Tuesday
4 April 2000
0830-1130 (IS)
Generally in war, the best policy is to take a state intact; to ruin it is inferior to this. Do not put a premium on killing. To capture the enemy's army is better than to destroy it....For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill. Thus, that which is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy.
Sun Tzu
A confused army leads to another's victory....Thus a victorious army wins before seeking battle; an army destined to defeat fights in the hope of winning.
Sun Tzu
Information technology is America's gift to warfare.
Admiral William A. Owens
Information Warfare has emerged as a key joint warfighting mission area....A comprehensive IW approach is essential to ensure warfighters have the tools to exploit adversary vulnerabilities while ensuring full access to timely, accurate and relevant information wherever and whenever needed.
General John M. Shalikashvili
Clausewitz and Sun Tzu aren't dead; they've just learned to use the microprocessor.
James L. Rodgers
Purpose
The purpose of this lesson is to comprehend the emerging concepts of "information power," "information warfare," and "information operations;" analyze the military implications of national information power; evaluate US military strategy and joint doctrine for information warfare and operations; and evaluate future military information requirements and capabilities.
Learning Objectives
1. Comprehend the concept of "information power" as a strategically relevant element of national power.
2. Analyze the information and communications revolution for its military implications.
3. Evaluate current US policy, military strategy and joint doctrine for information warfare and informations operations.
4. Create and devise military strategies for defeating adversaries through information operations.
Discussion
Today's topic examines a swiftly evolving and controversial defense priority: information power. Because it is the least refined of the strategic dimensions we address here, it might be useful to start with a working definition of a related term, information superiority. That term means the ability to collect, process and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of reliable information, while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same.
Joint Vision 2010 and its 1997 sequel, Concept for Future Joint Operations, go significantly further, describing information operations as an "integrating strategy," focused on "the vulnerabilities and opportunities presented by the increasing dependence of the U.S. and its adversaries on information and information systems." Both documents also set the aim of "information superiority," defining it as the "key enabler" that will "transform" how we employ and protect our forces in the next century. Indeed, the entire Vision and the ensuing Concept are built on the twin pillars of information superiority and technological innovation, designed to give the U.S. a decisive advantage in future conflicts. Likewise, the NMS stipulates that "information superiority allows our commanders to employ widely dispersed joint forces in decisive operations, engage and reengage with the appropriate force, protect the force throughout the battlespace, and conduct tailored logistical support."
Clearly, then, information superiority is a critical force multiplier. As such, it should not be taken for granted. For, like other multipliers, it depends on wise investment, superior technology and effective integration of systems, organizations and doctrine. Moreover, like any strategic advantage, information dominance is not a given. Rather, it must be gained and sustained through offensive and defensive operations.
Despite these assertions, there is ample evidence that we have yet to come to grips with the nature, purpose and conduct of this unique form of warfare. Many senior US military leaders publicly voiced their dissatisfaction with our ability to exploit the potential strategic benefits of information in the wake of Operation Allied Force. Not surprisingly, absent a clear understanding of even the basic terms of reference, it is difficult to conceptualize when, where, how, and to what end we should engage in information operations.
To complicate matters further, the civilian community, in the United States and abroad, has access to-and often, ownership of-many of the key technologies through which information operations are conducted. Likewise, the promise embedded in both the emerging technologies and the innovative concepts for their employment is marred by serious concerns over opening a Pandora's box of new ethical considerations and unforeseeable vulnerabilities.
There is also a great deal of sensationalism associated with this subject. For example, almost three years ago, Time magazine ran a full cover story on "cyber war," arguing that "the U.S. rushes to turn computers into tomorrow's weapons of destruction" and concluding that we may "soon wage war by mouse, keyboard and computer virus." More recently, dire warnings of an "electronic Pearl Harbor" have been sounded and a Presidential Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection has been established to look into our current and future vulnerabilities.
In this new realm, the strategist's tasks remain unchanged: Determine the "kind of the war upon which you are embarking, neither mistaking it for nor trying to turn it into something that is alien to its nature." We must ask ourselves whether the logic of our maturing strategic frameworks can help us understand the enormous potential and the risks and vulnerabilities of this new dimension of conflict. Can we also develop coherent concepts to master it?
Issues for Consideration
1. How could information technologies and the ways in which they might be used change the fundamental nature, purpose and conduct of war? What are the implications for the basic definition of "war"? When and how does it begin? When and how is it terminated? What are the measures of success? Who is, or should be, the "competent authority"?
2. What role should organizations other than DoD play in the development and employment of militarily relevant information technologies? If there is no meaningful distinction between military/civilian, national/international, and government/non-government assets, what are the implications for U.S. strategy in peace, crisis and war?
3. What changes in our current approaches, organizational and operational concepts, and resource allocations are required to attain the goal of information dominance? What is their relative importance among other competing priorities? What, if anything, should the United States do now to hedge against the threat that its current information superiority might be challenged by future adversaries or peer competitors?
4. How might U.S. actions in this strategic dimension affect inter-operability with current and future coalition partners? What message does this send to potential adversaries?
5. How would you assess the probability that information warfare would be employed in an unprovoked attack upon the United States? What indications and warning might there be of such an imminent attack? What defensive measures would be called for?
6. Are there any clear dividing lines within the U.S. strategic infrastructure which might determine whether offensive information warfare against the United States could merit a conventional military response? a nuclear response? Is the strategic infrastructure a vital national interest? What is the meaning of national security in "cyberspace" and is it a vital national interest?
7. Archer - The National Command Authority will have to make decisions to release certain information operations weapons to CINCENT and decide when to authorize those weapons for employment.
One of the weapons is "Spy Chips," which are computer chips covertly inserted into enemy computers or computer networks. They can execute espionage operations or destructive attack. The operating spy chips covertly implanted into Iraq's networks include 5 chips among three of Iraq's nuclear weapons facilities; 12 within its military command and control network; 56 within its public switched network; 23 in its power grid; 1 in each of four strategic command bunkers; and 12 in its Integrated Air Defense. Each chip has transmitted a signal identifying its location.
If incorporated in a network in turn connected to the Internet, the spy chips can transmit information on the activities of the penetrated network back to a US intelligence agency. Each chip is also accompanied by a logic bomb (malicious software) capable of destroying whatever computer it is located in when instructed to do so by Internet message or radio signal.
What are the implications of these technologies? Should CINCENT be authorized to use spy chips before any overt aggression takes place by Iraq? Why? Why not?
Required Readings
1. Joint Pub 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, Chapter I, "Introduction," pp. I-1 - I-20. (Student Issue)
2. Roger C. Molander, Andrew S. Riddle, and Peter A. Wilson, "Strategic Information Warfare: A New Face of War," Parameters, vol XXVI, no 3 (Autumn, 1996), pp. 81-92. (Reprint)
3. Lawrence Freedman, "The Revolution in Strategic Affairs," Adelphi Paper 118, IISS, Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 49-68 (Reprint)
4. Jia Xiaowei, "Pay Close Attention to Network Warfare Which Has Quietly Arrived, " Beijing Jienfangjun Bao, Peoples' Liberation Army, 24 Aug 99. (FBIS) (Reprint)
5. Fu Tong, Tao Wang and Du Xianzhou, "Four Years of Confrontation on the Net - Report on How a Division Command Post of Lanzhou Military Region Tries to Improve Its Command Capability Under High- Technology Conditions," Beijing Jienfangjun Bao, Peoples' Liberation Army, 29 July 99. (FBIS) (Reprint)
Recommended Readings
1. Joint Pub 3-13.1, Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare.
2. Joint Pub 6-0, Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications and Computer (C4) Systems Support to Joint Operations.
3. Jeffrey A. Harley, "Information, Technology and the Center of Gravity," Naval War College Review, Winter 1997.
4. Ryan Henry and C. Edward Peartree, "Military Theory and Information Warfare," Parameters. Autumn 1998, pp. 121-135
5. Edward Waltz, "The US Transition to Information Warfare," Journal of Electronic Defense, Dec 1998.
6. Yang Minqing, "Facing the Future Information War," Beijing Jingki Cankao Bao, Xinhua News Agency, 15 Oct 99. (FBIS)
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