INTRODUCTION
1. During peace-time the SANDF must maintain, develop and prepare forces that form the basis of its conventional defence capabilities. It must also employ such forces in the execution of secondary functions, as described in the White Paper and preceding chapters of this report. At all times, the SANDF must be ready to act in defence of South Africa in response to various defence contingencies. This is reflected in the vision of the Department of Defence:
To ensure, in accordance with the Constitution, effective defence for a democratic South Africa, enhancing national, regional and global security, through balanced, modern, affordable and technologically advanced defence capabilities.
2. Accordingly, the Department has the following mission:
To provide, manage, prepare and employ defence capabilities commensurate with the needs of South Africa as regulated by the Constitution, national legislation and parliamentary and executive direction.
TASKS
3. To plan and prepare for the execution of the above mission, the tasks associated with the defence needs of South Africa need to be defined. The following tasks are derived from the previous chapters of this report:
3.1 Providing core defence capabilities for defence of South Africa against external military threats, and the execution of military operations in defence of South Africa, its interests and its citizens when so ordered by the President.
3.2 Providing defence capabilities against internal threats to the constitutional order, and the execution of such operations in a state of emergency when so ordered by the President.
3.3 Promoting regional security through defence co-operation within the SADC framework.
3.4 Promoting international security through military co-operation in support of South Africa s foreign policy.
3.5 Providing a military capability for participation in regional and international peace support operations.
3.6 Providing and applying forces for land, air and maritime border protection against non-military threats.
3.7 Providing a capability to maintain law and order in co-operation with the SAPS on an ongoing basis. This will remain necessary until the police are able to fulfil the ask without assistance from the military, other than in exceptional circumstances.
3.8 Providing surveillance and enforcement support to relevant authorities for protection of marine resources, control of marine pollution, and maritime law enforcement.
3.9 Providing air traffic control services in support of civil aviation authorities.
3.10 Providing military support for the preservation of life, health and property in emergency situations where the scale of the emergency temporarily exceeds the capacity of the relevant civil authorities.
3.11 Providing emergency capabilities for the maintenance of essential services which have been temporarily disrupted and where the capacity of the relevant civil authorities is exceeded.
3.12 Providing medical and health services in support of relevant authorities in accordance with approved policy.
3.13 Providing search and rescue support to the relevant authorities in accordance with domestic agreements and South Africa s international obligations.
3.14 Providing an air transport service for VIPs and other officials in accordance with approved policy.
3.15 Providing support to other state departments for missions to the Antarctic and Southern Ocean.
3.16 Providing hydrographic services to South African mariners and in compliance with the international obligations of the RSA.
3.17 Providing an infrastructure for the management of the service corps.
3.18 Providing a communications security service to other state departments.
3.19 Administering the National Key Points Act.
FORCE DESIGN LOGIC
4. Notwithstanding this extensive list of tasks, the White Paper provides that force design should revolve chiefly around th SANDF s primary function of defence against military aggression. While the process of force design involves considerable military technical detail, the design is determined largely by decisions regarding three parameters: the level of defence required; the approved defence posture; and the defence budget.
5. The level of defence is reflected in the definition, scale and intensity of military operations associated with the defence contingencies and tasks discussed in Chapter 3 of this report. The size and configuration of the defence capabilities are in turn strongly influenced by the choice of defence posture, as elaborated in Chapter 2. The process is further constrained by budgetary guidelines and the costs associated with particular capabilities. In summary, the force design of the SANDF is needs driven, but cost constrained.
6. While the process is intended to produce a force design representing the best defence value for money within the selected parameters, it may not be possible to ensure the capabilities for a required level of defence within a restrictive budget. The resulting imbalance or inadequacy in defence capability represents a risk to the country, which must either be accepted or reduced by other means. Throughout the process there is thus an interplay of political judgement and military expertise.
FORCE DESIGN OPTIONS
7. The Department of Defence developed various force design options, reflecting different permutations of level of defence, defence posture and cost, for public consideration during the consultative conferences of the Defence Review. Four options were presented to the parliamentary defence committees and cabinet and were discussed in detail. Option One, as set out in this report, was approved subject to available finances.
STATUS OF A FORCE DESIGN
8. The approval of a force design by the parliamentary defence committee, Cabinet or Parliament does not constitute blanket approval for all implied capital projects or an immutable contract in terms of the exact numbers and types of equipment. At best, it constitutes approval in principal for the maintenance of the specified capabilities at an approximate level. There are several reasons for this.
9. The affordability of the force design, which is central to its implementation, is subject to certain assumptions and qualifications. The long-term sustainability of the design requires a continuous investment in the periodic upgrading and replacement of equipment. The costing of the design thus incorporates annualised upgrade and replacement costs over the life span of the equipment. This is based on realistic assumptions, under present conditions, of the anticipated life span and cost of such equipment. Since the life span of major equipment is measured in decades and many replaement projects will commence many years hence, it is impossible to predict with absolute accuracy the actual annualised cost of equipment.
10. The process further assumes that the current imbalance in the so-called tooth-to-tail ratio of the SANDF will be corrected by the transformation process, thus releasing a greater portion of the budget for combat capabilities. The ratio on which the calculations are based is an estimate of the anticipated result of transformation.
11. The numbers and costs of equipment in future replacement projects will also be affected by technological developments which may improve future equipment capabilities. On the other hand, less capable equipment may be available at a lower unit cost. During each procurement project a trade-off will thus have to be made between the required overall capability, the equipment available to the SANDF, cost, and available funds. These details can only be determined under the conditions prevailing at the time, and all major acquisition projects will thus be subject to the processes and levels of approval provided for in the White Paper on Defence.
12. The processes and assumptions on which the force design is based will be reviewed in successive planning cycles. This is bound to produce new insights that will require a periodic revision of the force design. The planning assumptions also reflect perceptions of the geopolitical environment, which will inevitably change. While no major discontinuities are anticipated, even gradual, relatively orderly change will require adjustments to defence planning on a continuous basis.
13. The force design thus reflects a dynamic environment and is itself dynamic. It represents the best present indication of the type and scale of defence capabilities that South Africa should establish and maintain, but its future orientation makes deviations inevitable. The transformation process in particular will impact directly on the force structure required to support the force design: force structure is subject to the Department s transformation project which will be discussed in detail in the course of the Defence Review process.
OPTION 1: RECOMMENDED GROWTH-CORE FORCE DESIGN
14. The absence of any immediate military threat to South Africa, the low probability of a significant threat within the foreseeable future, the reductions in the defence budget since 1989 and the likelihood that the budget will remain restricted for some time, have created a situation where the maintenance of extensive military capabilities is neither necessary nor affordable. Option 1 therefore represents the minimum force level that can be maintained as a growth core, in accordance with the core force approach detailed in Chapter 3, without the permanent loss of capabilities. This growth core will enable limited force employment, but will maintain the expertise and technological base for growth when warranted by the strategic or economic situation.
15. This option provides for a range of defence contingencies but excludes higher-level contingencies in the category of invasions and neutralising raids as described in Chapter 3. It also assumes substantial warning periods for the more severe contingencies. It allows for reasonable freedom of action for the SANDF at operational level, including interdiction and counter-offensive actions within a broadly defensive orientation. It also provides for peace support operations at a level of up to one infantry battalion group, for border protection and other secondary tasks, and for internal commitments in the short term.
16. At the broadest level of detail, this peace-time force will require some 22 000 full-time and some 70 000 part-time members; this includes only combat units and does not include non-combat personnel. The annualised cost of the combat units of this force will be in the order of R5 000 million in 1996 rand value1.
17. Defence is conducted jointly, with each Combat Service providing specialised capabilities to Landward, Air and Maritime Defence. Organisationally, however, land assets reside in the SA Army, air assets in the SA Air Force and naval assets in the SA Navy. The discussion below is thus structured in terms of Landward, Air and Maritime Defence, indicating under each heading the contribution of the Combat Services to defence in that dimension. The contribution of the SA Military Health Services is common to all the dimensions and will be discussed independently.
18. Landward Defence. Landward defence is conceptualised in terms of Conventional Defence (mobile operations) and Area Defence. Mobile conventional forces provide the first and main line of defence against external military threats. Area Defence comprises border safeguarding (border protection and border control) and area protection. Border protection entails defending the border against military threat and against crossings by armed and unarmed individuals or groups.
19. Area protection provides defence in depth against military incursions by external military forces, as well as a firm base from where mobile operations can be conducted. Within the primarily defensive orientation of the SANDF, a high premium is placed on firepower, night fighting ability, manoeuvring, quick reaction, surprise and tactical mobility. These features are reflected in the requirements of Option 1 regarding the land forces of the SA Army, which is the main provider of landward defence capability.
20. SA Army in Landward Defence. The basis for conventional defence is the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF). This comprises of a mechanised infantry brigade, a parachute brigade and a special forces brigade, which maintain immediate readiness for all shorter term contingencies. Potential for expansion is provided by the Part-Time Component mobile division, consisting of three balanced brigades at various levels of preparedness.
21. These conventional, mobile forces are supplemented by border and area protection forces. Their main purpose is the protection of landward borders and interior assets against enemy mobile, airborne and special forces. During peace-time they form the backbone of SANDF participation in border protection and maintenance of law and order tasks. These forces consist principally of 14 light infantry battalions, 12 territorial infantry battalions and 183 area protection units. Command and Control is currently effected through 27 Group Headquarters within nine Command Areas of responsibility throughout South Africa2.
22. Army main equipment associted with the force design includes the following:
22.1 Main Battle Tanks. Tanks provide a unique combination of mobility, firepower and resilience, and are the main combat element of the conventional land battle. The SA Army presently has 224 Olifant Mk1A/1B tanks on inventory, while Option 1 requires 154. The capability of tanks is vastly improved by using tank transporters for deployment over distances. The Olifant is due for replacement by a new generation main battle tank system from the year 20093.
22.2 Armoured Cars. Armoured cars are used in reconnaissance, attacks and counter-attacks against minor enemy strongholds, and in rear areas against lines of communication, providing high mobility and firepower in situations where heavy armour is uncalled for. They are a vital component of peace support/enforcement operations. Armoured cars cannot replace tanks and will only be used against tanks from defile positions or in static direct fire support. The Eland armoured car system is largely being phased out and replaced by the Rooikat. In 1989 the SA Army had 1 268 Eland and 18 Rooikat, compared with the present 235 Eland and 176 Rooikat. Option 1 requires 146 Eland and 242 Rooikat.
22.3 Anti-Armour Missile Systems. The ZT-3 anti-tank missile system, mounted on the Ratel 6 x 6 chassis, provides effective, highly mobile defence against tanks and other armoured vehicles. There are presently 53 systems on inventory, meeting the Option 1 requirement. Replacement by a new-generation system is anticipated from 2008.
22.4 Artillery Systems. Artillery provides indispensable indirect fire support to the land battle. This capability is provided by the G5 155mm towed medium artillery gun, the G6 155mm self-propelled medium artillery gun and the Bateleur 127mm multiple rocket launcher. There are presently 72 G5, 43 G6 and 25 Bateleur on inventory, compared with the Option 1 requirement of 45 G5, 43 G6 and 25 Bateleur.
22.5 Infantry Combat and Mine Protected Vehicles. The present Ratel infantry combat vehicle (ICV), in service since 1976, provides mobility for the infantry and command and control elements of the mechanised forces of the SA Army. The present inventory of 1 243 is close to the 1 214 required by Option 1. It will be replaced by a new generation ICV from 2005. The mobility of the bulk of the infantry units is presently dependent on a range of vehicles, including the mine-protected Casspir, Buffel and Mamba (numbering 3 227 in total) and the unprotected Samil/Kwe 20 and the Samil/Kwe 50. The Option 1 requirement is for 4304 protected vehicles due to a greater emphasis on protection against mines, small-arms fire and shrapnel. These vehicles are essential for mobility in conventional operations, area protection and peace support operations, and are due for replacement from 1999.
22.6 Anti-Aircraft Systems. Air attacks can have a devastating effect on unprotected ground forces and the mere threat of air attack can seriously inhibit mobility and combat effectiveness. The present SA Army air defence capability consists of a variety of towed and vehicle mounted anti-aircraft guns and associated radars. This is inadequate, however; some systems are obsolete and need to be supplemented and extended by new systems to fulfil the concept of layered air defence. The Opton 1 requirement thus includes towed guns, man-portable missiles, short range missiles and search- and fire-control radars.
23. SA Air Force in Landward Defence. The SA Air Force is a vital participant in landward defence, defending land forces against air attack and providing surveillance, mobility (air transportation) and firepower in support of landward operations. Fixed wing aircraft and helicopters provide the following capabilities toward landward defence:
23.1 Combat Support Helicopters (CSH). These provide direct fire support to land forces. They greatly enhance anti-tank capability and provide rapid support to the parachute and special forces brigades. Option 1 thus provides for 12 CSH as a core capability.
23.2 Fighter Aircraft. Fighters are the main means of ensuring a favourable air situation over an area of operations, thereby preventing enemy air operations and enabling aerial support to own ground forces. Their employment in air defence thus has important benefits in landward defence. Direct fighter support includes fire support, interdiction of the battlefield and enemy rear lines of communication. Both medium and light fighters are included in Option 1 (32 and 16 aircraft respectively). Light fighters can, however, only be used in a relatively benign air defence environment.
23.3 Aerial Surveillance. Knowledge of enemy dispositions and movements is essential to the successful conduct of defence. Aerial surveillance gives a unique vantage point, covers both large and selected areas rapidly, and enables a quick response to requests for information. This capability is provided in Option 1 by 16 light reconnaissance aircraft, 4 electronic warfare aircraft (see paragraph 27.5) and a squadron of remotely piloted aircraft. (See Note 2 above).
23.4 Air Mobility. Air transport is essential to the mobility of forces engaged in landward defence and is a critical component of the rapid deployment force concept. Fixed wing aircraft of various types provide mobility over longer distances, the most cost-effective type of aircraft being determined by distance and load considerations. Light and medium helicopters provide tactical mobility for troops in the field, and contribute to logistic support and casualty evacuation. VIP aircraft provide rapid, efficient transport of senior staff to and from theatres of operations. Option 1 thus provides for 44 transport aircraft of various types, 9 VIP aircraft, 96 transport helicopters and nine Voluntary Squadrons. (See Note 2 above).
24. SA Navy in Landward Defence. The SA Navy can provide fire support to landward defence operations in coastal areas and can transport forces, equipment and supplies to harbours serving an area of operations.
25. Air Defence. The use of the air for surveillance, mobility and firepower is a basic tenet of modern conventional warfare. Air superiority is the ability to make unhindered use of the air, while denying an enemy that capability. Air defence is the protection of assets against all forms of enemy air interference and involves both defensive and offensive measures.
26. The active component of defensive counter air measures include the early detection and warning of enemy air activity, ground- or shipboard-defence by means of gun or missile systems, and the use of fighter aircraft to intercept enemy aircraft. The passive component comprises the hardening of potential targets, the dispersion of assets, camouflage, damage repair capabilities, and so forth. Offensive counter air measures consist of direct attacks on enemy air assets including bases, aircraft, air defence systems, radars and command and control centres to neutralise enemy air capabilities. As detailed in Chapter 2, offensive action at an operational level in response to an enemy attack would not violate South Africa s primarily defensive posture. Offensive counter air measures are thus not excluded from the range of possible air defence actions.
27. While each Combat Service is responsible for the local defence of its own assets and the Navy can assist in harbour protection using the capabilities of ships in port, the SA Air Force is responsible for area defence and the defence of National Key Points against air attack. The SA Air Force is thus the main provider of air defence capabilities.
28. SA Air Force in Air Defence. The defence of South African airspace is the primary task of the SA Air Force. Flexible air defence is provided for in this force design option through a combination of airspace control radars (both static and mobile), point defence missile systems, and aircraft.
28.1 Command and Control. The Air Force employs an integrated command and control system linking subsidiary structures to a central Air Force Command Post. This provides an integrated picture of air operations and enables the efficient use of air resources.
28.2 Sensors. Radar coverage is essential to detect and track enemy air operations and to direct own operations. Present radar deployments provide only limited coverage of the country s airspace and borders. Option 1 makes provision for 3,5 radar squadrons, which constitute the required core capability.
28.3 Medium Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft. Medium fighters are essential for air defence. Obsolescence and dfence cutbacks have led to a reduction in medium fighter numbers from 89 in 1989 to 51 aircraft. The F1 s are to be phased out in 1999 subject to annual review, while the Cheetah C will stay in service until 2012. The Option 1 requirement is for 32 medium multi-role fighters.
28.4 Air Defence Missile Systems. The Cactus missile system, used for the defence of primary air bases, has been retired from service. One system is being kept functional as a technology and capability retention programme. Option 1 makes no provision for missile defences.
28.5 Electronic Warfare/In-Flight Refuelling. Electronic surveillance provides vital early warning of air attacks and other enemy actions, while in-flight refuelling extends the range and endurance of fighter aircraft employed in air, land and maritime defence. Retention of this capability thus makes a vital contribution to the other limited capabilities of Option 1 in all dimensions of defence. The recommended option includes five aircraft, reflecting the retention of four equipped aircraft, with a fifth unmodified aircraft used for training and transportation.
29. SA Army in Air Defence. The responsibility of the Army toward air defence consists of self-defence of its own assets, as detailed above.
30. SA Navy in Air Defence. The responsibility of the Navy toward air defence consists of self-defence of its own assets and harbour defence by ships in port, as detailed above.
31. Maritime Defence. South Africa s dominant position on a vital global trade sea-route, its dependence on sea trade and its vast maritime area make maritime defence a matter of great importance. The protection and defence of maritime life lines of commerce during times of conflict and hostilities may prove crucial to the survival and well-being of our people.
32. South Africa has six major commercial ports and two main naval bases - in Simon s Town and Durban. It is of vital importance that these ports be kept open to shipping during times of war or tension. The present lack of finance for defence, however, has determined that two critical areas - comprising Durban and Richard s Bay on the east coast and Cape Town, Saldanha Bay and Simon s Town on the west coast - should be prioritised. To this end, two maritime defence areas have been planned, based on these two areas.
33. Maritime warfare is multi-dimensional and effective maritime defence requires balanced air, surface and sub-surface capabilities. Surface vessels can conduct sustained operations, maintaining a presence unequalled by other systems, and have substantial capabilities in countering aircraft, other surface vessels and submarines. Submarines can control their visibility and pose a threat to even the most sophisticated surface forces, thus providing great deterrent and defence value. Aircraft provide area coverage and a rapid response capability that ships and submarines cannot equal. There is thus a complementary relationship between these elements and the neglect of any one has a disproportionate effect on the overall defence capability. Maritime defence is vested primarily in the capabilities of the SA Navy.
34. SA Navy in Maritime Defence. The maritime defence areas are defended by means of a layered approach where vessels with different capabilities are used in concentric layers extending outward from the harbours. The capabilities of each class of vessel contribute uniquely to overall defence capability.
34.1 Frigates/Patrol Corvettes. Frigates or corvettes are the workhorses of any navy. They are capable of countering aircraft, submarines and other surface vessels and can conduct sustained operations in sea conditions like those off the South African coast. They will patrol to the outer layer of about 200 nautical miles (370 kms) from the coast. Such ships, as a rule, carry helicopters which significantly improve and extend their defence capabilities. The SA Navy has no ships in this class, having lost its destroyers and frigates between the mid-1970s and late 1980s. Option 1 includes four corvettes.
34.2 Submarines. Submarines have built-in stealth, mobility, firepower, endurance and an ability to control their visibility that present significant problems for hostile naval forces. They patrol throughout the outer and inner layers of defence, providing early warning and a great deterrent against even the most powerful of surface forces. Without submarines, a navy would have to have a considerably larger surface fleet with higher sophistication at a significantly higher cost to provide the same deterrent and defence value. The three Daphne-Class submarines in service at present are coming to the end of their economical service life and their replacement should be seriously considered. Option 1 includes four submarines.
34.3 Inshore and Harbour Patrol. Inshore patrol vessels patrol the inshore waters of the maritime defence areas, primarily in the approaches to harbours. Harbour patrol boats are ski-boat sized vessels used for patrol purposes in the harbours themselves. These vessels form the inner layer of defence against smaller enemy forces that may have infiltrated through the outer defences. Option 1 provides for two inshore patrol boats and 39 harbour patrol boats.
34.4 Rapid Reaction Vessels. A number of strike craft or corvettes should be kept on stand-by to react against enemy forces encountered by the outer layers of defence and to patrol the intermediate area. The SA Navy has nine strike craft facing block obsolescence, six of which will have to be replaced shortly after the turn of the century. Option 1 therefore includes six strike craft.
34.5 Mine Countermeasures Forces. Mine hunters and minesweepers are required to keep the harbour approaches clear of mines. Option 1 includes four of each of these vessels, corresponding to the number presently in service. However, the minesweepers, being almost 40 years of age, require a life extension program and upgrade of their minesweeping gear to make them operational.
34.6 Combat Support Ships. Combat Support Ships provide replenishment at sea for combat ships and submarines, enabling operations on a sustained basis with minimal base support. These helicopter carrying ships are capable of performing multiple tasks and are vital in peace support operations because of their inherent cargo and personnel carrying capacity. Option 1 includes one such sip.
35. These forces will be divided up equally in defence of the two Maritime Defence Areas when so required. They can, however, be regrouped as required to meet other contingencies.
36. SA Air Force in Maritime Defence. Air participation in maritime defence provides enhanced surveillance capabilities and firepower, and plays a significant role in layered defence.
36.1 Maritime Patrol Aircraft. Maritime Patrol Aircraft have area coverage and long-range rapid reaction capabilities that enable surveillance far beyond the capabilities of naval vessels. Some are also fitted with weapons that enable attacks on surface ships or submarines. They can patrol throughout and far beyond the maritime defence areas, providing an outer layer of defence, giving early warning of approaching hostile forces, tracking those that have been detected, and assisting in the direction of maritime engagement. Such aircraft are a vital component of maritime warfare. Option 1 therefore includes six long range and 10 short range maritime patrol aircraft. The need for maritime patrol aircraft is, however, presently driven by surveillance requirements rather than full surface and sub-surface combat capability. In view of budgetary restrictions it may therefore be expedient to consider long range maritime patrol aircraft with downgraded combat capabilities, but with a possibility of upgrading when so required, rather than more combat capable medium range aircraft. The early warning capability provided by these aircraft can be supplemented by the surveillance capability of the electronic warfare aircraft of the SA Air Force.
36.2 Shipborne Maritime Helicopters. Helicopters increase the range of ships detection systems and weapons and may possess systems to help counter hostile surface warships or submarines. They therefore vastly improve the defence value of ships that carry them. Option 1 provides for five such helicopters to be carried on the patrol corvettes.
36.3 Fighter aircraft. Fighters provide rapid reaction to a naval threat and can substantially complement naval fire power, thereby compounding the self-defence problem of the enemy. While Option 1 makes no special provision for this role, multi-role fighters dedicated primarily to air and landward defence can be employed in this capacity.
37. SA Military Health Services. The medical services support the three combat services during operations. This support entails operational health services during deployments. The SAMHS participate actively in search and rescue missions, and provide casualty evacuation during missions. Direct support is given to the Army rapid deployment forces through the full-time force medical battalion group, and the part-time medical battalion groups provide direct support to the part-timeforce mobile division. The SAMHS also provide early warning of chemical and biological agents being used against own forces and carry out decontamination of personnel and equipment.
38. Strategic gaps and risks. The major strategic gaps in this force design are as follows:
38.1 Interventions by major powers and neutralising attacks can only be defended against in a limited way. This will require armed action, regular and irregular, supported by civilian based defence if military resistance fails. This limits the deterrence value of the SANDF.
38.2 Limited strategic mobility in the ground forces due to a low force to space ratio.
38.3 Limited strategic reconnaissance capabilities in the Air Force, exacerbated by the absence of high-speed autonomous unmanned aircraft.
38.4 Insufficient air defence capabilities for a classical defensive counter-air posture.
38.5 Restricted maritime capabilities for defence of all harbours and maritime areas outside the two mentioned critical areas.
38.6 Restricted maritime reconnaissance, limiting the operational options of naval surface and submarine forces.
38.7 If large scale forces are employed for peace support operations, this will further restrict capabilities for self-defence.
39. These strategic gaps limit the political freedom of the government in times of crisis and conflict and must be kept in mind during conflict management.
OPTION 2: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE LONG-TERM VISION FORCE DESIGN
40. This option provides for a broad range of defence contingencies, excluding major interventions by major powers as described in Chapter 3 under "invasion". It is based on the assumption that reasonable warning would be received for such contingencies to develop and that time for expansion of capabilities would be available. It allows for reasonable freedom of action for the SANDF at operational level, including interdiction and counter-offensive actions. It makes ample provision for peace support operations, border proection, and other secondary tasks but scales down on internal commitments in line with national defence policy.
41. At the broadest level of detail this peace time force will require some 36 000 full time and some 98 000 part time members (for combat units only). The annualised cost of the combat units of this force will be in the order of R6 000 million in 1996 rand value. As qualified in the discussion of Option 1, the cost does not include common support costs.
42. Land forces. This force design includes all the components of the conventional land forces but significantly scales up the parachute and special forces brigades relative to Option 1.
43. The territorial forces include 20 motorised infantry battalions and 205 area protection units. Command and Control is effected through 18 group headquarters throughout South Africa.
44. Army main equipment remains the same as in Option 1 with slight increase in quantity.
45. Air Forces. The concept of air operations in this force design is the same as for Option 1. Major changes in force elements are the inclusion of four long-range maritime patrol aircraft and high-speed autonomous unmanned aircraft. This enhances the effectiveness of the maritime defence and reconnaissance capabilities of the SANDF.
46. Numbers of light reconnaissance aircraft are reduced since their dual use as transport aircraft is made unnecessary through an increase in light transport aircraft. Two point defence systems are included, thereby improving this capability from technology retention to a limited operational capability. The airspace control radar squadrons are slightly reduced since there is less reliance on fighter interception for air defence.
47. Maritime Defence. Naval forces in this option differ only slightly from the previous option. The minesweepers and mine hunters remain the same in number but readiness levels are slightly improved. The inclusion of the long range maritime patrol aircraft will however substantially improve maritime defence capabilities.
48. SA Military Heath Services. The operational capabilities of the medical services are the same in this option as in Option 1.
49. Strategic gaps and risks. The strategic gaps of Option 2 remain largely in force, with the following reductions:
49.1 Neutralising attacks can be successfully countered, leaving only invasions as a strategic gap.
49.2 Maritime reconnaissance is significantly improved, enhancing the operational options of naval surface and submarine forces.
49.3 Strategic reconnaissance is enhanced by the inclusion of high speed autonomous unmanned aircraft.
50. The reduction in the strategic gaps improves the political freedom of the government in times of crisis and conflict somewhat, but significant gaps till exist and must be kept in mind during conflict management.
OPTION 3: LOWER LEVEL DEMONSTRATION OPTION
51. Option 3 demonstrates the effect of a reduction below the level considered to be the minimum growth-core. This force design also provides greater emphasis on the secondary functions than Options 1 and 2.
52. This force design requires some 26 000 regular force members and 78 000 part-time members (for combat units only). The annualised cost of the combat elements of this force design is approximately R4 000 million in 1996 rand value.
53. The general characteristic of this force design is the removal of certain capability areas rather than simply the reduction of capabilities over a broad range. Conventional capabilities in particular are traded for non-conventional territorial forces. Conventional air and naval capabilities are severely curtailed.
54. This option reduces the Army s conventional forces and increases the area protection units and the readiness level of the groups. In the Air Force, fighter capability is lost, combat support helicopters are excluded and transport helicopters are halved in relation to the previous options. The Navy loses its submarines, corvettes and the combat support ship. No provision is made for defence against chemical and biological attack.
55. The operational effect is to shift the emphasis from conventional to non-conventional operational concepts. It is for this reason also that personnel numbers are increased despite the reduced cost of this force.
56. Strategic gaps and risks. This force design has all the strategic gaps of Option 2. In addition the following gaps are evident:
56.1 The absence of fighters, combat support helicopters, corvettes and submarines, as well as the reduced conventional capabilities of land forces, severely limits the deterrent value of this force design.
56.2 The emphasis on the non-conventional elements of the Army implies a severe restriction on the operational concepts open to it.
56.3 No provision for defence against air attack.
56.4 The elimination of larger surface vessels and submarines severely restricts the effective radius at whch the Navy can operate effectively, and seriously compromises its ability to protect the sea lines of communication.
56.5 The design leaves South Africa vulnerable to any form of chemical and biological attack.
56.6 The strategic mobility of the SANDF is severely limited.
56.7 The force has a greatly reduced capability to contribute specialised capabilities to peace support operations.
56.8 In times of conventional conflict, South Africa will be forced into adopting non-conventional methods of defence which will be costly in terms of lives and territory lost.
57. These strategic gaps imply serious political risks for government. Since the SANDF cannot provide the deterrent capability outlined in the White Paper, the political management of conflict will require special attention. South Africa will be open to punitive and coercive actions by future enemies due to a lack of air and maritime defence.
OPTION 4: DEFENSIVE OPERATIONAL CONCEPT FORCE DESIGN
58. This force design is premised on the same level of defence as in Option 1. It therefore excludes defence against contingencies such as invasions and neutralising raids by major powers. It assumes a much more defensive posture, excluding all offensive operational concepts. Due to this restriction it requires longer warning periods for defence preparation. It has reasonable utility for peace support operations and good utility for border protection and other domestic tasks.
59. This force design will require about 27 000 full-time and 82 000 part-time members (for combat units only). It has an annualised cost of nearly R5 900 million for its combat units.
60. Land Forces. The rapid deployment force (mechanised, parachute and special forces brigades) remain in this force design to form the mobile landward defence focus. The mobile division is scaled down both in size and in readiness level in comparison to the previous three options.
61. The territorial forces are increased through additional personnel in the area protection units. This is to ensure better blanket coverage and geographical support to the rapid deployment force.
62. Air Forces. The air defence capabilities of the Air Force are greatly increased. Radar squadrons are increased to six and point defence squadrons are raised to four. The in-flight refueling squadron maintains four aircraft. Fighter capability is also considerably increased. This is to allow for adoption of counter-air defensive concepts only, which demand high levels of, and well dispersed, air defence systems. Thi increase in fighter aircraft could be interpreted as an offensive arms build-up.
63. The number of combat support helicopters are increased to enhance the fire power of land forces beyond the reach of the rapid deployment force.
64. To compensate financially for the above, the transport helicopters are reduced significantly. Other Air Force elements remain constant.
65. Maritime Defence. Maritime defence in this option is in line with options 1 and 2, with an increase in inshore patrol capabilities. The inclusion of the four long range maritime patrol aircraft further strengthens the maritime defence capabilities.
66. SA Military Health Services. This option, due to its defensive nature, strengthens the chemical and biological defensive programmes.
67. Strategic Gaps and Risks
67.1 As in Option 1, higher order defence contingencies involving major powers cannot be countered.
67.2 To remain affordable, lower levels of defence readiness must be accepted. This assumes longer warning periods.
67.3 Very limited strategic mobility for ground forces exists due to a low force to space ratio. This is aggravated by a reduced transport helicopter capability.
67.4 As in Options 1 and 2, maritime defence is restricted to two local defence areas.
67.5 As in Options 1 and 2, the aerial reconnaissance capabilities of the SANDF remain limited.
67.6 The strict adherence to a single operational concept severely restricts the freedom of action and flexibility of both government and the SANDF.
67.7 The concentration on static, defensive forces reduces the utility of the SANDF for peace support operations in particular.
67.8 According to this concept, the SANDF fights only on South African territory. This has obvious disadvantages in terms of loss of life, infrastructure, economic production and sovereignty.
68. These strategic gaps have serious risks to government regarding its ability to ensure the security of its people. Furthermore, it limits the freedom of action of government in that it subscribes to an inflexible defence concept. It also limits the utility of the SANDF in terms of its seconary functions.
CONCLUSION
69. The Department of Defence considers Option 2 to be the most prudent force design for the SANDF in the long term. This should remain the vision of the Department.
70. In the shorter term, however, due to financial restrictions and other national priorities, Option 1 will form an acceptable growth-core for the maintenance of military capabilities and skills.
71. Option 3 is considered unacceptable by the Department, and leaves strategic gaps and risks that should be unacceptable to government. It is well below the minimum growth-core for any future expansion.
72. Option 4 involves major deviations from present capabilities and doctrine, and will require more study before it can be recommended. If future tendencies are in this direction, Option 1 will be an acceptable base for such development.
73. In the light of the above, Option 1 is the recommended force design for the SANDF.
74. The chosen forces design option will become the object of implementation planning for the next decade or longer. However, the realisation of this force design will be influenced by periodic revisions of the Defence Review and subsequent planning to reflect the continuously changing strategic environment and prevailing circumstances. The result is that the exact details regarding the type and quantities of main equipment will inevitably deviate from the vision. Such deviations will be subject to parliamentary oversight and the stipulations of the acquisition process.
SANDF FORCE DESIGN OPTIONS
 |
 |
 |