Wednesday
16 March 2000
0830-1130 (LP)
A paradox of this new strategic environment is that American military superiority actually increases the threat of nuclear, biological, and chemical attack against us by creating incentives for adversaries to challenge us asymmetrically.
William Cohen, SECDEF
Our most vexing future adversary may be one who can use technology to make rapid improvements in its military capabilities that provide asymmetric counters to U.S. military strengths.
Joint Vision 2010
We must learn to negotiate new geography, where borders are irrelevant and distances meaningless, where an enemy may be able to harm the vital systems we depend on without confronting our military power.
President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection
The one that scares me to death, perhaps even more so than tactical nuclear weapons, and the one we have the least capability against, is biological weapons.
General Colin Powell
Purpose
The purpose of this lesson is to comprehend the concept of "asymmetric" threats and to evaluate weapons of mass destruction and their nonconventional use as possible "asymmetric" threats that will shape future US military theory and strategy.
Learning Objectives
1. Understand the concepts of "asymmetric threats" and "weapons of mass destruction."
2. Analyze current and projected trends in the use of asymmetric warfare by state and non-state actors.
3. Evaluate biological weapons as an asymmetric threat to the United States
4. Evaluate the vulnerability of the US homeland and US deploying/deployed forces to BW attacks.
5. Analyze the military implications of such an attack.
Discussion
This lesson introduces the concept of asymmetric challenges and looks at one in particular - biological weapons. Asymmetric challenges are not new. Indeed, one can argue that the entire history of warfare is one of opposing sides trying to identify and attack each other's vulnerabilities in ways that are difficult to counter. What brings the notion of asymmetric challenges to the fore in this era is the dominance of the United States and US allies in both nuclear and conventional forces, convincingly demonstrated by Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm and several operations since. Potential adversaries of the United States would likely recognize that challenging US conventional power for the time being is both high risk and expensive. So they look to counter US strength in ways to which we cannot readily respond in kind.
Traditionally, the United States has placed the very idea of operating in an environment dominated by chemical and biological weapons (CBW) in the category of "too hard to think about," let alone execute. Our aversion to this type of warfare has been so great that-as you will recall from Course 5604 discussions-we have been at the forefront of almost every international effort to ban the use and possession of CBW. The United States has unilaterally renounced any future development of these weapons, has no biological stocks, and is rapidly dismantling its remaining chemical arsenal. The problem is that many in the international community have been unwilling to practice what the U.S. has been preaching. Not only does Russia retain a formidable capability, at least 25 other nations have long discovered the relative ease with which CBW can be acquired or developed indigenously, and then hidden from international scrutiny.
Furthermore, contrary to popular belief, the 54-year-old taboo against nuclear use does not seem to apply to chemical and biological weapons. Although the horrors of WWI have not been repeated, there has been intermittent employment in such far-flung places as Ethiopia, Yemen, Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq. More recently, the possibility of chemical or biological attack was a serious possibility during the Gulf War. To this day, there is an ongoing debate as to whether Saddam Hussein was deterred from launching his considerable arsenal against coalition forces. Regardless, the fact that Iraq has been able to hide (if not actually continue) production-even when shackled by the strictest inspection regime ever imposed by the international community-attests to both the relative ease of deception and the high priority some nations may attach to weapons of mass destruction.
To complicate matters still further, nation-states are not the only international actors to pursue this capability. As the gas attack by the Aum Shinrikyo sect in Tokyo subway demonstrated, such weapons are not beyond the reach of well-educated and technically skilled terrorists. While the threat of fratricide and the inherent uncontrollability of weapons-effects might continue to constrain their use, the taboo has already been broken and usability demonstrated. Simply put, the benefit of attaining a critical objective might outweigh the costs and risks, particularly if the threat to one's own community is deemed minimal. Thus, a rational calculus might no longer exclude the employment of weapons of mass destruction. Of course, even if it does, we are still left with the irrational actors who, unfortunately, are not in short supply.
International treaties and wishful thinking notwithstanding, the reality is that any nation or group capable of producing beer or agricultural pesticides has the potential to produce biological weapons. Likewise, a 486 computer and a modem has the potential to shutdown a billion dollar weapons system. Defense against such threats is compounded by the permeability of international borders and the essential uncontrollability of international trade, and by the diffusion of scientific information now readily accessible on the Internet. Therefore, these weapons and the implications of their employment must be factored into our strategic equation.
Issues for Consideration
1. How serious is the threat of asymmetric attack on the US homeland and/or US forces?
2. How could this threat alter US security and military strategy in the 21st Century?
3. How seriously would you assess the threat of biological warfare over the next 10 to 20 years? What are the military advantages and disadvantages of an adversary using this weapon? What problems do biological weapons pose for military commanders?
4. What type of response would be appropriate to a BW attack on the American homeland or on deployed US forces?
5. Archer - The Central Intelligence Agency has reliable information that a terrorist group with suspected links to the Iraqi government has acquired biological weapons. The group plans to attack US troop locations in Turkey at the time of an Iraqi conventional operation in the Gulf. One of the agents the group has acquired is non-lethal but causes a flu-like incapacitating sickness. How should the United States respond to this kind of a low-level biological attack?
Required Readings
1. James K. Campbell, "Excerpts from Research Study, Weapons of Mass Destruction and Terrorism: Proliferation by Non-State Actors," Terrorism and Political Violence, Summer 1997, pp. 24-50. (Reprint)
2. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., "Asymmetric Warfare and the Western Mindset", 20 Nov 97 presentation at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University conference on The Role of Naval Forces in 21st Century Operations. pp. 1-12. (Reprint)
3. Randall J. Larsen and Robert P. Kadlec, "Biological Warfare: A Silent Threat to America's Defense Transportation System," Strategic Review, vol XXVI, no 2 (Spring, 1998), pp. 5-10. (Reprint)
4. Colonel Charles J. Dunlap Jr., USAF, "How We Lost the High-Tech War of 2007: A Warning for the Future," The Weekly Standard, January 29, 1996, pp. 22-28. (Reprint)
5. "Global Perspectives on the Revolution in Military Affairs: Selected Asymmetric Responses," A Report Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 13 November 1998, Foreign Systems Research Center, A Division of Science Applications International Corporation, pp. 1-50. (Reprint)
Recommended Readings
1. Alan Vick Shlapak, "The Evolving Threat to Airbases," Check Six Begins on the Ground: Responding to the Evoloving Ground Threat to U.S. Air Force Bases, Santa Monica, CA, RAND, 1995.
2. Richard Preston, "The Demon in the Freezer: How Smallpox, a Disease Eradicated Twenty Years Ago, Became the Biggest Bioterrorist Threat We Now Face," The New Yorker, 12 July 1999, pp. 44-61.
3. http://cns.miis.edu/research/cbw/cbterror.htm
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