INTRODUCTION
1. The White Paper on Defence states that the size, design, structure and budget of the SANDF will be determined mainly by its primary function of self-defence.
2. The White Paper states further that the absence of a foreseeable external military threat provides an opportunity to rationalise, redesign and right-size the defence force. The size and features of the SANDF should be consistent with that of a peace-time force.
3. In identifying and designing the capabilities of the peace-time force, a range of considerations have to be taken into account. The previous chapter discussed defence posture and doctrine. This chapter considers the following:
3.1 the SANDF s tasks related to the self-defence function;
3.2 the core force approach outlined in the White Paper;
3.3 defence contingencies (ie situations in which the SANDF will or may have to be involved in the exercise of self-defence);
3.4 the key characteristics of the peace-time force; and
3.5 the capabilities required by the SANDF in the light of the above.
TASKS
4. For effective and efficient planning it is necessary to translate the self-defence function into specific tasks. This serves to allocate responsibility, assists government to define the output it expects to achieve from military expenditure, and provides a system for categorising and prioritising such expenditure.
5. The following tasks relate to the self-defence function:
5.1 To provide a core defence capability against external military threas and execute military operations in defence of the Republic, its interests and its citizens when ordered by the President.
5.2 To provide a defence capability against internal threats to the constitutional order and execute operations in a state of emergency when ordered by the President.
5.3 To promote regional security through defence co-operation within the SADC framework.
5.4 To promote international security through participation in peace operations and military co-operation in support of foreign policy.
THE CORE FORCE APPROACH
6. The White Paper outlines the conflicting pressures on the national budget and the level of defence preparedness. It concludes that the maintenance of a core defence capability is a prudent and viable solution. The maintenance of this capability is therefore a priority task for the SANDF.
7. The White Paper provides that a core defence capability includes a balanced and sustainable nucleus with the following features:
7.1 the ability to deal with small-scale contingencies of a short-term nature;
7.2 the ability to deal with a range of contingencies;
7.3 the ability to expand to appropriate force levels within a realistic warning period should the threat situation deteriorate significantly;
7.4 maintenance and, where necessary, upgrading or replacement of equipment and weaponry; and
7.5 an effective intelligence capability to ensure early warning of potential conflicts and crises.
8. The core force approach derives from the following factors:
8.1 Due to the imperatives of the RDP, defence spending has to be kept to an appropriate level.
8.2 There is no foreseeable major external military threat to South Africa in the short- to medium-term.
8.3 The possibility of lesser military contingencies cannot be ruled out; parts of the world and the Southern African region are politically unstable; and the long-term future is uncertain.
8.4 While the political dimension of conflict normally develops over a long period, the features of modern weapon systems (such as range, firepower, flexibility, mobility, destructiveness and speed of deployment) make it possible to project military force relatively quickly.
8.5 Defence capabilities and expertise that are lost take longer to re-establish than the period in which a military threat can emerge. Major weapon systems may take up to 15 years to develop and commission, and combat leadership needs many years of experience and training. Start-up costs for acquiring such systems and expertise are high.
8.6 A credible conventional deterrence is a proven way of preventing aggression. It is a prudent means of preventing the hardships and loss of life associated with armed conflict.
8.7 At the same time, the establishment of a peace-time force with a non-threatening posture will contribute to confidence-building in Southern Africa.
8.8 The SANDF will be required to participate in regional defence arrangements; to engage in peace support operations; to co-operate with the SAPS in the maintenance of law and order and border protection in the short- to medium-term; to restore law and order in exceptional circumstances; and to support the civil authority in various secondary tasks. These functions are discussed elsewhere in this report.
9. For these reasons the SANDF must:
9.1 Have an affordable and sustainable force structure appropriate to its peace-time role and capable of expanding timeously to meet future defence contingencies.
9.2 Maintain the necessary systems and expertise to ensure flexible and responsive defence for high-risk defence contingencies which may arise in the short term.
9.3 Maintain effective intelligence and early warning capabilities to enable it to respond timeously to changes in the strategic environment.
9.4 Provide a conventional military deterrence which demonstrates the capability and political will of the state to defend South Africa against aggression.
9.5 Maintain and develop the capabilities and skills required to contribute to regional security.
9.6 Comprise a relatively small regular component, backed up by a sufficiently large part-time component. This structure is cost-effective and will promote regional confidence.
9.7 Perform its secondary functions chiefly with its core defence capabilities. Additional force structure elements may have to be added and funded for functions such as peace support operations and deployment in co-operation with the SAPS.
9.8 Rely on its core defence capabilities if employed against internal threats to the constitutional order. Additional force structure elements may be required according to the circumstances.
9.9 Certain military industrial capabilities must be maintained to support defence requirements.
DEFENCE CONTINGENCIES
Method
10. A major consideration in designing the peace-time force and the capabilities it requires is the nature of the defence contingencies against which the SANDF may have to act.
11. The White Paper asserts that South Africa is not confronted by an immediate conventional threat and does not anticipate external aggression in the short- to medium-term (approximately five years). The longer term future cannot be determined with any certainty because international relations are inherently unpredictable.
12. The examination of defence contingencies must therefore rely ona threat-independent, as opposed to a threat-specific, approach. If a concrete threat were to emerge, the examination would naturally become more specific.
13. The threat-independent approach should be rooted in an analysis of the external environment. It should take account, in particular, of the political, strategic and geographic situation in Southern Africa. The current reality is that Southern Africa is a region of allies. South Africa is a member of SADC and the ISDSC, and participates in common security arrangements under the auspices of these bodies (Chapter 3).
14. Further, planning for defence contingencies should be based on a realistic appreciation of the probability of such contingencies occurring and the impact on South Africa should the SANDF be unable to meet a contingency. This will help to prioritise contingencies for which the Defence Force should prepare.
15. Certain contingencies may occur with little warning, but in the Southern African context other contingencies are likely to be of a longer term nature where early warning will be obtained. This will allow for timely preparation and expansion.
16. Although the SANDF must ultimately be ready to deal with a range of contingencies, it need not maintain forces at immediate readiness for the longer term contingencies. However, it must retain the core for expansion.
17. The advantage of this approach is that substantial savings will be effected. As noted above, the core force will comprise a relatively small full-time component and a sufficiently large part-time component.
18. There are inherent risks in this approach, however. The warning period required to expand the core force may not be available due to strategic or operational surprise as a result of intelligence failure or an unwillingness of deciion-makers to heed the warning. After warning has been received, such expansion might be thwarted by sanctions and the inability of the defence industry to deliver equipment timeously.
19. Defence contingencies are examined below on a continuum from major contingencies such as an invasion to lesser contingencies such as threats against off-shore assets. For the sake of comprehensive analysis, all possible contingencies related to the primary function of self-defence are considered.
Analysis of Contingencies
20. Invasion. Invasion is defined as a major attack aimed at occupying the South Africa or part of it, replacing the government by force and conquering its people. This contingency is considered to be fairly remote since South Africa has no present or foreseeable enemies.
21. Further, a potential enemy does not stand to gain a major advantage from an invasion:
21.1 Although South Africa is relatively rich in resources, these do not have sufficient strategic importance given the resources available in other parts of the world.
21.2 The isolated geographic position of the Republic diminishes the possibility that it may be used by an external force as a springboard, base area or thoroughfare for military operations elsewhere. The only exception is the remote possibility of a world war where a belligerent has the capability to attack shipping on the Cape sea route. If an aggressor desires to launch an attack against a neighbouring state in Southern Africa, it would be far simpler to avoid South African territory.
21.3 The international situation would have to change considerably before an external power seeks to impose its ideology on South Africa through the use of force.
22. The probability of an invasion is therefore extremely low. However, the impact of a successful invasion would be so catastrophic that it cannot be ignored totally as a contingency.
23. From an operational perspective, an invasion can take place over the landward border, from the sea or a combination of the two.
23.1 An invasion over the landward border would require a major military build-up to the north. For a number of decades into the future, an operation of this kind could not be undertaken solely by an African state or alliance of African states. It would require the participation of a major power. It would also require coercion or invasion of one or more states to the north. The terrain to the north would present the attacker with logistic problems and restrict its mobility. These constraints provide a substantial warnin period for defensive action.
23.2 An invasion from seaward would require substantial specialist resources and could be undertaken only with the involvement of a superpower or coalition of major powers. Opportunities for strategic and deep interdiction in such a case would be more restricted. Factors favouring South African defences are natural obstacles to the attacker and ocean conditions favourable to defensive counter-strikes. As in the previous scenario, these factors provide a substantial warning period for defensive action.
24. Limited neutralising attacks. In this scenario a third party, such as a major power, wants to prevent the Republic from interfering militarily in that party s designs in Southern Africa. South Africa s approach to common security implies that it would threaten a major act of aggression against a SADC state.
25. The aggressor might therefore seek to neutralise South Africa s ability to project military power. The targets of an attack might include air and naval transport assets, air and naval attack assets, and mobile ground forces. Capabilities to defend these assets should thus be provided for in the peace-time force.
26. Such a scenario would probably entail UN, OAU and SADC condemnation of the aggressor, and would obviously be preceded by diplomatic efforts to avert a crisis. The development into an attack on the South Africa is therefore unlikely, although this scenario has a higher probability than the invasion contingency. The impact would be much smaller, however, making the total risk lower than that of an invasion. Nevertheless, force design should take note of this contingency.
27. Internal military threats to the constitutional order. The SANDF may be employed to combat internal military threats to the constitutional order. Such threats could take the form of civil war or general insurrection on a national or provincial scale. Such threats might be supported by external agents or forces. While the probability of this contingency is low, the impact would be considerable if it were not met successfully. This is therefore a contingency for which the SANDF should be prepared.
28. Raids. Raids of lesser intensity may occur against the RSA for the purpose of coercion or castigation. Coercion would aim to force South Africa to change its behaviour which is in conflict with another state s interests or goals, and castigation would be retaliation against South African actions regarded as offensive by such a state.
29. Raids could be launched by a major or smaller power. They could take many forms, such as air raids by aircraft or missiles; landward raids by mobile or unconventional forces; and maritime raids by surface vessels, amphibious craft or clandestine forces.
30. The impact of such raids, although considerable, would be lower than that of the previous scenarios. In contrast, the probability of such actions by irresponsible and irrational governments is higher than for the contingencies of invasions and limited neutralising attacks. Since raids may also be launched by non-governmental, radical organisations, the probability must be considered as real. The SANDF should therefore plan for these contingencies in designing the core force.
31. Blockades. Blockades may be invoked to coerce South Africa to change its behaviour which is in conflict with the interests and goals of another power. Blockades may take the form of interference in South Africa s sea lines of communications through mining of harbours or attacks on shipping within South Africa s maritime zone; landward blockades of trade routes to neighbouring states; or the enforcement of no-fly zones.
32. Given South Africa s dependence on trade, especially maritime trade, this could have an extremely negative effect on the well-being of the country and its people. The impact would thus be considerable and should be taken into account in designing the peace-time force.
33. Attacks on embassies, ships and aircraft. South Africa has a responsibility to protect its embassies, ships and aircraft outside its national borders. The threat against these assets is mainly one of piracy and international terrorism. Protection by host nations may not always be forthcoming or effective.
34. Although the impact of such contingencies is relatively low, the probability of their occurrence is relatively high. The capability to protect and release captured embassies, ships and aircraft should therefore be provided for in the core force. This capability must be at immediate readiness since the contingency may arise with little or no warning.
35. Law enforcement of marine resources and maritime zone. Maritime law enforcement is not a primary defence task and is discussed in chapter 7. However, a state may use military force to back up its exploitation of South African resources. The impact of such a contingency might be significant although the probability can presently be considered as low. This contingency requires capabilities similar to those needed to protect sea lines of communication.
36. Islands. The level of threat against South African islands (the Prince Edward Island group) and the impact if this threat materialises are such that no special or additional defence capabilities are required. However, it should be noted that the South African sea areas around these islands are rich in potential food sources.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PEACE-TIME FORCE
37. The peace-time force should be designed and structured to meet the strategic realities of South and Southern Africa. The following discussion considers the geographic, technological, organisational and operational factors in force design.
Geography
38. The features of the SANDF s likely area of operations should obviously serve as a force design determinant. Assuming that this area will be mainly South Africa, Southern Africa (for regional defence co-operation) and the surrounding seas, key factors to be taken into account include:
38.1 The large geographical area to be defended by relatively small forces.
38.2 Low infrastructure development which can be exacerbated by adverse weather conditions.
38.3 A scarcity of natural obstacles such as rivers and mountains.
38.4 Frequently adverse sea conditions.
38.5 Underwater ocean conditions which are favourable to submarines.
38.6 Access to and from South Africa largely dependent on sea and air transport.
38.7 A hostile health environment.
39. The peace-time force should thus have the following characteristics:
39.1 Mobility, including air and sea transport; self-contained ground forces suitable to rugged terrain and all-weather conditions; and ships with good sea-keeping capability.
39.2 Good underwater detection, location and attack capabilities.
39.3 Capabilities to ensure appropriate control of air and sea areas.
39.4 Operational medical support.
Technology
40. The technology employed by the peace-time force should be appropriate and affordable. Two main factors underpin this policy:
40.1 Given the lack of clarity on the possible enemies that the SANDF might have to counter, it would be imprudent to assume that a potential enemy will be unsophisticated. With the present proliferation of armaments and military technology, it must be anticipated that any future enemy will have sophisticated weapons and systems.
40.2 South Africa s regional obligations require the maintenance of a relatively high level of technological sophistication.
Balance and Flexibility
41. The SANDF must be a balanced force. A balanced force is one with the capabilities to meet a wide range of contingencies rather than one with equal numbers of all possible weapons systems.
42. Balance implies that the force should not be over-specialised to the extent that strategic gaps, which could be exploited by an enemy, are created. This is especially important in view of the uncertainty regarding future threats.
43. Balance also means that force structure elements should complement each other since a specific capability may be rendered ineffective because of technological advances, surprise attack or other factors.
44. The aim is to achieve a balanced defence force rather than a balanced Army, Air Force and Navy. For this reason, jointness between the arms of service will be promoted. The SANDF must also be a flexible force which allows for expansion or reduction of force levels according to operational requirements and budgetary considerations.
Expansion Potential
45. Maintaining a viable expansion potential is critical to the defence of South Africa.
46. The major determinants of expansion potential include the following:
46.1 A realistic determination of warning lead times.
46.2 The procurement times of main equipment. This depends on the nature of the specific equipment but is typically in the order of ten years from conceptualisation to operational availability. This period may exceed warning lead times provided by intelligence.
46.3 The time required to train and prepare leader groups and troops. This will influence the relative size of the full-time force and the part-time force.
46.4 The critical mass to which force structure elements can be reduced and below which no expansion would be possible.
Sustainability
47. The SANDF force structure must be sustainable. In other words, the SANDF must live within its means .
48. The aim is to have both a stable force and a stable defence budget commensurate with the threat situation and the lead times available for expansion. Should the threat situation change, a new force design and funding level would have to be determined.
49. An appropriate balance should be found between operating expenditure and spending on capital renewal or upgrading. Fluctuations in the capital budget should be equalised by long-term budgetary scheduling rather than through fluctuations in annual budgets. Fluctuationsand uncertainty in planning result in substantial fruitless expenditure. A long-term view is necessary and multi-year budgetary guidelines are highly desirable.
CAPABILITIES REQUIRED BY THE PEACE-TIME FORCE
50. In the light of the previous discussion, it is possible to list the specific capabilities required by the peace-time force.
50.1 Defence intelligence capability. Intelligence is an overarching capability required by the DoD. Strategic intelligence is the basis for force design, as well as early warning to ensure maximum time for expansion and defence preparation. Good tactical intelligence is a force multiplier during operations.
50.2 Landward defence. Capabilities to counter attacks over land should be mobile and largely self-contained.
50.3 Air defence. Air defence, including fighter-based capabilities and localised anti-aircraft capabilities, is needed to counter air attacks.
50.4 Maritime defence. Maritime defence capabilities to counter attack from seaward and on shipping should include mine clearance and the ability to act against air, surface and submarine attacks.
50.5 Biological and chemical defence. Subject to the provisions of the chemical and biological weapons conventions, the SANDF should maintain the capability to detect the use of chemical and biological weapons in a given area, to protect its personnel against such weapons, and to decontaminate forces and equipment which have been under such attack.
50.6 Interdiction capabilities. Once armed hostilities have begun, the SANDF should have the capability to interdict the battlefield.
50.7 Counter-offensive capabilities. On halting aggression, the SANDF should have the capability to drive the enemy from own or friendly territory.
50.8 Command and control. This is critical to the effective execution of the self-defence function at all levels. The diversity of military tasks performed by the different combat, combat support and supporting elements of the SANDF requires both single service and joint command and control capabilities. Great emphasis should be placed on electronic warfare and command information systems.
50.9 Force preparation. The SANDF must be able to prepare its forces continuously for self-defence. Force preparation should concentrat on two categories: i) formal training of personnel at all ranks for conventional operations; and ii) training and exercising force structure elements at arms of service level, as well as joint and combined operations.
50.10 Support capabilities. The SANDF must maintain effective support capabilities. These include operational medical support; operational logistics support and technology development; land, air and sea transport; personnel and chaplaincy services to maintain the morale of soldiers engaged in operations; and legal support to commanders during operations.
51. In summary, the defence capability of the SANDF should be cost-effective; sustainable; capable of appropriate expansion; technologically appropriate; balanced and flexible; and highly motivated and prepared.
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