Title: Central European Civil-Military relations and NATO expansion - Chapter VI

CHAPTER VI: CZECHOSLOVAKIA: FROM UNITY TO FEDERATION AND DIVORCE
Czechoslovakia did not have a powerful set of opposition forces like the Catholic Church and Solidarity in Poland. Nor did it have reformers in the Communist Party like Hungary. Nor did Czechoslovakia have by November 1989 a mass popular movement like the one that toppled the seemingly immovable Honecker and the Wall in East Germany. Despite this, and because of population expectations and lack of support for the Communist Party, Czechoslovakia's "Velvet Revolution" was extremely swift. Peaceful demonstrations and revolt, which erupted suddenly on 17 November 1989, ended the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCS)'s dominance, President Gustav Husak's rule, and led to the naming of a federal government dominated by non-communists on 10 December 1989.
After the Communist government used security troops to suppress a large public demonstration in Prague on 17 November, within days Vaclav Havel united opposition groups to create an umbrella organization, Civic Forum, to press their demands. After five days of strikes, the Communist government led by Prime Minister Ladislaw Adamec held its first meeting with Civic Forum representatives.Note 1 Then after only one week of mass demonstrations, Communist reformer Karel Urbanek replaced Milos Jakes as CPCS leader on 25 November 1989 and ten of the 13 members of the Communist Party presidium resigned. Note 2
On the following day Civic Forum issued a political program entitled "What We Want." Citing the deep moral, spiritual, ecological, social, economic, and political crisis resulting from the ineffectiveness of Czechoslovakia's then existing political and economic system, the Civic Forum political program set forth a number of objectives. Regarding the political system, it called for all political parties to have an equal opportunity to participate in free elections and for the CPCS to abandon its constitutionally guaranteed leading role within society. Regarding the law, the program called for a new constitution, to be adopted by a newly elected legislative assembly, to make relations more precise between the citizens and state. Finally, regarding the economy the Civic Forum program called for abandoning existing methods and creating a developed market.Note 3
On 29 November the Federal Assembly voted unanimously to abolish the constitutionally guaranteed "leading" role of the Communist Party in government and society.Note 4 As pressures continued to deepen between Civic Forum and Prime Minister Adamec over the formation of a new government, which would include Civic Forum representatives, Adamec resigned in frustration on 7 December to be replaced by Marian Calfa, a Slovak.Note 5 When the new government was finally formed on 9 December, for the first time since 1948 the Communists became a minority, holding only ten of 21 Cabinet posts. The ministry of interior post was left vacant. Slovak dissident Jan Carnogursky, recently released from prison, became deputy prime minister and headed a new commission overseeing the secret police. Jiri Dienstbier, a dissident who had been imprisoned with Vaclav Havel, became foreign minister. Vaclav Klaus, a Civic Forum strategist, became finance minister. Note 6
When President Gustav Husak resigned on 9 December, Civic Forum and its Slovak counterpart Public Against Violence announced that Forum leader Havel was their candidate for president, which according to the Constitution, the Federal Assembly had to elect within two weeks upon a vacancy.Note 7 On 29 December 1989, the Federal Assembly elected Vaclav Havel, a distinguished playwright and essayist and one of the spiritual leaders of the opposition to Communist rule, President of the Republic and, as such, took over as commander in chief of the armed forces.
In his new year's address to the Czechoslovak people President Havel set the tone for Czechoslovakia, when he noted:
My dear fellow citizens. For the past 40 years on this day you have heard my predecessors utter variations on the same theme: how our country is prospering...Our country is not prospering...We have become morally ill...I mean all of us, because we all had become accustomed to the totalitarian system...None of us is merely a victim of it, because all of us helped to create it. As the supreme commander of the defense forces, I intend to guarantee that the defense capability of our state will never again be a pretext to thwart courageous peace initiatives...People, your government has returned to you! Note 8
On 29 March 1990, the Federal Assembly approved the state's name change from Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (CSSR) to the Czechoslovak Federal Republic (CSFR). Under Slovak pressure the name of the state was again changed on 20 April to the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR). Czechoslovakia's free elections on 8-9 June 1990 resulted in Civic Forum majorities to both parliamentary houses. In the 150-seat House of the People, the Civic Forum/Public Against Violence Coalition received 88 seats; the Communist Party, 22; and the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), 21. In the 150-seat House of Nations, Civic Forum received 82 seats; the Communist Party, 22; and the CDU, 24.Note 9 Hence, by June 1990 full democratic mandate existed in Czechoslovakia completing a revolutionary process that had started only seven months earlier.
Hastily Concluded Defense Reform
The purpose of Czechoslovakia's defense reform was to establish federal presidential, governmental and parliamentary command and control over the defense ministry and the Czechoslovak People's Army (CSPA). In addition, the reform had to remove Czechoslovak Communist Party (CPCS) influence from, and establish civil control over the defense establishment and armed forces and to ensure that the forces were sufficient to guarantee the integrity and sovereignty of Czechoslovakia. Finally, the defense reform had to restore the armed forces' prestige in Czech society. In contrast to Poland, Czechoslovak society (like Hungary) held the military in low esteem because the armed forces had remained passive during the Munich crisis in 1938, the February 1948 Communist coup, the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, and apparently played a role in supporting counter-revolutionary activities during November 1989.
Constitutional Development. Czechoslovakia's 1960 Stalinist Constitution, which replaced the 1948 Ninth-of-May Constitution that severely limited the autonomy granted Slovakia,Note 10 declares the National Assembly shall be the supreme organ of state power.Note 11 According to Articles 49 and 50.3 of the 1960 Constitution, the National Assembly has the power (by vote of three-fifths of the delegates) to elect the president of the republic, to amend the constitution,Note 12 and to declare war in case of an attack or in the fulfillment of international treaty obligations.
The Constitution names the president of the republic the head of State and Article 62 grants him the power to: appoint and promote generals; act as commander-in-chief of the armed forces; and proclaim a state of war on the recommendation of the government (premier, the vice-ministers, and ministers) or declare war in pursuance of a National Assembly decree, if Czechoslovakia is attacked.
Because of the concentration of communist governmental authority in Prague, there had been growing discontent in Slovakia. As a result, on 27 October 1968, a new Constitutional Law of Federation amended 58 of the 1960 Constitution's 112 Articles that mainly concerned Slovak autonomy. The 1968 Constitutional Law federalized the government and declared the Czechoslovak State to be composed of "two equal fraternal nations."Note 13 It replaced the unicameral National Assembly with a bicameral Federal Assembly (see Table 9 below). The two bodies--the Chamber of the People based on proportional representation and the Chamber of the Nations, which contained an equal number of Czechs and Slovaks--shared equal authority.
Table 9 - CSFR Defense Reform, 1989-90
Despite the 1968 Constitutional Law of Federation, political power remained highly centralized in the hands of the Communist Party after the Warsaw Pact invasion. In addition, further Constitutional amendments in July 1971 authorized the federal government to interfere with and invalidate measures of the national governments. In other words, although the 1968 reform had remained intact through the 1989-90 revolution, in reality federalism remained little more than a facade after the 1971 constitutional amendments and under unitary Communist Party rule. As a result, after the 1989 revolution the Federal Assembly passed a series of amendments to address these problems. In December 1990 it passed an act on division of competencies between the two republics; and in July 1991 debated a law giving the federal and republican parliaments the right to declare a referendum on the form of the state.Note 14
On 9 January 1991 the Federal Assembly passed a Constitutional Act which instituted a Six Chapter, 44-Article, Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms protecting the individual from the State. In addition the Constitutional Act amended Article 5 of the 1968 Constitutional Act granting equal rights to citizens of both republics and the Federation and guaranteeing the status of nationalities in the CSFR. Note 15
Concerns over Czechoslovak People's Army (CSPA) subordination to the CPCS were clearly evident during the period of revolutionary change in Czechoslovakia. On 23 November 1989 Defense Minister Milan Vaclavik gave orders for possible use of force and urged the CPCS leadership to put the militia and CSPA on alertcecm-notes6.htmNote 16 and the CSPA published a strongly worded statement asserting that the CSPA would "defend Communism [and the] achievements of socialism."Note 17 On 24 November Gustav Husak resigned as CPCS leader and the order was never issued.Note 18
In response to the question to whom the CSPA was subordinated, Defense Minister Vaclavik announced to the Federal Assembly on 29 November 1989 that:
"We identify ourselves, above all, with those who think well of socialism and who are not misusing emotions to exert pressure to de-stabilize the political and economic situation in our society."Note 19
Apparently the ambiguity in Vaclavik's statement caused enough parliamentary concern to name Miroslav Vacek the new defense minister on 3 December 1989. When the same Federal Assembly asked Vacek the same question on 12 December 1989, he responded: "...from the very inception of the Czechoslovak Republic...the CSPA has always been subordinated in accordance with the constitution, above all, to the president of the republic...[who] has been the commander in chief. I assure you, esteemed deputies, that the CSPA will not be misused against the process which is taking place in our Republic."Note 20 Then on 19 December 1989, Prime Minister Calfa appointed MG Anton Slimak (who was promoted to LTG on 3 May 1990) to be the new Czechoslovak Army (CSA) chief of staff.
Another civil-military issue was the need to ensure the defense ministry's control of the military and guarantee that the CSA would remain subordinate to the government. This was a legitimate concern because of the existence of the then top secret Statute system that provided the Soviet Union direct access to Czechoslovak armed forces and the fact that most of the CSA officers had been trained in the USSR. To achieve this end, during the December 1989 revolution the CSFR changed the composition of the State Defense Council, which was responsible for exercising the general guidelines of the CSFR's defense capabilities. Rather than being chaired by the communist party secretary, the federal president (Vaclav Havel) became the Defense Council chairman, and the prime minister, members of the two national governments, the foreign, defense and interior ministers, and the chairman of the State Planning Commission became its members.Note 21
On 29 December 1989, Civic Forum civilian Antonin Rasek became deputy defense minister for education and culture with responsibility for abolishing the CSPA's political apparatus. In March 1990, outside experts proposed that the Federal Assembly create a General Inspectorate of the Czechoslovak Army, independent of the defense ministry. At first nothing was done because the defense ministry opposed the concept claiming that it already had its own inspectorate. Later the defense ministry capitulated and accepted the creation of a General Inspectorate with the proviso that it be created from the reinforced defense ministry inspectorate.
During August 1990 new pressures developed to create a real Inspector General (IG) chosen by parliament to ensure observation of laws and to monitor control of Army.Note 22 The reform effort took on new life on 18 October 1990 when Lubos Dobrovsky, a civilian, became defense minister. On 6 December 1990, the Federal Assembly finally enacted the proposal to create an Inspector General who oversees the armed forces, performs inspections, and prepares parliamentary reports on implementation of constitutional provisions, expenditures, level of preparedness, and implementation of military strategy.Note 23
During 1989-1990 the CSFR also established a number of oversight bodies to ensure military renewal and defense ministry subordination to state control. First, Civic Forum was dominant in an Association of Military Renewal [Vojenska Obroda (SVO)] established in December 1989 to participate in the development of CSFR military doctrine and to democratize the CSPA.Note 24 That this was an uphill battle became evident on 20 September 1990 when the SVO Central Committee criticized Defense Minister Vacek, the army leadership's lack of cooperation, and the slow pace of military democratization and restructuring.Note 25
Second, on 19 January 1990 a Union of Professional Soldiers was founded.Note 26 Its purpose was to defend the social welfare of servicemen and to participate in cadre issues. Third, in early September 1990 the founding Congress of the Free Legion [Svoboda Legie] convened in Prague. In opposition to the Army leadership, the Free Legion promoted the goals to reduce Army enrollment, professionalize the force, and promote 12-month military service. The Free Legion had also demanded Defense Minister Vacek's resignation because of his role in the November 1989 counterrevolution.Note 27 Both the Union and Free Legion played less important roles by 1992.
Concerned about the Army's role during the 17-24 November 1989 revolutionary period, on 18 September 1990 President Havel set up an investigation commission comprised of two members from the Federal Assembly Defense and Security Committee, two from SVO, two from the defense ministry Inspectorate, two from the President's Office, and one from the Military Office of the President.Note 28 On 16 October 1990 Havel received the commission's report which proved that Vacek and the Army Command had made preparations--under the code-word operation "Wave"--for actions against demonstrators.Note 29 The aim of the later abandoned operation had been to install army specialists in radio and television and gain control over broadcasts.Note 30 On the same day that Havel received the commission report, he recalled Miroslav Vacek and then (on 18 October) named a civilian, Lubos Dobrovsky to be defense minister.Note 31
In the immediate aftermath of the revolution, a serious civil-military issue in Czechoslovakia had been the question of secrecy of military affairs. Because of previous secret police abuses, military counterintelligence, which had been under the dual subordination of the defense and interior ministries, was transferred as of 1 April 1990, to the defense ministry as military defense intelligence.Note 32 The first stage of the reorganization of military counterintelligence into military defense intelligence had been completed at the end of June 1990 when the security service was transferred to the defense ministry. Some 16 percent of the former military counterintelligence officers did not pass Civic Forum and Military Renewal screening. Though the second stage was to be completed at the end of 1990,Note 33 on 1 October Vacek reported to the Federal Assembly that military counterintelligence was now subordinated to him; and that as of 1 January 1991 an "army security service" of 40-50 percent of the CSA's 800 military counterintelligence members would be in operation. Note 34
One of Lubos Dobrovsky's first actions was to suspend the activity of the military defense intelligence service (on 26 October 1990), placing all 827 employees on coerced "leave." Dobrovsky did this because he felt Vacek had not been thorough enough since 72 percent of the former members of the military counterintelligence service subjected to evaluations had been deemed fit for further service. Dobrovsky justified his action by noting that: "I believe that the staff of the former counterintelligence service ought to be subjected to screening...identical with those undergone by the staff of the State Security Corps...[adding that] Even people who passed the screening should not work in the military defense intelligence service in the future."Note 35 Deputy Defense Minister Antonin Rasek added that in the future military defense intelligence would function with only about one-fifth of the present staff and would also take over military police tasks, including those of the crime squad.Note 36
In December 1990 Dobrovsky was quite forthcoming in his views. Following the dissolution of military defense intelligence, he intended to create a new unit subordinate to the defense minister to "protect the Army against any kind of destructive act on the part of anyone." In early December this unit had a staff of 80 people, and was envisaged to grow to 180 (compared to the original 827 on coerced leave). An all-professional 1,000-man military police force charged to deal with Army criminal activity and traffic controlNote 37 began operating in April 1991.Note 38 In addition, Dobrovsky greatly eased secrecy laws so that publication of troop size, deployment, and budget were made public, though mobilization plans and everything connected to them remained classified.Note 39
Parliamentary and governmental oversight of the military had advanced through the appointment of a civilian defense minister, the establishment of the Inspector General (IG), organizations such as the SVO and Free Legion, and implementation of screening laws and campaigns.
President Vaclav Havel in December 1990 sought an expansion of his emergency authority during periods of serious social unrest, natural disasters, and international incidents. Havel sought the state of emergency bill because the CSFR Constitution--which had been changed after the November 1989 revolution to prevent interference in internal affairs--limited presidential authority and because of concerns about Saddam Hussein's threats of terrorism and the Soviet crackdown in the Baltic.Note 40 Havel sought powers to employ the Army, if circumstances warranted, to secure basic food stuffs and telecommunications to prevent state collapse.Note 41
During Spring 1991 the restructuring of the Czechoslovak federal ministry of defense--as the supreme body of the Army--was completed (see Table 10 below). The political administration section controlled by Defense Minister Dobrovsky was separated from the direct command of the troops, led by the chief of the general staff. Directly subordinate to Dobrovsky was a secretariat and four organizations--the minister's inspectorate, health administration, personnel administration, and the courts. Note 42
Table 10 - CSFR Defense Reform, 1991-92
The reformed defense ministry comprised four elements:
- (1)A deputy defense minister for social and humanitarian questions, led by a civilian Antonin Rasek, headed directorates on social management, legal service, higher educational institutions, and military institutes for Sociological Research, History of the Army, and Culture.
- (2)A deputy defense minister for strategic management and development headed by Gen. Imrich Andrejcak.Note 43
- (3)A deputy minister for economic management headed by Ivan Balaz, dealing with budgetary issues, ecology, and private enterprise. This deputy minister had acquired great political importance since the CSFR's military industrial base was disproportionately positioned in Slovakia where 80,000 people were employed. The CSFR's depressed military industry meant higher Slovak unemployment rates, contributing to state tension (and disintegration).
On 25 April 1991 Balaz announced that he would soon present a plan to alleviate the consequences of military industrial unemployment, especially in Slovakia. Not only did Balaz mention the need to get the Czechoslovak Army (CSA)'s special facilities--the 12,000-employee Military Engineering Works and 28,000-employee Czechoslovak Army Repair Works--more involved in civilian sector "entrepreneurial activity," but also the need to maintain Czechoslovakia's foreign military sales, specifically citing Syria, Iran, Algeria, and Latin America. Balaz also noted that the earlier announced CSA troop redeployment to Slovakia would not take place unless the defense ministry were to get three billion crowns (kcs), which the redeployment was expected to cost and "which the Army does not have."Note 45
- (4)The CSA's Chief of General Staff heading the armed forces. Czechoslovakia was able to gain control of the General Staff through different means than Hungary and Poland. Many former military officers, who had sympathized with the 1968 Prague Spring reform, had been cashiered after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. They provided a pool of former military officers, who were politically reliable, and available for duty. One such officer was MG Karel Pezl, an SVO member and adviser to Lubos Dobrovsky, who replaced LTG Anton Slimak as CSA chief of staff on 29 April 1991.Note 46 On 15 May, Pezl noted that his most important tasks were to: "[C]hange the whole image of the Czechoslovak Army in a short period of time and change it from an offensive into a defensive army."Note 47 Further military shakeups occurred on 1 June 1991, when Dobrovsky recalled the deputy commander of the General Staff, commander of the Main Logistical Support Branch, and head of the Main Administration of Ground Forces. Note 48
During the failed Soviet coup in August 1991 when Czechoslovakia tested its emergency machinery, it (like Hungary) felt less threatened than Poland because Soviet troops had already vacated its territory. On 19 August 1991 the federal interior ministry set up a special security staff, comprising representatives from foreign affairs, defense, transport, the federal intelligence service, and from the republican ministries. The staff met around the clock, issued orders to carry out certain measures on the borders, evaluated incoming information, and prepared proposals for the Defense Council.Note 49 On 20 August the Defense Council approved measures for the defense of the state, securing continuous supplies for the CSFR, and reinforcing the borders against migration.Note 50
The CSFR's greatest test came with the 6 June 1992 Federal Assembly democratic elections, whose results brought the CSFR's disintegration. Though Slovak demands for autonomy were realized, it opened a new era in relations between Czechs and Slovaks, and boded ill for Central European security. During the next six months, the federal government began to decline while the two republican governments began to assume more and more authority with the impending 1 January 1993 split.
Czechoslovakia's Velvet Divorce
Constitutional Divorce. When the new Federal Assembly was elected in June 1990 as a constituent assembly, it created a self-imposed mandate to complete a new constitution within its two-year term. By far the most contentious issue facing the constitutional drafters was the structure of the federal state and the respective competencies of the two member republics. As the 1992 elections approached, talks stalled as all parties awaited the results of the elections.
On 11 May, well before the 5-6 June 1992 elections, Vladimir Meciar, head of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, met with Vaclav Havel and noted that following a declaration of sovereignty, Slovakia would adopt a new constitution for itself, and then hold a referendum to decide if Slovakia should remain in the federation.Note 51
In the elections for the Federal Assembly there was an 85 percent turnout in the Czech Republic and 84 percent in Slovakia. The 5 percent threshold to win representation allowed Czechoslovakia to avoid the Polish 1991-fragmentation problem and reduced the number of political parties from more than 20 to six from each republic to the Federal Assembly, with Vaclav Klaus' Civic Democratic Party (ODS) getting 34 percent of the vote in the Czech Republic and Vladimir Meciar's Movement for Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) getting 34 percent of the vote in Slovakia.Note 52 On 7 June Vaclav Havel charged Klaus with forming a new federal government.
Czech and Slovak differences were immediately apparent after the 5-6 June 1992 CSFR elections. Klaus's espousal of rapid and radical market reforms clashed with Meciar's more cautious, socialistic economic agenda and penchant for nationalistic proclamations. After meeting with Meciar on 9 June, Klaus noted "deep and fundamental differences in views on the future setup of Czechoslovakia."Note 53 Meciar wanted a sovereign Slovak state with weaker links to Prague; Klaus favored a strong federation or split. After two weeks of discussion, Meciar and Klaus agreed to negotiate a division of Czechoslovakia into two states by 30 September. When the Slovak parliament convened on 23 June, Meciar pushed it to declare sovereignty in July and adopt a Slovak Constitution in August.Note 54
On 26 June the CSFR Prime Minister Marian Calfa and government resigned to make way for a new interim Cabinet, which would have only ten members; five Czechs and five Slovaks.Note 55 When Jan Strasky (ODS) became the new prime minister instead of Klaus it was clear the split was imminent; Slovaks took over the ministries of foreign affairs, interior, and defense.Note 56 CSFR President Havel and Vaclav Klaus, leader of the Czech Civic Democratic Party wanted the next federal defense minister to be a civilian while Meciar's Movement for a Democratic Slovakia wanted a professional soldier.Note 57 In the end, Klaus prevailed and LTG Imrich Andrejcak, an independent Slovak, became the new CSFR defense minister after going into the reserve. Jiri Pospisil assumed Andrejcak's position as deputy defense minister for strategy, and Antonin Rasek was recalled and replaced by Igor Urban as deputy defense minister for social and humanitarian affairs.Note 58
When the Slovak National Council adopted a declaration of sovereignty with a margin of 113 to 24 (with ten abstentions and three deputies absent) on 17 July,Note 59 Vaclav Havel announced he would resign as president. When Havel resigned on 20 July 1992, Jan Strasky, the CSFR prime minister, assumed the president's powers (except the power to appoint and recall the Federal Government). Chief of Staff Karel Pezl confirmed this publicly when he noted that the federal prime minister had now assumed the duties of commander-in-chief of the armed forces.Note 60
It was decided that the property of the CSA would be divided on a ratio of 2:1 among Czechs and Slovaks; with a special consideration for the Air Force and Air Defense. On 23 November 1992 the Czech and Slovak Republics signed a 21-article Treaty of Good Neighborly Relations, Friendship, and Cooperation, which contained guarantees on security consultation (Article 5) and ethnic minority rights (Article 8).Note 61 Then on 25 November 1992 the CSFR Federal Assembly approved, by the necessary three-fifths vote, the constitutional bill ending the CSFR.Note 62 The Constitutional Law On the Termination of the CSFR, which became effective immediately, vested powers in the two republics' legislatures, governments, and courts.Note 63
New Constitutions. At the end of July both the Slovak and Czech National Councils began preparations to draft new constitutions. Though constitutional development of the CSFR had been remarkably advanced, the disintegration of the federation would create new and different problems for each of the successor states. In some ways, particularly for Slovakia, both returned to the 1989-90 stage of development.