DEFENCE MISSIONS AND TASKS
44. Starting from these security priorities, the Review re-examined the broad Missions and more specific military tasks for our forces to form a basis for planning, taking into account their contribution to other policy objectives. The revised Missions cover both current priorities and longer term insurance:
- Peacetime Security
- Security of the Overseas Territories
- Defence Diplomacy
- Support to Wider British Interests
- Peace Support and Humanitarian Operations
- Regional Conflict outside the NATO area
- Regional Conflict inside the NATO area
- Strategic Attack on NATO.
The new Missions
45. The broad scope of defence activity covered by these Missions is similar to recent years but there are significant changes in the balance between the Missions and in the specific military tasks that underpin them. Defence Diplomacy becomes a Mission in its own right, reflecting the importance to our security of building and maintaining trust and preventing conflict, particularly in Europe. We anticipate continuing and perhaps growing calls for contributions to international peace support and humanitarian operations, some of which could be militarily very demanding. For the foreseeable future, we envisage that the largest operation we might have to undertake would be involvement in a major regional conflict, whether as part of NATO or a wider international coalition. We need, however, to retain a basis on which we could reconstitute larger capabilities should a strategic threat to NATO ever begin to re-emerge.
46. Peacetime Security. Support against terrorism of all kinds will remain of the highest priority for the foreseeable future. As in the last few years, our forces may be called on more frequently to assist, often in co-operation with other nations, with the evacuation of British (and other) citizens caught up in overseas crises. There may well be an increased requirement for some specialist support to civil authorities, for example in countering drug related crime.
47. Overseas Territories. The security of our Overseas Territories is a fundamental government responsibility. Although there are at present no significant military threats to these territories, our forces must be able to react to any emerging security problem, including from drugs and international crime, and where necessary to assist the civil authorities. We will, therefore, continue to provide garrisons and other forms of military presence as appropriate, including in the Falklands, Cyprus, Gibraltar and the Caribbean, and maintain the capability to supplement these as needed.
48. Defence Diplomacy. The Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defence have considerable experience and expertise in conflict prevention work but the creation of a formal Defence Diplomacy Mission will make this a core defence activity. This will give it greater priority and ensure that it is properly linked to the Government's broader policy objectives.
49. The new Mission covers arms control, non-proliferation and related security building measures; our Outreach programme in Eastern Europe; and wider military assistance and training for overseas countries. We intend to improve the effectiveness of our existing activities and increase our effort in all these areas including:
- an enhanced arms control programme incorporating an improved 'Open Skies' capability to monitor arms control agreements and additional training in arms control inspection techniques;
- an expansion of the Outreach programme including greater use of attachments and short term training teams, and additional training courses. A particular aspect of this programme is explaining the importance of accountability, and the role and value of civilians in defence management;
- wider education and training initiatives, to help develop the skills and structures needed by modern democratically accountable forces. This will include the establishment of a Defence Diplomacy scholarship scheme at the Joint Services Command and Staff College and providing extra manpower for short term in-country tasks.
50. We are also undertaking a worldwide reassessment of our requirement for defence attachés in the new international environment, taking particular account of their key part in defence diplomacy. We expect to create a number of new posts, including some specifically to support the expanded Outreach programme, and selection, training and career management of attachés will place increased emphasis on the qualities and skills needed for this role.
51. Wider British Interests. We see no diminution in the value of the activities which our forces undertake in support of British interests and standing overseas. They will continue to have a particular role in demonstrating our commitment to our international friendships worldwide, for example through our contribution to the Five Power Defence Arrangements in South East Asia. There are many ways in which they can assist broader national objectives and interests, including valuable training and support for British exports.
52. Peace Support and Humanitarian Operations. In a less stable world, we have seen more international operations of this type. The trends identified earlier suggest that this will continue. Britain will play its full part in such international efforts. At one end of the spectrum, this might involve logistic or medical support to a disaster relief operation. At the other, it might involve major combat operations as we were prepared to undertake when NATO's Intervention Force (IFOR) first deployed to Bosnia.
53. Our forces have developed particular experience and expertise in operations of this kind. We regard it as important to strengthen the effectiveness of the international community in peace support and humanitarian operations of all kinds and in co-ordinating between political, humanitarian and military operations. But we attach particular priority to enhancing the abilities of the UN in this area. Many of the improvements in capability set out in Chapter 5 will have a direct application in peace support and humanitarian deployments. As a Permanent Member of the Security Council, we intend to give a lead by making our national contribution to UN operations more effective. We will also make a much larger proportion of our front line capabilities potentially available to the UN for such contingencies, including all of our rapidly deployable forces. And our new Joint Defence Centre (see Chapter 9) will have a particular responsibility for contributing to the development of international peace support doctrine.
54. Regional Conflict Outside NATO. Outside Europe, the greatest risks to our national economic and political interests - and probably to international stability - will remain in the Gulf. Regional conflict in North Africa or the Near East could, in some circumstances, also affect our interests and those of our Allies. As the 1990/91 Gulf War and subsequent events have shown, this Mission may involve major combat operations as well as early, deterrent deployments. Such operations also impose demanding requirements, for example, in relation to strategic transport for deployment and supply, and to command and control.
55. NATO Regional Conflict. Britain has always made a major political and military contribution to NATO's capability for collective defence. This will continue to be at the heart of our defence policy. NATO no longer faces a Cold War threat but circumstances could arise in which Alliance members were threatened by a smaller scale but still militarily demanding regional crisis or conflict. NATO must therefore continue to provide a military capability to deter and if necessary respond to such crises. This includes the maintenance of a capability to deter the threat or use of nuclear weapons. The full range of Britain's military capabilities will continue to be available to NATO; in particular, we shall maintain our leading role in its Rapid Reaction Corps.
56. Strategic Attack on NATO. No threat on this scale is in prospect. It would, however, be unwise to conclude that one could never reappear but the conventional forces needed to threaten such an attack would take many years to create. This Mission therefore provides for longer term insurance through a credible nuclear deterrent and the retention of the essential military capabilities on which we could rebuild larger forces over a long period, if circumstances were radically to worsen.
Conclusion
57. The pattern of demands on our forces which emerges is very different from that of the Cold War. In operational terms, the most demanding individual scenario against which we must now plan is no longer all-out war in Europe but a major regional crisis involving our national interest, perhaps on NATO's periphery or in the Gulf.
58. Apart from scale, however, the new international environment is in many ways more demanding. Undertaking smaller but frequent, often simultaneous and sometimes prolonged operations can be more difficult than preparing for a single worst-case conflict. During the 1990s, we have deployed or been prepared to deploy forces on a wide range of operations at various levels, in addition to maintaining our day-to-day responsibilities. Against the security priorities described earlier we can expect this trend to continue. There is a new emphasis on defence diplomacy and on the use of armed forces to support diplomacy in efforts to deter or manage crises, from humanitarian missions to UN embargoes and peacekeeping. Crises often occur with little warning and we need to be able to respond rapidly. In order to deter, and where deterrence fails, we must maintain forces which can be successful in conventional warfighting. Indeed most of the military capabilities required are equally valuable in support of the wider range of tasks we now face. All this places a premium on the flexibility and usability of the Armed Forces in the modern world.
59. We could of course, as a country, choose to take a narrow view of our role and responsibilities which did not require a significant military capability. This would mean that we would not wish and would not be able to contribute effectively to resolving crises such as Bosnia, Kosovo, or the invasion of Kuwait. This is indeed a real choice, but not one the Government could recommend for Britain.
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