THE DEFENCE REVIEW AS A POLICY PROCESS
1. The White Paper on Defence, as approved by Parliament in May 1996 set the stage for further defence transformation by establishing a policy framework for defence in a new South Africa founded on the principles of democratic governance. The White Paper also lay the basis for a more detailed Defence Review. The review was conducted in stages and each component was comprehensively debated with the Joint Standing Committee on Defence and presented to Cabinet and Parliament for final approval. This process has culminated in this document which was similarly approved by Parliament.
2. Defence Transformation has, in South Africa, been a comprehensive and dynamic process that has led to a clear formulation of defence policy and the establishment of comprehensive Parliamentary oversight on defence matters. This has been coupled to reductions in defence expenditure and a review of defence business processes, force design and force structure.
3. When embarking on the Defence Review process, the Department of Defence set out to design a consultative process that would both inform the people of South Africa of current defence thinking, and would also allow the Department to glean an understanding of what South Africans expect of their defence force. By so doing, the Department of Defence sought to migrate to a position where a common understanding could be achieved on the roles and function of the SANDF, its future size and shape. The primary objective was therefore to develop and establish a national consensus on defence issues.
4. During the Defence Review process, the Department of Defence sought to gain an understanding of the expectations and vision for defence from all South African people and to successfully translate that into defence policy, including force structure and force design. Thus, in keeping with South Africa's emergent civil-military relations tradition, Parliament and the Joint Standing Committee on Defence were extensively consulted. Consultation, however took place far more extensively, extending into the provinces of South Africa where church leaders, non-governmental organisations, academics, labour, business and community leaders were consulted, thus bench marking the Defence Review as an example of true government consultation.
5. The Defence Review has been a significant defence policy process in that it expresses a holistic understanding of defence policy in a synchronised and integrated manner. Defence policy has traditionally been fragmented with little harmonisation across policy boundaries. The Defence Review has, for the first time, expressed broad defence policy in a manner which demonstrates a progression of thought and logic transcending sectoral focuses.
6. Operational policy, force design and force structure, human resource and par-time component policy, land and environmental policy and acquisition policy is presented in a manner that expresses a South African vision for defence into the new millennium. Similarly, the Defence Review expresses defence policy that is congruent with the democratic traditions that are being established post-1994.
7. The Defence Review also has successfully attempted to describe and address the challenges of an African country that seeks to position defence, and the roles and functions of a defence force, in a post-Cold War environment where there is no longer polarisation of society around East/West traditions. This environment poses new challenges for all defence forces, including the SANDF. The Defence Review thus presents not just an examination of the primary functions and tasks of the SANDF, but also presents an amelioration of South Africa's expectations of the SANDF in other roles. This is in keeping with the White Paper on Defence, which elucidates a broad concept of security, encompassing all aspects of human security, stating unambiguously that the greatest threats to the South African people are non-military.
THE DEFENCE REVIEW AS A MODEL FOR CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
8. The eight constituent forces of the SANDF all entered into the SANDF with different traditions and understandings of civil-military relations. One of the challenges facing the Department of Defence has been to agree on and establish a uniquely South African civil-military relations tradition. While embracing the principles of civil-military relations in western societies, the South African Department of Defence has been seeking to establish a model of civil-military relations that has a distinctly African character.
9. The Defence Review has provided the opportunity for the Department of Defence to implement facets of civil-military relations as yet unexplored in South Africa. In terms of process, the Defence Review was not only extremely consultative, but also made extensive use of skills outside of the Department such as academia and NGOs. This is significant in that it expresses an acknowledgement by the Department of Defence of two critical factors:
9.1 Firstly, it acknowledges that the Department is not the sole repository of skills on defence issues and acknowledges that the defence debate can be strengthened by outside consultation and involvement.
9.2 Secondly, it acknowledges for the first time that, in a democracy, defence cannot be a closed shop arrangement, but by definition must take cognisance of the many and diverse opinions that exist outside of the Department.
10. The Defence Review has been instrumental in shaping the way that civil-military relations will unfold in South Africa, contributing both to a common understanding of defence and to the development of a model for future South African civil-military relations. Extensive consultation with Parliament and with broader civil-society in the form of business, labour, clergy, non-governmental organisations and community leadership took place. By so doing, the Defence Review benchmarked the concept of responsible and accountable governance by the Department of Defence and has formed a framework for transparent defence in a democracy.
11. In terms of the relationship between the Department of Defence and Parliament, the Defence Review process established the basis for a collaborative partnership on defence management between elected oversight authority and the Department. The Defence Review underscored the nature of the Department of Defence's responsibilities to Parliament in the minds of both soldiers and civilians alike.
THE MEDIUM TERM EXPENDITURE FRAMEWORK
12. The first report of the Defence Review (chapters one to eight of this document) elaborated on the Constitutional imperative that the SANDF will have a primarily defensive posture and orientation, as well as elaborating on the constitutionally derived functions and roles of the SANDF. The Defence Review has as a result developed new defence doctrinal and design criteria.
13. The determination the SANDF's size and shape is guided by South African defence and other national policy. The tasks of the defence force relating to self-defence are categorized under four broad headings:
13.1 Defence against external military threats.
13.2 Defence against internal threats to the constitutional order.
13.3 The promotion of regional security.
13.4 The promotion of international security, including participation in PSO's and military co-operation in support of foreign policy.
14. Chapter Eight presents options for the future design of the SANDF and recommended a design that was approved by Parliament on 20 August 1997. This force design is based on the concept of a peace-time force containing those elements required to serve as the core for future expansion, should this be required, and those elements required for ongoing peace-time tasks.
15. It is essential for the core force approach to rely on the expansion capability inherent in a part-time component which is extremely cost-effective and allows for flexibility in force levels. Part-time units are to be transformed to be fully representative of South Africa's demography.
16. Throughout the Force Design Chapter, a needs driven, but cost constrained, approach was used as the underlying principle for design.
17. Both the Force Design Chapter and the Force Structure Chapter of the Defence Review express a policy vision for defence. Although force design and structure should be based on real defence needs, in reality these are constrained by costs and monies available to meet these visions. The force design and force structure of the Defence Review thus reflect a vision for defence, but in reality, this vision must be tempered with the financial constraints placed on the defence budget.
18. Towards the latter stages of the Defence Review, government expressed a vision of future government spending and how the allocation of public monies to Departments will take place. This Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) of multi-year spending (three year period), outlined the base-line funding that Departments can expect from central government.
19. Government identified the following six prioritised areas of focus for the Department of Defence in the MTEF.
19.1 Border protection and border control.
19.2 Support to the SAPS in terms of the National Crime Prevention Strategy, including Area Protection.
19.3 VIP flights
19.4 Search and Rescue.
19.5 Maintenance of essential services.
19.6 Essential force preparation.
20. Initial indications are that the allocation to the Department of Defence will be in the order of 1.5% of GDP. (This translates into Rm 9 201 in 1997 rand-value and Rm 9 721 in 1998 rand-value.) Government is however aware that although the establishment of a base-line percentage of GDP does assist the Department of Defence with its long-term plannin, this allocation may fluctuate as specific defence programmes require attention.
21. Since the completion and approval by Parliament of the vision force design, it has become apparent that national priorities and budgetary restrictions place constraints on defence expenditure. This means that the achievement of a sustainable force design of the magnitude envisaged in the Defence Review will not be possible in the short to medium term. The Department of Defence will maintain the Defence Review force design as its vision to be pursued, but will make the necessary short-term adaptations to ensure the maintenance of the required capabilities and expertise within the financial allocation to defence.
22. This will be managed within the MTEF vision for the Department of Defence and the Minister of Defence will regularly report to Parliament and Cabinet on the status of defence capabilities in relation to the Defence Review requirements.
23. In the light of national priorities and budgetary constraints, the Department of Defence will be testing, and where necessary, adapting its force design according to these. Defence scenarios will also be undergoing revision in the light of changing international trends.
24. The Defence Review visualises a 40:30:30 ratio for defence spending on personnel, operating and capital costs after the transformation process is completed. The question of the correct balance between maritime, air and landward defence, based on the strategic realities of South Africa, is still bein studied. Should defence spending remain at approximately 1,5% of GDP, or Rm 9 721 in 1998 Rand-value, the allocation of the defence budget at a 40:30:30 ratio should be in the order of:
a. Rm 3 889 for personnel expenditure,
b. Rm 2916 for operating expenditure and
c. Rm 2 916 for capital expenditure.
This ratio will remain the Department of Defence's vision once transformation is completed. Table 1 and Figure 1 describe this ratio.
FUTURE DEFENCE POLICY INITIATIVES THAT ARISE FROM THE DEFENCE REVIEW
25. The Defence Review initiated a number of ancillary and corollary defence policy processes within the Department of Defence. These are described hereunder.
White Paper on Peace Missions
26. The White Paper on Defence's analysis of the strategic environment indicates that there is no apparent or foreseen conventional threat against South Africa. Instability and inter-state conflict originating in socio-economic factors, however, pose a considerable immediate and long-term threat to the region. While the deployment of the military does not provide a solution to these threats, their deployment is nevertheless often essential to create or maintain conditions in which solutions can be sought by other means.
27. The post-1994 era in South Africa has seen an increase in pressure for South Africa to become involved in United Nations driven conflict prevention initiatives in Africa. The Great Lakes conflict, the Zaire (DRC) conflict and the Congo Brazzaville conflict demonstrated that the international community expects South Africa to become involved in multi-national forces constituted under a UN mandate. This involvement may range from support services (medical, military engineering, air transport, communications etc) to placing combat troops on the ground.
28. To this end, the Departments of Defence and Foreign Affairs have been developing a White Paper on Peace Missions which seeks to guide future South African involvement in peace missions.
29. Conflict on the African continent, rooted in non-military, socio-economic factors, has shown itself in the recent past to be primarily intra-state, although inter-state conflict of a limited scale and intensity is also a possibility, but potentially less so. Recent continental conflict has manifested itself mainly as civil unrest, domestic insurgencies and civil war. Such conflicts are extremely destructive and are characterised by large numbers of displaced people and refugees.
30. The changing security environment has not however eradicated conflict and violence. These continue to manifest themselves in a variety of different forms and pose profound challenges for the manner in which international security is managed and maintained.
31. There is an increased deployment of civilian, military and NGO personnel in a wide spectrum of operations ranging from peace-building and peace-making to humanitarian relief and peace-enforcement operations. Traditional peace missions have moved from being relatively homogenous exercises - observer missions and peace-keeping missions for instance - into being complex and multi-functional missions spanning the entire globe. In the process, the diplomatic and political components of peace missions have assumed an increasing importance as against the more military emphasis of traditional "peace operations".
32. It is therefore important for South Africans to determine the political, normative, military and resource implications of involving ourselves in peace support operations in the future, and the White Paper on Peace Missions seeks to establish the framework of such an understanding.
33. Critical capabilities relevant to working in an African environment would include:
33.1 Comprehensive land, air and maritime capabilities that address the functions of mobility, surveillance and firepower.
33.2 The focus of peace support operations should be on land, with naval and air support.
33.3 The emphasis should be on light, mobile forces. Air mobility and sea-lift would be essential.
33.4 Air defence that provide efficient defence against a limited air threat.
33.5 The ability to maintain long external lines of logistic support is essential.
33.6 The ability to operate away from main bases and maintain equipment far from support infrastructure is vital.
33.7 Logistics, medical support and engineering services assume an even more prominent position.
33.8 A vital maritime defence component is required to protect marine resources.
33.9 The ability to independently (remotely) sense the movement and intent of belligerent parties in an unfamiliar setting, far away from own fixed infrastructure, is very important. From this data, information must be extracted, distributed, processed and used in an efficient command and control system.
Defence Industry Green Paper
34. The Department of Defence is, together with input from other role-playing Departments, producing a Green Paper on the South African Defence Industry for the National Conventional Arms Control Committee. This initiative has its genesis in a Cabinet Decision in 1996 to produce a White Paper on the Defence Industry.
35. The Green Paper will be significant, in that it will not only give a descriptive overview of the Defence Industry and those policies which govern it, but will be a seminal document that, for the first time, captures a holistic understanding of the Defence Industry. The Defence Industry in South Africa has historically been shrouded in secrecy and the Green Paper will aim to provide the first comprehensive analysis of the business processes that take place within the industry.
36. The Green Paper will form the basis of a White Paper that will aim to provide cogent and integrated policies for the Defence Industry. This is an important development in that fragmented policy and legislation will be identified and harmonised, so that a coherent expression of Government's approach to the industry will exist. It is envisaged that a number of legislative, management process and policy amendments will arise as a result of the White Paper.
37. The Green Paper, will seek to position the Defence Industry within a South African normative and policy framework, expressing both mechanisms for Government control of the industry and mechanisms for supporting a legitimate and transparent Defence Industry. The Green Paper will also provide a strategic analysis of future defence requirements and as such, will articulate how the industry should position itself to meet South Africa's future defence needs, providing a vision for the industry within the South African macro-industrial base.
Defence Conversion Within A National Conversion Framework
38. The Department of Defence, in its transformation process, identified a number of key strategic issues which face the Department. One of these was a meaningful way of expressing the Department's support of the Reconstruction and Development Programme.
39. Apart from the more obvious contributions of the SANDF to the National Crime Prevention Strategy and the conducting of Border Control, the conversion of defence assets to civilian assets and capabilities is the most significant measure by which the Department can support the RDP.
40. Although it is necessary to establish a National Conversion Framework, the elements of future Defence Conversion can be articulaed as the following:
40.1 Base Conversion, this being the return of bases earmarked for closure during the transformation process to civilian or government use. This process includes not only the closure of bases but the environmental clean up of terrains which have been contaminated or soiled by military use.
40.2 Human Resource Conversion, this being the process of addressing the reintegration of rationalised soldiers back into civil society through a number of programmes which would typically include en-skilling of those soldiers that facilitates their re-entry into economic society.
40.3 Community Economic Adjustment, this being the process of economically adjusting communities adjacent to military facilities earmarked for closure, who have traditionally been reliant on the presence of the SANDF for their survival or prosperity.
40.4 Inventory Clean-up, this being the consolidation and disposal of the SANDF's capital inventories in alignment with the accepted force design and current and future defence realities. Remarkable progress has already been made in this arena with the clean-up of the SANDF's anti-personnel landmine inventory, resulting in the destruction of these weapons. This positioned South Africa as a world leader in this arena. Equally pressing on the international agenda is the initiation of measures to prevent the non-proliferation of small arms. The SANDF is similarly consolidating its inventory of arms and ammunition and will initiate disposal, even destruction, of these weapons in accordance with South African Foreign Policy and a number of Cabinet decisions that exist in this regard.
41. Once clarity has been achieved in the transformation process with regard to the SANDF's future land, facilities and armaments requirements, an integrated strategy for Defence Conversion can be developed and articulated. It is important that this not be done in isolation, but take place in a deliberate, responsible and coordinated manner within the context of a National Conversion Strategy. The Department of Defence has already entered into discussions with other role playing departments, such as Public Works in this regard.
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