CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
1. The Constitution provides that the SANDF may be employed in the following functions:
1.1 for service in the defence of the Republic, for the protection of its sovereignty and territorial integrity;
1.2 for service in compliance with the international obligations of the Republic with regard to international bodies and other states;
1.3 for service in the preservation of life, health or property;
1.4 for service in the provision or maintenance of essential services;
1.5 for service in the upholding of law and order in the Republic in co-operation with the South African Police Service under circumstances set out in law where the Police Service is unable to maintain law and order on its own; and
1.6 for service in support of any department of state for the purpose of socio-economic upliftment.
2. It is the policy of government that the above functions do not carry equal weight. The primary function of the SANDF is to defend South Africa against external military aggression. The other functions are secondary.
3. The size, design, structure and budget of the SANDF will therefore be determined mainly by its primary function. However, provision will have to be made for the special requirements of internal deployment and international peace support operations.
4. The rest of this Chapter considers the various functions of the Defence Force in more detail.
SELF-DEFENCE
5. Governments have an inherent right and responsibility to ensure the protection of the state and its people against external military threats. South Africa will employ the following principal strategies to this end:
5.1 Political, economic and military co-operation with other states. In this context, a common security regime, regional defence co-operation and confidence- and security-building measures in Southern Africa are particularly important. [Chapter 4]
5.2 The prevention, management and resolution of conflict through non-violent means. Conflict resolution, in the form of diplomacy, mediation or arbitration, may take place on a bilateral basis or under the auspices of an international or regional body.
5.3 The deployment of the Defence Force. The use or threat of force against external military aggression is a legitimate measure of last resort when political solutions have been exhausted.
6. It is clear from the above that the government's preferred and primary course of action is to prevent conflict and war. South Africa will only turn to military means when deterrence and non-violent strategies have failed.
7. Deterrence requires the existence of a defence capability which is sufficiently credible to inhibit potential aggressors. Although South Africa is not confronted by any foreseeable external military threat, this capability cannot be turned on and off like a tap. It is therefore necessary to maintain a core defence capability.
8. A core defence capability includes a balanced and sustainable nucleus with the following features:
8.1 the ability to deal with small-scale contingencies of a short-term nature;
8.2 the ability to deal with a range of contingencies;
8.3 the ability to expand the size of the Defence Force to appropriate force levels within a realistic warning period should the threat situation deteriorate significantly;
8.4 the maintenance and, where necessary, the adequate and appropriate upgrading or replacement of equipment and weaponry; and
8.5 an effective intelligence capability to ensure early warning of potential conflicts and crises.
9. This `core force' approach takes account of government spending priorities and the fact that the self-defence problem is likely to be limited in the short- to medium-term. It does not require a large standing force. Instead, the SANDF will comprise a relatively small Regular Force and a sufficiently large Part-Time Force [Chapter 6].
10. The Defence Review will address in more detail the implications of the core force approach for the size, doctrine, posture, structure, weaponry, equipment and other features of the SANDF.
11. The Review will also address the strategic and technical implications of the constitutional provision that the SANDF shall be "primarily defensive in the exercise or performance of its powers and functions". As noted earlier, the adoption of a defensive and non-threatening military posture will contribute to promoting confidence and positive relationships in Southern Africa.
DEPLOYMENT IN CO-OPERATION WITH THE SA POLICE SERVICE
12. It was noted in Chapter 4 that SANDF troops are currently employed on a widespread basis in support of the SAPS, and that such employment is likely to persist for some time because of on-going public violence and the relative shortage of police personnel.
13. In order to ensure effective deployment and maximum co-operation, the following steps should be taken before the SANDF is deployed alongside the SAPS:
13.1 the creation of a formal liaison committee incorporating the relevant structures;
13.2 analysis and determination of the role definition, method of deployment and responsibilities of the SANDF;
13.3 the establishment of a clear chain of command and control, a code of conduct and appropriate rules of engagement;
13.4 agreement on the duration of the SANDF deployment; and
13.5 a thorough review of the deployment if the objective of the mission is not achieved within the agreed time-scale.
14. Notwithstanding the above, the history of South Africa and many other countries suggests that it is inappropriate to utilise armed forces in a policing role on a permanent or semi-permanent basis. This perspective is based on the following considerations:
14.1 Armed forces are not trained, orientated or equipped for deployment against civilians. They are typically geared to employ maximum force against an external military aggressor.
14.2 On-going employment in a law and order function invariably leads to the defence force becoming increasingly involved in non-military activities.
14.3 Such employment may also undermine the image and legitimacy of the defence force amongst sections of the population.
14.4 Internal deployment places a substantial burden on the defence budget.
14.5 It also has a disruptive effect on the economy where large numbers of part-time soldiers are engaged.
14.6 Efforts to apply military solutions to political problems are inherently limited and invariably lead to acts of repression.
15. In the light of these considerations, the policy goal of the government is to build the capacity of the police to deal with public violence on their own while political solutions are being sought or have failed. The SANDF would then only be deployed in the most exceptional circumstances, such as a complete breakdown of public order beyond the capacity of the SAPS, or a state of national defence.
16. In order to achieve this goal, financial resources for maintaining internal stability should be allocated to enhancing the capacity of the SAPS. Further, and as a matter of urgency, the Departments of Defence and Safety and Security will establish a work group to devise strategies for the withdrawal of the SANDF from an on-going policing role.
17. The internal employment of the military will be subject to parliamentary control and the constitutional provisions on fundamental rights, and will be regulated by legislation. Officers and other ranks deployed in internal operations will be equipped and trained appropriately.
18. The SANDF is currently employed in border protection in co-operation with the police. Those activities which relate to combatting crime and controlling the flow of illegal arms and immigrants into South Africa are more properly the responsibility of the SAPS. This matter will similarly be reviewed by the Departments of Defence and Safety and Security.
INTERNATIONAL PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS
19. As a fully fledged member of the international community, South Africa will fulfil its responsibility to participate in international peace support operations.
20. There are two types of peace support operations in which the SANDF may become involved: i) peacekeeping, which entails military operations undertaken without resort to force and with the consent of the major parties to a dispute in order to monitor and facilitate the implementation of a peace agreement; and ii) peace enforcement, which entails the application or threat of force, pursuant to international authorisation, in order to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order.
21. In the short-term, such participation will be regarded with a fair measure of caution since the political and military dynamics of these operations are new to South Africa and the Defence Force. Further, the integration of the former statutory and non-statutory forces is still underway.
22. In order to prepare properly for peace support operations, the SANDF is currently investigating the development of appropriate doctrines, operational procedures and training programmes in co-operation with foreign partners.
23. Public awareness and parliamentary debate on the complexities and different types of peace support operations is equally important.
24. South Africa will only become involved in specific peace support operations if the following conditions are met:
24.1 There should be parliamentary approval and public support for such involvement. This will require an appreciation of the associated costs and risks, including the financial costs and risk to the lives of military personnel.
24.2 The operation should have a clear mandate, mission and objectives.
24.3 There should be realistic criteria for terminating the operation.
24.4 The operation should be authorised by the United Nations Security Council.
24.5 Operations in Southern Africa should be sanctioned by SADC and should be undertaken together with other SADC states rather than conducted on a unilateral basis. Similarly, operations in Africa should be sanctioned by the Organisation of African Unity.
25. South Africa's consideration of involvement in specific peace support operations will not be limited to the possible deployment of troops. The involvement could also take the form of providing equipment, logistical support, engineering services, communications systems and medical personnel and facilities.
26. The acquisition and maintenance of military equipment shall take account of the particular requirements of peace support operations.
OTHER DEFENCE FUNCTIONS
27. As noted earlier, the Constitution provides that the SANDF may be employed in a range of activities in addition to those discussed above.
28. These activities include disaster relief; the provision and maintenance of essential services; search and rescue; evacuation of South African citizens from high threat areas; protection of maritime and marine resources; and regional defence co-operation.
29. It should be stressed again that these are secondary functions. They arise from the unique capability of the Defence Force. Inappropriate use of military forces in non-military activities is economically inefficient.
30. The government is disinclined to employ the SANDF in socio-economic development. Such employment blurs the distinction between the military and civilian spheres; it contributes to the militarisation of civil society; it undermines the preparedness and capabilities of the force with respect to its primary function; and it may undermine the image of the SANDF in the eyes of sections of the population.
31. However, there may be exceptional circumstances which mitigate against the delivery of services by line function departments. The support of the SANDF may be required as a matter of urgency because of its specialised skills and resources. An example of this might be assisting with emergency provision of water to a rural community.
32. The following guidelines will govern these situations: the employment should be requested of the DOD by the relevant government department; it should have the consent of the affected community; it should have a limited time duration; and it should be subject to civilian control.
33. Finally, the SANDF can make an important contribution to developing human resources through its education and training programmes. Special training programmes are associated with integration, demobilisation and rationalisation. For example, the Service Corps will train its members in a range of vocational and other skills to prepare them for employment in civil society [Chapter 6].
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