RESERVE FORCES
1. Britain relies heavily on the contribution made by Reserves to our Armed Forces. Reservists serve alongside their Regular colleagues in operations, and they are integral to our ability to expand our forces in times of crisis. They are a very cost-effective way of adding to our military capabilities. One of the clearest findings of the Defence Review has been that we could not fight a war at any significant level without them.
2. There are several kinds of Reservist. The two largest groups are the Regular Reserves: former members of the regular Armed Forces who are still liable for service in an emergency; and the part time Volunteer Reserves, who are recruited directly from the civilian community - the Royal Naval Reserve, the Royal Marines Reserve, the Territorial Army and the Royal Auxiliary Air Force. However, the Reserve Forces Act 1996 also provides for the wider use of Reserves, such as those wishing to serve full time with the Regular Forces for a limited period, and "sponsored" Reserves: contractors' staff who have agreed to be mobilised when required, to continue their work in operations alongside the Service personnel who depend upon them. These newer forms of reserve service may well become more important in future.
3. The Volunteer Reserves are more widely distributed across the country than the Regular Forces. In most areas, it is therefore Volunteer Reserves who provide the most visible Armed Forces presence. They help to inform society about what the Armed Forces do and of their importance to the nation, and provide a means by which the community as a whole can contribute to our national security interests. The role of cadet forces also establishes a vital link with young people, fostering good relations and helping recruitment.
4. Our aim in the SDR has been to ensure that the roles given to Reserve Forces are relevant to the international situations in which our Armed Forces might operate in the future. We need to ensure that the Reserves are usable, and that in common with the rest of the Armed Forces they have the right training, the right equipment, and the right support to play their part. We also need to ensure that the administration and support of the Reserve Forces is efficient and effective, and that the link between Reserves and Regular Forces at all levels is strong and clear.
5. We have concluded that it is right for Britain to continue to remain dependent on our Reserve forces. But these Reserve forces, which have hitherto largely been held for a struggle for national survival, should be restructured to undertake new challenges and the new style of operations that may be launched in the future.
The Cold War and its aftermath
6. The size and shape of our Reserve Forces is governed by the risks that we face. During the Cold War, our forces were organised to defend against a strategic attack on Western Europe. We were required to maintain a large Reserve so as to regenerate our forces on the continent in the face of such aggression, and to defend the United Kingdom against direct attack. The size of our Armed Forces, both Regular and Reserve, grew over the last decade of the Cold War, and the Reserves expanded significantly faster than our Regular Forces.
7. With the welcome end of the Cold War, there has been a period of adjustment in all three Services:
a. the Royal Naval Reserve reduced in size by 1994 to less than half of its Cold War establishment, and changed role from focusing on mine countermeasures (with dedicated vessels) and defence of the UK base to a wider role in support of the Fleet. However, its utility has been limited by relatively low levels of funding for training activity. Royal Marines Reserve authorised strength fell from 1,580 to 1,000 in the same period;
b. the Territorial Army has been restructured twice, falling in strength from 74,000 in 1989 to around 56,000 in 1998. An increasing proportion of the Territorial Army is involved in vital supporting roles, rather than combat ones. But large numbers of Reservists in the Territorial Army are still dedicated to Military Home Defence, such as the guarding of key points throughout Britain or forming a reconnaissance screen against an invading force;
c. the Royal Auxiliary Air Force had also reduced in size by 1994 to less than two-thirds of its Cold War establishment.
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 NOTE: Volunteer Reserve Forces include Home Service Force and Non-Regular Permanent Staff. |
Strategic Defence Review
The Requirement
8. The key element of the changed strategic situation is that there is no longer any immediate threat of a major conventional attack on Britain or on our NATO allies; nor could such a threat re-emerge without warning and preparation time of some years. On the other hand, the likelihood of short notice, smaller-scale conflicts around the world has increased. Taken together, this means that the forces we have available to deploy can be smaller than before, but they will have to be more flexible and more ready to deploy at very short notice. They will also have to be able to sustain operations for extended periods.
The Future Reserve Role
9. Against this background we have concluded that the main contribution of Reserves should switch from being insurance against a struggle for national survival to supporting Regular Forces' deployments abroad, both with individuals and with formed units.
10. Certain individuals in the Reserves will need to be ready to reinforce Regular units with their special skills, wherever required. They will therefore need to be held at similar - sometimes very short notice - readiness to their Regular colleagues. Many of these individuals will be drawn from the Regular Reserves, but some will be from the Volunteer Reserves.
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11. In general, Reserve Units would require a period of warning and preparation before they could deploy. But we believe that they could also be ready, in time, to perform a wide range of specialist supporting tasks for large and very demanding operations (such as the Gulf War of 1990/1): these, too, may occur at relatively short notice. All this means that we will need Reserves that can be fully integrated into Regular formations and able to work with high levels of skill in situations that may be very demanding.
12. We also consider that Reserves should be able to serve in long running peace support operations, of the kind now taking place in Cyprus or Bosnia, that have become part of the Armed Forces' day to day work. These types of operations have increased in number over the past decade and we have benefited greatly from the willingness of several thousand Volunteer and Regular Reservists to support current operations and valued their commitment and skills.
13. There is another factor we need to bear in mind: the scope for Reservists, many of whom are in civilian employment, to provide continuous support to the Regular Forces is understandably limited; this means that, unsurprisingly, the overwhelming majority of the burden of these commitments must continue to fall on the Regular Forces.
14. In all of the roles described above, the requirement for Reserves is likely to remain broadly steady or to increase. But given the disappearance of a direct threat, there will not be the same requirement for large numbers of the Territorial Army committed to Military Home Defence. There are also a few cases where roles currently performed by Volunteer Reserve units are likely to be required at such short notice that we must now plan for their tasks to be fulfilled by regulars.
The Size of Volunteer Reserve Forces
15. To respond to these new circumstances we are proposing the following changes:
The Royal Naval Reserve
16. The Royal Naval Reserve ceiling will increase by 10% from 3,500 to 3,850 to provide an expanded pool of personnel available for use across the Fleet. These trained personnel will be available for augmenting the Royal Navy. No changes are planned to the strengths or roles of the Royal Marines Reserve.
The Territorial Army
17. There needs to be substantial change to the composition and structure of the Territorial Army, especially to reflect the clear requirement to provide highly trained and properly resourced forces to support the Regular Army while reducing the effort devoted to the old Military Home Defence task. The following are the key changes proposed:
a. we shall need more medical Reserves, as part of our overall aim of increasing medical support to the Armed Forces generally;
b. we shall continue to require Reserves in a wide range of arms to support the Regular Army on operations;
c. we shall need fewer light infantry battalions and Royal Armoured Corps (also known as "Yeomanry") regiments. We also plan to reduce the number of engineer and transport regiments, some of which currently exist to support a rather larger force than we are now likely to deploy.
These changes will produce a Territorial Army of about 40,000 volunteers. This is smaller than the present structure, but differs in that it is specifically constructed to meet our current and foreseeable future requirements. Most importantly, the Territorial Army will have a meaningful and clearly defined function - and one which the nation will need to rely on if our Armed Forces are to perform their tasks as effectively in the future as they have in the past. Work on the detailed design, structure and composition of the Territorial Army will be carried forward during the autumn.
The Reserve Air Forces
18. Following the reductions in 1994, the Reserve Air Forces had already begun to be reconfigured and this was under way before the Strategic Defence Review was undertaken. Among other things, the RAF is committed to the employment of Reservist aircrew in support of the front line, and a significant number have already taken part in Air Transport operations. The Review has also identified the need for an additional 270 posts within the Reserve Air Forces in other supporting roles.
Readiness
19. Numbers of Reserves and the roles they undertake are important. But the key to the future effectiveness of the Reserve Forces is readiness - being properly prepared so that units and individuals in the Reserves will be able to do the job required of them in the right timescale. Currently most of our Volunteer Reserves are at low levels of readiness; in the future some units, particularly logistic, medical and other support elements, will be placed at higher states of readiness to reflect the increased likelihood that they will be called out. Already, all Reserve aircrew and Public Relations personnel - and a significant proportion of Intelligence personnel - in the Reserve Air Forces are now High Readiness Reserves, liable to deploy on operations within days.
Call-out Arrangements
20. Reserves in the future will be there to be used, with clearly defined and important roles. If they are to be used properly we must be able to deliver the Reserves to where we need them in the right timescale. This means that there must be better arrangements for call-out. In other words, such is the importance of Reserves that we must be able to have great assurance as to their availability. We believe that improvements to our existing procedures are necessary in these new circumstances. In the Territorial Army, for those who volunteer for service in operations, we will invest much more effort in mobilisation, so as to ensure that there is a smooth process that will deliver individual Reservists to units, capable of making an immediate contribution. To this end we are establishing an Army Mobilisation Centre and new management measures to improve the quality of service and training to Reservists on call-out, on operations, and on return to civilian life.
21. In some circumstances, however, it will not be possible to rely upon Reservists volunteering. In mounting any major operation we will need to guarantee the availability of key capabilities provided by the Reserves, whether these are in battalions, sub-units, or the skills of a particular individual, and we will need to do so within a short period of time. Although many individual Reservists may be willing to volunteer for service, for a range of reasons some will not, and it is unlikely to be enough to rely on this willingness alone; nor would it be fair on Reservists or on their comrades.
22. If we are to use our Reserve Forces to their maximum effect on any sizeable operation, we must therefore be prepared to mobilise them compulsorily. Selective compulsory call-out is therefore envisaged for situations well short of a direct threat to the United Kingdom - for example, for deployments on a similar scale to the Gulf War.
The Reserves Commitment
23. Planning for our Reserves to take part in force projection operations underlines our seriousness about the use of Reserves, and their importance. In turn it demands from those in the Reserves a commitment to the possibility of active service. Membership of the Reserve Forces implies taking a share in the responsibility for the fulfilment of our defence and foreign policy objectives. All Reservists must be available and expect to be mobilised under the 1996 Reserve Forces Act. We will be emphasising to our volunteers the seriousness of their responsibilities in this regard.
Employers
24. For our part, we recognise that this will make demands on those who employ Reservists as well as on the volunteers themselves. The appeal and financial payment provisions of the Reserve Forces Act 1996 will help us to address such concerns. We will seek, in a continuing dialogue with civilian employers, to reinforce support for the Reserves and to encourage it at all levels in the community. We will depend heavily upon the excellent work of National and other Employer Liaison Committees, and the Territorial, Auxiliary and Volunteer Reserve Associations (TAVRAs). We have been encouraged, in the course of the Review, by the many expressions of support received from employers for the Reserve Forces, and recognition they show of the benefits that staff with Reserve experience bring to any organisation.
Resources
25. Since such clear and crucial roles for the Reserves have been identified in the Review, we recognise that it is vital that Reserves are resourced to carry them out. Sufficient funds must be made available to ensure that all Reserve units are properly manned and trained to meet the tasks required of them, and are capable of using new equipment with familiarity and confidence in an operational situation. We are determined to provide the resources necessary. In particular, new equipment will be introduced as part of our continuing programme of improving the capability of our Armed Forces; and training days will be provided at a level sufficient to guarantee operational effectiveness and to make service in the Reserves a challenging and enriching experience.
26. We therefore intend that training for the Royal Naval Reserve and the Royal Marines Reserve will increase, in the case of the Royal Naval Reserve by 40% and for Royal Marines Reserve recruits by 66%. Territorial Army members volunteering for service with Regular Forces will have two weeks focused training immediately following mobilisation. And we intend that in the future the resourcing of our Reserves will continue to get the attention it deserves.
Local Links
27. As well as providing the opportunity to contribute to the effectiveness of the Armed Forces, service in the Reserves has wider social and representational benefits, in that it offers the opportunity to people from all walks of life and in all areas to make a contribution to the national good. Such links benefit both sides. Volunteers bring back technical and management skills to industry, improved citizenship to society, and assist in regional support in many ways, including recent military aid to flooded areas.
28. The Reserves provide important support to the cadets. The cadet forces are significant national volunteer youth movements. We aim to plan the changes to the Reserve Forces in such a way as to minimise any disruption to the cadets. In addition, we intend there to be modest increases in resources devoted to cadets from the defence budget.
29. All this will make implementing the changes to the Reserves, and to the Territorial Army in particular, a very complex process. It may not be until some months after our initial announcements that we will be able to make clear how each Territorial Army unit and training centre may be affected. However, the principles we will apply in restructuring the Territorial Army will take local issues very much into account. We will want to protect, so far as possible, existing strong links with the community, and with the cadet forces. We will want to build upon the enthusiasm there is in many areas for volunteer service. We will also want to take into account matters such as the availability of training facilities, and the need for close working between Territorial Army units and the Regular Armed Forces. Within these constraints, we aim to preserve as wide a presence of the Territorial Army throughout the country as possible.
Administration and Career Management
30. We have taken the opportunity to consider our arrangements for the day-to-day running of our Reserve Forces. It is important that Reserve Forces should be backed up by a policy-making and administrative structure which is efficient, which ensures that the linkage between Reserve Forces and the Regular Forces alongside whom they will serve in battle is properly managed, and which at the same time recognises the special circumstances relating to service in the Reserves.
31. Support to Reserves is therefore to be enhanced by a dedicated manning and careers branch for the Territorial Army, which has now opened at the Army Personnel Centre in Glasgow. Similar functions are already conducted in the much smaller Reserves of the other Services. A clearly defined structure for high-level policy direction for the Territorial Army is now in place, and work on a range of initiatives is under way. This will ensure that issues relating to the Territorial Army are given sufficient prominence at the very heart of the Army's policy-making processes, that the new focus for the Territorial Army set out in the Review will be driven through successfully, and that the full resources of the Ministry of Defence are placed behind Reservists.
The TAVRAs
32. At local level administration and support of the major elements of the Reserve Forces will continue to be carried out through the TAVRAs, working within the context described in the 1996 Reserve Forces Act. This is a tri-Service role which has been carried out by the TAVRAs and their predecessor organisations for many years. It is an unusual arrangement, but has been found to be a successful one. The TAVRA system ensures that people from the local communities in which the Reserve Forces and cadets are based are involved in the running of Reserve and cadet units. It also provides Reserve Forces and cadets representatives with the right of direct access to Ministers, so that they can make representation about Reserves issues. This provides an important balance and ensures that the case for the Reserves is clearly articulated at a high level.
33. TAVRAs have a second role as administrators and suppliers of services to the Reserve and cadet forces organisations. All this will remain unchanged. However, to reflect the increasing operational integration of Army Reserve and Regular forces, there will be certain changes in the way in which TAVRAs are organised (they were last restructured in 1968). It is important that regional commanders take on full responsibility for the operational standards of Army Reserve units in their area; as a result, TAVRA boundaries will be altered and brought more in line with the Army's Regular command structure. The new arrangement will take account of the needs of the other Services' Reserve Forces and all the cadet organisations. There are areas of activity, such as property management and recruiting, where the Royal Naval Reserve and Royal Marines Reserve will rely more heavily on the assistance of the TAVRAs, where this is seen to be beneficial and cost-effective.
Conclusion
34. We need the Reserves: they have a proud history and we fully intend that they will have a secure and relevant future. We need the commitment of tens of thousands of individuals to train for and take part in military operations in support of our legitimate national interests and foreign policy objectives. There is great flexibility in the Reserves, both in the type of service and in the wide range of roles a Reservist may fill. There are many ways that Reservists can and will make their contribution in future. Without them we will not be able to do much that our Armed Forces might be called on to do.
35. The Strategic Defence Review has given us the opportunity to restructure our Reserve Forces in a coherent and enduring way. It has confirmed the need for them to continue to perform some existing roles and to take on new and demanding ones. But it has also shown where some Cold War tasks are no longer relevant. We consider that the size and shape of the Reserve Forces emerging from the Review will be sufficient to meet any plausible operational eventuality.
36. There will, in particular, be changes to many Army regiments that have long and honourable histories. This, we recognise, will be hard for many involved. But the resulting forces will be capable and usable - better fitted and able to work in support of Regular Forces on all types of operations. With the commitment of individual Reservists and their employers, the right training, support and equipment and new management arrangements, our Reserve Forces will be more important, more relevant, and will provide their volunteers with opportunities to continue serving the country in ways that are both meaningful and necessary.
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