Central European Civil-Military Relations and NATO Expansion - Chapter V

Title: Central European Civil-Military relations and NATO expansion - Chapter V

CHAPTER V: HUNGARY

Hungary's revolution was more similar to East Germany and Czechoslovakia than Poland's evolutionary five-stage process. Hungarian reform differed from Czechoslovakia in that it lacked a politician like Vaclav Havel who had gained the confidence of society through long years of shared battles. Polish reform was led by Lech Walesa and indigenous institutions--the Church and Solidarity--from the outside with the effective cooperation of a corrupt party apparatus.

In Hungary, with the Hungarian Socialist Worker's Party (HSWP) influence waning as a result of years of deepening crisis within the party apparatus and economic degeneration in the country, communist reformers inside the system engineered Hungary's reform in league with outside opposition. When the previously disunited Hungarian opposition reconciled its differences, the HSWP reform leadership committed itself to make the transition to a democratic multi-party system.

A major step toward coming to grips with Hungary's communist past occurred on 16 June 1989 when over 100,000 people took part in public funeral services for Imre Nagy who had been executed three decades earlier. Over the summer Hungary began to dismantle the "iron curtain" on its western border, and in September opened the border for East German refugees to travel to the Federal Republic of Germany. As noted above, this action sparked the exodus of East Germans to the West, and ignited the revolution in East Germany creating a domino effect in Czechoslovakia.

During the summer and early fall the HSWP's round-table negotiations with eight opposition parties resulted in an 18 September accord which cleared the way for multi-party elections. At the 6-9 October 1989 HSWP Congress the reform wing of the HSWP led by Imre Pozsgay transformed the discredited HSWP by changing its name to the Hungarian Socialist Party (HSP) and adopting a progressive program that embraced multi-party parliamentary democracy, respect for civil liberties, and a mixed economy.

Most observers anticipated that the March 1990 Parliamentary elections would radically reduce communist HSP representation and result in a coalition government including a number of opposition parties. In anticipation, Prime Minister Miklos Nemeth, in an effort to insulate the military from the political change, announced on 1 December 1989 a major defense ministry and military reform, which included changing the military command.

After the first free Parliamentary elections were held in March 1990,

the two major winners--the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) with 165 of the Parliament's 386 seats and Alliance of Free Democrats (AFD) with 92 seats--formed a pact in late April and a new non-communist government was sworn into power on 23 May 1990. Under terms of the agreement Jozsef Antall, a member of the MDF, became prime minister. The first stage of Hungary's revolution was completed in August 1990, when Parliament elected Arpad Goncz, of the AFD, president.

The second stage of Hungary's revolution commenced as relations between the two parties worsened during the end of 1990 and through 1991. Significant MDF-AFD differences developed over spheres of authority between the prime minister and president; these were challenged and resolved in the Constitutional Court.

The third stage commenced after the government's successful Constitutional Court challenge at the end of 1991. In 1992 a new defense reform was then implemented to redress the effects of the 1 December 1989 reform, and the MDF significantly tightened its political control over the defense ministry and other key government institutions.

The fourth stage began with the May 1994 parliamentary elections which returned the Hungarian Socialist Party (HSP) to power. The new challenge became to write a constitution that all the Hungarian electorate would consider legitimate.

Step-by-Step Defense Reform

As in Poland, the purpose of Hungary's defense reform has been to establish civilian [parliament and government] command and control over the defense ministry and Hungarian People's Army (now called Magyar Honvedseg). It also had to clarify the lines of authority between the president and government [prime minister and civilian defense minister] in peacetime and in wartime. Finally, the reform had to remove Soviet and Hungarian Socialist Worker's Party (HSWP) influence from the military establishment, to ensure that Hungarian military forces were sufficient to guarantee the integrity of Hungary, and to return the armed forces to Hungarian society.

Under the old system, Hungarian national security policy (as in Poland) was formulated by a small group headed by the HSWP First Secretary in his capacity as president of the Defense Council, and in the HSWP Central Committee by the secretary in charge of national defense, with perhaps the addition of the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and the defense minister. In July 1989 Prime Minister Miklos Nemeth noted that Hungary's new national defense policy must make clear that the national armed forces were in the hands of democratic power under appropriate and strict control. When asked at the time who was commander-in-chief of the armed forces, Nemeth answered that "it is not possible at present to give an unequivocal reply to this."

During 1989 the communist-dominated Ministry of Justice drafted an entirely new Hungarian Constitution (to succeed the 1949 communist Constitution), based upon the principles articulated at the round-table talks which took place in the spring. The parliament which passed that constitution in October 1989 was still dominated by members of the communist party.

According to constitutional changes in October 1989, National Assembly representatives are elected for four-year terms, as is the president, who is elected by the National Assembly and is commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

Only Parliament is entitled to make decisions concerning the use of the armed forces.

According to Article 19 of the Constitution, the National Assembly has the power to declare the state of war and conclusion of peace. In the event of war, it declares a state of emergency and sets up the Defense Council. If the National Assembly is unable to convene, the president assumes these powers.

When so empowered, the Defense Council--chaired by the president

--has the power to deploy armed forces abroad and within the country.

During peacetime, the prime minister, elected by a majority of the National Assembly, and ministers of the Government "control the operation of the armed forces, the police, and other organs of policing."

On 1 December 1989 Hungary's defense reform divided the defense ministry into two separate entities; a defense ministry subordinate to the prime minister, and a Command of the Hungarian Army (HA) subordinate to the president (see Table 6 below).

When the defense reform was announced, the Nemeth government's intention was to take the armed forces, which until then were under direct party command, and remove them from the direct influence of the future noncommunist government, which was expected to exercise power following the then anticipated March 1990 multiparty elections.

Table 6 - Hungarian Defense Reform, 1989

The new reform was clearly intended to put the armed forces under communist control by removing the core of the army cadres from the defense ministry and placing them under a Commander of the Hungarian Army subordinate to the president. As a result of the reform, the president--who at the time was assumed would be communist-reformer Imre Pozsgay--became the commander-in-chief of the army. Whereas in most other Parliamentary systems a clear line of authority exists from prime minister to defense minister to chief of staff, after the December 1989 Hungarian defense reform the line of authority went directly from the president to Commander of the Hungarian Army to the chief of staff, with the government basically out of the chain of command.

One unfortunate result of the reform was increased tension between the president and the government (prime minister and defense minister). Subordinate to the prime minister (before elections Miklos Nemeth, Jozsef Antall of the MDF after) and Council of Ministers is the defense minister (then Ferenc Karpati, after May 1990 an MDF civilian Lajos Fur) who maintains a relatively small staff and is responsible for state administration tasks and military policy. After the 1989 defense reform the defense ministry dealt more with social and political questions, matters which Parliament normally dealt with.

After the 1989 defense reform, the Army remained subordinate to the president (then Matyas Szuros, since August 1990 Arpad Goncz of the AFD), and control over the Army was now exercised by a new (as of March 1990) Command of the Hungarian Army (LTG Kalman Lorincz) who, as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, supervises actual military tasks.

Under the defense reform, the president has authority to appoint generals.

According to LTG Laszlo Borsits:

The higher military leadership is exercised by the Commander-in-Chief, through theGeneral Staff.

The troops are directly commanded by the field army corps staff and the home air defense corps staff.

On the operational-tactical level of command the corps, brigade, and battalion staffs perform the task of leadership.Note 13

Hungarian concerns about control of Hungarian forces during an emergency and authority to make the transition to war were evident in the October 1989 National Assembly debate over the new draft constitution. At the time, only a "qualified majority...in the National Assembly"

could declare a state of emergency or war, which brings into being the Defense Council in order to exert extraordinary measures.

Subsequent National Assembly Defense Committee sessions focused on the issue of Soviet control of Hungarian armed forces. Sensitivity was evident in discussions about the illegality of the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia and in the problems of Hungarian Socialist Worker's Party (HSWP) control over the army. Hungary's participation in the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion focused attention on the issue of command and control of armed forces. Bela Biszku, who had been HSWP Central Committee secretary between 1962-1978, told the National Assembly's Defense Committee on 3 January 1990 that the related command for intervention in 1968 was "most certainly" given to the Hungarian defense minister by the Warsaw Pact's Combined Armed Forces Commander in Chief.

In response, the National Assembly amended the defense law during February 1990 so as to grant itself the authority to decide on the deployment of armed forces abroad or in Hungary.

After the Defense Committee blamed the HSWP for the illegal 1968 invasion, it concluded on 2 March 1990 "that party direction of the army must in all events be abolished."

After the March 1990 elections, the governing MDF coalition and opposition Alliance of Free Democrats agreed to many significant amendments to the new constitution. The National Assembly amended the Constitution on 19 June 1990 to change some of the more objectionable provisions of the former communist government that related to the use of force. For example, Chapter VIII which deals with "The Armed Forces and Police" now specifically required a two-thirds (rather than simple) majority of the National Assembly to employ these forces, thereby ensuring parliamentary control over them.

Another significant defense reform involved intelligence. The Council of Ministers established four offices (two civilian and two military) to deal with intelligence: The National Security Office (NBH) under MG Kalman Kocsis and the Information Office (IH) under MG Sandor Simon have nationwide responsibility, are under independent jurisdiction, and overseen by civilian minister without portfolio Andras Galszecsy, who receives directions through the Office of the Prime Minister. The third and fourth, the Military Security Office (KBH) under MG Karoly Gyaraki and Military Intelligence Office (KFH) under MG Janos Kovacs are part of the Hungarian Defense Forces, funded through the defense budget, and overseen by Defense Minister Lajos Fur.

On 14 February 1990, the military intelligence function was transferred to the Hungarian Defense Forces from the Interior Ministry II/IV group command and became an independent organization commanded by a professional officer. Its functions are to protect against foreign intelligence activities, prevent insurrections and danger to military preparedness, provide physical security for military facilities, and protect persons performing confidential functions.

Both the Military Intelligence Office and the civilian Information Office have responsibility to operate globally while the National Security Office and Military Security Office are confined to operating only in Hungary.

Essentially the goal of the general defense reform amounted to the reassumption of national control of the Hungarian military from the Soviet Union. But the defense reform also created new problems between presidential and governmental authority. On 3 August 1990 parliament elected Arpad Goncz (AFD) president.

In order to fulfill his constitutional duties to approve Hungary's armed forces defense plan and to declare an emergency or convene the National Defense Council in case the National Assembly is impeded from doing so, Arpad Goncz created a Military Office to liaise with the Commander of the Hungarian Defense Forces. Colonel Robert Pick, who heads and manages the activities of the office, informs President Goncz on subjects related to general military policy and military diplomacy, and acts as the core staff of the commander-in-chief during the transition period between peace and war.

Although the December 1989 reform was successfully implemented, intervening events during 1990--such as parliamentary elections resulting in a six-party coalition government producing a prime minister and president from different political parties and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact--created new civil-military problems for Hungary. In fact one might argue that the 1989 defense reform created more problems than it solved.

The 1989 defense reform contributed to confusion and differences of opinion over span of authority between the Commander of the Hungarian Army and the defense minister. Though Lajos Fur replaced Ferenc Karpati on 23 May 1990 and became Hungary's first civilian defense minister, by September Fur was expressing concern about limits to his authority. Defense Minister Fur apparently felt that officer training institutes, the Institute of Military History, and the management of all cultural areas which were under military sphere of authority should be under his authority.

In other words, although Hungary was the first Central European state to have a civilian defense minister, no Hungarian civilian exercised effective control over Hungarian military matters (as was nominally exercised by civilian Deputy Defense Ministers Rasek since December 1989 in Czechoslovakia and Komorowski since April 1990 in Poland).

These differences escalated into a major civil-military crisis causing a constitutional dispute and problems within the Army's leadership. The constitutional debate involved questions over the sphere of authority between the Commander of the Hungarian Army and the defense minister, and ultimately between the president and the prime minister. An October 1990 transport strike brought these different views about presidential and prime ministerial authority to a test. When Defense Minister Fur and Prime Minister Antall wanted to call up the military to break the strike, President Goncz, as commander-in-chief, refused and threatened a constitutional crisis. Though the prime minister and defense minister backed off, in an interview shortly after this incident Defense Minister Fur noted:

[O]ne of the important things to settle is the relationship between the [defense] ministry and the army commanders. The unclarified questions emerge not so much in the relationship between the commander in chief, the ministry, and the Army, but rather in the relationship between the Army and the ministry.

Soon after the blockade the government questioned the president's authority to command the army and initiated a review of the issue in the Constitutional Court.

During the spring of 1991, though, President Arpad Goncz (Alliance of Free Democrats) and Prime Minister Antall and Defense Minister Fur (Hungarian Democratic Forum) still had differences of opinion over control of the armed forces. Lajos Fur argued that the leadership of the army was oversized, that it was unnecessary for the Hungarian Army Command and the general staff to function in parallel, and therefore it would be desirable to adopt a leadership structure consistent with other European democracies.

President Goncz countered in an interview that "attempts are being made to transform the Army by abolishing the command system, which I do not agree with ...[adding that] the argument is not yet closed."

Tension reached such a pitch that LTG Kalman Lorincz, Commander of the Hungarian armed forces, submitted his resignation

to Goncz on 29 March 1991. Though neither Goncz, Antall, nor Fur accepted Lorincz's resignation,

they recognized this civil-military issue to be a serious problem and mandated a new defense reform that was developed at the end of 1991.

National Assembly Parliamentary Defense Committee member Bela Kiraly argued that the president is clearly the commander-in-chief and the constitution places two restrictions on his command. First, it authorizes the National Assembly to decide on deploying armed forces within Hungary or abroad. Second, it requires the prime minister's countersignature regarding every action involving national defense. Upon the National Assembly's declaration of war or emergency, presidential authority and responsibility expand. In sum, Bela Kiraly felt no constitutional change was required, but he argued that the Commander of the Hungarian Army position be abolished; that its responsibilities be transferred to the Hungarian chief of staff; and that the chief of staff be unconditionally subordinated to the defense minister.

During 1991 two further tests brought the issue of military command to public attention; the failed August Soviet coup and increasing problems along the Yugoslav border. The failed Soviet coup in August 1991 only partially tested Hungary's machinery; in part because the last Soviet troops had already left Hungary. (In contrast, Poland still had Soviet troops on its soil). When the National Security Cabinet met on 19 August to examine the situation, it noted that the borders were calm and concluded that Hungary was in no immediate danger. Antall met with members of the six legislative parties, who expressed full unity with the approach taken by the Cabinet that Hungary should take a restrained and moderate approach to the affair.

Hence, no military orders or special measures, which would have required a National Assembly vote, were issued.

The second test involved the constant overflights of Yugoslav aircraft. Hungary's response also evidenced restraint. Despite the fact that no military mobilization measures had been issued and heightened alert of Border Guard and Hungarian Defense Forces had been handled normally, on 18 September 1991 Chief of Staff MG Janos Deak expressed concern to the National Assembly Defense Committee. MG Deak argued that if an emergency arose--for example if Hungarian barracks were attacked--LTG Kalman Lorincz lacked the authority to react rapidly. Deak argued that while Lorincz had mobilization authority, current constitutional stipulations presupposed that the decision either would be obstructed by the National Assembly (which requires a two-thirds vote) or would be made only very slowly.

Due to these external tests as well as increasing internal tensions between President Goncz and Prime Minister Antall, Defense Minister Fur in August 1991 sought an unequivocal Constitutional Court interpretation concerning peacetime direction of Hungarian forces. On 23 September, the Constitutional Court rendered its decision to limit presidential powers; it ruled that the president as commander-in-chief may only render guidelines to the military instead of issuing orders. The Court concluded that the direction of the functioning of the armed forces was within the authority of the branch that exercised executive power (e.g., the prime minister and defense minister).

In response to the Constitutional Court's decision, at the end of 1991 the defense ministry began a reorganization (see Table 7 below) to redress the problems created by the December 1989 defense reform. The new 1992 defense reform, which accelerated personnel changes in the defense ministry, had the dual purpose of subordinating the military command to the defense ministry in accordance with the Constitutional Court decision and replacing career military officers with civilians in order to strengthen Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) control over the ministry. The new appointments increased civilian representation by reducing the concentration of staff officers who had been communist party members in the defense ministry, replacing them in important mid-management positions with civilians sympathetic to the MDF.

Table 7 - Hungarian Defense Reform, 1992

The president of the Republic remains the commander-in-chief of the armed forces with specific duties and responsibilities. Though these have been defined by the Constitutional Court, they remain untested in practice. Commander ColGen Lorincz remains subordinate to President Goncz when the president is authorized to exercise his emergency powers during crisis and war. During peacetime Defense Minister Fur provides direction to Lorincz, who exercises command and control of the armed forces. Also subordinate to Fur is a political state secretary and an administrative state secretary, who supervises three deputy state secretaries.

By early December 1991, apart from Political State Secretary Raffay and Deputy State Secretary Rudolf Joo, more new civilians were appointed to mid-management positions in the defense ministry. Dr. Csaba Hende (MDF) became the ministerial parliamentary secretary, Dr. Zoltan Bansagi (MDF) headed the ministry's department for legal and administrative matters, and Laszlo Szoke (MDF) took over the department for social relations.

Thus, MDF political-packing became the rule in the defense ministry.

Though the 1992 defense reform attempts to clarify the line of authority problems created by the 1989 defense reform, the issue of presidential versus prime ministerial authority during transition to war and during wartime remained untested. Different Hungarian views continue to exist as to whether the president will exert real (as against symbolic) powers during wartime. The debate is exacerbated by the untested role of the Defense Council, which is chaired by the president, but whose members also include the Speaker, leaders of the political parties from the National Assembly and the prime minister, the ministers, as well as the Commander of the Hungarian Army and the Chief of Staff from the Government.

Thus the powers of the president may be sharply curtailed by the predominance of political opponents on the Defense Council. Despite these nagging concerns, the 1992 defense reform had gone a long way to solve many problems that resulted from the 1989 defense reform in peacetime.

In order to get further clarification on significant matters of disagreement, the 11-member Constitutional Court became Hungary's locus of adjudication. Jozsef Antall asked the Consti-tutional Court on 25 May 1992 to rule on the president's scope of authority in firing government officials. The issue was over President Goncz's refusal to countersign Antall's order to fire the director of Hungarian Radio, Elemer Hankiss. Antall asked the Constitutional Court to declare Goncz's obstructionism unconsti-tutional and, indeed, on 8 June 1992, the Court, in a seven to three decision, ruled that the president could only block the prime minister's appointments and dismissals if legal procedures were not followed, the candidates were incompetent, or if in accepting the government's decisions Hungarian democracy would be threatened.

In August 1992 a proposed draft national defense bill attempted to eliminate "management duplications" by expanding the government's management authority. The National Assembly (or, in case of declared emergency, the Defense Council) would be responsible for approving the basic principles of national defense, directions of military development, and the budget. During peacetime, all other decisions related to army mobilization, location, leading, and training of troops--as well as partial deployment in case of external threat and until parliament can decide--would come under government authority. The president would continue to have the title of commander-in-chief with no authority to command the armed forces. In peacetime his authority would be limited to approval of defense plans and to appoint and release high-ranking commanders in accord with the responsible minister's recommendation.

In September 1992 Defense Minister Fur asked the court if he could fuse the Commander of the Hungarian Army position with the Chief of the General Staff without a constitutional amendment.

In February 1993, Fur submitted two related draft laws on defense to parliament. One dealt with necessary constitutional changes; the other was the defense law itself. The Parliament passed both laws by the required two-thirds majority on 7 December 1993.

Armed Forces Reform. At the end of 1992, Hungarian Defense Forces comprised 100,000 from its 1989 size of 155,700. The number of conscripts declined from 91,900 in 1989 to 51,100; professionals from 30,500 to 22,900 (of which 8,500 were NCOs); and civilian employees from 33,300 to 26,000.

During 1992 Hungarian Defense Forces were reorganized; army brigades of a new type were created and the organizing and forming of mobile Air Force units began.

In addition, a training center for peacekeeping forces was designed to train the first Hungarian peacekeeping company.

The second phase in the Army's development would last until 1995, during which the forces were stabilized and conditions established for modernization after 1995 when funds would become available. The 1993 defense budget of 64 billion forints, which was increased to 66.5 billion forints in 1994, left very little room for modernization as 91.2 percent of the budget was needed for day-to-day operations.

Immediate aid for Hungarian Defense Forces came from Germany in April 1993, with its decision to supply spare parts, as well as electronic and training aircraft from stocks of the former East German army.

Assistance also came from Russia, with the decision to supply 28 MiG-29s in October-November 1993 to cover $800 million of its $1.6 billion debt to Hungary.

As a compensation, the National Assembly earmarked 1.1 billion forints in 1993 to install 113 electronic Identify Friend or Foe (IFF) systems to the Hungarian Air Force which were to be installed during 1994.

Two new laws were adopted. The first law, which followed an April 1991 Constitutional Court decision

(adds Article 19(e) to the Hungarian Constitution), provides a new power for the executive. Under the new law, the government may, in three limited cases (invasion of Hungarian airspace, surprise air attack, or surprise invasion), order immediate military action of not more than two Army brigades (5,000 troops) without specific agreement from the president and without declaration of emergency by parliament.

The government, however, is obliged to inform parliament of any such decision.

The second law dealt with the organization of the border guard; defining the circumstances in which they fell within the jurisdiction of the military (as they did) or the police. The decision was necessary and significant because of the Yugoslav crisis. If the border guard were under the military, ultimate control would lie with parliament; if they were under the police, then they would be under the executive, or minister of interior. In the bill, the border guard falls under the police, except for a state of war, and is subject to executive control. Both laws were enacted by overwhelming parliamentary majority as amendments to the constitution on 7 December 1993.

On 23 February 1993 Laszlo Szendrei (a Hungarian Democratic Forum MP) replaced Erno Raffay as political state secretary of defense.

On 31 March 1993 Rudolf Joo, an MDF civilian, replaced LTG Antal Annus as administrative state secretary, thus placing the defense ministry's top three posts in civilian hands.

On 14 April 1993 the National Assembly unanimously approved Resolution No. 27 concerning the Basic National Defense Principles of the Hungarian Republic.

Also on 7 December the National Assembly adopted (with 277 deputies for, one vote against, and one abstention) a new defense law to come into effect on 1 January 1994. According to the law, civilian service in the military would be 18 months and military service would be 12 months.

In October 1993, when Yeltsin survived a coup attempt in Moscow, Lajos Fur noted that he survived in large part because "the Army, with its neutrality...unambiguously committed itself to support Yeltsin."

President Goncz noted that "I can promise one thing: I will never give the order to shoot on the Hungarian Parliament...[adding that] the struggle in Russia will lead Hungary to work harder than ever for membership in the EU and NATO."

In October 1993 the 88th Airborne Infantry Battalion was established as part of the Hungarian Defense Forces restructuring. LTG Bela Gyuricza noted that its function was to make available to the military leadership a rapid deployment unit capable of preventing and managing armed conflicts and suitable to perform UN peacekeeping functions.

On 12 December 1993 Prime Minister Antall died and the government's legal mandate ended. The interim government, under Interior Minister Peter Boross, operated with reduced powers until the president nominated a new prime minister, who had to be confirmed by a majority vote in parliament. (Failure to appoint a government within 40 days would result in new elections called by the president).

On 14 January 1994, the Government announced that it would merge the defense ministry and army command in accordance with the 7 December 1993 Defense Law, thereby placing the armed forces under civilian control in peacetime and war. This was scheduled to occur when General Kalman Lorincz reached the mandatory retirement age of 55 in February.

LTG Janos Deak, the chief of staff, assumed the post of Commander of the Hungarian Army on 1 March and was promoted to ColGen on 15 March. According to Lajos Fur, as of 1 March 1994, the defense ministry would have three state secretaries; political, administrative, and CoS.

Post-communist Return and a New Constitution

On 30 June 1993, the Hungarian cabinet submitted a draft bill aimed at modifying the Electoral Law of 1989. It raised the electoral threshold from 4 percent to 5 percent and modified the procedure for by-elections. Now all by-elections would be held on the same day once every year, and never during the year of a general election.

Hungary's May 8 and 29, 1994 parliamentary elections (like those in Poland in September 1993) brought the Hungarian Socialist Party (HSP) back to power; of the 386-seat Parliament, the HSP gained 209 (or 54 percent) of the seats for 33 percent of the vote. The second place Alliance of Free Democrats (AFD) received 70 (or 18 percent) of the seats on a popular vote of 20 percent; followed by the former Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) with 9.6 percent of the vote and 37 seats. Although the socialists had secured a Parliamentary majority, they decided to enter into negotiations and form a coalition government with the AFD. Thus with 51 percent of the popular vote, the two HSP-AFD coalition parties had the necessary two-thirds parliamentary majority to amend the constitution.

Hungary's 1994 vote-to-seat disproportionality was remarka-bly similar to 1990 and resulted from Hungary's "mixed" electoral system. Out of the 386 deputies, 176 are chosen in two-round (majority and plurality), single-district elections, while up to 152 seats are filled in proportional votes in 20 regional constituencies, and at least 58 representatives are chosen from a national compensation list.

Similar to Poland, one of the consequences of the Hungarian electoral system is that while disproportionality magnifies the strength of the winning parties and enhances governability, it is wholly ill-suited when it comes to the needs of constitutional politics. The constitution's amending formula, which allows two-thirds of the Parliament to revise the constitution, cannot be left as it is! Theoretically, the new socialist-liberal (HSP-AFD) coalition could unilaterally act under the inherited amending formula to change the constitution along with the current two-thirds electoral law and permanently undermine the chances of the weak opposition.

Both the electoral law and the constitution's amending formula present dangers to Hungary's parliamentary democracy and constitutional stability. One indication of this danger occurred on 30 September 1994 when all four opposition parties walked out when voting began on a constitutional amendment to voting procedures for local elections. But the HSP-AFD coalition, with two-thirds majority, voted to change the constitution to simplify procedures for local election and improve the chances of the incumbent left-of-center majority. This led to charges of a constitutional dictatorship.

In addition, the procedures for amending the constitution need to be changed to bring the past five-year transition period to a legal close. Though Hungary needs a new procedure to prevent ceaseless parliamentary tinkering with the constitution, the new socialist-liberal coalition is not in a good position to initiate a new phase of constitution making. First, although it holds 72 percent of the seats, its 51 percent electoral base is too narrow to establish anything but a winner's constitution. Second, neither the HSP (whose forerunner HSWP imposed a pseudo-constitution on the country) nor the AFD is well-situated to sponsor a new constitution. But Hungary needs to revise its constitution to deal with the following problems: it must clarify the role of the president, reduce the Constitutional Court's powers, and redefine the role of the prosecutor.

During 1995, Hungary is likely to draft and pass a new Hungarian constitution because the coalition parties are committed to this goal. They have formed a 27-member parlia-mentary committee (HSP will have 10; AFD 5, and opposition parties 10) to draft the new document, working under the minister of justice. They plan to present the new constitution for popular ratification by 20 August 1995, when new presidential elections are required.

Several items on the constitutional agenda include presidential powers, guaranteeing judicial independence by a National Judiciary Council, redefining the role of the public prosecutor, reforming local government, and trimming the Constitutional Court's functions.

A new constitutional amending formula will be proposed, requiring a second parliamentary session to ratify amendments made by a previous one. Finally, a new electoral law will be proposed, abolishing the second elect-oral round, keeping a mixed system but taking the principle of proportionality into account.

When the new government was formed after the election, HSP leader Gyula Horn became prime minister (see Table 8 below). On 24 June the HSP-AFD coalition signed a government agreement; the AFD would take over three ministries--interior, transportation, and education--and the HSP would take over the remaining 12. Gyula Horn appointed retired Colonel Gyorgy Keleti as new defense minister.

Table 8 - Hungarian Defense Reform, 1994

Keleti, former press spokesman for the ministry under Fur, had left under a cloud in 1992. Keleti noted that he walked out on Fur "because the conditions prevailing in the ministry made it impossible to work normally with the minister and several of his employees."

Upon Keleti's return on 15 July 1994, he began to replace all the MDF personnel mostly with former colleagues from the armed forces; Reserve Colonel Joszef Feher was promoted to Brigadier General on 15 July and appointed administrative state secretary;

retired LTG and former Chief of Staff Laszlo Borsits and MG Karoly Janza became deputy administrative state secretaries. Keleti also appointed MG Csaba Liszkai to supervise press and social relations with the rank of deputy state secretary. The military also took over departmental-level positions. Colonel Peter Haber, an old colleague of Borsits, became head of the Military Department under Borsits; Colonel Nandor Gruber replaced civilian economist Sandor Kovacs as head of Defense Economic Department; and Colonel Istvan Szekeres replaced civilian sociologist Laszlo Dobos as head of Department on Social Relations and Culture.

One civilian, Andras Toth became political state secretary; and in November, Dr. Istvan Fodor replaced Andras Toth (whomoved to head the prime minister's office) as the new political state secretary at the defense ministry. The only other high-ranking civilian was Tibor Toth (an expert on disarmament from the foreign ministry) as one of the three deputy state secretaries. Keleti also began an internal reorganization of the defense ministry cutting it from 317 to 287 people. Defense ministry spokesman Colonel Lajos Erdelyi noted that the reorganization was "an internal affair" adding that according to law, the defense minister can make such decisions. In response, Imre Mecs, chairman of the National Assembly's Defense Committee, expressed concern about "militarization" of the defense ministry and noted that there was not enough "civilian staff."

In an early interview Keleti noted that he was sure that he would have harmonious relations with the generals and that he intended to act as a civil politician and not a "former colonel." He also indicated that intended to abolish the government order that provides deadlines for the organizational fusion of the Army headquarters with the defense ministry and after further study, decide whether or not the proposed fusion was really justified, since "the Army leadership should receive sufficient independence to plan and lead their professional activity."

He also noted that he met with President Goncz and agreed to meet with him once a month to inform him about the Army's situation. Keleti also invited Robert Pick, head of the president's military office, to attend all cabinet sessions of the ministry.

Then in early September, Defense Minister Keleti recommended to the National Assembly Defense Committee that the defense ministry and Amy headquarters not be merged.

Also as of 1 November Keleti once again divided the two top Army positions when he appointed LTG Sandor Nemeth to become chief of staff, while retaining Janos Deak as Commander of the Hungarian Defense Forces.

Keleti noted that his major concern was retention of professionals in the armed forces. Because the Army cannot be financed from the budget with its current structure, Keleti proposed reducing personnel by calling up fewer conscripts; some 2,000 less in August 1994, with repeated reductions in February 1995 and 1996 reducing the Army by 12,000 overall. In addition he suggested beginning February 1996 reducing the length of military service to ten months with a more intensive training program.

Keleti noted that the ministry calculates that it needed 69 billion forints in 1994, of which 7.2 billion was not covered by revenue; and that efforts by defense managers could only cut 3.5 billion by cost-saving means.

MG Karoly Janza, deputy state secretary for economic and budgetary affairs, argued that the financial situation was worse than he expected, citing significant infrastructure expenses of more than one billion forints to maintain the recently acquired MiG-29s. Janza suggested that reducing exercises and conscripts was the only way to reduce the shortfall.

When Keleti noted in September that he would cut the size of the defense ministry as a cost-saving measure, he claimed that he would retain the Army Command size as is because intermediate command levels were to be eliminated and the military zones were to report directly to the General Staff.

In response to the economic shortfall, Keleti also shifted further from his predecessor's policy. After the MiG-29 acquisition from Russia, Lajos Fur had indicated that he also would like to get the S-300 missile air defense system in exchange for the remaining $800 million debt. Though Keleti rejected this policy, he did make efforts to acquire military spare parts and armored vehicles from the Ukraine in return for Hungarian goods.

Keleti also stressed that he wanted to pursue modernization in the Air Force, particularly radio-technical modernization (ground-based radar).

When Army Commander Janos Deak presented the army reform concept to the National Assembly, he noted that the program was motivated by the fact that budgetary allocations were inadequate to maintain existing military structures and by the need to modify the military to integrate into NATO.

Keleti promised that he would continue to reduce the intake of conscripts and beginning in 1996 would reduce their national service time to nine months.

In addition, the reform would reduce Hungary's four military districts to two, resulting in a reduction of staff.

Based upon the PFP exercise experience and military exercises with NATO states, Imre Mecs noted that "we have a long way to go to catch up in the fields of telecommunication, organization, and cooperation, including the knowledge of languages. [Nevertheless, he concluded that] the Hungarian Army would be suitable for NATO membership around 1998.

Hence, during 1995 a German-British-Hungarian PFP exercise is planned, with plans to invite one sub-unit from each of Hungary's neighboring countries. Hungarian soldiers will also participate in an exercise in Italy.

Hungary has come a long way. The National Assembly has effectively developed oversight of the military through budget, approval of the Basic Principles of National Defense and the Defense Bill, and deployment of armed forces. The Constitutional Court has effectively addressed the problems caused by the October 1989 Constitution and 1 December 1989 Defense Reform; and, its decisions have been respected. The military has evidenced significant reform; it has been restructured to accommodate NATO, but force modernization continues to be greatly restrained by scarce resources.

But Hungary still has a number of tasks to achieve effective civilian oversight of the military. Hungary's main tasks are to adopt a new constitution that has broad-based national consensus and clarifies some outstanding issues such as the president's wartime authority. In addition it is necessary to ensure that the defense ministry maintains real civilian oversight of the military. Finally, military training and force modernization needs attention and development to meet NATO standards.