Tuesday
14 March 2000
0830-1200 (PD/S)
The proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and the missiles that can deliver them pose a major threat to the security of the United States, its allies and friendly nations. Over 20 countries possess or are developing NBC weapons, and more than 20 nations have theater ballistic missiles or cruise missiles to deliver them. Some of these countries are pursuing capabilities for much longer range ballistic missiles.
Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, 1999
It may not be the sheer killing power of these weapons that produces the greatest effect. It is the strategic, operational, psychological, and political impacts of their use that can affect strategic objectives and campaign decisions.
Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations
Purpose
The purpose of this lesson is to analyze the strategic and military implications of the proliferation of cruise and ballistic missiles as an example of the broader trend of transnational technology transfers and rapid technological growth.
Learning Objectives
1. Analyze missile technology proliferation as a transnational phenomenon with military strategic implications
2. Evaluate arguments for and against deployment of a national missile defense system from a military point of view.
3. Comprehend how cruise and ballistic missiles change tactical and operational dynamics and therefore become a strategic factor.
4. Evaluate the likely future threat of continued missile proliferation and technology advancements
Discussion
An important military trend is the proliferation of cruise and ballistic missiles. Rapid technological change is both improving these weapons' range and accuracy while reducing the costs and complexities of their production. The globalization of information and the market mean that reliable and sophisticated missiles and missile systems are no longer the sole province of the well developed nations. Meanwhile, a host of political, economic and social problems make sale and acquisition of missiles and missile-related technology attractive to many states and conceivable to non-state actors.
This proliferation is a major military concern to the United States. Relatively precise missiles, especially (but not only) when coupled with weapons of mass destruction, can be used to counter US forces in a number of potentially successful ways. First, they put major platforms such as aircraft, ships and combat vehicles at risk and so can counter conventional forces directly, especially challenging the air and maritime superiority necessary to operations in the strategic littorals. Second, as we learned so tragically in the Gulf War, even imprecise missiles and rockets pose a threat to the logistical train that normally accompanies any significant US deployment. Third, missiles are a potentially effective "anti-access" weapon that could deny to the US use of key ports and airfields required to deploy and sustain forces. Fourth, missiles are less expensive to develop and deploy than are effective defenses and counters to them, and so can seem an attractive way for a poorer nation to confront a richer nation. Finally, and perhaps most worrisome, medium- and long-range missiles could be launched against the United States itself.
The difficulties of countering missile proliferation do not end there. Theoretically effective defenses depend on cutting-edge technologies that are largely unproven and very expensive and thus stimulate considerable political debate over their necessity. Most defensive systems depend upon the cooperation of other countries, at least to host critical sites, and so raise questions of reliability, shared risk, and shared threat perception, all of which can create diplomatic tensions that affect other aspects of our relations. The choice of deploying or not deploying missile defenses has implications for arms control as well. Deploying a national missile defense, for example, would clearly require an amendment to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Russia, which the Russians oppose.
For this topic, we will examine in some detail the current debate over national missile defense. Perhaps no other issue so clearly illustrates the difficult nexus of military, technological, political, economic, ethical, and diplomatic considerations that attend military strategy. We intend first to evaluate the threat itself and come to our own judgment as to its military gravity and the military measures that might be taken to counter it. This is the formulation of military advice, which the JCS are expected by law to do. Then, as national security strategists, we will consider the broader political, economic, ethical and diplomatic implications of the military situation in order to judge whether there is a "best" strategic response to missile proliferation. Although our focus is on national missile defense, analogous problems exist with regard to theater missile defenses and, indeed, to countering the whole range of arms and technology transfers that are changing the global military balance.
Issues for Consideration
1. How would you measure and express the military risk posed by the proliferation of intercontinental ballistic missiles? Is it modest, because the missiles available to potentially adversarial nations pale in comparison to the threat once posed by the Soviet Union? Or is it grave, given that even one impact of a missile bearing a weapon of mass destruction is unacceptable?
2. Other than national missile defenses, what military measures (if any) should we consider as part of our strategy to counter this threat? What other instruments of power might be brought to bear?
3. Does the current national military strategy as you understand it adequately address the threat as it has been portrayed? If not, how might it be improved? Given what you know of this threat, what priority should the counters to it be given in our overall strategy and defense spending?
4. Archer - If the United States had a national missile defense capability, would the JCS approach the military dimensions of two conflicts any differently? What about the policy dimensions?
5. Archer - The US places considerable emphasis on theater missile defense (TMD). In our two-contingency scenario, force protection will be a major strategic issue. The US will have limited TMD assets to protect forces and politically sensitive targets in two theaters. The assets will be Navy Aegis Cruisers with Upper Tier; Army THAAD and Patriot PAC-3 for close-in defense; and the new USAF Airborne Laser in limited numbers. Both CINCs will want highly reliable coverage over US forces. Politically, the US will be asked to expand protection for some cities in Japan and the Republic of Korea. In addition, the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council will probably make a US guarantee against Iraqi missiles and nuclear weapons a condition of involvement. As the CJCS, how will you decide which theater has the priority? Between protection of forces, critical infrastructure and populations?
Required Readings
1. Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, pp. IV-18 - IV-19. (Student Issue)
2. National Intelligence Council, "Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015," September 1999. (Reprint)
3. National Air Intelligence Center, Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat, April 1999 (Student Issue)
4. Congressional Testimony of Lieutenant General Ronald Kadish, Director, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization. (Reprint)
5. O'Hanlon, Michael, "Star Wars Strikes Back," Foreign Affairs, vol 78, no 6 (November/December 1999), pp. 68-82. (Reprint)
6. Drozdiak, William, "Possible Missile Shield Alarms Europe," The Washington Post, November 6, 1999, p. A1. (Reprint)
7. Fitchett, Joseph, "Chinese Nuclear Build-up Predicted," International Herald Tribune, November 6-7, 1999, p. 1. (Reprint)
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