SECURITY PRIORITIES IN A CHANGING WORLD
17. Britain's place in the world is determined by our interests as a nation and as a leading member of the international community. Indeed, the two are inextricably linked because our national interests have a vital international dimension.
Interest and Goals
18. We are a major European state and a leading member of the European Union. Our economic and political future is as part of Europe. Our security is indivisible from that of our European partners and allies. We therefore have a fundamental interest in the security and stability of the continent as a whole and in the effectiveness of NATO as a collective political and military instrument to underpin these interests. This in turn depends on the transatlantic relationship and the continued engagement in Europe of the United States.
19. But our vital interests are not confined to Europe. Our economy is founded on international trade. Exports form a higher proportion of Gross Domestic Product than for the US, Japan, Germany or France. We invest more of our income abroad than any other major economy. Our closest economic partners are the European Union and the US but our investment in the developing world amounts to the combined total of France, Germany and Italy. Foreign investment into the UK also provides nearly 20% of manufacturing jobs. We depend on foreign countries for supplies of raw materials, above all oil.
20. Our economic interests and our history give us other international responsibilities. Over 10 million British citizens live and work overseas. We have 13 Overseas Territories spread around the world. We are members of many important international organisations and have developed close ties of friendship with countries in every continent. And as an open society, we are easily affected by global trends and other external influences.
21. Our national security and prosperity thus depend on promoting international stability, freedom and economic development. As a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council and as a country both willing and able to play a leading role internationally we have a responsibility to act as a force for good in the world. We do not aspire to be a world policeman; many of our important national interests and responsibilities are shared with others, particularly our Partners and Allies in the European Union and NATO. We also attach immense importance to the international community as a whole working together through the many multinational organisations, above all the United Nations.
THE CHANGING WORLD TO 2015
22. The post-Cold War environment offers new opportunities to promote these goals and interests but also brings new challenges. And, over the period considered by this Review, there are potential longer term risks to be considered. Over this length of time, there will also be substantial change in the political, social and technological context in which our forces will have to operate. Again, there are opportunities to be exploited and risks to be guarded against. We need to face both with open eyes and recognise that they will bring further changes to our Armed Forces.
Opportunities
23. The end of the Cold War has transformed our security environment. The world does not live in the shadow of World War. There is no longer a direct threat to Western Europe or the United Kingdom as we used to know it, and we face no significant military threat to any of our Overseas Territories.
24. The improvement is political as well as military. The end of confrontation has revitalised international bodies and made the 'international community a reality. This is epitomised not only by the role now taken by the UN Security Council but also by the unprecedented international peace support operations in Bosnia which have involved 37 countries operating under a NATO umbrella, including Russia and other members of the former Warsaw Pact.
25. These changes have important implications for the shape of our forces. We do not at present face the threat of an air or other direct attack on this country. Nor do we need large standing forces on the continent or in the Atlantic simply to defend ourselves and our Allies. This has given us the opportunity both to reduce the scale of our forces and to employ them on a wider range of tasks in support of foreign and security policy but this also requires changes in the balance of our military capabilities. The process of restructuring our forces began in the early 1990s but, while the previous government was swift to cut defence expenditure by major cuts in Cold War capabilities, it did not invest adequately in the right capabilities to meet new demands.
26. The first requirement of our foreign and defence policy is to maintain and reinforce the present favourable external security situation. We must consolidate the changes that have taken place in Eastern Europe. Our forces have acquired a new role in promoting our security through programmes designed to promote understanding and trust between all European armed forces and, in particular, to assist the development of modern, democratic forces in Central and Eastern Europe. Such defence diplomacy also has considerable utility in support of wider foreign policy objectives. The next chapter describes the Review's plans for increasing the emphasis we place on this aspect of defence.
Current Challenges
27. While we no longer face the threat to our national survival represented by the Warsaw Pact, today's security environment is not benign. This is reflected in the very high level of commitments in which our forces are currently engaged. These arise from a wide range of risks to our security and interests, including combating terrorism related to Northern Ireland. The Government believes that the Belfast Agreement provides the basis for a lasting political settlement. The Armed Forces have already responded flexibly in their deployment following the various ceasefires since 1994. The Government hopes that the level of threat from terrorism will reduce further and allow for reductions in the numbers of troops required to assist the civil authorities consistent with the level of threat, while maintaining normal garrisons as elsewhere in the United Kingdom.
28. While today's commitments are individually on a smaller scale than the Cold War threat, they are operationally demanding, especially in aggregate. At the beginning of the year, we had over 25,000 personnel on operations in Northern Ireland and overseas. This is not unusual. Over the last eight years many more British troops have been on active operations at any one time than during the Cold War. These have ranged from the Gulf War - which was by far our biggest operation since Suez - to the rescue of British citizens from a series of crises overseas. Before considering the implications for our Forces, we need to understand the factors that have contributed to this change.
Underlying Risks
29. For the last two hundred years, the dominant force in international affairs has been the nation state. Most wars have been caused by attempts to create or expand such states. In contrast, over the next twenty years, the risks to international stability seem as likely to come from other factors: ethnic and religious conflict; population and environmental pressures; competition for scarce resources; drugs, terrorism and crime.
30. These pressures operate both within states and across borders. The break-up of states seems likely to be as much a security problem as traditional expansionism, although Saddam Hussein provides a powerful reminder that this should not be ruled out. Moreover, the consequences of initially local crises may spread dramatically in an ever more interdependent world.
31. Events in Bosnia illustrate this well, with a quarter of a million refugees fleeing to the rest of Europe. Even more worrying was the possibility that the war would ignite tensions over Bosnia's borders, drawing in other states. Overspill of this kind could lead to pressures which might weaken or undermine some of the new democracies in the region and even put at risk wider European security. Events in Kosovo emphasise the continuing dangers and the need to be able to mount a military response rapidly to contain crises before they get out of hand.
Impact of Social and Technological Change
32. Social and technological change are already having a huge impact both on the nature of the risks we face and our options for responding to them. Indeed, technology is a major force in social change worldwide. We can expect such change to continue and probably accelerate.
33. In military capability, we can look, for example, for much more precise application of force as a result of improvements in intelligence gathering, command and control and precision weapons. Equally, there is potential for practical and cost benefits in the way we train and support our forces. Such possibilities also raise difficult long term questions. How much should we invest in improving "enabling technologies" at the expense of weapon numbers? How can our equipment plans keep up with the pace of change? How do we and our Allies retain interoperability with US forces given the radical changes they envisage? And will technological changes also require radical changes in the way our forces are organised and fight? We will be addressing these issues in the coming years.
34. Technological and social change will also open up broader possibilities which will have a profound effect on our future security. Many of these developments will be double-edged, bringing new vulnerabilities as well as opportunities. They include new ways of fighting such as information warfare (which attacks through the computer systems on which both our forces and civil society increasingly depend); greater pressures on operational decisions (instant media reporting from both sides of the front line); the wider spread of technologies which may be used against us (such as biological weapons); and highly sophisticated civil capabilities that will be readily available both for us and potential adversaries. And where we (and our Allies) exploit technology to strengthen our existing superiority in conventional weapons, our potential adversaries may choose to adopt alternative weapons and unconventional (or 'asymmetric') strategies, perhaps attacking us through vulnerabilities in our open civil societies.
35. While we cannot predict the detailed impact of such changes over twenty years, we have taken a hard look at how we can seek to make the most of emerging trends in all areas of the Review, including how to adapt our requirements and procurement processes so that we are not left behind by the speed of change.
SECURITY PRIORITIES FOR THE FUTURE
European Security
36. European security will remain fundamental to our national security and economic well-being. We must not take that security for granted. We need to work to preserve it, through strengthening international security relationships and responding to new risks of instability within Europe, as in Bosnia. We also need to preserve our capability to react should the political climate change for the worse.
37. Membership of NATO will continue to provide the UK with its best insurance against all these risks. This partnership between Europe and North America has been a uniquely effective political and military security Alliance for half a century. The fundamental purpose of defending the freedom of all its members remains as important as ever.
38. NATO has also shown it is highly relevant to the specific circumstances of Europe today. Militarily, NATO has been reinvigorated and has shown its continuing value by its role in Bosnia and its response to events in Kosovo. Politically, it has responded positively and imaginatively to the aspirations of the new European democracies. The planned admission in 1999 of three new members from the former Warsaw Pact is a welcome first step in a carefully managed process of enlargement which will strengthen both the Alliance itself and European security as a whole. NATO's Partnership for Peace programme and its Agreements with Russia and the Ukraine are also part of this positive approach to strengthening political and security relationships in Europe.
39. A wide range of other institutions also have major parts to play in the development and reinforcement of European security. The European Union has a vital role in helping to preserve and extend economic prosperity and political stability, including through the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The Western European Union has an important role in fostering defence co-operation amongst its members, in conflict prevention and, particularly, peacekeeping. Development of the European Security and Defence Identity within NATO will enable the Western European Union to carry out these roles more effectively. And the Government places high importance on the role of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe which embraces 54 states and is uniquely placed to contribute to building confidence and preventing conflict in Europe.
SECURITY PRIORITIES FOR THE FUTURE
Outside Europe
40. Outside Europe our interests are most likely to be affected by events in the Gulf and the Mediterranean. Instability in these areas also carries wider risks. We have particularly important national interests and close friendships in the Gulf. Oil supplies from the Gulf are crucial to the world economy. Confrontation in the Middle East carries the risk of escalation and since the region borders on NATO, in some circumstances crises could involve the Alliance directly. The same is true, to a lesser extent, in North Africa. Although our direct interests in the region are limited, its proximity to the southern boundary of the European Union and NATO gives us a continuing stake in its stability.
41. There are already significant sources of instability in these regions - including the continuing threat represented by Saddam Hussein's Iraq. The size of the military forces available and the presence and potential spread of ballistic missiles, chemical and biological weapons and even nuclear weapons add to the risks. These dangers seem unlikely to diminish and may grow. Many of our Allies and Partners have similar important interests and friendships in these areas. We would therefore expect to work with them in responding to any future crises.
42. Elsewhere, although the risks to our specific interests are small, we have longstanding international friendships to maintain and we have an important wider interest in supporting international order and in promoting freedom, democracy and prosperity. Our international stature and position as a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council gives us a particular responsibility to contribute. Nor does the British public expect us to turn our back on poverty,
The Role of Defence
inequality and human suffering in poorer countries. We will respond to such problems as necessary drawing on the range of civil, diplomatic, economic and military means at our disposal.
43. This chapter has considered Britain's security priorities in a changing world. Pursuing these priorities requires the combined application of all the means at our disposal. Military action is one of those means but will seldom be sufficient on its own. We require armed forces which can operate in support of diplomacy alongside economic, trade and developmental levers, to strengthen security and avert conflict as well as conducting effective military operations if required.
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