Title: South African Defence Review 1998 - Chapter V
CHAPTER V: INTERNATIONAL PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS
POLICY FRAMEWORK
1. As a fully fledged member of the international community, South Africa will fulfil its responsibility to participate in international peace support operations.
2. In the short-term, however, such participation will be regarded with caution since the political and military dynamics of these operations are new to South Africa and the DoD.
3. In order to prepare for peace support operations, the DoD is investigating the development of appropriate doctrines, operational procedures and training programmes in co-operation with foreign partners.
4. Public awareness and parliamentary debate on the complexities and different types of peace support operations are equally important.
5. South Africa will only become involved in specific peace support operations if the following conditions are met:
5.1 There should be parliamentary approval and public support. This requires an appreciation of the associated costs and risks, including the financial costs and the risk to military personnel.
5.2 The operation should be authorised by the UN Security Council.
5.3 Operations in Southern Africa should be sanctioned by SADC and undertaken with other SADC states. Similarly, operations in Africa should be sanctioned by the OAU.
5.4 The operation should have a clear mandate, mission and objectives.
5.5 There should be realistic criteria for terminating the operation.
6. Involvement in peace support operations will not be limited to the deployment of troops. It could also take the form of providing equipment, logistical support, humanitarian aid, engineering services, communications systems and medical personnel and facilities.
7. The acquisition and maintenance of military equipment will take account of the particular requirements of peace support operations.
TYPES OF PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS
8. Preventive diplomacy involves diplomatic action taken in advance of a predicted crisis to prevent or limit violence. In particularly tense situations, preventive deployment of military forces may support such action. The deployment may be aimed at deterring violence; assisting local authorities to protect threatened minorities; securing and maintaining essential services; and ensuring access to an area of operation.
9. Peacemaking is a process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation or other form of peaceful settlement of conflict that seeks to end disputes and resolve the issues which give rise to conflict. Military forces may be required to support this process.
10. Peace building consists of post-conflict actions that strengthen and rebuild civil infrastructures and institutions in order to provide a lasting peace. Military forces may assist in restoring the civil authority; rebuilding physical infrastructures; conducting elections; demobilising former belligerents; and collecting and controlling small arms.
11. Peacekeeping involves military or para-military operations undertaken with the consent of the disputant parties. The operations aim to monitor and facilitate the implementation of an existing peace or truce agreement, and to support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term settlement. Peacekeeping activities include observation, monitoring and supervision of the provisions of peace agreements. These typically relate to cease-fires; arms control; withdrawal and demobilisation of combatants; denial or freedom of movement; and elections.
12. Peace enforcement is the application or threat of military force, authorised by the UN Security Council, to compel compliance with Security Council resolutions. The aims are to maintain or restore peace and to support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term settlement. Unlike other peace support operations, peace enforcement may include combat action. Military missions may include the restoration and maintenance of order and stability; guarantee or denial of movement; enforcement of sanctions; establishment and supervision of protected zones; and forcible separation of belligerent parties.
13. Humanitarian or relief activities may constitute a discreet operation or be part of the operations described above. Such activities, in which military support may be required, include provision of humaniarian aid, disaster relief, health care and assistance to refugees and displaced persons.
14. It is evident from the preceding paragraphs that peace support operations may require the involvement of medical, communications, engineering, logistical, administrative, transport, combat and other components of armed forces.
AUTHORITY AND DECISION MAKING
15. As a rule, the UN Security Council decides on the establishment of a peace support operation and is responsible for extending or terminating the mission. (Peace enforcement operations which take place under the auspices of the OAU or SADC require prior endorsement by the UN Security Council.)
16. A resolution of the Security Council authorises the operation and determines the mandate. The resolution typically covers the terms of reference for the mission; the appointment of the Force Commander; force levels and contributing countries; and administrative, logistical and budgetary arrangements.
17. The overall direction of the operation is in the hands of the Secretary-General who acts on behalf of, and reports to, the Security Council. The Secretary-General delegates the daily operational management to a Head of Mission, but will usually retain direct control over policy matters and major decision-making.
18. The Secretary General is assisted in the exercise of these functions by a secretariat of political and military advisers in the Office of the Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs (OUSGSPA).
19. The Force Commander, who may or may not be the Head of Mission, is responsible to the Secretary General for the efficient operation and administration of the multi-national force. He/she exercises this responsibility through OUSGSPA which actually runs the mission.
20. The Force Commander exercises operational control of the national forces of participating countries. He/she gives direct orders for execution by these forces, without resort to the contributing countries. The contingents execute his/her orders without clearance from their governments. The Commander does not maintain formal contact with contributing countries. Such contacts are maintained by the Secretary General through OUSGSPA.
21. National commanders are directly responsible and answerable to the Force Commander for the effective operational and administrative functioning of their units. Personnel serving in these units remain under the command of their national commanders.
22. Where South Africa is requested to participate in a peace support operation, the following will apply:
22.1 The request will be routed to the Department of Foreign Affairs. That Department will liaise closely with the National Intelligence Co-ordinating Committee and the Department of Defence, through the Minister of Defence, with regard to the nature of South Africa s potential involvement.
22.2 Additional agreements relating to the determination of the mission and objectives of the operation will also be negotiated by the Department of Foreign Affairs in consultation with the Department of Defence.
22.3 The Departments of Foreign Affairs and Defence will advise Cabinet on the matters referred to above. Cabinet is responsible for final decisions.
22.4 In terms of the Constitution, the employment of the SANDF in peace support operations requires the authorisation of the President.
22.5 In terms of the Constitution, Parliament is empowered to review the President s decision regarding such employment.
DEPARTMENTAL AND OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
23. The following issues should be addressed before committing SANDF forces to a peace support operation:
23.1 There must be a realistic appreciation of the extent of the SANDF s involvement in the light of its capabilities and other commitments.
23.2 Liaison channels must exist with UN peacekeeping structures. A clear command and control system must be established, and rules of engagement must be determined.
23.3 Channels of finance must be opened both with the UN and between the relevant South African government departments, and financial arrangements must be finalised in the contract.
23.4 Standardisation and compatibility must be established with other peacekeeping forces regarding drills; telecommunications; language; and doctrine and procedures for combined operations.
23.5 A time scale for the period of involvement must be established, and a disengagement plan for own troops must be in place.
23.6 South African forces must be supported logistically from own resources for at least 28 weeks, after which UN support shoul be available.
23.7 Planning and execution of operations must be compatible with UN operating procedures.
23.8 Forces must be familiar with the conditions prevailing in the area of operations.
23.9 South African Military Health Services (SAMHS) support for own troops must be in place.
24. The SANDF has particular skills and expertise in communications, field engineering (including mine-clearing), medical, and command and control functions which are relevant to peace support operations. Consideration should be given to designating these areas as the preferred mode of participation in the short- to medium-term. Decisions in this regard will depend on the nature of the operation and the country of deployment.
25. The following considerations must be taken into account with regard to the area of operations: the potential political risk to South Africa if it deploys forces in neighbouring countries; and the need for foreign assistance should forces be deployed beyond the operational reach of the SANDF.
26. The Defence Act currently provides that SANDF personnel may only be compelled to serve outside the borders of the RSA "in time of war... against the enemy". The legal implications of deploying personnel in peace support operations will therefore have to be addressed in new defence legislation.
TRAINING
27. Peace support operations are fundamentally different from traditional approaches to fighting wars. The differences are manifest in the mission, objectives and doctrine of these operations, and in the role and tasks of the forces involved therein. Offensive action by these forces is usually prohibited, although it may receive limited expression in peace enforcement.
28. The skills, attitudes and expectations of SANDF personnel therefore need to be addressed through thorough training prior to deployment. They must be briefed properly on the political, cultural, linguistic and geographic features of the country of deployment. Failure to understand and respect the nuances of local culture and politics will undermine the efficacy and perceived impartiality of the peacekeepers.
29. All personnel involved in the operation must know and understand the rules of engagement. If possible, they should have an opportunity to practise the rules through simulation exercises prior to deployment.
30. Personnel also require training in mediation, negotiation and consensus-building skills. They should be psychologically prepared to back down and lose face in certain circumstances. They should appreciate the importance of impartiality, patience, tolerance and political sensitivity.
31. Training should be based on typical peace support operation tasks. These include cease-fire monitoring and maintenance; checkpoint operations; medical assistance to the civilian population; crowd control at food distribution points; apprehension of criminals; and performing certain of the responsibilities of the civil authority if it has collapsed.
32. Military forces involved in peace operations should comply strictly with international humanitarian law, and may be mandated to oversee compliance with this law by the belligerent parties. It is therefore essential that SANDF personnel deployed in such operations are familiar with the relevant provisions of the law and with the application thereof in situations of conflict.
33. Combined training should be undertaken with the forces of countries with which South Africa is likely to be involved in peace support operations.
FORCE DESIGN
34. In terms of the mandate of the SANDF, participation in international peace support operations is a secondary function. The SANDF will therefore not normally create special structures for such operations, but will rather provide for them within the primary structure.
35. More specifically, peacekeeping and peace enforcement are secondary functions of the Army s Rapid Deployment Ground Force which includes mechanised, parachute and motorised forces. Two motorised infantry battalion groups will be prepared for peacekeeping operations on a relay basis. The capabilities of the mechanised and parachute forces will be used in peace enforcement operations if required.
36. Similarly, the Air Force, Navy and SA Military Health Services will not provide dedicated force components for peace support operations but will ensure that the components which might be deployed in these operations are equipped and trained appropriately.
