JOINT OPERATIONS
1. In joint operations, the forces provided by two or more Services are integrated to maximise their combined military effectiveness. Using military capabilities jointly is fundamental to modern warfare. The extension and encouragement of our ability to conduct joint operations successfully has therefore been at the heart of the Strategic Defence Review, and the principles have been set out in a Joint Vision Statement.
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JOINT VISION STATEMENT - Success in modern warfare depends on joint teamwork. Battles and wars are won by maritime, ground and air forces operating effectively together in support of shared military objectives. - Joint operations are not new and Britain's Armed Forces have a proud record of successful co-operation. In the modern world, where we will face complex and unexpected situations which require a swift and flexible response, the importance of a joint approach is more critical than ever. - Individual units depend for their fighting capability on the training, discipline and ethos generated by their parent Service. But success for the force as a whole requires effective orchestration of its individual components. - To achieve this, a single joint commander is needed, supported by a unified command structure. The joint commander must be able to draw upon and direct the entire range of front-line forces committed to the operation, together with supporting units and personnel (both military and civilian). - Joint teamwork does not just happen. It requires a shared understanding of the roles each participant is required to play. It also needs mutual confidence, built up from extensive practical experience of operating together, that everyone will deliver his or her contribution effectively. - We must therefore ensure that a joint approach forms a central part of the way defence activity is carried out. This means closer integration in day-to-day training, in operations, and in the way defence is organised, supported and managed at all levels. - The future of Britain's defence is in joint operations. We must therefore create an integrated framework which, while capitalising on single-Service professionalism, will be increasingly and necessarily joint. |
2. The Joint Vision will help to shape the future organisation and operations of the Armed Forces. It will guide developments in strategy, doctrine, technology and force structure. This essay describes the basis from which the joint or integrated concept will be developed, and the specific measures forming part of the Review.
The Starting Point - A Joint Inheritance
3. Because of our geography, joint operations have always been fundamental to British military success. Much of our planning for the Cold War was undertaken on a joint basis, and this stood us in good stead in the Falklands, the Gulf and Bosnia. But the requirement is changing all the time. What was adequate during the Cold War is inadequate in today's very different circumstances. The traditional distinction between ground, sea and air theatres of operations is rapidly being replaced by a single battlespace, embracing all three environments and cyberspace, and encompassing functions as diverse as joint logistics, information warfare and media operations. Britain's Armed Forces have an unparalleled tradition of joint co-operation, on which we now intend to build to produce truly integrated forces for the next century.
4. The post-Cold War process of increasing joint co-operation and integration between the Services started during the mid-1990s:
- a Permanent Joint Headquarters has been established at Northwood. It now plans and executes all joint operations, including Bosnia and recent deployments to the Gulf;
- a Joint Rapid Deployment Force was set up to provide a national quick response capability;
- the Joint Services Command and Staff Course at Bracknell has started to train future commanders in a completely joint environment;
- a start has been made in expanding integration in the support area, including joint flying training establishments at Barkston Heath and Shawbury; and joint fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft repair organisations run by the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy respectively; and
- we have deployed forces on operations in fully joint packages, such as the mixed Navy and Royal Air Force air wings serving aboard the aircraft carrier sent to the Gulf earlier this year.
The Way Ahead - The Strategic Defence Review
5. Although these initiatives are helping to foster a culture of joint operations, the changes have not yet gone far enough. The Strategic Defence Review will therefore carry the joint approach to defence forward where it makes sense to do so in the front-line, the command structure and the support area.
6. There will, however, be no merger of the Services. Our judgement and experience elsewhere is that this would reduce, not increase, their overall effectiveness. Within a joint framework, the individual Services have distinct roles and professional skills. This has been reflected throughout the SDR work, which has been based firmly on practicalities rather than dogma, taking account of the lessons learnt on operations and the views of our own personnel.
Joint Rapid Reaction Forces
7. Today's unpredictable strategic environment is placing new demands on the Armed Forces. If they are to play an effective role in supporting Britain's foreign and security policy objectives, their ability to conduct a wide range of military activities, over long distances and often at short notice, will be paramount. We concluded early in the Review that we needed broadly the same kind of forces to meet contingencies arising from our vital stake in European security, our very important interests in the surrounding regions, and our wider national and international responsibilities elsewhere. We also concluded that these forces must be flexible, high capability, mobile and responsive, with the training, motivation and equipment to be successful in demanding conventional warfare and complex peace support operations.
8. Such forces must be able to send a powerful message of our willingness to act should diplomacy fail. As United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan said recently: ". . . . you can do a lot more [with diplomacy] when it is backed up by firmness and force".
9. The creation of hard-hitting, flexible and genuinely deployable forces, able to undertake the full spectrum of short- notice missions in today's international environment, became a central theme of the Review. And our analysis made it clear that to be effective, these forces must be joint.
10. The Joint Rapid Deployment Force was an important step in the right direction. It brought together capabilities drawn from all three Services into a joint structure for short notice operations in which NATO was not involved. These capabilities included light ground forces (the Commando and airborne brigades), heavier ground forces at battalion level, and a range of maritime and air forces. Creating a pool of readily available forces from all three Services was clearly right. It has also provided a good focus for developing our joint operational expertise.
11. But experience has revealed some major flaws in the concept:
- the Force, especially its ground component, lacked the self-protection, tactical mobility and firepower needed for more intense combat operations. And its reinforcement would have been a long time coming because of our limited strategic transport capabilities;
- the Force was a one-shot weapon. It had only a single logistic and medical support chain so that it could conduct only one operation at a time. In the post Cold War world, we cannot expect to be able to meet our commitments and responsibilities consecutively rather than concurrently. One of the consequences has been a reluctance to use the Joint Rapid Deployment Force in some crises because, once committed, our ability to respond quickly elsewhere would be constrained;
- the force did not have genuinely joint deployable headquarters; and
- the force as such did not have a NATO role, which risked creating unhelpful distinctions between different types of operation and giving the incorrect impression to our Allies that we were beginning to re-nationalise our defence policy.
12. The Strategic Defence Review has acknowledged the strengths of the Joint Rapid Deployment Force and sought to build on them. Our aim has been more capable, better supported joint forces with the strategic transport to make them truly deployable.
13. The solution we have adopted is a pool of Joint Rapid Reaction Forces, bringing together all readily available forces from all three Services, including a range of enhanced capabilities to address the deficiencies described earlier. From this pool we can draw the right force packages to mount short-notice medium-scale (i.e. brigade size or equivalent) operations of all kinds across the crisis spectrum and under NATO, Western European Union, UN coalition or national auspices. We will be able to mount concurrent operations if necessary, or use the pool of forces to make a coherent and balanced early contribution to larger operations, subsequently building up our commitment over time using forces held at lower readiness levels. The concept is set out diagrammatically in FIGURE 1 below.
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14. To be effective, the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces concept requires a significant increase in the size of our pool of readily available joint forces, including front line, command, support and transport capabilities. Among the key additions will be the airmobile brigade (and, in due course, its successor air manoeuvre brigade); an armoured and a mechanised brigade; much larger and more capable maritime and air elements; special forces; a dedicated joint task force headquarters, properly manned, equipped and trained, together with the nucleus of a second such headquarters for concurrent operations; logistic, medical and other support to mount two concurrent operations; heavy lift aircraft and four further roll-on/roll-off container ships. As a result, instead of being limited to deploying a light brigade, reinforced by a battalion of heavier troops, we will for example be able to send a commando brigade to take part in a peace support operation and an armoured brigade to contribute to a warfighting mission elsewhere. Or vice versa, depending on the circumstances.
15. The Joint Rapid Reaction Forces will be ready to deploy in two echelons, supported by a range of enabling capabilities. The planned composition of these forces is set out in the following boxes.
16. The pool of forces available for the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces will vary from time-to-time but its approximate size and shape will include:
- around 20 major warships (aircraft carriers, attack submarines, amphibious ships, destroyers or frigates);
- about 22 other vessels (mine warfare and support ships);
- four ground force brigades;
- about 110 combat aircraft;
- over 160 other aircraft.
17. Setting up the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces is a major undertaking, but we believe that this initiative is right for defence and that the logic underpinning it will command widespread agreement. Taken together, the measures we propose will provide Britain with a step-change in our ability to undertake short- notice force projection operations.
18. It will take time to put all of the capabilities in place. We are, however, giving priority to this aspect of implementation of the Strategic Defence Review, and our aim is for the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces to be operational in 2001.
Chief of Joint Operations
19. In parallel, we are pressing forward with the move to greater joint co-operation and integration in a number of other key areas. The substantial expansion in both the number and types of forces assigned to our Joint Rapid Reaction Forces, and hence the increasing number of operations likely to come under the command of the Permanent Joint Headquarters, has led us to reassess the role of the Chief of Joint Operations.
20. As explained in our Joint Vision, his role is crucial to operational success. And units operate more effectively if they have exercised regularly as a joint force and if they are familiar with the commanders, headquarters and joint procedures under which they will work on operations. To ensure that the contingency plans and joint procedures are effective in a wide range of potential scenarios, there is a need regularly to bring together key Joint Rapid Reaction Force commanders and their personnel.
21. We will therefore increase the responsibilities of the Chief of Joint Operations. He will have increased authority for enhancing the training and preparedness of the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces. A new two-star post, the Chief of Joint Force Operations and Training, will be established to assist him in these tasks. The Chief of Joint Operations will also have a much greater voice in stating joint warfare requirements. And he will be responsible for a top level budget, placing him on a similar budgetary footing to the single Service Commanders in Chief.
Joint Force 2000
22. The operational potential of a joint carrier air wing was graphically shown earlier this year in the Gulf, when the deployment of Royal Air Force Harrier GR7s alongside the Royal Navy Sea Harriers on HMS INVINCIBLE made an important contribution to the multinational force applying pressure on Iraq to comply with UN resolutions.
23. Total integration of current Harrier aircraft into a single force is impracticable. The two Harrier variants share only around 10% of their airframe and avionics, and they have quite different primary operational roles. But closer harmonization between the existing Harrier forces could pave the way towards a truly joint force for the future. Capitalising on the success of current joint Harrier operations, we propose to develop a Joint Force 2000, which could eventually involve the replacement of all Harriers with a common aircraft type.
24. There are several options for the new aircraft (which would be capable of operating from ashore and afloat). For the Joint Force 2000 concept to work successfully, we will need a common aircraft, common operating procedures, common maintenance practice and a common support organisation. Further study will begin shortly to determine the best way to realise the potential which the concept offers to provide a flexible and deployable joint force, able to operate either from land bases or aircraft carriers.
Joint Defence Centre
25. The importance of joint operations has highlighted the need for greater cohesion and better co-ordination in the development of joint doctrine. Such doctrine provides guidance for the planning and conduct of joint operations and training at all levels.
26. We will therefore set up a Joint Defence Centre to develop high-level joint doctrine, co-ordinate the development of single Service doctrine, and provide the British input to Allied and multi-national doctrine. It will also support the operational role undertaken by the Permanent Joint Headquarters. The Centre will give impetus to forward thinking, contribute to the future joint vision and strategic development of our armed forces and thus contribute directly to the cohesion and effectiveness of our forces in joint operations. Work is in hand to establish where the Centre should be situated.
Joint Helicopter Command
27. Our work has emphasised the need for joint approaches to capability areas in which more than one Service is directly involved. One of the main examples is battlefield helicopters. All three Services operate battlefield helicopters in support of forces on the ground; these include the Royal Navy's Sea Kings; the Army's Lynx and Gazelles (and Longbow Apache when in service); and the Royal Air Force fleet of Chinooks, Pumas and Wessex (and Merlin Mk3 when in service). Other helicopters are employed in anti-submarine warfare/anti-surface warfare, airborne early warning and search and rescue roles. But their roles and the equipment they use have little in common with battlefield helicopters.
28. Operational experience in Northern Ireland, Bosnia and the Gulf has demonstrated the unique contribution of battlefield helicopters throughout the conflict spectrum. Moreover, it has become evident that there are frequently too few of them available to meet the collective demands they face.
29. One option which has frequently been discussed is the transfer of all battlefield helicopters to a single Service. But, as with merger of the Services, we believe that any advantages would be outweighed by the damaging impact it would have on ethos, morale and operational effectiveness.
30. We therefore propose to form a Joint Helicopter Command, responsible for training, standards, doctrinal development and support for operations. The Command will draw on the equipment, personnel and expertise of the single Services and be charged with providing the Joint Force Commander tailored packages of battlefield helicopters (from one or more Service), support equipment and personnel, to meet operational requirements. The Command will provide a single focus for the ready transfer of best practice from Service to Service and for removing, over time, differences in current operating procedures.
31. Significant rationalisation of the engineering and supply arrangements for helicopter operations has already taken place in recent years. The Defence Helicopter Support Authority has become the tri-Service organisation for the management of all helicopter support, and its responsibility will be expanded to include the direction and tasking of the non-deployable elements of helicopter support in each Service. This will help develop a taut customer/supplier relationship with the new Joint Helicopter Command.
32. Further study is now underway to determine the best location for the new Command's Headquarters, and its detailed responsibilities. Our assessment is that this initiative will produce small savings and that, in time, the new Command will provide the framework for much greater efficiency and operational effectiveness.
Joint Ground Based Air Defence
33. A second area where greater joint integration can produce important operational benefits is ground based air defence. Our deployed forces continue to require low level air defence cover to protect manoeuvring ground troops and key static installations such as logistic sites and air bases. Until now, both the Army and the Royal Air Force have maintained separate capabilities using different variants of the Rapier short-range air defence missile system. Each used their own operating procedures, command and control systems, maintenance support chains and training organizations. This has been operationally inflexible and wasteful.
34. In the future, Rapier training will be conducted jointly at RAF Honington and the differing variants of the system will be phased out and replaced by a common standard by 2006. This will allow a Joint Air Defence Headquarters to contribute specialist staff to the joint commander of air defence operations, and to organize training and support. These measures will ensure that joint deployments will have a properly integrated and flexible low level air defence coverage, as well as achieving greater efficiency, particularly in Rapier training and support.
Joint Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defence
35. Joint integration can be especially effective in response to new or emerging threats. The continuing global proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and recent events in the Gulf have underlined the risks which deployed forces may face from these weapons, particularly biological and chemical, and the consequent need for an effective and deployable nuclear, biological and chemical defence capability.
36. Training is already conducted jointly at the Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defence Centre at Winterbourne Gunner, but we shall now build on this by establishing a joint (Army and Royal Air Force) nuclear, biological and chemical defence regiment manned mainly by Regular personnel. This contrasts with the current capability, which is provided by the Territorial Army. Through this joint approach the unit will be able to provide this essential capability at the high readiness necessary to support the deployments of our Joint Rapid Reaction Forces. The pooling of expertise, together with a new joint doctrine, will allow for this capability to be flexibly deployed to protect all forces as the threat dictates.
Joint Support
37. Joint co-operation and integration can have benefits throughout defence, in the support area as well as the front line. The joint approach is increasingly at the heart of modern, effective and efficient support. It will also help us move towards a functional, defence-wide support structure, which makes increasing sense in the modern world and will help us to free resources for other defence priorities.
38. One of the most obvious areas in which we need a joint approach is support to deployed forces. For example, in providing communications support, the Army and Royal Air Force have maintained their own units based in Britain (at RAF Digby) and Cyprus. These have been collocated but we have decided that in future they should become Joint Service Signal Units, to provide more effective support to joint operations of all kinds. This will also enable us to rationalise their organisational structure.
39. The same principle applies fundamentally to logistic support. Our current logistic support organisations were developed to support forces from a single Service, operating predominantly from secure bases with the necessary infrastructure already in place. Recent experience in the Gulf, Bosnia and operations in Africa has shown that at present we have difficulty in supporting diverse, joint operations mounted from sparsely equipped, temporary bases. In these circumstances, the Joint Commander of deployed forces must be able to exercise effective control over his supply chain, which must in turn be flexible and capable of adjusting rapidly to changing front line priorities. We are therefore putting in place a Joint Force Logistic Component Headquarters as part of a joint headquarters to co-ordinate all joint logistics support.
40. Elsewhere in the support area, there has been growing dependence on one Service providing support to the others on a joint basis. But there is much more we now need to do to ensure that the support areas can meet the changing demands of the front line.
41. Fundamental to our approach is a radical restructuring of the whole organisation of logistic support to introduce much greater joint direction and management. The three single Service logistics organisations will be brought together into a unified structure to provide logistic support to all the Services. A Chief of Defence Logistics will be appointed to take control of the existing organisations and to reconfigure them into a single integrated organisation. This will take time to achieve but its advantages should be significant. It will encourage the greater interoperability of logistics systems, develop a pan-defence business overview and spread best practice throughout the support area. It will also help extend the benefits from the Smart Procurement initiative into the logistics field.
42. Development of a properly integrated logistic structure will require other changes as well. This will be an evolutionary process which is set out in more detail in the essay on 'Support and Infrastructure'. Among the first steps will be:
- formation of transitional joint Defence Explosive and Non-explosive Storage and Distribution Agencies, which will be unified to perform all storage and distribution tasks from 2004/05;
- the formation of a Joint Defence Transport and Movements organisation to take responsibility for the movement of all personnel and materiel;
- formation of a single Defence Aircraft Repair Agency to repair and overhaul all military aircraft, both fixed-wing and helicopters;
- centralisation of the procurement and management of fuels and lubricants across defence.
43. The new joint organisation for defence logistics will strengthen our strategic logistics planning, matching logistics support more effectively to the requirements of joint operations. We will be able to implement innovative ideas throughout the support organisation more quickly and achieve closer integration of the supply network, particularly by the use of information technology. Industry will see consistent and coherent business processes in the logistics area, complementing the changes to be implemented under Smart Procurement. Modern forces need modern support. These initiatives will help provide it.
44. The measures set out above are logical and important steps in the modernisation of our Armed Forces. By building on the successful joint initiatives already taken, we will ensure that we can deliver forces in support of Britain's foreign and security policy aims which together provide a greater capability than the sum of their individual parts.
45. The realisation of the Joint Vision will be dependent on our personnel and their preparedness to think about defence in new ways. Feedback during the Review from all levels of the Services has confirmed that the need for effective tri-Service operational and support structures is recognised and welcomed where it makes sense operationally, and reflects experience and consultation rather than dogma. The changes we are introducing will reinforce the successes already achieved whilst retaining the individuality of the single Services which generate so much of the pride, loyalty and commitment of our people.
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