POLICY FRAMEWORK
1. The Constitution provides that the primary object of the SANDF is to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people, in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international law regulating the use of force.
2. In respect of defence posture, the White Paper provides the following additional directives:
2.1 National security shall be sought primarily through efforts to meet the political, economic, social and cultural rights and needs of South Africa s people, and through efforts to promote and maintain regional security.
2.2 South Africa shall pursue peaceful relations with other states. It will seek a high level of political, economic and military co-operation with Southern African states in particular.
2.3 The SANDF shall have a primarily defensive orientation and posture.
2.4 South Africa is committed to the goals of arms control and disarmament at national, regional and international levels.
3. The White Paper states that South Africa does not now, and will not in the future, have aggressive intentions towards any state.
4. The White Paper asserts further that governments have an inherent right and responsibility to ensure the protection of the state and its people against external military threats. South Africa will employ the following principal strategies to this end:
4.1 Political, economic and military co-operation with other states. In this context, a common security regime, regional defence co-operation and confidence- and security-building measures in Southern Africa are particularly important.
4.2 The prevention, management and resolution of conflict through non-violent means. Conflict resolution, in the form of diplomacy, mediation or arbitration, may take place on a bilateral basis or under the auspices of an international or regional body.
4.3 The deployment of the Defence Force. The use or threat of force against external military aggression is a legitimate measure of last resort when political solutions have been exhausted.
5. It is thus clear that the government s preferred and primary course of action is to prevent conflict and war. South Africa will only turn to military means when non-violent strategies and deterrence have failed.
6. Deterrence requires the existence of a credible defence capability to inhibit potential aggressors. Although South Africa is not confronted by any foreseeable external military threat, this capability cannot be turned on and off like a tap. It is therefore essential to maintain a core defence capability with the potential for expansion should this ever be necessary.
7. In summary, South Africa has turned away from an isolationist and offensive posture to one of common security in Southern Africa; defence co-operation with other states; respect for international peace and security; and adherence to international law.
8. In terms of domestic security, the SANDF is currently employed in co-operation with the SAPS in the maintenance of law and order and in border protection against non-military threats. Ideally, the SANDF should be deployed in the former role only in the most exceptional circumstances.
DETERRENCE
9. As noted above, the White Paper requires the maintenance of a defence capability which is sufficiently credible to deter potential aggressors. Deterrence plays a crucial role in preventing armed conflict.
10. The maintenance of this capability should take account of the following:
10.1 A potential aggressor must believe that South Africa has the capacity to apply sufficient force to thwart an act of aggression.
10.2 A potential aggressor should also believe that South Africa has the political will to apply such force if it is compelled to do so.
11. The Constitution states that the security services will adhere to international law on armed conflict (Articles 198(c), 199(5) and 200(2)). This includes the Geneva and Hague conventions and protocols, referred to as international humanitarian law, which provide, inter alia, that armed forces may only attack military targets and must refrain from attacking civilians and civilian property. These rules necessarily circumscribe deterrence doctrine.
12. South Africa s approach to deterrence encompasses the following:
12.1 South Africa will pursue military co-operation with other states in such a way that potential aggressors run the risk of encountering collective military capabilities in response. Collective capabilities would also deter threats to the region as a whole.
12.2 Capabilities to neutralize possible threats should be at a level of readiness commensurate with the lead time for such threats to develop. This should be clearly visible. Care must be taken not to open strategic gaps in the capability of the SANDF when reducing force levels.
12.3 Deterrence will not only be pursued against potential short-term aggression through immediate force readiness. Potential aggression in the longer term will also be deterred by maintaining the capability for expansion.
12.4 Even if South Africa is not strong enough to ensure dominance in defensive actions, the risk to any potential aggressor should be unacceptably high.
12.5 Deterrence should not be counter-productive in that it triggers an arms race. This has implications for doctrine, force design and force levels.
SANDF DOCTRINE
13. Operational doctrine consists of the main principles and concepts by which armed forces guide their actions in military operations in support of national objectives. Doctrine derives from, and must be consistent with, defence policy and posture.
14. The doctrine of the SANDF should therefore reflect the international prohibition on acts of aggression; the exercise of the right of self-defence in a manner which is consistent with international law; a defensive posture at strategic level; and the employment of the SANDF as a measure of last resort.
15. The policy of non-aggression and the constitutional commitment to international law, which outlaws the initiation of armed hostilities by states, constitute the basis of SANDF doctrine. International law does not preclude the exercise of the right of self-defence against external aggression.
16. In the light of the above, the doctrine of the SANDF will be based on a strategic defensive posture with sufficient capabilities to protect military and economic assets against offensive actions by an aggressor.
17. Further, capabilities to reverse the effects of offensive actions are required. The SANDF must be able halt, contain and roll back such actions. Accordingly, appropriate offensive capabilities will be required at operational level.
18. This approach will be complemented in times of conflict by government spelling out clearly the threshold for offensive action by the SANDF. In practice this may take the form of a declaration of appropriate exclusion zones or similar mechanisms.
19. Finally, it is important to note that the defensive orientation of the SANDF is reinforced by Executive and Parliamentary control over its employment.
IMPLICATIONS FOR FORCE DESIGN
20. The above provisions, and particularly the requirement that the SANDF shall have a prmarily defensive orientation and posture, impact directly on force design. The rationale for a small but efficient and sustainable core force is in line with this requirement (Chapter 3). The implications for force design are as follows:
20.1 The size and capabilities of the SANDF, in the context of government s defence policy, should not be seen as threatening by other states in Southern Africa. The emphasis will be on confidence-building defence in the regional context.
20.2 Force levels will be limited to what is needed to maintain essential capabilities and expertise. These will serve as a basis for expansion if required.
20.3 The potential for expansion should be consistent with a realistic appreciation of warning times for the development of military threats. Participation in regional early warning structures will reinforce such appreciation.
20.4 SANDF doctrine requires an emphasis on defensive rather than offensive force elements. Manifestly offensive armaments and weapon systems have therefore been excluded from the force design. Other potentially offensive weapon systems which give undue strategic reach have been limited in number.
20.5 The design of the SANDF should allow for dispersion of own forces. This leads to a reduction in target concentration and therefore less vulnerability in the event of an attack. It also contributes to regional confidence-building since mobilisation can easily be observed.
20.6 Great reliance will be placed on the PTC. This ensures that mobilisation will be more visible and thus less threatening than a large standing force.
20.7 Where practically possible and financially viable, mobile and offensive forces will be drawn away from border areas to deeper internal bases.
20.8 Training and force preparation should be consistent with defence policy, posture and doctrine.
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