Tuesday
21 March 2000
0830 - 1130 (S)
An imminent war, its possible aims, and the resources it will require are matters that can only be assessed when every circumstance has been examined in the context of the whole.
Carl von Clausewitz
To be prepared beforehand for any contingency is the greatest of virtues....Those skilled in war must know where and when battles will be fought.
Sun Tzu
We must learn to regard a war, and the separate campaigns of which it is composed, as a chain of linked engagements, each leading to the next.... An isolated advantage gained in war cannot be assessed separately from the overall result. A businessman must work on the basis of his total assets, and in war the advantages and disadvantages of a single action can only be determined by the final balance. By looking at each engagement as part of a series, at least insofar as events are predictable, the commander is always on the high road to his goal.
Carl von Clausewitz
A skilled commander seeks victory from the situation and does not demand it of his subordinates....Therefore, when using troops, one must take advantage of the situation as if he were setting a ball in motion on a steep slope. The force applied is minute but the results are enormous.
Sun Tzu
Ordinary men who normally follow the initiative of others tend to lose self-confidence when they reach the scene of action; things are not what they expected, all the more so as they let others influence them. But even the man who planned the operation and now sees it carried out may well lose confidence in his earlier judgment....War has a way of masking the stage with fearsome apparitions....This is one of the great chasms between planning and execution.
Carl von Clausewitz
Purpose
The purpose of this lesson is to evaluate the US concept of major theater warfare as a military imperative of national security strategy; to comprehend the current and future military implications of this concept; and to evaluate current US military strategy and joint doctrine for waging major theater warfare.
Learning Objectives
1. Evaluate current US military strategy and joint doctrine for waging major theater wars.
2. Analyze the military requirements of credibly deterring or fighting and winning two major theater wars.
3. Evaluate the US concept of "major theater warfare" as an imperative of US military strategy, including the requirement to deter, fight and win two nearly simultaneous major theater wars.
Discussion
One of the most daunting challenges facing today's commanders is the requirement to plan for multiple crises that unfold concurrently. This problem is not new. Because the US is separated from vital interests and key allies on the other side of two broad oceans, we have had to deal with crises across both consistently since 1898. Since the end of World War II, the United States has based its planning on the possibility of having to fight more than one war, in more than one place, at the same time. You might recall such Cold War constructs as "One and a Half War," "Two War" and "Two and a Half War"-all antecedents of the current approach.
More recently, the Base Force concept, developed by then-CJCS General Colin Powell at the end of the Bush Administration, called for armed forces capable of responding to two nearly simultaneous Major Regional Contingencies (MRCs). The reasoning, as explained in General Powell's book, was both simple and compelling: "If we were fighting in one place, we still wanted to have enough force remaining so that another potential aggressor would not be emboldened to pull a fast one."
The "2 MRC" idea combined with the post-Cold War downsizing of the Armed Forces produced a so-called "Win-Hold-Win strategy." The term was initially coined by the press, but quickly adopted by both pundits and officials. It posited that the US would fight one war to victory while holding another enemy at bay, then "swing" forces to that theater and win there as well. This caused serious concern among U.S. allies. In particular, the Republic of Korea immediately asked if a war to defend it were the one to be "put on hold." The so-called "two MRC strategy" became a controversial strategic construct, with debate ranging from those who viewed it as extravagant and unnecessary (given the dearth of threats), to those who worried that, real as the threats might be, it was simply unsustainable.
The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review reaffirmed that "U.S. forces must be capable of fighting and winning two major theater wars nearly simultaneously." Likewise, the NMS stipulates that "the U.S. military will be called upon to respond to crises across the full range of military operations, from humanitarian assistance to fighting and winning major theater wars (MTW), and conducting concurrent smaller-scale contingencies." To this end, the NMS posits the "imperative that the United States be able to deter and defeat nearly simultaneous, large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames, preferably in concert with allies.... The capability to fight two major theater wars initiated in rapid succession is of critical importance as it helps deter opportunism and promote stability, and provides the depth and flexibility to deal with unanticipated challenges."
The National Defense Panel critiqued "the two-military-theater-of-war construct as a force sizing function, not a strategy." The NDP voiced concern that "this construct may have become a force-protection mechanism-a means of justifying the current force structure-especially for those searching for the certainties of the Cold War era." As such, according to the report, "it is fast becoming an inhibitor to reaching the capabilities we will need in the 2010-2020 time frame." Undoubtedly, this perception of the two-war element of US strategy will undergo further scrutiny in the ongoing work of the Commission on US National Security in the 21st Century and the upcoming 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review.
It is therefore important to examine this issue carefully. Our method of doing so, implicit in the learning objectives, is first to examine what US strategy and doctrine actually say about waging major warfare. Second, based on your assessment of current and future threats, is to derive a notion of how much of what sort of capabilties would be required to wage a major theater war. Third is to decide what role, if any, this task should play in determining our military strategy and our national security strategy.
Issues for Consideration
1. Is major war obsolete? Are we prepared for the wrong type of war?
2. Is the "2MTW" framework a valid approach to providing for the national defense? Is our doctrine adequate? What are the risks? How might we mitigate the risks and enhance the likelihood of success in multiple contingencies?
3. In planning for multiple contingencies, does it make a difference which occurs first? What are the implications for the CINCs involved?
4. How credible is the intent to disengage from any one operation to fight another? What challenges does such a "swing" concept present? Does your analysis apply in equal measure to MOOTW and MTW?
5. What are the strategic advantages and disadvantages of the 2MTW construct in U.S. military strategy? Are there reasonable alternatives to the 2MTW construct that are justifiable?
6. Archer - There are limited resources to meet combat requirements in multiple theaters, and many of them are already en route to Korea. This will force decisions on how to prioritize dual allocated forces, satisfy conflicting needs for air and sealift, and allocate sustaining materiel. The limitations on resources will create tensions and force decisions on priorities and objectives. In the current situation, the JCS will be confronted with deciding which theater has priority, generally and for each of many specific capabilities. If Korea has first priority, deterrence may fail in the Gulf. If both theaters have equal priority, then there may be a longer, more costly war in each theater. If the Gulf has priority, the defense of Korea may be in question. US counterattack forces, night precision attack capabilities, missile defenses, specialized intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets, and amphibious shipping are only some of the assets that must be allocated. How should the JCS resolve these tensions? How do you decide on priority in this scenario?
Required Readings
1. Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations. Chapter IV, "Joint Operations in War"; Appendix A, "Principles of War." (Student Issue)
2. Michael Mandelbaum, "Is Major War Obsolete?" Survival (Winter 1998-99), pp. 20-38. (Reprint)
3. John F. Troxell, Force Planning in An Era of Uncertainty: Two MRCs as a Force Sizing Framework (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army Strategic Studies Institute, 1997), pp. 1-41. (Reprint)
4. Richard L. Kugler, "Improving Upon the 2-MTW Standard," informal memo. 3 December 1999. (Reprint)
5. Frederick W. Kagan and David T. Fautua, "Could We Fight a War If We Had To?" Commentary, vol 103, no 5 (May 1997), pp. 25-29 (Reprint)
Recommended Readings
1. Donald Kagan, Eliot A. Cohen, and Michael Mandelbaum, "Is Major War Obsolete? An Exchange." Survival, Summer 1999.
2. David Abel, "Two-War Strategy Is Unrealistic, Senator Says," Defense Week, December 1999.
3. Gerald Green, "NDP Calls Simultaneous Two-War Scenario Unlikely," Journal of Electronic Defense, January 1998.
4. Richard K. Betts, "Power, Prospects and Priorities: Choices for Strategic Change," Naval War College Review, 1997.
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