; Formerly Director of National Security Studies at the Hudson Institute, New York)
- Simon Jenkins (Columnist of the Year 1993; Columnist for The Times and the London Evening Standard and formerly Editor of both newspapers)
- Richard Lapthorne (Vice Chairman of British Aerospace plc and member of the Industrial Development Advisory Board)
- Dr. Patricia Lewis (Formerly Director of the Verification Technology Information Centre (VERTIC); now Director of The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)
- Admiral of the Fleet Sir Julian Oswald (Chief of the Naval Staff 1989-93; currently Chairman of Aerosystems International)
- Trevor Phillips (Presenter of LWT's The London Programme, and weekly Columnist for The Independent)
- Sir Michael Quinlan (Director of the Ditchley Foundation; formerly Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Defence 1988-92)
- John Rose (Chief Executive of Rolls Royce plc)
- Dr. Alan Rudge (Chairman, WS Atkins plc; Chairman of The Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council; Chairman of The Engineering Council; and Chairman of ERA Technology Ltd.)
- Colonel Terence Taylor (Assistant Director of the International Institute of Strategic Studies and Editor of The Military Balance)
- Field Marshal the Lord Vincent (Chief of the Defence Staff 1991-2, Chairman of the NATO Military Committee 1993-96)
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