THE FUTURE SHAPE OF OUR FORCES
76. The Review has demonstrated that our forces still have some way to go before they are fully adapted to the needs of the post-Cold War era. We need to solve the problems of undermanning and additional overstretch which comes from over-commitment. And we need to remedy weaknesses in key areas which limit their effectiveness for the changed pattern of operational demands. Modernisation has therefore been a key theme of our work.
77. In the Cold War, we needed large forces at home and on the Continent to defend against the constant threat of massive attack from an enemy coming to us. Now, the need is increasingly to help prevent or shape crises further away and, if necessary, to deploy military forces rapidly before they get out of hand. Most force projection operations of this kind are likely to be multinational. As in Bosnia, we can draw on the immense advantages of fifty years of working within the NATO Alliance. We also need to be able to participate in UN, Western European Union (WEU) or other multinational operations.
78. A similar broad range of capabilities is likely to be required to meet contingencies which may arise from our direct security interests and from our wider international responsibilities. In each case we could find ourselves in operations involving modern conventional warfare. Moreover, only forces equipped and trained for warfighting will have the range of specific capabilities - as well as the deterrent effect - to be effective across the full range of peace support and humanitarian operations.
79. While single-Service skills and ethos will remain the essential foundation of all our military capability, most future operations will be conducted by joint forces composed of fighting units from individual Services. These will be under joint (tri-Service) command and control, drawing on joint intelligence capabilities and with joint logistics. We must therefore also build the joint approach into our doctrine and our preparation and training for operations; in many areas, support functions can also be most effectively provided on a defence-wide basis (see Chapter 9).
Future Combat Capabilities
80. We cannot insure equally against every possible contingency and what we contribute to multinational operations must take account of what our Allies are able to do. Our modernised forces need a cost-effective mix of combat capabilities complemented by wider capabilities which will enable them to make a significant and effective contribution in the very wide variety of combat and other operations in which they may become involved. Such 'force multipliers' will be crucial to retaining a technological edge over potential adversaries.
81. Central to this is the ability to gather information about an opponent and use it to maximum effect. In military terms, the first aspect is our intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance capability (ISTAR). This is not only vital for combat operations but also increasingly important for many peace support operations. New methods of information gathering - particularly through sensors which operate at long distance - are becoming available. They had a significant impact in the Gulf War and further improvements are expected to lead to a step change in the information available to commanders at all levels.
82. The sheer volume of information will bring its own problems. It will only be useful if we can get the information to the right place at the right time and relate it to the wider military and political context. This will depend on developing improved command, control and communications capabilities ("C3" in the jargon). In doing so, we will need to give greater priority to ensuring our command and control arrangements enable us to work effectively in multi-national operations, including NATO's new combined joint task forces, UN missions and ad hoc coalitions.
83. The increasing dependency of modern armed forces on high technology information systems in this area brings both vulnerabilities against which we must protect ourselves and opportunities which we need to be able to exploit. Indeed, the potential vulnerabilities and risks arising from "information warfare" go much wider than the Armed Forces and the defence infrastructure. Defence is therefore contributing to the development of national security policies and technical measures to respond to these new challenges.
84. Our biological and chemical defence capabilities have assumed a new significance in the post-Cold War era. Although the use of such weapons is banned by international law, some opponents may be tempted to regard their use or threat as a counter to superior conventional forces. The evidence which the UN Special Commission has uncovered about Iraqi biological and chemical weapons programmes and Iraq's continuing failure to provide convincing evidence of the destruction of these capabilities provides the clearest and most immediate example of the dangers we may face. But there is also worrying evidence of wider proliferation.
85. At sea, the emphasis is continuing to move away from large scale maritime warfare and open-ocean operations in the North Atlantic. In future littoral operations and force projection, for which maritime forces are well suited, will be our primary focus. These tasks, which range from the evacuation of citizens from an overseas crisis to major warfighting operations as part of a joint force, will be highly demanding. The balance of anti-mine warfare previously centred on defence of UK waters will also move more towards force projection operations.
86. For the land battle, we will continue to need a full range of war fighting capabilities. Scale is likely to be less important but we need to be capable of offensive, mobile operations. Key requirements will be firepower (including air-delivered) with greater emphasis on precision and range to maximise military impact and minimise civilian casualties, and protection for our forces in a wide range of circumstances to make their deployment an acceptable risk. But both firepower and protection must be more deployable and more mobile on the battlefield. To achieve this, we will need to exploit to the full, new equipment entering service - notably 'smart' weapons and the Apache helicopter - and improved intelligence and reconnaissance. Over the period covered by the Review these changes will increasingly affect the nature of the land battle and we will need to adapt the structure and balance of our forces accordingly.
87. Air power will be a crucial factor in maritime warfare, on most battlefields, and as part of the most demanding peace support operations as in Bosnia in 1995. Air superiority and air defence will be essential for a wide range of deployed operations. For the next decade at least, the direct air defence of the UK will be a lower priority. Long-range air-attack will continue to be important both as an integral part of warfighting and as a coercive instrument to support political objectives (as demonstrated in the Gulf earlier this year). There will be an increasing premium on "stand-off" precision missiles which can be launched at targets from long range.
Scale of Effort
88. We cannot predict the crises we will face. Our forces are our insurance against the unexpected. We must not skimp on the premium because we will pay a heavy price if we get it wrong. At the same time we cannot afford the luxury of having additional forces 'just in case'. Our objective is to meet our purely national requirements and be able to make a reasonable contribution to multi-national operations in support of our foreign and security policy objectives.
89. On this basis, we have set some broad benchmarks for the scale of our planning. In addition to providing whatever military support is required to continuing commitments such as Northern Ireland, we should be able to:
- respond to a major international crisis which might require a military effort and combat operations of a similar scale and duration to the Gulf War when we deployed an armoured division, 26 major warships and over 80 combat aircraft.
or
- undertake a more extended overseas deployment on a lesser scale (as over the last few years in Bosnia) while retaining the ability to mount a second substantial deployment - which might involve a combat brigade and appropriate naval and air forces - if this were made necessary by a second crisis. We would not, however, expect both deployments to involve warfighting or to maintain them simultaneously for longer than six months.
We must also retain the ability, at much longer notice, to rebuild a bigger force as part of NATO's collective defence should a major threat re-emerge in Europe.
90. These scales of effort will not require significant changes to the strength of our Regular forces. But these forces must be configured so that, as well as responding to major crises, they are able at other times to carry out day-to-day tasks, several small but perhaps long-running commitments and respond to minor contingencies.
Joint Rapid Reaction Forces
91. The range of contingencies which may arise from the new-style risks and challenges described earlier require a different form of military response to the territorial defence of the Cold War. For conflict prevention, peace support, crisis management and war, the key will be to put a powerful joint force into place fast, capable of immediate and, if necessary, sustained operations. This applies to NATO commitments, operations under the auspices of the UN or other international organisations, and ad hoc multinational coalitions. The existing Joint Rapid Deployment Force can provide an early initial presence, which may act as a deterrent. Nevertheless, it is inadequate for the new environment because it is relatively small, lightly armed and potentially vulnerable if attacked before it can be reinforced by heavier forces which take much longer to deploy.
92. Our future military capability will therefore be built around a pool of powerful and versatile units from all three Services which would be available for operations at short notice. They will be known as Joint Rapid Reaction Forces. From these we will put together the best force packages - with real punch and protection - for particular circumstances. To make this work, we will also need to improve our strategic transport, operational logistics and medical services, and our deployable command and control arrangements. Our aim is for the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces to be operational in 2001.
93. The pool of Joint Rapid Reaction Forces will cover all military tasks for which we need to provide forces at short notice, including to NATO's Allied Command Europe (ACE) through our contribution to the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps and the ACE Mobile Force (Land). Its first echelon will always be held at very high readiness for 'early entry operations' - for example to secure a landing point - and to provide an initial military capability. Its second echelon will provide follow-up forces normally held at slightly longer readiness.
94. The first echelon forces would be able to provide a maritime task group, an air power package which could be used initially to deter or contain aggression, lead battle groups of land and amphibious forces (including an armoured battle group), and a special forces component. We are creating a fully equipped rapidly deployable Joint Task Force HQ to command these initial forces and be able to expand to command a larger force if required. We will also maintain the nucleus of a second HQ which could command a second contingency.
95. The second echelon naval and air forces will reinforce the initial force packages so that they can undertake substantial combat operations and, in particular, give them a significant offensive capability. For land operations, we will be able to provide a brigade-sized force. This could range from a commando or airmobile brigade to an armoured brigade.
96. Strategic Transport. It is not enough to modernise the front line. We have an urgent need to improve our strategic transport, to allow us to move more powerful forces quickly to an overseas theatre. In the short term we expect to do this through acquiring four additional roll-on roll-off container ships and four large C17 aircraft or their equivalent. In the longer term, we will also need to consider a replacement for our remaining elderly transport aircraft. The European Future Large Aircraft is a contender for this requirement.
97. Joint Helicopter Command. The support helicopter plays a crucial role in virtually all today's military operations. Its importance in providing tactical mobility and flexibility is likely to grow, especially when the Apache attack helicopter enters service. Although our support helicopters are already used very flexibly, to achieve maximum operational effectiveness we have decided to bring together all our battlefield helicopters (ie excluding those normally based on warships or used for search and rescue) in a single joint command. To achieve greater operational effectiveness, and enhance training and support, this Command will be responsible for the peacetime management of the helicopter fleet and for providing the helicopter force packages required by operational commanders.
98. Logistic Enhancements. The increased operational pressures of the last few years have shown up weaknesses in our ability to sustain forces deployed overseas, particularly where local facilities are limited. In particular, we would face serious difficulty in supporting two substantial operations at once. The pressure on our logistic services has been so great that specialists in key areas have only 14 months between periods of service overseas.
99. To remedy these weaknesses and ease overstretch we plan a package of logistic enhancements. These will include the creation of two Joint Force Logistic Component Headquarters and the creation of some 1900 new regular logistic posts to allow us properly to support two concurrent operations. Where this is appropriate, we will consider the use of contractors to assist with logistic support. At present this is more appropriate for well-established operations - as in Bosnia - but we are exploring whether this can be extended through the use of sponsored reserves (see paragraph 107).
100. Medical Support. The Review has identified a particular weakness in the amount of medical support we can provide for substantial combat operations overseas. (In the Cold War we had the use of permanent facilities and assumed general mobilisation.) We therefore plan to establish a new Regular ambulance regiment, acquire an additional 200 bed primary casualty receiving ship, increase the Regular element of the Defence Medical Services, and use the compulsory call out of medical reservists to augment Regular field hospitals when a surge capability is needed (see paragraph 106).
101. Chemical and Biological Defence. We are responding urgently to the risks arising from the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons by significantly improving our defensive capabilities. The importance of this was underlined by Iraq's recent confrontation with the UN. We are building up stocks of existing vaccines and at the beginning of June 1998 we and the United States announced our agreement to co-operate closely in the development of new medical and other countermeasures.
102. Much of our specialist capability is provided by the Territorial Army. It cannot be deployed sufficiently quickly to meet the current range of possible operational requirements. We will therefore be creating a mainly regular joint Army/RAF nuclear, biological and chemical reconnaissance organisation for land-based operations. This will be accompanied by enhancements to our biological and chemical detection and decontamination equipment.
103. Joint Training. The joint approach will also be built into our training and preparation for operations. The Chief of Joint Operations will be given additional responsibility for joint operational training and exercises (see paragraph 174). Two important initiatives in this area will be the further development of joint RN/RAF carrier-based Harrier operations and joint Army / RAF training for ground based air defence. In the longer term, both are likely to lead to the development of joint operational forces.
Readiness and Reserves
104. Operational readiness is a critical factor in our ability to react to both major crises and sudden incidents. But high readiness also involves extra cost and makes it more difficult to carry out training and peacetime tasks. We must therefore strike a balance between forces which may be needed at short notice and those for which we can expect a reasonable amount of warning and preparation time. We have therefore adopted a graduated approach to readiness under which units - and the transport and support needed to deploy them - can be provided at levels of notice matched to their particular operational tasks.
105. Reserve Forces have an integral part in our military planning but the change in strategic circumstances has a significant impact on the scale and nature of their role. We no longer need - and cannot afford - to maintain additional combat units and support services simply against the possibility of a general war in Europe. At the same time, we inevitably rely on regular forces to meet our day-to-day commitments and respond to short notice contingencies. To meet the demands of the future, we need a different kind of Reserve force, more closely integrated with their Regular colleagues, more capable of use at shorter notice and in crises short of all-out war in Europe.
106. We have concluded that, while it would not normally be appropriate to call out formed units of Reserves at short notice we should be prepared to do so if this were necessary to complete the build-up of a large military force in a major international crisis such as the Gulf War. And, because it would be neither cost effective nor practical to maintain permanently the extra medical support which would only be required for a substantial warfighting operation, we would also be prepared to call out medical reserves at lower scales of effort. We propose to develop plans with the National Health Service and health trusts to enable us to do so, if necessary, without disruption to the health service.
107. We also plan to extend the use of individual reservists, particularly specialists - some 2500 reservists have served very successfully in Bosnia. In particular, we hope to develop the use of sponsored reserves - that is contract support personnel who may be called up for active service in a crisis.
108. This new pattern of operational requirements will not significantly affect the structure of the Royal Naval and Royal Marine Reserves or the Royal Auxiliary Air Force because they are largely employed as individuals, and there will be small increases in their size. We need, however, to modernise the Territorial Army (TA) so that it will be as valuable in helping us to meet the challenges of the future as it has the dangers of the past.
109. The TA is about 56,000 strong, still 80% of its size at the end of the Cold War, and largely made up of formed units at low readiness intended for the defence of the UK against invasion or to reinforce NATO in Germany. For the future we need a smaller but more readily deployable and usable TA closely integrated with our Regular force elements. Although numbers will fall to around 40,000 volunteers with reductions concentrated in yeomanry, infantry and supporting combat services, crucially, we will be able more rapidly to bring the TA to full operational readiness. To achieve this, we will create an Army Mobilisation Centre and ensure that TA units are fully manned and trained and equipped to the standards needed to undertake their tasks effectively.
Force Structure
110. We have re-examined our force structure against the revised set of military tasks and the analysis of likely future operations to emerge from the Review. The front-line has already reduced significantly since the end of the Cold War, particularly in areas focused on the defence of Western Europe. For example, our tank fleet has been reduced by 45%, our submarine force cut by 57%, and our air forces are already planned to withdraw completely from Germany by 2002. Nevertheless, further changes are needed in the light of the continued evolution of the strategic environment, particularly to produce greater flexibility and deployability.
111. As part of this process of modernisation, the Army will be restructured to improve its ability to train for, mount and sustain deployed operations without excessive disruption to Service people and their families. It will retain two deployable divisions, one based in Britain and the other in Germany, and there will be no changes in the size of the regular infantry which will continue to be in heavy demand. We have already made a good start in improving recruitment but we need to end undermanning and make the best use of our resources.
112. We currently have three armoured and two mechanised brigades which can be used for a wide range of tasks and three lighter and more specialised airborne, airmobile and commando brigades. An additional mechanised brigade will provide a more balanced operational cycle which better meets readiness and other requirements for both peacekeeping and warfighting and, because of its wider utility, would also ease overstretch. At the same time, we do not see a need for parachute operations at bigger than battalion level. We therefore propose to convert the present airborne brigade into a mechanised brigade. The parachute role will be transferred to the airmobile brigade which will become a highly mobile air-manoeuvre brigade when the attack helicopter enters service. Once the Apache helicopter entersservice this will provide a very powerful striking force for rapid reaction and other operations.
113. The Gulf and Bosnia have demonstrated that tanks have a continuing importance although the ways in which they are used may vary considerably. Experience also suggests that our current tank regiments are smaller than the ideal and, in particular, do not contain sufficient manpower for some roles. We therefore intend to replace the present eight regiments (planned to have about 470 personnel) with six larger regiments of about 600 personnel. At war strength they will each be equipped with 58 tanks rather than the currently planned 38 but will only hold 30 tanks for peacetime training. This will allow a more efficient 'whole fleet' approach to the use and maintenance of our tank force and allow some tanks to be held ready for rapid deployment.
114. This restructuring will also involve removing some 2,500 troops, including three armoured regiments, from Germany to the United Kingdom. Two of these regiments will be given new roles as part of the change from eight to six armoured regiments. One will become a new armoured reconnaissance regiment and the other will form part of our new joint biological and chemical defence capability (paragraph 101).
115. The focus for our maritime forces in the new environment will move towards rapid deployment operations. Our amphibious capability with its improved specialised shipping will give our Rapid Reaction Forces important extra flexibility. Aircraft carriers will have a wide utility, including for deterrence and coercion. Our current INVINCIBLE class carriers will be given a wider power projection role by the development of a "Joint Force 2000" combining RN and RAF Harrier aircraft. To meet our longer term needs, we plan to replace our current carriers from around 2012 by two larger, more versatile, carriers capable of carrying a more powerful force, including a future carrier borne aircraft to replace the Harrier. These plans will now be developed in detail in the normal way.
116. On the other hand, the trend away from large scale open-ocean warfare has led us to revise our plans in some other areas. While we will need to maintain the range of our current capabilities, we have concluded that we can reduce our force of attack submarines over the next few years from 12 to 10 and maintain the Merlin anti-submarine helicopter force at 44. We also anticipate withdrawing the RAF's Tornado aircraft from the anti-ship role. There will also be an impact on the number of destroyers and frigates we need. Taking into account their wide peacetime utility, our reassessment has concluded that the total force can be reduced from 35 to 32. With the reduced requirement for mine clearance in home waters, we judge that 22 modern Sandown and Hunt class minehunters will be sufficient rather than 25 as previously planned.
117. The acquisition of 232 Eurofighters remains central to our long term plans, providing a step change in the RAF's ability to achieve air superiority and provide air defence for our forces. Eurofighter will also be able to fulfil some other roles currently provided by the Jaguar. To reflect changes in the scale and readiness needed for future operations, including the anticipated withdrawal of the Tornado from the anti-shipping role, and the introduction of Eurofighter in the next few years, we have concluded that we can reduce our present front line by 23 offensive support and 13 air defence aircraft.
118. Unlike other recent reviews, these changes will not lead to cuts in the overall strength of our Regular forces. In some areas, such as logistics, previous cuts have gone too far and we are strengthening those areas and capabilities which assume greater importance in the new strategic environment. Similarly, we intend to use manpower released by the minor reductions in escorts, submarines and fast jets to fill gaps in our front line manning. The overall result will be a rebalanced and modern force structure capable of meeting our future defence and security needs more effectively.
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