FUTURE MILITARY CAPABILITIES
1. The aim of the Strategic Defence Review has been to reshape and modernise Britain's Armed Forces for the 21st century. All three Services have undergone great changes in the last decade (see FIGURE 1). At the same time, military personnel and the civilians who support them have had to cope with high levels of operational activity which few would have predicted at the end of the Cold War.
|
||
|
2. Nobody with an understanding of defence issues would argue that the Armed Forces should be immune to change. But changes to military capabilities must be matched to changes in the strategic environment, and to the activities we expect our forces to undertake. A process of evolution has been taking place throughout the last decade, and in some respects our forces are well prepared for the challenges of the next century. But the process is not yet complete. This essay explains how we have sought to ensure that Britain's Forces are the right size and shape, with the people they need for the tasks we want them to undertake.
I. Process
3. To translate the Review's policy framework into a detailed basis for determining Britain's defence needs, a comprehensive set of planning assumptions was developed. This methodology has been used before but it was refined and expanded considerably during the Review.
4. The first step was to define the Missions which the Armed Forces must be able to undertake in support of foreign and security policy, and develop them into specific Military Tasks. The Missions are set out below, and both they and the Military Tasks are described in detail in Annex A.
The most important changes from previous analyses are the establishment of Defence Diplomacy as a distinct Mission and the decision that we should no longer maintain forces solely to meet a strategic attack on NATO - an attack on the scale of the Cold War is no longer within the capacity of any conceivable opponent and to recreate such a capacity would take many years.
5. The next step was to consider the level of forces or scales of effort over and above those required for day-to-day commitments (such as Northern Ireland) that we should plan to be able to contribute to different Missions, taking account of Britain's national interests, operational requirements, Allies' capabilities and our military strengths. These assumptions were also influenced by recent experience of operations, such as the Gulf Conflict, Bosnia and many smaller deployments, and an assessment of future trends and requirements. It should be emphasised that the scales of effort are planning tools; they do not prejudge the size of an actual commitment in particular contingencies, which could be larger or smaller depending on the circumstance. The principal scales are:
- small scale: a deployment of battalion size or equivalent. Examples include the ARMILLA patrol in the Gulf, the British contribution to United Nations Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP), and the Royal Air Force operations enforcing the no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq;
- medium scale: deployments of brigade size or equivalent for warfighting or other operations. An example would be our contribution to the NATO-led Intervention Force (IFOR) in Bosnia;
- large scale: deployments of division size or equivalent. The nearest recent example would be our contribution to the Gulf War coalition, although on that occasion the British division deployed with only two of its three brigades. Large scale is the maximum size of force we would plan to be able to contribute to peace enforcement operations, or to regional conflicts outside the NATO area;
- very large scale and full scale: these comprise all the forces we plan to make available to NATO to meet significant aggression against an Ally. This is the most serious single scenario that we might now face. The two scales differ primarily in the warning time available in response to the emergence of a major threat, and in the size of that threat. In both cases, we assess that the warning time we would have available would be many months or even years.
6. We then considered the levels of readiness applicable to different sorts of operation: that is, the notice period within which units must be ready to deploy from their bases or other designated areas. The readiness required of a unit helps to determine its level of manning, equipment, training and logistic sustainability, and also whether it must be Regular or could be Reserve. The aim was to match readiness to political and military requirements, including warning times where applicable. Account has also been taken of campaign sequencing, or the phases in which operations are likely to unfold, recognising that the readiness of forces should be graduated in accordance with the likely timescales for their employment.
7. Another important factor is the likely duration of operations and the potential need to sustain a deployment for an indefinite period - endurance. The possibility that some operations will be enduring (as in Cyprus, where we have taken part in UNFICYP since 1964, and more recently in Bosnia) has a significant impact on total force structure, as there must be sufficient units to be able to provide for the rotation of those actually deployed at any one time.
8. We also considered the number of operations, of a given scale of effort and duration, that we should be able to conduct at any time - concurrency. This is crucial to determining the size and shape of force structure needed in the modern world, where military planning is no longer dominated by a single worst-case scenario. Our conclusion was that not to be able to conduct two medium scale operations at the same time would be an unacceptable constraint on our ability to discharge Britain's commitments and responsibilities. It would, for example, oblige us to withdraw from an enduring commitment such as Bosnia in order to respond to a second crisis.
9. Finally, emerging trends in the relative importance of different aspects of defence capability were identified, to guide force development and ensure that our forces have the capabilities they will need, rather than those we needed in the past.
10. Taking all these planning assumptions together, we concluded that the size and shape of our forces are dictated by two main requirements:
- the challenge of conducting two concurrent medium scale operations - one a relatively short warfighting deployment, the other an enduring non-warfighting operation. For many elements of our force structure this is the most demanding scenario;
- a full scale operation, which is the most demanding scenario for the remainder of the force structure.
11. On the basis of the planning assumptions, we carried out an exhaustive analysis of the force elements required for each Military Task, and thus of the numbers of each force element required overall. The methodology used, the attribution of force elements to Military Tasks and the consequent numbers of each force element are set out in more detail at Annex A. The remainder of this essay sets out the main results of this process in terms of future force structure.
II. Future Force Structures and Capabilities
12. The nature of future operations - force projection. For four decades following the Second World War, British military planning was dominated by the Cold War, in which it was expected that most ground and air forces would fight from or close to their peacetime bases, with the benefit of well-established infrastructure. This scenario envisaged a highly intense conflict of relatively short duration. By contrast, modern operations are likely, even in the worst case, to be smaller in scale; indeed, as explained above, the risk of a strategic attack on NATO is now so remote that we no longer need to maintain forces specifically for that contingency. But modern operations will often be more demanding in other ways. British Forces can expect to have to go to the operation, rather than have it come to them. They may have to operate in areas where the supporting infrastructure is limited or non-existent. And they may have to sustain non-warfighting operations for indefinite periods whilst retaining the ability to respond to other contingencies. This calls for rather different force projection capabilities than we have needed in the past.
13. Multinationality. With the exception of national commitments such as Northern Ireland and the security of our Overseas Territories, future operations will almost always be multinational. Britain will usually be working as part of a NATO, UN or Western European Union (WEU) force, or an ad hoc "coalition of the willing". This means that we do not need to hold sufficient national capabilities for every eventuality, just as we did not plan to defeat the Warsaw Pact on our own. But it also means that we need balanced, coherent forces which are capable of operating effectively alongside forces from other countries (including in NATO's Rapid Reaction Corps, which Britain leads), and that this requirement must be reflected in training and equipment. Our conclusion is that an ability to make a contribution of this kind to multinational operations will enable us to meet our national commitments as well.
14. High-Intensity and Low-Intensity operations. In the past, a contrast has sometimes been drawn between the high-intensity capabilities required for warfighting and the low-intensity capabilities which suffice for other operations such as peacekeeping - between, for instance, tanks on the one hand and light infantry in blue berets on the other. This is an artificial distinction. Recent experience has shown that enforcing and keeping the peace may require the deployment of forces trained for modern conventional warfare and equipped with battle-winning capabilities such as aircraft carriers, submarines, tanks, artillery, attack helicopter and combat aircraft. And the capabilities an operation requires may vary over time, as has been the case in Bosnia. We therefore need a balanced and coherent spectrum of capabilities, which collectively provide a range of deployment options.
15. Trends in military capabilities. Our analysis of force development identified a number of increasingly important capabilities:
- command, control, communications and computers, and intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) are crucial to the exploitation of information to facilitate the effective employment of combat power;
- the trend towards force projection operations, for which we may need to deploy very rapidly in order to be successful, places an increasing premium on transport or lift capabilities;
- combat service support (logistics, equipment and medical support) is key to sustaining deployed operations, particularly those of significant duration;
- protection against chemical and biological weapons will be critically important in some of the regions in which we are likely to have to operate, such as the Gulf;
- Special Forces are likely to be essential in all warfighting operations;
- air manoeuvre forces will be increasingly central to high intensity land operations as their tempo continues to increase.
Some other capabilities remain very important, but improvements in the range and precision of weapons mean that we no longer need them in the same quantity as during the Cold War. And some capabilities are of declining relative importance. This applies in particular to the direct defence of the United Kingdom itself and to open-ocean maritime operations. In a number of cases, changes of emphasis are already in train. Elsewhere, the Review has re-balanced the force structure, to provide a coherent set of capabilities for the operations we now need to plan for.
Joint Rapid Reaction Forces
16. Joint operations are one of the main themes of the Review. The most important development in the force structure is the creation of a pool of Joint Rapid Reaction Forces to bring together all readily available forces from the three Services. From this pool we will be able to draw the right force packages to mount short-notice brigade level or equivalent force projection operations of all kinds across the crisis spectrum. Joint Rapid Reaction Forces are described in full in the essay on joint operations, but the measures set out below should be seen in the context of the Joint Rapid Reaction Force concept.
Shortfalls
17. The Review has given high priority to addressing shortfalls in our capability to undertake force projection operations.
18. Strategic Lift. We cannot at present deploy Joint Rapid Reaction Forces quickly enough to meet operational requirements in the changed strategic environment, nor is commercial shipping or airlift likely to be available in sufficient quantities to meet rapid deployment deadlines, although it will have an important place in transporting follow-on forces. Our tactical capabilites are already being improved by introducing additional support helicopters and replacing our oldest Hercules aircraft by the new C-130J version. A wide range of options was considered for enhancing the strategic sea and air transport fleets. The following is the most effective alternative in military and resource terms:
- acquire four additional roll-on roll-off container ships to join the two now entering service. It may be possible to do so using Public Private Partnership;
- in the short term, meet our strategic airlift needs with four C-17 large aircraft or their equivalent;
- in the longer term, we need to consider a suitable replacement for our remaining elderly transport aircraft, for which the proposed European Future Large Aircraft is a contender.
Bids will be invited to meet the short-term and long-term air transport requirements in parallel competitions. Requests for proposals will be issued later this year, and we would hope to make decisions on procurement by early 2000. We will also be issuing requests for information for a new tanker aircraft for air-to-air refuelling.
19. Enhanced logistic support. The current logistic support structure cannot sustain prolonged or simultaneous operations. A package of measures will address the worst of these deficiencies by:
- establishing two well-found logistic lines of communication to support two concurrent medium scale deployments;
- creating a joint force logistics component commander and headquarters for each to co-ordinate joint support assets;
- enhancing the ability of the Royal Air Force to conduct operations from remote locations with little or no infrastructure by providing the logistic support needed for deployed operating bases;
- addressing key shortfalls in weapon systems and spares for critical equipments, including missiles and ammunition;
- organising logistic support forces so that early-entry capabilities are provided by Regular personnel, with greater use of Reserve and contractor personnel for follow-on support once the operation has been established.
The overall effect of these measures will be to provide more effective support for deployed forces and to reduce the current overstretch problem faced by personnel in many logistic specialisations.
20. Enhanced medical support. Medical support is another area in which there are serious shortfalls, both in peacetime care and in operational medical support. The Government will therefore make a significant investment in additional equipment and personnel. Key improvements will include:
- establishment of a new Regular ambulance regiment;
- the updating of current afloat medical support facilities;
- acquisition of an additional 200-bed primary casualty receiving ship; and
- enhanced ground and aeromedical evacuation capabilities.
To meet the requirement for extra medical personnel, the Regular element of the Defence Medical Services will be increased. But it is neither militarily sensible nor cost effective to rely solely on Regular personnel. We will therefore use the compulsory call-out of medical Reserves to augment Regular field hospitals for combat operations at the equivalent of brigade level or above. Work is under way to establish the best ways of achieving this.
Joint enabling capabilities
21. The Review has sought to reflect and reinforce the increasingly joint nature of operations and the force structure. A number of capabilities common to more than one Service have a crucial enabling role:
- significant improvements in tactical communications and command and control systems, such as the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System, the Joint Operational Command System, and the Theatre Wide Area Communications Network, are already in hand. To exploit this, we are creating a fully-equipped Joint Task Force Headquarters, capable of very rapid deployment for the command and control of our Joint Rapid Reaction Forces, and forming the nucleus of a second Headquarters which could take command of a separate, concurrent deployment;
- continued investment in key ISTAR projects, such as the Astor airborne stand-off radar, the Phoenix remotely piloted vehicle and the Cobra counter-battery radar, will significantly improve the effectiveness of British forces in future conflicts;
- we have confirmed plans to enhance the support helicopter force by procuring 22 Merlin support helicopters and 14 Chinook HC2A/3. Their overall military effectiveness will be increased by establishing a new Joint Helicopter Command to co-ordinate the use of all battlefield helicopters;
- the Review has confirmed the importance of our highly-regarded Special Forces capability in a broad variety of roles, and we will continue to invest in high-quality personnel, training and equipment.
Maritime capabilities
22. Maritime forces are inherently well suited to most force projection operations. Their reach, ability to sustain themselves without reliance on host nation support and flexibility are invaluable attributes. A joint maritime force often provides the opportunity for early and timely intervention in potential crises. Recent events in the Gulf have demonstrated the ability of maritime forces in this respect. In almost all operations, maritime forces will be essential to help deliver ground forces to the theatre. And they can make a vital contribution to humanitarian and disaster relief operations, as seen recently in Montserrat.
23. Against this background, the Review suggested a continuing shift in focus away from large-scale open-ocean warfare towards a wide range of operations in littoral areas. This reflects changes in the potential maritime threat, especially relative to NATO, the missions of our forces and the likely geographic location of future operations. These changes are a continuation of trends since the end of the Cold War. They include a decline in the likelihood of an open-ocean anti-submarine or anti-surface threat on the scale previously envisaged. Similarly, the size of the mine countermeasures force must take account of the reduced threat in home waters. By contrast, we need to be better able to conduct combat operations in littoral areas, to take better advantage of the contribution of maritime platforms in the force projection role, and to have the capacity to undertake prolonged peace support commitments and day-to-day tasks without overstretching our forces.
24. To achieve this the Government will maintain strong and well- balanced maritime forces but with some changes of emphasis. The Strategic Defence Review will:
- maintain plans to modernise the destroyer and frigate force with a new class of Common New Generation Frigates but reduce overall strength from 35 to 32 (this figure is based on two concurrent medium scale deployments, which is the most demanding requirement for the destroyer and frigate force);
- continue modernisation of the nuclear-powered attack submarine force but reduce strength from 12 to ten in the longer term. All ten attack submarines will, however, be equipped to fire Tomahawk land attack missiles to increase their utility in force projection operations (this compares with previous plans to fit only seven submarines for the Tomahawk system);
- modernise the mine countermeasures force and continue to increase its strength (currently 19 vessels), but limit the increase to 22 rather than 25 by paying off three older vessels;
- maintain a full Commando Brigade and its specialist shipping, and continue the modernisation programme, which began with introduction of the helicopter carrier, HMS OCEAN, by procuring two landing platform docks and two landing ships logistic to replace current vessels;
- retain all three Invincible Class aircraft carriers and their associated aircraft, and increase their utility by developing further their use by Royal Air Force as well as Royal Navy aircraft; and
- continue plans to purchase 44 Merlin anti-submarine helicopters but place no further orders. In addition, ten Lynx Mk3 helicopters will be converted to Mk8 standard for operation from destroyers/frigates;
- retain the comprehensive afloat support capability provided by the Royal Fleet Auxiliary, and continue planned modernisation by procuring two auxiliary oilers as replacements for the current vessels.
In addition, the dedicated fishery protection force will be reduced by one vessel following the decision of the Scottish Fisheries Protection Agency to move to the sole use of civil contractors to carry out this role in Scottish waters.
25. This rebalancing will be matched by adjustments to peacetime tasks where necessary to ensure that overstretch is addressed. At the same time, we will take action to remedy longstanding undermanning within the Royal Navy. In the first instance, most personnel released by the changes set out above will be redeployed across the Service to ameliorate current shortfalls. Once manpower problems have been solved the net effect of the Review on the Navy's Regular manpower requirement will be a reduction of some 1,400.
26. Future Aircraft Carriers and Carrier-borne aircraft. One of the key longer-term issues in the Review has been whether to replace the current generation of aircraft carriers and their aircraft, and if so with what. Our conclusion is that the ability to deploy offensive air power will be central to future force projection operations. But we cannot be certain that we will always have access to suitable air bases. Even when we do, experience has shown that bases may not always be available in the early stages of a crisis, and that their infrastructure is not always able to support the full range of operations required. In these and a range of other operational circumstances, aircraft carriers can provide valuable flexibility. They can also offer a coercive presence which may forestall the need for warfighting, as recently in the Gulf. We judge that there is therefore a continuing need for Britain to have the capability offered by aircraft carriers.
27. The Invincible Class carriers were designed for Cold War anti-submarine warfare operations with helicopters and a limited air defence capability provided by a small number of embarked Sea Harriers. This is no longer the main requirement. The emphasis is now on increased offensive air power, and an ability to operate the largest possible range of aircraft in the widest possible range of roles.
28. When the current carrier force reaches the end of its planned life, we plan to replace it with two larger vessels. Work will now begin to refine our requirements but present thinking suggests that they might be of the order of 30,000-40,000 tonnes and capable of deploying up to 50 aircraft, including helicopters. Our intention is that they will be built using all relevant cost-saving techniques, following the example of HMS OCEAN. No decisions have been taken on a future carrier-borne aircraft but a version of the Joint Strike Fighter currently under development in the United States remains a strong contender. We are therefore participating in the concept demonstration phase of the programme.
29. To get the maximum military output from this major investment, Royal Navy Sea Harrier FA2 and Royal Air Force Harrier GR7 aircraft will combine in a new force able to operate from land or carriers. Joint Force 2000 will be a significant upgrading of Britain's maritime force projection capability.
Land capabilities
30. Both the Gulf Conflict and Bosnia have demonstrated that, notwithstanding technological advances, Britain still needs forces which can operate effectively on the ground, whether to enforce and keep the peace or to take and hold territory. Most of the warfighting capabilities used in the Gulf have also been required in Bosnia. The tempo of land operations is also increasing, putting a premium on forces which are deployable and mobile, but with sufficient protection and firepower for warfighting. The Army will therefore retain a balanced, combined arms, high capability structure of two deployable divisions, with some rebalancing to make existing forces more usable and to address overstretch in the current structure.
31. At present there are five deployable brigades (three armoured and two mechanised) with wide utility, together with three lighter and more specialised deployable brigades (one airborne, one airmobile and the Royal Marines Commando Brigade). Our forces must be trained effectively for warfighting operations, available both as part of the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces and as part of NATO's ACE Rapid Reaction Corps, and able to undertake prolonged operations. This requires a balanced force structure and operational cycle, which we do not currently have. A force of six armoured and mechanised brigades achieves this and would improve significantly the Army's ability to deliver combat-ready formations. Because of its wider utility, a third mechanised brigade would also help to reduce overstretch, and we are therefore adopting this structure.
32. In addition, we can no longer identify circumstances in which Britain would need to undertake parachute operations at greater than battalion group level. Maintaining a smaller battalion-level capability, which confers important operational flexibility, and modernising the role of the remainder of the Parachute Regiment to take advantage of their unique skills and ethos, has been central to the Review. We also need to make better use of key front-line equipment such as tanks.
33. The Review will therefore make the following changes to the Army's operational structure:
- 5 Airborne Brigade will be converted into a third mechanised brigade. The battalion-level airborne role will be transferred to 24 Airmobile Brigade which, when the Attack Helicopter enters service, will be developed into a new high capability air manoeuvre formation, forming part of the Joint Helicopter Command, and including two battalions of the Parachute Regiment;
- we will retain the ability to generate a division of three armoured brigades for warfighting operations, but adopt a militarily more effective structure for their component units. Instead of the eight small armoured regiments, each with 38 tanks and 470 personnel, planned previously, there will be six larger ones each with 58 tanks and 600 personnel. In parallel, the Army will adopt a "whole fleet management" approach to the tank fleet. Each regiment will hold only the 30 tanks it needs on a day-to-day basis to achieve required training standards. The balance required to bring regiments up to warfighting strength will be provided prior to deployment for operations. This will allow us to make better use of the new Challenger 2 tank fleet and reduce costs with no operational penalty;
- the two armoured regiments released as a result will be re-roled, one as the Army's contribution to the new joint capability for nuclear, biological and chemical defence, the other as a new armoured reconnaissance regiment;
- the current total of 40 Regular infantry battalions will be maintained but we will reconfigure them to reflect the creation of the third mechanised brigade. In future we will have:
- nine instead of eight armoured infantry battalions,
- six instead of four mechanised infantry battalions,
- three parachute battalions of which one (rather than two as now) will be in-role at any time (the other battalions of the Parachute Regiment will be employed on other tasks), and
- 22 instead of 25 light infantry battalions.
Vehicles for the increased numbers of armoured and mechanised units will be made available by the more effective management of existing fleets;
- 15 Regular artillery regiments will be retained, although a light gun regiment will be re-roled to form a sixth AS90 regiment, and we will proceed with programmes for long-range precision munitions and for the Lightweight Mobile Artillery Weapon System;
- a sixth close support engineer regiment will be created, the engineer support provided to the air manoeuvre brigade will be increased from squadron to regiment level, and support to deployed air forces will be improved by forming two new Regular engineer squadrons and two new Regular signals squadrons;
- plans for future land weapon systems such as Medium Range TRIGAT and the Next Light Anti-Armour Weapon will be retained but planned numbers will be reduced to reflect the restructuring and changes to readiness.
34. Basing in Germany. The Government is committed to the principle of NATO Allies stationing forces on one another's territory, which is an important symbol of our mutual obligations. Moreover, although the specific military argument for stationing forces close to the Cold War front line has disappeared, there are still significant military benefits in having capable forces based in continental Europe, where they are closer to many potential theatres of operations and they can train more readily alongside our Allies. There is also the practical and economic question of how much additional military infrastructure and training the United Kingdom could readily accommodate. All these considerations have led us to conclude that the bulk of our current military presence in Germany should remain there.
35. Some reductions can, however, be made in that presence as part of Army restructuring. Three armoured regiments (including the two to be re-roled) and a number of supporting units will be removed from the front line in Germany and returned to the United Kingdom, totalling about 2,500 military personnel and some 186 tanks.
36. Army Manpower. In overall terms, the size of the Regular Army will rise by some 3,300 personnel, with increases particularly in signals, engineer and logistics troops. Combined with the restructuring described above, we believe that this will eventually remedy overstretch in the force structure.
Air capabilities
37. Air power remains a fundamental component of warfighting capability, complementing maritime and ground forces, and providing an offensive capability in its own right which will be enhanced by the increasing precision of air-delivered weapons. It has also proved its utility in non-warfighting operations, including the enforcement of no-fly zones and humanitarian deployments. The Review has concluded that Britain should therefore retain a balanced mix of aircraft, including offensive support, air defence, ISTAR and maritime patrol, airborne early warning, transport and tanker aircraft, and support and search and rescue helicopters. Our work has, however, identified a number of areas in which adjustments are necessary to reflect changes in the scale and readiness required for likely future operations.
38. Most of the Royal Air Force front line will remain unchanged. The main decisions taken in the Review are as follows:
- most importantly, to maintain the Government's commitment to acquire 232 Eurofighters to replace the Tornado F3 and Jaguar in the air defence and offensive air support roles, with a front line establishment of around 140 aircraft. Eurofighter will be the primary component of the Royal Air Force future fighting capability and a vital element in Britain's overall defence effort;
- to retain in service all three types of offensive air support aircraft (Tornado GR, Harrier and - until replaced by Eurofighter - Jaguar) but reduce their front-line establishment from 177 to 154 aircraft, and from 14 to 13 squadrons. This reduction would comprise 12 Tornado GR1s, nine Harriers and two Jaguars. For operations carrying longer warning times we will continue to be able to increase the number of aircraft available by making use of the operational conversion units;
- to make a small reduction in the establishment of the Tornado F3 air defence force from 100 to 87 aircraft, and from six to five squadrons. We would again plan to make use of the operational conversion unit in some contingencies;
- continue with procurement of the Brimstone and Stormshadow air-to-surface missiles, and with plans to procure a beyond visual range air-to-air missile for the Eurofighter fleet;
- develop a new collision warning system for the Tornado GR4, to enter service early in the next century;
- make a small reduction in the RAF Regiment's squadron strength, from 14 to 13, but give them an enhanced nuclear, biological and chemical defence role as part of a new joint Service capability;
- maintain the search and rescue force and make it more cost-effective by greater use of civilianisation in non-deployable posts.
39. As with the Royal Navy and the Army, the first priority for manpower released by these changes will be to reduce undermanning in the Royal Air Force as a whole. Once full manning has been achieved, the net effect of the Review on Regular RAF manpower will be broadly neutral.
40. Future Offensive Air System. Future offensive air power requirements have been studied in conjunction with future aircraft carriers and carrier-borne aircraft. The proposals developed in the maritime context will meet a substantial part of Britain's overall future offensive airpower needs. There will, however, be an important requirement to replace in around 20 years' time the capability currently provided by the Tornado GR fleet in the offensive support role. No immediate decision is necessary on how we should do so, but we will continue to study how best to meet the requirement, giving consideration to cruise missiles and remotely piloted/unmanned air vehicles as well as manned aircraft.
Reserve Forces
41. As noted above the risk of a strategic attack on NATO is now so remote that Britain does not need to maintain forces specifically against such a contingency. There is therefore no longer a requirement for large numbers of Reserves in this role. But recent experience, in the Gulf and in Bosnia, has underlined the value of the contribution the Reserves can make in operations from peace support to regional conflict. The Reserves also have a vital role in defence as a link between the Armed Forces and Society. The Reserves, and in particular the Territorial Army, will therefore continue to have a central part to play in Britain's defence. But to play that part effectively, they must change. If they do not, the Reserves face marginalisation and decline.
42. The Government is determined that this will not happen and that the Reserves will not fade into our history. The Review will therefore:
- increase the strength of the Royal Naval Reserve (by about 350) and the Royal Air Force Reserve (by about 270), and make them even more usable;
- give the Territorial Army new roles, and integrate them more closely with the Regular Army. The primary emphasis will be on key support and medical tasks, making maximum use of the skills and enthusiasm that Reserve soldiers contribute;
- reduce the size of the Army from around 56,000 to a more compact and usable force of about 40,000;
- make more use of Territorial Army personnel across the spectrum of defence Missions, including through greater use of call-up to undertake force projection operations;
- establish a dedicated Army Mobilisation Centre to overcome problems experienced by Reservists in recent operations;
These changes are explained in greater detail in the separate essay on Reserve Forces.
Modern Forces for the Modern World
43. The Government promised at the outset of the Strategic Defence Review that the process would be foreign policy-led, identifying what our forces need to be able to do and making sure that they had the necessary capabilities. This promise has been kept. We have identified the Missions and Military Tasks our forces must be able to undertake in support of Britain's foreign and security policy, and force structures have been derived directly from an analysis of those Tasks, informed by the planning assumptions we have developed and our strategic priorities. The Review has produced a clear and coherent force structure for Britain's Armed Forces in the next century.
ANNEX A TO FUTURE MILITARY CAPABILITIES ESSAY
Missions and Military Tasks
A1. To ensure that the aims and objectives of foreign and security policy are properly reflected in defence planning, they need to be developed into specific functions for which the Armed Forces must be trained and equipped. Until recently, the Ministry of Defence planned to undertake three Defence Roles:
Defence Role One: to ensure the protection and security of the United Kingdom and our Dependent Territories even when there is no major external threat.
Defence Role Two: to insure against a major external threat to the United Kingdom and our Allies.
Defence Role Three: to contribute to promoting the United Kingdom's wider security interests through the maintenance of international peace and stability
These Roles were further broken down into some 50, more specific, Military Tasks.
A2. Whilst the Defence Roles were a valuable step forward, their utility for detailed defence planning has lessened with the changes to the strategic environment in recent years. For example, they did not give sufficient prominence to the range of different operations covered by Role Three. We had already begun to move to an alternative approach based on Missions, and the Review has further developed and refined this. The eight Missions shown below provide a more accurate and balanced statement of what our Armed Forces are for, and a clearer and more coherent basis for defence planning. The Missions are deliberately not placed in any order of priority, and the sequence in which they appear has no significance for planning purposes.
|
A3. For planning purposes, a further level of detail is needed below the Missions against which forces can be assigned. The concept of Military Tasks remains the best way of meeting this requirement. We have, however, sought to improve on previous attempts to define the functions of the Armed Forces by focusing as far as possible on outputs (such as peace enforcement) rather than inputs (such as the elements assigned to particular NATO force categories). In the process, we have also rationalised the set of Tasks, from 50 to 28. This does not imply that the Armed Forces have less to do! It simply reflects a more focused analysis, minimising the duplication which was a feature of the Tasks under the three Defence Roles.
A4. The Military Tasks are set out below, with a short explanation of each. Although the Tasks are numbered for reference purposes, they are again not in any order of priority.
Peacetime Security
A5. MT1: Military Aid to the Civil Power in Great Britain
Military Aid to the Civil Power in Great Britain is provided for the direct maintenance or restoration of law and order in situations beyond the capacity of the civil power to resolve in any other way.
A6. MT2: Military Aid to the Civil Power in Northern Ireland
Military Aid to the Civil Power in Northern Ireland supports the Royal Ulster Constabulary in maintaining law and order and combating terrorism through the conduct of operations to deter terrorist activity.
A7. MT3: Counter Drugs Operations
Military forces are made available upon request, where operational commitments and resources allow, to support the counter-drugs activities of law enforcement agencies in the United Kingdom and the Overseas Territories, and in support of the international counter-drugs effort.
A8. MT4: Military Aid to Other Government Departments
Military Aid to Other Government Departments is the use of military forces for non-military Government tasks, including fishery protection and hydrographic tasks.
A9. MT5: Military Aid to the Civil Community
Military Aid to the Civil Community is the provision of Service personnel and equipment, both in emergencies and in routine situations, to assist the community at large.
A10. MT6: Military Search and Rescue in Peacetime
The Armed Forces provide a 24-hour peacetime search and rescue capability, with the priority task of rescuing Service personnel in the United Kingdom and surrounding seas. Search and Rescue for the civil community is provided in conjunction with other relevant agencies.
A11. MT7: Nuclear Accident Response
The Department maintains a capability for nuclear accident response to ensure, in conjunction with civil agencies, an effective response to incidents or accidents in the United Kingdom involving nuclear weapons, defence nuclear materials or naval reactors; and, when requested, to provide assistance to civil authorities in accidents with civil nuclear facilities.
A12. MT8: Integrity of United Kingdom Waters in Peacetime
To demonstrate British sovereignty within and ensure the integrity of the United Kingdom's territorial waters (and where necessary to protect the United Kingdom's rights and interests in the surrounding seas), a military presence is maintained which provides routine sea and air surveillance of these waters in peacetime.
A13. MT9: Integrity of United Kingdom Airspace in Peacetime
A continuous recognised air picture and an air policing capability is needed to maintain the integrity of the United Kingdom's airspace, and meet NATO commitments in the United Kingdom Air Defence Region.
A14. MT10: Intelligence
Defence intelligence collection, processing and analytical capability is required to support policy makers, planners and operational commanders.
A15. MT11: Hydrographic, Geographic and Meteorological Services
Hydrographic surveying and geographic mapping and survey services are a defence responsibility because of the security aspects of providing hydrographic support for the strategic deterrent, anti-submarine warfare and mine countermeasures operations, and the need to maintain a survey capability for operations and emergencies. The Meteorological Office provides essential meteorological services and weather forecasts for the Armed Forces; and undertakes meteorological and climate research activities in order to retain Britain's world class reputation in meteorology.
A16. MT12: Evacuation of British Citizens Overseas
In cases where civil contingency plans prove insufficient, defence capabilities held for other purposes may be used to evacuate United Kingdom entitled personnel from countries where their lives may be at risk.
A17. MT13: Public Duties and VIP Transport
The Department provides military personnel for state ceremonial and routine public duties, and secure air transport for the use of the Royal Family and senior members of the Government.
Security of the Overseas Territories
A18. MT14: Security of the Overseas Territories
The Ministry of Defence is responsible for the external security of Britain's Overseas Territories, and provides support and assistance to the civil authorities as required.
A19. MT15: Security of the Cyprus Sovereign Base Areas and Territorial Waters
The British presence in the Sovereign Base Areas of Cyprus provides strategic communications facilities, a base for operations in the Eastern Mediterranean and beyond, military search and rescue, and training facilities.
Defence Diplomacy
A20. MT16: Arms Control, Non-Proliferation, and Confidence and Security Building Measures
The Ministry of Defence provides military and civilian personnel in support of arms control, non-proliferation and confidence and security-building regimes. It also supports export control regimes and arrangements. In addition, the Ministry of Defence is responsible for ensuring that Britain retains the ability to achieve political and military objectives despite the presence, threat or use of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons and their means of delivery.
A21. MT17: Outreach
The Outreach programme is designed to contribute to security and stability in Central and Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia through bilateral assistance to and co-operation with the countries concerned.
A22. MT18: Other Defence Diplomacy Activities
The Ministry of Defence undertakes military assistance activities with overseas military forces and defence communities (not already covered under the Outreach programme under MT17) to help to dispel hostility, build and maintain trust, and assist in the development of democratically accountable armed forces.
Support to Wider British Interests
A23. MT19: Support to Wider British Interests
The Ministry of Defence conducts activities to promote British interests, influence and standing abroad, including in relation to Brunei, the Five Power Defence Arrangements and support to defence exports.
Peace Support and Humanitarian Operations
A24. MT20: Humanitarian Operations and Disaster Relief Outside the United Kingdom and Overseas Territories
Humanitarian crises and disasters, if not addressed rapidly and effectively at an early stage, can often lead to potentially serious conflicts. When appropriate, and at the request of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office or Department for International Development, the Armed Forces contribute to humanitarian and disaster relief operations, either on a national basis or as part of a co-ordinated international effort.
A25. MT21: Peacekeeping; MT22: Peace Enforcement
Prevention, containment and resolution of conflict is a vital element in the maintenance of international stability and security. We will therefore make an appropriate contribution, in concert with other nations, to both peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. Peacekeeping operations are conducted with the consent of the disputing parties in order to support the achievement of a long term peace settlement. Peace enforcement operations are conducted in circumstances where there is no peace or peace process to which all the relevant parties are committed; such operations are coercive in nature, and require warfighting capabilities sufficient to ensure compliance.
Regional Conflict Outside the Nato Area
A26. MT23: Regional Conflict outside the NATO Area
Inter-state conflicts may arise, outside the territory of NATO members, to which Britain may wish to respond along with other countries, to support other allies and partners, to protect our national interests, and to uphold international law and stability.
Regional Conflict Inside the Nato Area
A27. MT24: Regional Conflict inside the NATO Area; MT25: Major Regional Conflict inside the NATO Area
Under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, Britain would assist any NATO Ally or Allies under armed attack in Europe or North America by taking appropriate action, including the use of armed force. Britain's force planning to meet this commitment is based on the contingency of a regional conflict involving aggression against a NATO member. This may include the predeployment and reinforcement of forces during a time of tension in order to deter aggression. The distinction between the two Tasks reflects the different scales of threat which potential future adversaries could pose in a regional context. The full range of Britain's military capabilities, including our nuclear forces, is available to NATO.
A28. MT26: Military Home Defence
The Government has an obligation to ensure the provision of critical services and the functioning of government itself during times of crisis and conflict. This is achieved primarily by the protection of critical installations and information systems.
A29. MT27: Nuclear Forces
Britain's Trident force provides an operationally independent strategic and sub-strategic nuclear capability in support of NATO's strategy of war prevention and as the ultimate guarantee of our national security. In current circumstances, nuclear forces continue to make a unique contribution to ensuring stability and preventing crisis escalation. They also help guard against any possible re-emergence of a strategic scale threat to our security.
Strategic Attack on Nato
A30. MT28: Strategic Attack on NATO
This Task is concerned with the very remote risk of the emergence of a massive military threat to NATO territory, with the ability to mount major offensive operations on two or more fronts. In the current security environment, no forces are maintained specifically against it, although we retain the ability to reconstitute forces in the event of the emergence of such a major threat.
Determining the force structure
A31. To determine the conventional forces required to carry out these Missions, we used a process of assigning force elements to Military Tasks known as force summation. This process identified forces committed to a Task at any one time (such as infantry battalions deployed in Northern Ireland) and those held contingent for a Task (such as infantry battalions which might need to be deployed as part of our commitment to NATO). It produced the total requirement for each force element, taking account of judgements about the requirements of each Military Task, and the main scale of effort and concurrency permutations discussed in the main essay. The total requirement for each force element was determined by the largest figure derived from these permutations. The main factors driving the force structure proved to be two concurrent medium scale operations or a single full scale operation. Readiness assumptions were then applied to establish which force elements must be Regular and which could be Reserves.
A32. Finally, a range of additional factors were used to take account of our experience of the numbers actually required to produce the force structure needed for operations. These factors comprise:
- generation - for the Royal Navy this covers ships engaged in the training and trials needed to prepare for operations, for the Army it reflects differences between peacetime and wartime establishments (e.g. an armoured infantry battalion comprises three rifle companies in peacetime but would deploy for warfighting with four companies), and for the Royal Air Force, the fact that aircraft are used more intensively when deployed on operations means that more crews and additional aircraft are required to complete the training task in peacetime, so in order to deploy a given number of aircraft on operations, a higher number is required in peacetime (the crew/airframe ratio is 1.33:1 in peacetime, 1.5:1 for non-warfighting deployments and 2.0:1 for combat operations);
- maintenance - this reflects the Royal Navy's refit cycle and the average number of ships in refit at any one time;
- rotation - to maintain a commitment for a prolonged period while ensuring operational effectiveness and without placing undue strain on the personnel concerned, we must maintain a pool of forces to rotate through the deployed force. Experience shows that the optimum ratio for prolonged commitments is in the region of three or four ships, five army units and three or four RAF squadrons for each one deployed. We have assumed that these guidelines would be breached in the event of major warfighting operations or for two concurrent medium scale operations;
- regeneration - this applies to combat aircraft and reflects our ability to use operational conversion units, in an operational role, primarily in the event of a major NATO regional conflict for which there would be a prolonged period of warning time, but also for some sustained commitments;
- choice - for some Military Tasks we need to maintain a range of capabilities to reflect possible alternative requirements (e.g. a package of combat aircraft might need to focus on air defence, offensive air support or a mixture of the two).
A33. As a supplement to force summation, we also used a scenario-based analysis to assess the forces necessary for force projection operations at medium and large scales of effort. This process was known as force estimation. It employed a range of contingencies, some based on recent operations, and the results were used to validate the force summation process.
A34. The force structure resulting from the force summation work is set out in the three sets of tables in Annex B, together with the factors from which they have been derived:
- the first set assigns force elements to Military Tasks, and indicates whether they are committed or contingent to that Task. The table does not show those Military Tasks which have no forces specifically assigned to them. Nor does it cover MT10: Intelligence, which has been excluded for security reasons;
- the second set shows the number of each force element required to undertake the two main scale of effort and concurrency permutations - two medium scale deployments and a full scale deployment. They also show the impact of continuing other commitments in parallel and the factors discussed in paragraph A32 above. Royal Navy and combat aircraft totals have been rounded to the nearest whole number;
- the third set summarises for each force element the numbers held now and those that will be held once the Review has been implemented.
ANNEX B TO FUTURE MILITARY CAPABILITIES ESSAY
Force Element Tables
General Notes
The tables show planned post-SDR implementation force levels.
Only Regular Army Force Elements are shown as the revised structure of the Territorial Army has yet to be determined.
The Infantry Battalions Force Element covers all infantry tasks, some of which are planned to be undertaken by other units out of role, e.g. Armoured and Artillery Regiments and RM Commandos. The Force Element also includes the Armour Delivery role which will be undertaken by forces drawn from Infantry Battalions.
Engineer Regiments include the Military Works Force.
Equipment Support Battalions (REME) exclude the REME Battalion (Aviation) but include the REME Battalion in Northern Ireland.
The Royal Logistics Corps Regiments (Close and General Support) Force Element includes the Logistics Battalions supporting 24 Airmobile Brigade and 3 Cdo Brigade and the resident Regiment in Northern Ireland.
The Support Helicopters Force Element covers Puma, Chinook, Sea King 4 and Merlin Mk3 Support Helicopters. As these helicopter types vary in terms of range, endurance and carrying capacity we have expressed all numbers in terms of Chinook equivalents.
- Table 1 - Mission: Peacetime Security (MTs 1-7)
- Table 2 - Mission: Peacetime Security (MTs 8 & 9, 12 & 13)
- Table 3 - Mission: Security of the Overseas Territories (MTs 14 &15)
- Table 4 - Mission: Support to Wider British Interests (MT 19)
- Table 5 - Mission: Peace Support & Humanitarian Operations (MTs 21 & 22)
- Table 6 - Mission: Regional Conflict Outside the NATO Area (MT 23)
- Table 7 - Mission: Regional Conflict Inside the NATO Area (MTs 24 & 25, 26, 27)
- Table 8 - Concurrency: Two Concurrent Medium Scale
- Table 9 - Concurrency: Full Scale
- Table 10 - Force Levels
 |
 |
 |