Panel/Seminar
Two major powers will be addressed: the power of the purse, and the power to use military force.
The federal budget serves many purposes: it sets priorities for government spending among diverse interests, programs, and claimants; it is a highly political document which structures the public and congressional debate over policies and priorities; and, it gives the President a degree of control over the Executive Departments and to a limited extent over the economy.
For the first 132 years of the federal government, there was no presidential budget. It was not until 1921, with the enactment of the Budget and Accounting Act, that the president was given responsibility for initiating the budget. Before then, there was a "Book of Estimates," prepared by each executive agency, which was taken to Capitol Hill often independently of the president. These estimates were then negotiated with the appropriate congressional committees and subsequently approved by Congress. There was no presidential control, no OMB, and only a sporadic federal coordination process. But the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 changed all that and laid the groundwork for the current budget process.
In 1974, Congress sought to exercise its power of the purse in a more rational, comprehensive way by passing the Budget and Impoundment Control Act. Congress began looking at the budget as a whole and making broad tradeoffs among spending categories. It also created new institutions--the House and Senate Budget Committees, and the Congressional Budget Office--to facilitate its new responsibilities.
Before a single dollar can be spent on any defense program, it must pass nine hurdles (six committee votes--budget, authorization, and appropriations in each House--plus the three related conference committees set up to reconcile differences) and survive twelve floor votes (passage of two bills and one resolution in each House plus passage of the conference Report for each bill and final budget resolution). It could be argued that there are even more hurdles since there are mark-up sessions in subcommittee as well as full committee.
In 1994, Congress acted on several significant measures affecting the budget process: it approved budget resolutions which foresaw a balanced federal budget by 2002; it passed legislation giving the President a modified line item veto over certain spending measures, starting in 1997; and, the House approved (but the Senate did not) a Constitutional amendment requiring a balanced budget.
In 1997, President Clinton and Congress took advantage of a booming economy and enacted a comprehensive budget to end the deficit on the books by 2002 while also cutting taxes and increasing funds for certain programs. One of the great policy debates of the previous decades was resolved in 1998 when the surging economy ended the deficit.
In regard to the use of force, the Constitution gives Congress the power to declare war but makes the President commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Those differing powers over the use of force have led to intense struggles at times in our history.
During the Vietnam War, Congress passed the War Powers Resolution in 1973 over the veto of President Nixon. While he opposed that legislation, Nixon reluctantly accepted Congress' use of the power of the purse that same year when it enacted another law prohibiting the use of funds to "support directly or indirectly combat activities in Southeast Asia." By the War Powers Resolution, Congress sought to set basic ground rules to reassert its Constitutional authority over one of the most important powers of government-the decision to introduce and maintain U.S. forces in hostile situations.
Since 1973, Presidents and Congress have avoided a showdown on the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution. Presidents have tried to avoid a clear violation of its provisions while Congress has refused to force the issue or, as in the 1991 Persian Gulf debate, has passed legislation having the effect of endorsing Presidential action.
In recent years, there has been less emphasis on war powers procedures and much more on legislating timetables and conditions for the use of troops abroad.
The readings provide the historical background, advocacy for and against the War Powers Resolution, and an analysis of congressional power through funding restrictions.
Topic Objectives
- To understand the process by which the Executive Branch develops its budget proposals to send to Congress.
- To comprehend the Congressional budget process for national security programs.
- To assess the impact of recent legislative developments on the budget process.
- To assess the relatives merits of pro-Executive and pro-Congressional views on the exercise of war powers.
- To review the adequacy of the War Powers Resolution as a means of codifying respective war powers.
Questions for Consideration
- Why did Congress give the responsibility for preparing the budget to the President? Does the Office of Management and Budget adequately protect the President's interests?
- Does it really matter for the U.S. economy how big the federal budget is, or what proportion is discretionary, or how much the deficit is? At whose expense should the budget be balanced?
- How influential are Members of Congress or lobbyists in the development of the defense budget within the Pentagon?
- What reforms might improve the budget process?
- To what extent are defense programs protected by an "iron triangle" linking the military services, Congress, and defense industry?
- Is a two-year budget a good idea?
- How much latitude should the President have in using force?
Required Readings
* Congressional Oversight of National Security: A Mandate for Change (The Final Report of the CSIS Project on Congressional Oversight of Defense) (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1992), pp. 7-28. (Reprint)
* Howard E. Shuman, Politics & The Budget: The Struggle between the President and the Congress (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1984), pp. 1-21. (Reprint)
* Allen Schick, The Federal Budget: Politics, Policy, Process (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1995), pp. 49-62, 70-97. (Reprint)
* The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 1997, AFSC Pub 1, pp. 5-1 to 5-21. (Student Issue)
* William C. Banks and Peter Raven-Hansen, National Security Law and the Power of the Purse (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 27-32, 171-181. (Reprint)
* Paul R. Stockton, "Beyond Micromanagement: Congressional Budgeting for a Post-Cold War Military," Political Science Quarterly (Summer 1995), pp. 110:233-260. (Reprint)
* Richard F. Grimmett, "War Powers Resolution: A Brief Summary of Pro and Con Arguments," CRS Report for Congress, June 5, 1966. (Reprint)
* Louis Fisher and David Gravy Adler, "The War Powers Resolution: Time to Say Goodbye," Political Science Quarterly, Volume 113, Number 1, (1998), pp. 1-20. (Reprint)
* Robert Keith "Introduction to the Federal Budget Process," CRS Report for Congress, August 28, 1998, pp. 1-28. (Reprint)
* Louis Fisher, "Judicial Rulings on the War Power," CRS Report for Congress, August 18, 1999, pp. 1-20. (Reprint)
* War Powers Resolution, (Public Law 93-148 [H.J. Res. 542], 87 Stat. 555, 50 U.S.C. 1541-1548). (Reprint)
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