Title: South African Defence Review 1998 - Chapter VI
CHAPTER VI: CO-OPERATION WITH THE SA POLICE SERVICE
POLICY FRAMEWORK
1. South Africa is characterised by a high level of crime and criminal violence which affects all sectors of society and is exacerbated by a proliferation of light weapons in private hands. Violence in certain parts of the country remains unacceptably high and poses a serious threat to public order and the security of citizens.
2. The government is tackling this problem through efforts to strengthen the criminal justice system, community policing and a National Crime Prevention Strategy. Long-term solutions include upgrading the conditions of impoverished communities through the RDP, and supporting economic growth and development in Southern Africa.
3. Public order policing is primarily the responsibility of the SAPS. Given the relative shortage of police personnel, a large number of troops are currently deployed to assist them in the maintenance of law and order.
4. Despite public calls for greater military involvement in combatting crime, the government regards this tendency as undesirable. The history of South Africa and many other countries indicates that it is inappropriate to utilise armed forces in a policing role on a permanent or semi-permanent basis. This perspective is based on the following:
4.1 Armed forces are not trained, orientated or equipped for deployment against civilians. They are typically geared to employ maimum force against an external military aggressor.
4.2 On-going employment in a law and order function may lead to the defence force becoming politicised and increasingly involved in non-military activities.
4.3 Such employment may also undermine the image and legitimacy of the defence force amongst sections of the population.
4.4 Internal deployment places a substantial burden on the defence budget. It also has a disruptive effect on the economy when large numbers of part-time soldiers are called-up.
4.5 Efforts to apply military solutions to political problems are inherently limited and may undermine resolution of these problems.
5. The Departments of Defence and Safety and Security are formulating plans for the withdrawal of the SANDF from a policing role. The SANDF would then be deployed only in exceptional circumstances, such as a state of emergency or national defence or a breakdown of public order beyond the capacity of the SAPS.
6. Until this goal is attained, the employment of the SANDF in co-operation with the police will continue. Such employment will be authorised by the President, regulated by legislation and subject to the Bill of Rights and parliamentary approval and safeguards. Officers and other ranks deployed in internal operations will be equipped and trained appropriately.
7. To ensure effective deployment and maximum co-operation with the SAPS, the following steps should be taken: the creation of formal liaison committees; analysis and determination of the role, method of employment and duties of the SANDF; the establishment of a clear chain of command and control, a code of conduct and appropriate rules of engagement; agreement on the duration of the SANDF deployment; and a thorough review of the deployment if the objective of the mission is not achieved within the agreed time-scale.
8. The Department of Defence will establish mechanisms to facilitate communication and liaison between the SANDF and provincial and local authorities regarding the internal deployment of troops. However, these authorities will have no decision-making powers over such deployment. Command of the SANDF remains centralised at national level.
9. The SANDF is currently employed in border protection in co-operation with the police. Those activities which relate to combatting crime and controlling the flow of illegal immigrants into South Africa are more properly the responsibility of the SAPS. This matter is similarly under review by various government departments in the context of the National Crime Prevention Strategy.
STRATEGIC APPROACH
10. The internal employment of the SANDF will take place within the framework of the National Crime Prevention Strategy. This will ensure effective co-ordination, an integrated approach and synergy of effort.
11. In implementing this strategy, a clear distinction between the roles of the military and the police will be maintained.
11.1 Types of activity. The defence force will not perform police functions such as criminal investigation, arresting suspects, preparing dockets and involvement in the criminal justice system.
11.2 Powers. The SANDF does not have normal powers of arrest, detention and search and seizure; these are legally the preserve of the SAPS. Certain exceptions may be made by government regulation in a state of emergency.
11.3 Geographic focus. SANDF employment should be concentrated in rural and border areas since these coincide with the military s conventional theatre of operations. As an interim measure, an expansion of the military s role in border protection will free police resources for combatting routine and priority crimes.
11.4 Types of crime. The SANDF should not be involved in combatting routine crime but should rather focus on i) crimes which constitute a threat to the constitutional order; ii) crimes where military employment is consistent with international practice; and iii) serious crime. These categories are described below.
Crimes Constituting a Threat to the Constitutional Order
12. Crimes which constitute a threat to the constitutional order might include extremist political groupings which are armed; the expansion of para-military forces; large scale political instability; mass civil disobedience; and a complete breakdown of law and order.
Crime Combatting in Accordance with International Practice
13. It is acceptable internationally to deploy armed forces to counter certain types of crime which have serious socio-economic, security and/or environmental implications.
13.1 The SA Army is deployed, in co-operation with the SAPS and other state departments, in border protection. This is intended to prevent illegal immigration and the smuggling of drugs and weapons across landward borders.
13.2 Smuggling, illegal entry, plunder of marine resources and other crimes occur along the coast of the Republic. The Navy is deployed in co-operation with the SAPS and the departments of environmental affairs, home affairs and revenue services in patrolling the coast to prevent such activities.
13.3 The Air Force has air space surveillance and control capabilities which assist in the protection of the country s air space against smuggling and illegal entry.
13.4 The SA Military Health Services provides medical support to the SANDF and SAPS during crime prevention operations.
Serious Crime
14. The SANDF can contribute to combatting serious crime such as attacks on farms; stock theft by armed groups; illegal trafficking in drugs, arms and ammunition; car hijackings; and taxi violence.
15. Such SANDF activities include monitoring and surveillance; providing air transport support to the SAPS; providing logistic and personnel support to police engaged in roadblocks, cordons and vehicle and foot patrols. The SANDF also provides reaction force back-up to the police where this is required.
COST-EFFECTIVE UTILISATION OF RESOURCES
16. The SANDF has a range of capabilities which can be utilised to assist the police. In the interests of cost-effectiveness, these assets are put at the disposal of the police and therefore need ot duplicated by the SAPS.
17. Relevant capabilities include fixed wing and helicopter transport; specialised aerial and naval reconnaissance; naval transport; air space control; operational medical support; communications; and logistic support.
FORCE DESIGN AND FORCE LEVELS
18. Employment in co-operation with the SAPS is not a primary factor in determining force design. The SANDF relies mainly on its core defence capabilities to prepare and equip for the above tasks.
19. The extent of military deployment is determined by the security situation and is reviewed periodically. Where core defence capabilities are insufficient, additional personnel are required. In 1997 approximately 6 000 soldiers were deployed on a daily basis in co-operation with the police.