Wednesday
22 March 2000
0830-1130 (LS)
Though it may surprise some people, the military is not necessarily eager to apply force to achieve political ends, except as a last resort. The intellectual community is apt to say "we have to do something" and diplomats fire off their diplomatic notes. But in the end, it is the Armed Forces that bring back the body bags and have to explain why to the parents.
General Colin L. Powell
America's role is to build a peaceful world and to terminate the abominable injustices and conditions that still plague civilization.
Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright
In war many roads lead to success and they do not all involve the opponent's outright defeat. Since war is not an act of senseless passion, but is controlled by its political object, the value of this object must determine the sacrifices to be made for it in magnitude and also in duration. Once the expenditure of effort exceeds the value of the political objective, the objective must be renounced and peace must follow.
Carl von Clausewitz
Peacekeeping is not a soldier's job, but only a soldier can do it.
UN SECGEN Dag Hammarskjold
Purpose
The purpose of this lesson is to evaluate the US concept of "military operations other than war" as an imperative of national military strategy; to comprehend the current and future military implications of this concept; and to evaluate current US military strategy and joint doctrine for conducting military operations other than war.
Learning Objectives
1. Evaluate the US concept of "military operations other than war" as a military imperative of US national security strategy
2. Comprehend the range of missions and operations that fall within the general category of "military operations other than war"
3. Analyze the implications of a strategic requirement to conduct military operations other than war on the readiness of the US Armed Forces to conduct major theater war
4. Evaluate current US military strategy and joint doctrine for conducting military operations other than war
Discussion
Some have argued that military operations other than war ("MOOTW") are much more likely tasks for the Armed Forces than major theater war for the foreseeable future. Although the U.S. military has engaged in these kinds of missions throughout US history - from nation building, disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, to refugee control and peacekeeping - several recent factors have combined to place more emphasis upon them. The end of Cold War stability and its overwhelming conventional and nuclear threat to US vital interests has allowed the US and its allies to focus on smoldering national, religious and ethnic rivalries that can break out in conflict. New social, political, ecological and economic stresses have also produced violence. The communications revolution brings scenes of human tragedy immediately and graphically to the attention of an increasingly global body politic, creating political pressures to take action. The US National Security Strategy of engagement implies the promise of US assistance with these problems, while the Armed Forces are by far the country's most capable instrument for planning, organizing, deploying, commanding and sustaining any large-scale effort abroad.
Military operations other than war raise a host of difficult questions for the national security strategist. The degree of interest, public support, "exit strategies," the length of commitment, the military costs and risks, international command, the definition of success or "end state," finding ways and means not just to suppress violence but to resolve the source of conflict -- all are complex and intractable. For the military strategist, there are likewise a host of problems associated with MOOTW, and especially with peacekeeping operations (PKO), the particular type of MOOTW we will address in this lesson. The role and applicability of force to the problem at hand is central. Whether forces organized, trained and equipped for conventional warfare (including the young men and women who make up those forces) can also accomplish the humanitarian assistance, governance, and police tasks of peacekeeping at acceptable risk to their readiness is another. Because "role and missions" are a major determinant in how forces are trained, equipped and prepared, an enduring national commitment to PKO begs the question of whether the US should create forces specifically for that purpose. These problems are more pronounced in an era of downsizing when competition for resources is especially keen.
Recent humanitarian missions in Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia, and several disaster relief efforts involving U.S. military forces in the continental United States, have also demonstrated the importance of interagency planning and coordination. As a result, the Clinton administration issued Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56 in May 1997 entitled "Managing Complex Contingency Operations." This directive is intended as the first step in achieving cooperation and coordination of effort for U.S. crisis response measures involving more than one agency of the Federal government.
PDD-56 recognizes that success in complex humanitarian crises frequently requires the coordination of many instruments of national power-political, military, economic, humanitarian and informational. Without careful coordination toward a commonly understood mission, there would be the potential for, at the least, a great deal of duplication of effort and wasted resources. At the worst, a mission could be badly managed and human lives lost through inefficiencies or a failure to capitalize on available talent or resources.
Under PDD-56, preparation and planning for complex contingency operations is to occur at the interagency level, with the National Security Council staff serving as the focal point for coordination of effort and dissemination of information. Federal agencies involved include the Departments of State and Defense; the Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Agency; the Departments of Treasury, Commerce, Transportation and Justice; the Agency for International Development and the U.S. Information Agency; and the Office of Management and Budget.
In essence, this program establishes the idea of "jointness" at the interagency level. It does not (yet) establish any commonality of procedure in the planning and execution of operations within individual agencies (a sort of interagency "joint doctrine," if you will). However, it does mark a first effort at a common basis for understanding capabilities among federal agencies, and for identifying uniform strategic objectives and coordinating the effort and resources to achieve them.
Issues for Consideration
1. Based on your assessment of the current and future security environment, how important is it to US national security that we be able to effectively conduct peacekeeping operations?
2. In what ways are peacekeeping operations and combat operations in wartime different, and in what ways are they similar? Can combat forces readily transition from one type of operation to another?
3. What unique problems confront the commander of a peacekeeping force?
4. How can we better orchestrate all the instruments of statecraft so as to minimize the risks associated with a lag between military success and desired political outcomes? How can we guard against mission creep and open-ended commitment?
5. Are there identifiable "centers of gravity" in peacekeeping operation? If so, what are they? If not, how do we focus our efforts?
6. How applicable are our current and future operational concepts-such as information superiority, dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full- dimensional protection, and focused logistics-to peacekeeping operations?
7. Archer - In our scenario, the United States is involved in four MOOTW in addition to the conflict in Korea. The four include counterdrug operations off the southern border and coast; an extensive disaster relief effort in coastal Texas; a humanitarian relief effort in Central Africa; and a major peacekeeping operation in Peru and Ecuador. (see the scenario itself for details) The JCS will have to recommend to the President whether to continue or curtail each of these operations. How would you recommend deciding on priorities? What are the strategic and operational implications of disengaging? How do you assess the strategic risk? If the United States were still involved in the Balkans, would your assessment of implications and risk be different?
Required Readings
1. Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Chapter V, "Military Operations Other Than War", pp. V-1 - V-14. (Student Issue)
2. Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, Executive Summary, pp. vii-vx; Chapter I, "Introduction", pp I-1 - I-8. ; Chapter II, "Principles of MOOTW", pp. II-1 - II-8; and Chapter III, "Types of Military Operations Other Than War", pp. III-1 - III-16. (Student Issue)
3. Joint Pub 3-07.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Peace Operations, Chapter I, "Primer for Peace Operations", pp. I-1 -I-24. (Student Issue)
4. Nathan S. Lowery, "Peacekeeping Operations in Kosovo: The 26th MEU During Operation Joint Guardian," Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 83, Number 12, (December, 1999), pp. 57-63. (Reprint)
5. Ashley J. Tellis, "Terminating Intervention: Understanding Exit Strategy and U.S. Involvement in Intrastate Conflicts," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, (April 1996), pp. 117-126, 143-151. (Reprint)
6. Gideon Rose, "The Exit Strategy Delusion, " Foreign Affairs, vol 77, no 1 (Jan-Feb 1998), pp. 56-67. (Reprint)
Recommended Readings
1. J.J.A. Wallace, "Manoeuvre Theory in Operations Other Than War," Journal of Strategic Studies, Dec 1996.
2. Ralph Peters, "Our Soldiers, Their Cities," Parameters, v. XXVI, n. 1, Spring 1996, pp. 43-50.
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