"All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress."
U.S. Constitution, Article I
Panel/Seminar
In addition to the general power to legislate, Congress has several enumerated powers in Article I, section 8, which bear directly on national security. These powers make it a major participant in both the formulation and implementation of national security--primarily through the hearing, confirmation, ratification, and authorization/appropriation processes.
The major national security committees of Congress are divided into two groups: the legislative or authorizing committees and the funding or appropriating committees. Both kinds of committees have oversight functions as well, the former to see that the laws and policies are carried out and the latter to make certain that the funds are spent for the purpose appropriated. The budget committees also play a role in the process by developing budget authority and spending ceilings beyond which neither the authorizers nor appropriators may go.
The Senate Armed Services Committee and its counterpart, the House Armed Services Committee, have primary influence over defense policies and programs through their authorization bills. The Appropriations Committees control the purse strings for all government agencies. Other committees also have some jurisdiction over national security issues. These include the House International Relations and Senate Foreign Relations Committees, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. International trade and economic policy issues come before still other committees.
Congress has the authority to regulate the internal organization, procedures, and operations of Executive Branch entities, and has used its oversight function from the earliest days of the Republic as demonstrated by the investigation of the war against the Indians in 1792. Examples of recent legislation strengthening this oversight function are the 1973 War Powers Resolution, which established provisions to regulate the introduction of U.S. forces into hostile situations; the 1990 Intelligence Oversight Act which required specific reporting by the CIA; the requirement that the President submit an annual written national security strategy to Congress; and numerous personnel, spending, or other requirements included in each year's authorization cycle.
Incentives for Congress to conduct oversight activities include fostering a give-and-take relationship with federal agencies which improves government efficiency; the public relations value of attacking waste, fraud and abuse; and saving scarce resources for use in other programs; and the acquisition of information useful in drafting legislation. There are also considerable disincentives for Congress to engage in oversight, caused in part by the fact that Members usually sit on Committees where there is a personal or State interest, and interest group contributions usually do not flow to critics of their respective programs.
Members of Congress from States with extensive defense industries often join the defense authorizing and or appropriating committees. Membership on the budget or intelligence committees is less desirable since making budget cuts is unpopular and there is seldom political mileage to be gained from intelligence related work, which often remains classified and unpublicized.
Members are subject to considerable pressures in their daily schedules, which are only compounded when dealing with strategic issues. Typical demands range from a need for campaign financing, frequent travel, separation from family, constant contact with constituencies, demands from staff and special interests, to the advancement of their own personal agendas. They often have little time to reflect on broader national issues.
National security committee staff members are typically professionals with career profiles not unlike faculty or students at the National War College. Many are retired military officers. Committee staffs tend to be older and serve longer than Members' personal staffs. Since the mid 1970s, there has been a major growth in staff size as Congress has attempted to develop expertise to review, oversee, understand, and sometimes challenge the actions of the Executive Branch.
Topic Objectives
- To understand the procedures by which Congress participates in national security policy.
- To assess the techniques used by Members to influence national security decision-making.
- To understand how legislative and budgetary tools shape policy.
- To understand the role of staff in the operations of Congress.
- To assess how staff get their information and how they relate to others in Congress and the Executive Branch.
Questions for Consideration
- Is Congress justified in its efforts, especially since the 1970s, to play a more active role in U.S. national security policies? Has the impact of that assertiveness been positive? What circumstances might lead to a swing of the pendulum back toward presidential dominance?
- How do Members reflect public opinion by their votes and actions? Is it done differently in the House and Senate?
- Does Congress have adequate staff and technical expertise to conduct oversight? Are politicians intended to have technical expertise? Is it engaged in too much or too little oversight? How much does oversight cost and is it cost effective?
- How much influence do staffers have with their Members? To who is a staff member ultimately responsible: the Constitution, the national interest, or the Committee Chairman?
Required Readings
* John T. Tierney, "Congressional Activism in Foreign Policy: Its Varied Forms and Stimuli," in David A. Deese, The New Politics of American Foreign Policy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), pp. 102-126. (Reprint)
* Edward V. Schneier and Bertram Gross, Legislative Strategy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), pp. 159-201. (Reprint)
* John R. Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, Congress as Public Enemy (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1995), pp. 124-162. (Reprint)
* Roger H. Davidson and Walter J. Oleszek, Congress and Its Members, 6th Edition (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1997), pp. 120-152 and 251-273. (Reprint)
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