Monday
20 March 2000
0830-1030 (L)
The first requirement of deterrence is that it be credible to the potential aggressor; and credibility, in turn, requires that the means of deterrence be proportionate to the objectives at stake.
Robert E. Osgood
Deterrence is when your adversary believes the arrival of your first soldier, sailor, airman, or marine means that the rest are on their way to impose our will. If he believes that, he'll be deterred even by a small force. If not, he won't, even if it's "lethal" and "mobile."
General Colin L. Powell
The first response in any crisis normally consists of steps to deter an adversary so that the situation does not require a greater U.S. presence.
National Military Strategy, 1997
There is no deterrent in a general or abstract sense; it is a case of knowing who can deter whom, from what, in what circumstances, by what means.
Raymond Aron
Purpose
The purpose of this lesson is to analyze the concept of deterrence as an element of military strategy and operations; to evaluate US deterrent strategy; and to create and devise deterrent concepts applicable to the future security environment.
Learning Objectives
1. Comprehend the concept of "deterrence" and the deterrent role of military forces, both nuclear and conventional
2. Analyze geopolitical changes since the end of the Cold War for their military implications with regard to deterrence
3. Evaluate the concept of "flexible deterrent options" as a component of US military strategy
4. Create and devise concepts for the employment of US military force as a deterrent to potential 21st Century adversaries
Discussion
In this part of Course 5605 we will turn from our study of the current and future military threat environment to look at some of the missions that that environment implies. We want to evaluate whether these missions are appropriate and sufficient ways of dealing with the threats we envision. We also want to examine whether it is feasible to create the means of accomplishing them. Whether we decide that they are or are not appropriate, sufficient and feasible, the analysis itself takes us a long way toward crafting a good national military strategy. Knowing what one wants one's forces to do is critical to military planning. In addition, this section should impress upon us the tremendous scope of tasks performed by US Armed Forces and the complexities of achieving what Joint Vision 2010 calls "full spectrum dominance."
We will look first at deterrence. "US Armed Forces help shape the international environment primarily through their inherent deterrent qualities..," states the 1997 NMS. We want to understand whether this is true and how it is accomplished. Building on our discussion of deterrence in Course 5602, we want to project the concept into the 21st Century security environment we have just studied and see what changes, if anything.
Issues for Consideration
1. Do deterrence concepts as understood in the Cold War, with the assumption of a rational opponent, still apply? What adjustments are necessary to our calculus of deterrence to better account for current realities and future trends?
2. Are some states and non-state actors simply not "deterrable?" Why or why not? If so, what other military ways might be devised for countering such actors?
3. What role does retribution play in establishing the credibility of a deterrent posture? Pre-emption? What are the strategic advantages and disadvantages of these concepts? What are their ethical implications?
4. What military qualities and capabilities are necessary to a force that is to act as a strategic deterrent? Why are these qualities and capabilities essential? Do US Armed Forces seem to have them? Are the characteristics of a deterrent force different from the characteristics of a fighting force? How can that occur?
5. Archer - Most discussions of deterrence introduce the dimensions of will and capability. Apparently, the Iraqi decision to consider aggression is based on an assumption of limited US capabilities and not a lack of US will. Does deterrence have a different quality in a situation where an aggressor doubts our capability, rather than our will? Can we still deter? What military (and other) means would you take to deter Iraq at this point?
Required Readings
1. Joint Pub 3-12, Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations. Chapter I, "Objectives." (Student Issue)
2. Colin S. Gray, Explorations in Strategy (Westport, CT: Praegar, 1996), Chapter 3, "Is Deterrence Reliable? " pp. 31-52 (Reprint)
3. Ed Rhodes, "Review of Empirical Studies of Conventional Deterrence," Publication of the Center for Global Security and Democracy, Rutgers University, July, 1999. (Reprint)
4. Richard K. Betts, "What Will It Take to Deter the United States?" Parameters, vol XXV, no 4 (Winter, 1995/1996), pp. . (Reprint)
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