THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY
1. Technology and its application has been a high priority of the Strategic Defence Review, underpinning the themes of high capability forces and better value for money in defence. This essay looks at how, at a time of accelerating technological change, we can best take account of the impact of technology for defence purposes.
2. We need battle-winning forces to underpin our foreign and security policy. They must be able to make a distinctive, high quality contribution to multinational operations; and their equipment must give them a decisive technological edge over any potential opponent. If our forces are to remain contributors of quality to NATO and other multinational operations, our capabilities must be firmly at the high end of the technological spectrum and technically compatible with those of our allies. We must therefore ensure that we procure equipment based on high but proven technology.
3. Our Armed Forces must be able to conduct a wide range of operations, from high-intensity combat to peacekeeping. The MOD must also contribute towards the Government's wider objectives of building Britain's reputation in the international community, developing a skilled and well-educated workforce and providing opportunities for high technology work for British industries.
4. As scientific discovery and technological advance continue apace, so the military options available to potential aggressors increase. The military advantage will rest with those who most effectively identify and exploit battle-winning technology. This places a premium on the ability to generate and identify opportunities; adopt them for military use; and integrate them rapidly into platforms, weapons systems and force structures. Britain must therefore maintain an agile and effective research and development process.
5. It is the very pace of technological advance and the associated explosion of opportunities which makes it unlikely that every opportunity can be exploited. Hard choices will be required to cope with the wide range of possibilities within a limited budget. We must therefore focus on areas where we can really make a difference, such as communications and information systems, improved explosives, better sensors and improved simulation.
Changing Technology
The Pace of Change
6. Military planners have sometimes been slow to recognise, and the procurement process slow to exploit, the opportunities offered by advances in technology. With the accelerating pace of change we shall need to be especially alert to this issue. Moreover, whereas advances in science and technology for military purposes have historically had applications in the civil market, new advances in the civil market are increasingly having profound implications for our future military capability.
7. In electronics, software and information technology generally, civil investment in research and development is ten times greater than defence investment. The computing power of state-of-the-art systems is doubling every 18 months or so; this implies around a 100-fold increase over ten years. The impact of these developments will be all-pervasive because of their use in the vast majority of modern military systems. We have to accept that in these areas it is difficult to predict where technological advances may lead for more than about five years in the future. Nevertheless, the Smart Procurement initiative will ensure that fast moving technologies can be quickly developed to maintain the capability of in-service platforms and systems through technology insertion, thereby guarding against obsolescence.
8. If we are to meet our foreign and security policy objectives, we must also be able to operate on terms of broad technological parity within multinational operations, most probably involving the United States, and to counter opponents exploiting freely available civil technologies. Although we may be forced to replace or upgrade systems dependent on fast-moving technology (weapons, sensors and communication equipment) more frequently than in the past, platforms are likely to retain their operational edge for longer because the technologies on which they depend (materials, structures and propulsion) will probably advance less rapidly, and because they will be designed to accommodate updates. Thus the balance of investment will shift from platforms in favour of the progressive update of in-service equipment.
The Revolution in Military Affairs
9. The biggest change in the conduct of future military operations is likely to come not from the weapons alone but from the application of information technology to military command and control . There is a growing body of opinion, particularly in the US, that we are approaching a 'Revolution in Military Affairs' in which we will see a step change in military capabilities resulting from the synergistic combination of long-range precision weapons with networks of advanced sensors and data processors. Radically improved capabilities in the field of information processing and communications systems will increase situational awareness (knowing where hostile and friendly forces are, and where they are not) by combining information from all available sources and rapidly distributing it to those who need it, thus permitting more effective and efficient use of our forces. Smart long-range precision weapons will enable us to attack targets accurately from distance, thereby reducing our own and civilian casualties.
10. Leaving aside the academic debate on whether or not a revolution is underway, it is clear that exploiting these technologies will lead to significant improvements in military capability. They will inevitably be led by the US. If Britain and other Allies can successfully tap into these developments, the result will be more effective coalition operations. Conversely, there is potential for multinational operations to become more difficult if compatible capabilities are not preserved. This could lead to political as well as military problems. Our priority must therefore be to ensure that we maintain the ability to make a high quality contribution to multinational operations and to operate closely with US forces throughout the spectrum of potential operations. To do this we may need to be selective about the technologies we develop nationally or on a European basis, and be prepared to use US technologies in other areas in order to continue to make a leading contribution to multinational operations.
11. Keeping pace with the US is not solely dependent on funding. We are already talking to the US Administration about the policy implications. In parallel we will need to ensure that doctrine is developed to take full advantage of the potential of developing technologies.
12. Our forward equipment programme contains a range of projects which will exploit key technologies. These include the airborne stand-off radar (ASTOR) surveillance system; and our indirect fire precision attack programme which will provide a range of smart, long-range, guided weapons delivered by rockets or extended range artillery. Long-range airborne systems include the Brimstone, Storm Shadow and Hellfire missiles. In addition, our Joint Battlespace Digitisation initiative is fundamental to our future defence capability. This initiative aims to improve operational effectiveness by integrating weapons platforms, sensors and command, control, intelligence and information systems. It takes account of current work in the same field by the US and other NATO Allies to ensure that the communication and information systems crucial for future multinational operations will be compatible. The programme also reflects the perception that by 2015, military operations will no longer be characterised as sea, land or air, but will merge into a single battlespace in which the ability to conduct joint and combined operations will be fundamental.
13. The increasing dependence on high technology to ensure that our forces maintain the ability to fight and win when called upon may encourage some potential adversaries to adopt alternative weapons or unconventional strategies ('asymmetric warfare'). Our future plans will need to guard against introducing new weaknesses which aggressors could exploit and ensure that we have the capability to combat or defend against alternative weapon systems.
Human Factors
14. The design of defence systems must take account of the capabilities and limitations of the people who will operate them. The principle underlying the application of technology in this area is to build on human strengths and mitigate human weaknesses. Development of improved detection, countermeasures and treatments for victims of increasing threats, such as chemical and biological warfare, is being addressed. There will also be a continuing need to provide lightweight protection against explosive blast and fragments, as well as against environmental extremes such as heat, cold and vibration.
15. New equipment is also changing the role of people in battle. Technology offers the potential for reducing the exposure of personnel to situations of greatest risk, for example by allowing unmanned platforms to carry out roles previously requiring manned solutions. The most likely early application is in the use of unmanned aerial vehicles for reconnaissance. Our Phoenix programme is an important step, and we are committed to investigating the potential for their wider application. Other examples are the use of remote controlled unmanned vehicles for land and sea mine clearance, and the increased use of stand-off weapons. The increased automation of tasks can, however, isolate personnel from each other and from direct contact with the battle and potentially reduce their situational awareness. These issues must be understood and taken into account by such programmes as Joint Battlespace Digitisation.
Information Vulnerability
16. Greater integration of information systems has major benefits, but it also introduces new risks and offers new opportunities for an adversary to attack our information networks, thus degrading the fighting effectiveness of our forces. We will continue to invest in high quality research and development to ensure that we are at the forefront of this technological challenge.
17. The threat to information infrastructures is not just a defence issue. We are therefore working with other areas of Government, our allies and suppliers of key services to ensure that security policies and technical solutions match the developing nature of the infrastructure. We will provide appropriate resources to improve our ability to protect defence information networks, to deter those who would attack them and to provide an immediate warning of attack in order to counter and recover from such attacks. We will vigorously test these arrangements, make changes to policies and procedures where necessary, and provide training and education to assure the security and availability of information vital to the conduct of defence.
Modelling and Simulation
18. Increasingly sophisticated and accurate computer modelling techniques are transforming systems development and training. They are reducing development time and cost by cutting the number of prototypes required, and improving the efficiency and effectiveness of designs. Advanced simulation also allows the computer-based representation of complex equipment and scenarios for operational and tactical training, and provides mission rehearsal and decision-making tools. This has the added advantages of reducing the number of expensive munitions expended in training, the wear on warfighting equipment and the use of training areas, and could eventually lead to a requirement for fewer items of equipment.
Reliability
19. Civil equipment has become significantly more reliable in recent years, chiefly as a result of better manufacturing methods based on quality management and systems engineering. Our aim is to harness civilian best practice and apply it to military equipment. More reliable systems, which are easier to maintain and sustain in the field, will lead to a greater proportion available for operations at any one time. This too should mean that we can reduce the total number of systems required.
The MOD Response
20. In its Manifesto, the Government pledged to nurture investment in new technologies. As part of this process, the Strategic Defence Review has re-examined and confirmed the importance of technology in defence.
21. Excellence in specialised military fields, such as stealth, sensors, electronic warfare and guided weapons, will be essential, but there will also need to be closer links with the areas of civil technology described earlier. MOD will need to fund research aimed at incorporating the best of civil technology into military systems. Dual use (civil and military) research, in collaboration with industry, will be an important theme, as will increased international research collaboration.
Technology Strategy
22. The MOD, in discussion with industry, has produced a formal technology strategy, first published in May 1996, aimed at maximising access to the science and technology that is available worldwide. The intention is to develop the MOD technology base in those areas most likely to enhance defence capability. The strategy guides the formulation, in consultation with the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency (DERA), of a research programme designed to close the gap between the capabilities provided by the existing technology base and those required in the future. Our objectives are:
- to ensure that MOD has access to impartial high quality technical advice so that it can act as an 'intelligent customer' and obtain value for money in procuring higher technology equipment;
- to enhance the ability of industry to respond cost-effectively to MOD's equipment requirements;
- to facilitate collaboration and research planning with industry, other Government departments and Allies; and,
- consistent with defence aims, to contribute to Britain's overall prosperity.
23. The technology strategy provides a stable basis for the longer term planning of MOD's research programme, thus enabling other Government departments, industry and others to make plans accordingly. The strategy will, however, be updated at intervals in the light of changes to the military threat, technological opportunity and the views of stakeholders.
Technology Transfer
24. The MOD makes an important contribution to technology transfer to industry. Each year we spend over £2Bn on defence equipment development, including some £450M on research with the DERA. Technology transfer is, of course, a two-way street and the MOD also benefits from industrial developments in the world market. It is these mutually beneficial processes which we would like to enhance.
25. The Government's Manifesto said "we support a strong UK defence industry, which is a strategic part of our industrial base as well as our defence effort". In furtherance of this pledge, the Defence Secretary has re-invigorated the National Defence Industries Council, of which he is Chairman. One of the actions being taken forward under the Council's auspices is the preparation of a wider national technology strategy.
Defence Diversification
26. The main goal of technology transfer to civil industry is to accelerate and widen the diffusion of defence originated technology and techniques into the broader economy. This is easier said than done, and several reports produced by the Defence and Aerospace Panel of the Technology Foresight Programme have emphasised the need for better harmonisation of technical priorities between government, industry and academia.
27. We therefore see considerable value in fostering dialogue and networking amongst the Government, industrial and academic communities that formulate and deliver research programmes. Part of the expertise thus generated can be extended to civilian use more efficiently than at present, and we published our proposals for doing so in March 1998, in the consultative Green Paper 'Defence Diversification - Getting The Most Out Of Defence Technology" (Cm 3861). The centrepiece of these proposals is to set up a Defence Diversification Agency.
28. The Agency would provide a focus for information on what is available, stimulate access to Government expertise and facilities, and encourage collaboration. It would also provide a confidential database of future defence needs, to enable companies to consider how their technology could be applied to defence, or to target research and development to meet known future markets. We believe that this will help to strengthen the technology and manufacturing base, thereby securing the capacity to provide our future equipment needs, and to sustain manufacturing output and employment in accordance with the Government's broader objectives.
International Collaboration
29. International operations have become the norm, and the Armed Forces regularly train alongside our allies to hone their interoperability. It clearly makes sense to have consensus on what the key technologies of the future are and how interoperability will be maintained. MOD intends to ensure that such a consensus exists by maintaining the strong international links between both military and policy making staffs. To stimulate debate both within Britain and internationally, we intend to publish periodic reports on how emerging technologies worldwide could affect future military operations.
30. International collaboration offers access to the 95% of scientific research conducted overseas. Collaborative research, currently involving more than 20 countries, is an essential part of our technology strategy. It contributes to both the breadth and quality of the MOD technology base, improves the value for money obtained from defence research, leads to greater commonality in operational requirements and helps to achieve improved interoperability with our allies. Britain has a great deal to offer, with world-class technology and expertise in a number of fields, such as in the detection of biological warfare agents and in avionics systems. We can use this expertise to trade with other countries to our mutual advantage. Our strategy includes the identification and establishment of new collaborative projects with nations who possess a capability in those areas of advanced technology rates as a key for our future defence needs. With this aim in mind, it is our intention to maintain or increase our collaborative research activities.
Technology Demonstration
31. Technology demonstration is intended to reduce technical risk inherent in high-technology projects and to encourage the transfer to industry of technology derived from defence research. We intend to increase the use of technology demonstration and to involve the military user at an early stage in the evaluation of new systems, drawing on the lesson of the successful US model of advanced concept technology demonstrators.
Conclusion
32. One of the main lessons we have learned from our work on technology in the Strategic Defence Review is that in the future we will need to consider technology issues from a politico-military as well as a technical perspective. No country can hope to grasp every possible opportunity, but we have put in place the machinery to ensure that technology can be harnessed effectively for the Armed Forces. Our policy is to be able to make a distinctive, high quality contribution to multinational operations with equipment that is interoperable with our most advanced allies and has a decisive technological edge over our opponents. This presents a robust and ambitious goal for our use of technology which is given direction by a focused and coherent technology strategy.
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