Monday
3 April 2000
0830-1130 (LS)
Amateurs talk strategy, professionals talk logistics.
General H. Norman Schwartzkopf, quoting Erwin Rommel during the "Mother of all Briefings," March 1991
For the foreseeable future, the United States, preferably in concert with allies, must remain able to deter and defeat large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping times frames.
A National Security Strategy for a New Century, 1998
If we do not build a transportation system that can meet our needs of tomorrow, then it doesn't matter much what kind of force we have because it won't be able to get there.
General John M. Shalikashvili
Dr Matthews: We have modeled force closures for two MRCs using several time periods to define "nearly simultaneous." Fifteen days, I believe, was the tightest. Is that transportation-feasible?
General Kross: No. It's fantasy. Not achievable. Not transportation-feasible.
General Walt Kross, USCINCTRANS
Oral History, October, 1999.
Purpose
The purpose of this lesson is to analyze the military logistical implications of a global national security strategy; evaluate current and projected US joint logistical capabilities and doctrine; and create and devise military logistical concepts appropriate to future US military theory and strategy.
Learning Objectives
1. Comprehend the logistical requirements of deploying, sustaining and redeploying U.S. active and reserve forces to and among smaller scale contingencies and major theater wars.
2. Comprehend the strategic mobility capacity of the United States Defense Transportation System (DTS) under all stages of mobilization.
3. Assess the implications of the dependence of the DTS on U.S. and foreign commercial carriers.
4. Evaluate current and projected U.S. joint logistical capabilities and doctrine.
5. Create military logistical concepts appropriate to future US military strategy.
Discussion
The DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms defines logistics as: "The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces." A more comprehensive definition would also include all aspects of developing and acquiring weapons and support systems. This lesson will focus on the more narrow definition of deploying and maintaining America's armed forces in multiple crises and, in particular, in two nearly simultaneous major theater wars from a posture of global engagement.
Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has become increasingly dependent upon its Defense Transportation System (DTS). The DTS is led by the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) and supported by its service components: the Air Force's Air Mobility Command, the Navy's Military Sealift Command, and the Army's Military Traffic Management Command. The assets assigned to these components include airlift, aerial refueling, sealift, afloat prepositioning ships, land transportation (primarily in CONUS) and seaport management, both CONUS and OCONUS.
Airlift will generally be the first means of response in a major crisis, but sealift will carry the vast majority of tonnage. This was best represented in Operation Nickel Grass, the resupply of Israel during the 1973 War. When the first sealift ship arrived in Israel, it carried more tons than the entire airlift (567 C-5 and C-141 sorties carrying 22,318 tons), but it arrived two weeks after the war had ended. The rapid speed and limited capacity of airlift, and the slow but massive capacity of sealift, are factors not likely to change in the 21st Century. Current war plans call for 95 percent of dry cargo and 99 percent of wet cargo to be transported via sealift.
The DTS is perhaps the best example of the success of Total Force. More than 50 percent of strategic airlift, 90 percent of aeromedical evacuation, and 80 percent of port operations personnel are in the reserve components. Furthermore, the DTS is a superb example of public and private sector cooperation for national security. In a major theater war, 95 percent of all troops and nearly one-quarter of all airlifted cargo will be deployed via commercial contract flights.
Sealift is also heavily dependent upon the commercial sector. Of the 464 sealift voyages made during the Desert Shield deployment, only 34 were accomplished by DoD owned ships. The Ready Reserve Force (operated by the Department of Transportation) provided ships for 162 voyages and 268 were made by commercial ships (77 US-flagged / 199 foreign-flagged). All ships were operated by civilian mariners. According to a recent GAO Study, this dependence on the reserve component and private sector has saved the American taxpayers billions of dollars during the past four decades. It likely will also remain unchanged in the 21st Century.
The DTS has enjoyed remarkable success during the past several decades, but the challenges of the 21st Century are cause for concern. These include the reduced overseas presence of US forces; general force reductions; increased operating tempo for deployments in support of UN, NATO and other humanitarian operations; an aging and decreasing fleet of airlifters; and relative decreases in US-flagged shipping. Possibly even more significant is "access," that is, whether the United States will be granted the overflight, transit and port entry rights necessary to move forces quickly. A parallel challenge is the poor, and declining, quality of transportation infrastructure in some parts of the world. All of these have caused some to doubt DoD's ability to support our current national security strategy. Furthermore, some question the capability of a system highly dependent on civilians to operate in combat environments.
When developing national security and military strategies for the challenges of the 21st Century, the capabilities and weaknesses of America's DTS must be fully understood and appreciated. As Martin Van Creveld pointed out in his seminal work, Supplying War:
"Strategy, like politics, is said to be the art of the possible; but surely what is possible is determined not merely by numerical strengths, doctrine, intelligence, arms and tactics, but in the first place, by the hardest facts of all: those concerning requirements, supplies available and expected, organization and administration, transportation and arteries of communication."
If the U.S. is to remain a global power in the 21st Century, it must maintain its global reach. That global reach requires a robust DTS. Strategists need to understand and appreciate the strengths and weaknesses of the current system and develop a vision for what it must become.
Issues for Consideration
1. When the SECDEF and Chairman were recently asked by Congress about America's capability to fight and win two nearly-simultaneous MTWs, they said the US could win the first MTW, but they assessed the risk to be high in the second. What does this assessment mean?
2. Is the significant dependence on the civil sector a major vulnerability? A key element in winning the second MTW is the ability to rapidly move forces from one theater to another. Since civilian airlines would move the vast majority of troops, and commercial sealift the vast majority of equipment and supplies, doesn't this suggest a clear and effective strategy to an opponent? Would attacks on air and seaports by SCUDS, conventionally-armed terrorists, or chemical/biological contamination seriously disrupt these operations? Is this the Achilles' heel of America's national security/military strategy?
3. What are the likely effects of implementing the various stages of the Civil Reserve Airlift Fleet?
4. Archer - Chemical or biological weapons use by Iraq would cause a significant problem for the US during the initial movement into SWA. Since 80% of the available military airlift aircraft are supporting the operation in Korea, contract cargo aircraft will make up the bulk of the early lift into the Gulf.
Civil Contract and the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) WILL NOT operate in a contaminated environment because:
- The instrument to provide the civil airlift is a business contract that does not contain the requirement to operate in an NBC environment.
- The oxygen and communications hook-ups on Civil Aircraft are not compatible with aircrew chemical ensembles.
- Civil Crews are not trained to fly in contaminated environments; however, they will receive "just-in-time" training and Ground Chemical Warfare Defense Ensembles for emergency purposes only.
Does this affect your thinking at this stage in the crisis either about the ability of the United States to deal with the crisis or about declaratory statements concerning chemical or biological weapons?
5. Archer - The four operational concepts of Joint Vision 2010, Dominant Maneuver, Precision Engagement, Full Dimensional Protection, and Focused Logistics have produce combat support systems that are responsive, flexible, and precise. Said in different words, particularly the Army and Air Force units which deploy into SWA will be light, lean and lethal. The consequence is that resupply must begin at the time of deployment. Should this affect the NCA risk calculus in the situation? Would it change the response?
Required Readings
1. Joint Pub 4-01, Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System. "Executive Summary," pp. v-vii; Chapter I, "The Defense Transportation System," pp. 1-1 - 1-6; Chapter II, "Interrelationships," pp. II-1 - II-10; Chapter III, "Transportation Resources," III-1 - III-11. (Student Issue)
2. Walter Kross, "The Joint Force Commander and Global Mobility," Joint Force Quarterly (Spring, 1998), pp. 57-61 (Reprint)
3. Kevin R. Wheelock, "Review Criteria for the Logistic Plan," Joint Force Quarterly (Spring, 1997), pp. 128-133. (Reprint)
4. John A. Tirpak, "Airlift Reality Check," Air Force Magazine (December, 1999), pp. 31-36. (Reprint)
Recommended Readings
1. Stephen P. Ferris and David M. Keithly, "21st Century Logistics: Joint Ties that Bind," US Army War College, 1997.
2. Joint Pub 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations, "Executive Summary".
3. Martin Van Creveld, Supplying War, Cambridge University Press, London, UK, 1977.
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