THE GLOBAL CONTEXT
1. The ending of apartheid and the establishment of democracy have given rise to dramatic changes in the external strategic environment from the perspective of South Africa. The country is no longer isolated internationally. It has been welcomed into many international organisations, most importantly the United Nations (UN), the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).
2. South Africa is in fact expected to play an active role in these forums, especially with regard to peace and security in Africa and in Southern Africa in particular. There are expectations that South Africa will become involved in multi-national peace support operations on the continent.
3. South Africa does not now, and will not in the future, have aggressive intentions towards any state. It is not confronted by an immediate conventional military threat, and does not anticipate external military aggression in the short- to medium-term (+/- 5 years).
4. The longer term future cannot be determined with any degree of certainty because international relations are unpredictable. They are characterised by both co-operation and competition around political, military, economic, environmental and other issues. There is the risk of armed hostilities in some parts of the world, and a high level of political cohesion in others.
5. A number of prominent trends in the international system are discernible since the ending of the Cold War:
5.1 The vast majority of armed conflicts are taking place within, rather than between, states. They arise from internal ethnic, religious and other divisions, and in some instances have led to the disintegration of states. Such conflicts are increasingly being regarded as regional and international concerns.
5.2 There is a tendency towards greater interdependence, regionalism and internationalism. New regional blocs and international organisations have been formed, with particular emphasis on the facilitation of inter-state trade.
5.3 The developments outlined above, together with global media and communications systems, present a profound challenge to the notion of the `sanctity' of state sovereignty and national borders.
5.4 There is a major fault line between the countries of the North and those of the South, as the latter become progressively poorer. Moreover, there is widespread concern amongst African leaders that the continent has been marginalised in world political and economic affairs.
5.5 There has been a reorientation of thinking on `security' and `threats to security'. These concepts are now viewed in a holistic way. As outlined in Chapter 2, the security of people and the non-military dimensions of security have gained prominence.
5.6 The UN Security Council, no longer frustrated by the exercise of the veto, has become increasingly active in a number of areas, especially peace operations, humanitarian assistance, and control of conventional armaments and weapons of mass destruction.
5.7 The ending of the Cold War has resulted in a substantial decline in the volume of global arms sales. This had led to efforts, with mixed results, to convert armaments industries to civilian production. At the same time, the major arms suppliers are offloading surplus stock at a relatively cheap price in the developing world, compounding the problem of arms proliferation.
6. The following conclusions for the defence sector are drawn from this overview of the external environment.
6.1 The absence of a foreseeable conventional military threat provides considerable space to rationalise, redesign and `rightsize' the SANDF. The details of this process will be spelt out in the Defence Review.
6.2 The SANDF has to maintain a core defence capability because of the inherent unpredictability of the future. Such capability cannot be created from scratch if the need suddenly arises. The maintenance and development of weapons systems is necessarily a long-term endeavour. The concept of a core defence capability is discussed in Chapter 5.
6.3 Within budgetary constraints, the DOD will engage in co-operative ventures with its counterparts throughout the world in such fields as training and education, defence planning, exchange visits, combined exercises and procurement of arms and equipment.
6.4 For political, strategic and geographic reasons, defence co-operation with other Southern African states is a priority. South Africa will seek to strengthen the security and defence forums of SADC. The question of regional security is discussed in more detail below.
6.5 As a responsible member of the international community, South Africa will conduct its foreign policy, arms trade and external defence activities in accordance with international law and norms. South Africa is a member of a number of multi-lateral arms control regimes, and has recently introduced new policy on national arms control. [Chapter 8]
THE REGIONAL CONTEXT
7. The most significant strategic development over the past few years is South Africa's new status in Southern Africa, previously an arena of intense conflict. With the election of the Government of National Unity, relations with neighbouring states have changed from suspicion and animosity to friendship and co-operation.
8. The region as a whole has undergone substantial change since the end of the Cold War. Considerable progress has been made towards the resolution of internal conflicts, the establishment of democratic political systems, and demilitarisation and disarmament. The prospects for regional peace and stability are greater today than at any other time in recent decades.
9. Nevertheless, much of the sub-continent is stricken by chronic underdevelopment and the attendant problems of poverty, illiteracy and unemployment. There are large numbers of refugees and displaced people; an acute debt crisis; widespread disease and environmental degradation; and a proliferation of small arms. Certain states remain politically volatile. The worst case scenario, as was experienced most intensely in Angola and Mozambique, is civil war.
10. These phenomena are not confined to national borders. They impact negatively on neighbouring states in the form of a range of non-military threats: environmental destruction, the spread of disease, the burden of refugees, and cross-border trafficking in drugs, stolen goods and small arms.
11. Regional instability and underdevelopment can only be addressed meaningfully through political reform, socio-economic development and inter-state co-operation in these spheres. Similarly, the prevention and management of inter- and intra-state conflict is primarily a political and not a military matter.
12. Following trends in other parts of the world, South Africa will encourage the development of a multi-lateral `common security' approach in Southern Africa. In essence, the SADC states should shape their political, security and defence policies in co-operation with each other. This does not preclude the conclusion of bilateral and trilateral security agreements.
13. A common approach to security in Southern Africa is necessary for a number of reasons. First, many of the domestic threats to individual states are shared problems and impact negatively on the stability of neighbouring countries.
14. Second, it is possible that inter-state disputes could emerge in relation to refugees, trade, foreign investment, natural resources and previously suppressed territorial claims.
15. Third, since the sub-continent is politically volatile and its national and regional institutions are relatively weak, internal conflicts could give rise to cross-border tensions and hostilities. This volatility and weakness also makes the region vulnerable to foreign interference and intervention from land, sea and air.
16. Common security arrangements would have many advantages in this context. They could facilitate the sharing of information, intelligence and resources; the early warning of potential crises; joint problem-solving; implementing confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs); negotiating security agreements and treaties; and resolving inter-state conflict through peaceful means.
17. Certain of these endeavours are the responsibility of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Chief amongst them is the settlement of conflict through preventive diplomacy, mediation or arbitration.
18. Other types of activity, some of which are under discussion in the newly formed security and defence forums of SADC, will be undertaken by the DOD.
19. First, regional defence co-operation could be promoted in the fields of logistics; training and education; intelligence; combined exercises; secondment of personnel; and the development of common doctrines and operational procedures.
20. Second, the government might be called upon by neighbouring countries to play a number of supportive roles. For example, the SANDF could provide assistance with respect to disaster relief; controlling cross-border trafficking in small arms; clearing minefields; military training; and maintaining and upgrading weaponry and equipment.
21. Third, the DOD is keen to pursue the implementation of CSBMs. These are measures which provide for greater transparency in military matters in order to alleviate possible mistrust, prevent misunderstandings from developing into crises, and thereby promote collective confidence and stability.
22. Appropriate CSBMs might include the following:
22.1 Annual consultation and exchange of information on defence budgets, force structure, modernisation plans and troop deployment.
22.2 Consideration of national threat perceptions which inform force structure and modernisation plans.
22.3 The establishment of a regional arms register which records information on imports, exports, production and holdings of conventional arms and light weaponry.
22.4 Notification and on-site observation of military exercises and other specified activities.
22.5 Verification procedures in respect of the above.
22.6 A communications network and a `crisis hotline'.
22.7 Procedures for dealing with unusual or unscheduled military incidents.
23. Situations may arise in Southern Africa where inter- or intra-state conflict poses a threat to peace and stability in the region as a whole. If political efforts to resolve the conflict are unsuccessful, it may become necessary to deploy the SANDF in multi-national peace support operations. [Chapter 5]
24. South Africa shares the view of many of its neighbours that the creation of a standing peacekeeping force in the region is neither desirable nor practically feasible. It is far more likely that the SADC countries will engage in ad-hoc peace support operations if the need arises.
25. Nevertheless, the SADC states are committed to regional co-operation in preparing for peace support operations. It may therefore be worthwhile to establish a small peace support operations centre, under the auspices of regional defence structures, to develop and co-ordinate planning, training, logistics, communication and field liaison teams for multi-national forces.
26. South Africa will support the conclusion of multi-lateral treaties on disarmament, conventional arms control, the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction, and foreign military involvement in the region. The most important agreement would be a non-aggression pact which endorses the international prohibition on the threat or use of force.
27. Given South Africa's relative military strength on the sub-continent, the adoption of a defensive and non-threatening posture would contribute to building confidence and positive relationships.
28. Further, reductions in South Africa's force levels and weapons holdings might stimulate a broader process of disarmament in Southern Africa. This would release resources for development and thereby promote stability. However, force reductions should be kept within reasonable proportions if South Africa is to play an active supportive role in the region.
29. Finally, South Africa has a common destiny with Southern Africa. Domestic peace and stability will not be achieved in a context of regional instability and poverty. It is therefore in South Africa's long-term security interests to pursue mutually beneficial relations with other SADC states and to promote reconstruction and development throughout the region.
THE DOMESTIC CONTEXT
30. From a security perspective there are three prominent trends at domestic level. First, as noted in Chapter 2, there is an overwhelming need for socio-economic development and reconstruction in order to address the root causes of much personal insecurity and social instability. This is both a moral obligation and a strategic imperative.
31. Second, South Africa is characterised by endemic crime and criminal violence which affects all sectors of society and is exacerbated by the proliferation of small arms in private hands. The government is tackling this problem through efforts to strengthen the criminal justice system, community policing and crime prevention strategies. A long-term solution lies in upgrading the conditions of impoverished communities through the RDP.
32. Third, there has been a considerable reduction in the level of public and political violence since the elections in April 1994. Nevertheless, violence in certain parts of the country remains unacceptably high and poses a serious threat to public order and the security of citizens.
33. Public order policing is primarily the responsibility of the South African Police Service (SAPS). However, given the relative shortage of police personnel, large numbers of troops are currently deployed to assist them. This tendency is undesirable. As motivated in Chapter 5, it is a matter of urgency that plans are formulated to allow for the withdrawal of the SANDF from a policing role.
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