The Central European revolutions of 1989 (annus mirablis) have been truly of historic proportions. They not only captured the attention and imagination of the world, but they have tested and challenged five states in the extreme--Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia (now the Czech Republic and Slovakia).
In historical terms, the continuing transformations are much more encompassing and complex than the mere disintegration of communism. The aftershocks of World War I, which saw the disintegration of the Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian empires, continue to haunt Central European successor states. Not only do the 1989-90 Central European revolutions have to deal with historical unfinished business, Note 1 they also test prevailing assumptions about civil-military relations in contemporary liberal democratic polities. And most important, the revolutions are likely to provide serious future challenges to U.S. and European security. History has been in fast-forward over the past five years. Already four distinct periods are evident since the Central European revolutions of 1989-90. The present period is the one that may prove to be the most critical for Central Europe's future.
The first geo-strategic shift, which occurred during 1989-90, was marked by Central European euphoria resulting from the revolutions themselves, optimism about a "Return to Europe" by joining NATO and the European Community (EC), now European Union (EU). The period witnessed NATO's July 1990 London Declaration extending a "hand of friendship" to the East. The period concluded with the successful Four-plus-Two (plus-One) negotiations culminating not only in Germany's 3 October 1990 unification, but also in NATO's expansion to the Polish border to now incorporate the former German Democratic Republic in its security guarantee.
The second period, which occurred from German unification through the end of 1991, witnessed the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, withdrawal of Soviet Groups of Forces from Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and a failed coup in the Soviet Union. During 1991 NATO convened ministerial meetings in Copenhagen (June), which sanctioned developing military ties to the east, and in Rome (November), which resulted in a new strategic concept (to replace NATO's Flexible Response) and the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) to engage the East. Central Europe's initial euphoria about Western Europe's embrace of their "return" turned to more cautious (or realistic) optimism.
State disintegration marked the third period which opened in January 1992 and continued through 1993. The year 1992 witnessed the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia marking the emergence of more than twenty states. It also witnessed the continued withdrawal of Soviet (now Russian) troops from Germany and Poland in Central Europe.
NATO demonstrated willingness to engage in peacekeeping operations under either CSCE (May) or United Nations (December) auspices; and in June 1993 in Athens, the NACC expressed its willingness to support the Alliance in UN and/or CSCE-mandated peacekeeping operations. The same period also witnessed Boris Yeltsin's initial support for, and change of mind about NATO's expansion to Central Europe. NATO and EU hesitancy toward Central Europe coupled with Russia's pursuit of a Near Abroad policy and another failed coup in 1993 contributed to increasing Central European pessimism about Russia's prospects for democratic political development, security to the East, and skepticism about support from the West.
The fourth period opened with NATO's January 1994 Brussels Summit, which adopted the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), Partnership For Peace (PFP), and committed the Alliance to future expansion. During this period, the last of the Russian troops were withdrawn from Germany and Poland.
Central (and East) Europeans, who were initially skeptical, if not cynical about Western intentions because they perceived the Alliance as bending to Russian opposition to their entry in 1993, have decided to test NATO in order to determine whether PFP and CJTF offer a real step toward NATO membership. In this regard, and with little doubt, the January 1994 Summit marked a watershed for NATO, but only time will tell whether the future Alliance will prove to be "hollow" or remain relevant to Europe's eastern security problems.
What NATO Has Done
NATO's responses to developments in the East--first, to the former Warsaw Pact members of Central and Eastern Europe and second, to the new states emerging from the disintegrated Soviet Union--have been both extraordinary and insufficient. NATO's institutional responses have been extraordinary in that so many new initiatives have been taken in such a short period of time. Yet they have been insufficient in that events have moved at such a fast pace that NATO's responses have not kept up with expectations in the region.
London Declaration, July 1990. Only months after the revolutions of November-December 1989, NATO extended its first "hand of friendship" at the London Summit on 5-6 July 1990. NATO invited the six (now former) Warsaw Pact members (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania and the Soviet Union) to visit Brussels to address the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and invited these governments to establish regular diplomatic liaison with NATO to share thinking and deliberations and to intensify military contacts during the period of historic change. Note 2 During the summer, new liaison ambassadors from the Warsaw Pact participated in briefings at NATO headquarters.
East German Absorption. East Germany's transformation from a key Warsaw Pact member in November 1989 to a full member of NATO on 3 October 1990 was unexpected and rapid. The Soviet position underwent unforeseen and mercurial twists on the security framework for a united Germany. Mikhail Gorbachev initially refused to accept the Germany-in-NATO framework when he met with George Bush on 3 June 1990. Though Gorbachev wanted a neutral unified Germany, his concession to Helmut Kohl in July indicated that he really had little choice in the matter. In reality, the Soviets ceded control when the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) failed to stabilize the domestic situation as a reform communist state in November 1989; de facto unification had occurred on 1 July 1990 with economic and monetary union of the two German states. The Soviets also decoupled political unification from the security issue when they conceded that all-German elections could occur irrespective of the Four-plus-Two agreement, which was signed on 12 September 1990. Note 3
When formal unification occurred on 3 October 1990, Germany's five new eastern Laender (states created from the former GDR) assumed the protection of NATO's Article 5-"an armed attack against one...shall be considered an attack against them all." NATO's eastward expansion occurred without the need to sign a new protocol of association as employed upon the accessions of Greece and Turkey in 1951, Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982.
Copenhagen NAC, June 1991. On 6-7 June NATO took the next step at the Copenhagen NAC session by agreeing to implement a broad set of further initiatives "to intensify...[NATO's] program of military contacts at various levels" Note 4 with Central and East European (CEE) states. CEE military contacts would be intensified with NATO headquarters, SHAPE, and other major NATO commands, and NATO would invite CEE military officers to NATO training facilities for special programs concerning civilian oversight of defense. Meetings of experts would be held to discuss security policy issues, military strategy and doctrine, arms control, and military industrial conversion to civilian purposes. NATO invited CEE experts to participate in NATO's "Third Dimension" scientific and environmental programs and to exchange views on subjects such as airspace management. Also NATO information programs expanded to the CEE region.
NAC Ministerial, 21 August 1991. Until August, NATO treated all former Warsaw Pact countries alike. During the August 1991 coup attempt in the then Soviet Union, the 21 August NAC ministerial statement differentiated the Soviet Union from the other Warsaw Pact countries, when it suspended liaison "pending a clarification in that country." The statement also noted:
We expect the Soviet Union to respect the integrity and security of all states in Europe. As a token of solidarity with the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, we will develop ways of further strengthening our contribution toward the political and economic reform process within these countries. Our diplomatic liaison arrangements with the Central and Eastern European democracies now take on added significance. Note 5
Rome Summit, November 1991: Genesis of NATO's Political and Military Transformation. At the 7-8 November 1991 Rome NAC summit, NATO approved the Rome Declaration which broadened NATO's activities with the Soviet Union and Central and East Europe to include annual meetings with the NAC at ministerial level in what would be called the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC); periodic meetings with the NAC at ambassadorial level; additional meetings as circumstances warrant; and regular meetings with NATO subordinate committees, including the Political and Economic Committees; and the Military Committee and other NATO military authorities. Note 6 In addition to creating the NACC, the November 1991 Rome summit initiated another major change when it adopted a New Strategic Concept to replace its 1967 strategy of "Flexible Response." The new strategy moved NATO's military emphasis away from massive mobilization toward enhanced crisis management capabilities and peacekeeping operations. It also established the groundwork for NATO's military transformation.
North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). Note 7 On 20 December 1991 the foreign ministers of all the "former adversaries" (including the newly independent Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia) met at the inaugural NACC to adopt a "Statement on Dialogue, Partnership, and Cooperation" that endorsed annual meetings of the NACC at ministerial level; bimonthly meetings of the NAC with liaison ambassadors beginning February 1992; additional NACC meetings as circumstances warrant; and regular meetings of the Political, Economic, and Military Committees with liaison partners. The purposes of the consultations and cooperation would be security and related issues.
On 26 February, the NACC met at the ambassadorial level to discuss and adopt a "Work Plan for Dialogue, Partnership, and Cooperation." The 10 March 1992 Extraordinary NACC meeting, which convened to broaden membership to 35 (to include the former Soviet republics except Georgia), endorsed the Work Plan which covered a wide set of activities including defense planning issues, defense conversion, economic issues, science, challenges of modern society, dissemination of information, policy planning consultations, and air traffic management. Note 8
While the NACC had laudable goals and its activities have mushroomed, its limitations immediately became apparent. First, the disintegration of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 and the decision to include all its successor states as new NACC members meant that rather than the originally conceived five non-Soviet Warsaw Pact members and the USSR, the NACC would include more than twenty new members. The immense diversity among NACC partners (e.g., between Poland and Uzbekistan) led to Central European demands for differentiation and increasing demands for membership in the Alliance. In sum, despite well-intended goals, the cooperation partner's demands on the NACC made it quite apparent how ill-prepared and limited the organization really was. NATO's recognition of its inadequacy came in January 1994 when in lieu of extending membership, the North Atlantic Council adopted the Partnership For Peace (PFP) program.
NATO and NACC as "Out-Of-Area" Peacekeeper
Oslo NAC/NACC, June 1992. On 4 June 1992 the North Atlantic Council (NAC) Foreign Ministers session in Oslo agreed "to support on a case-by-case basis in accordance with their own procedures, peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of [the Council on Security and Cooperation in Europe] CSCE." Note 9 Immediately afterward, NATO moved "out-of-area" and with the Western European Union (WEU) dispatched naval units to the Adriatic to enforce the UN embargo. Many NACC members evidently saw this as an opportunity to broaden their cooperation with NATO and on 5 June the NACC foreign ministers attached "particular importance to enhancing the CSCE's operational and institutional capacity to contribute to conflict prevention, crisis management, and the peaceful settlement of disputes [and expressed willingness] to contribute." Note 10
In December 1992 the NATO NAC Ministerial extended a parallel offer to the Unite Nations; it noted the Alliance's readiness "to support peacekeeping operations under the authority of the UN Security Council." Note 11 The NACC then followed by agreeing that NATO and cooperation partners would share experience with one another and with other CSCE states in the planning and preparation of peacekeeping missions and would consider possible joint peacekeeping training and exercises. The same NACC also approved a 1993 Work Plan with specific provisions on peacekeeping and created a NACC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping, to discuss general political and conceptual principles and practical measures for cooperation.
Closer cooperation and confidence among NACC partners became evident in February 1993 when the Military Committee met for the first time in cooperation session. When NACC defense ministers met at the end of March 1993, they recognized the importance "of the ability to act in a cooperative framework" in peacekeeping tasks and "ensure(d) that a high priority be given this work." Note 12
On 12 April 1993, under authority of UN Resolution 816, NATO started the no-fly zone enforcement-operation over Bosnia-Herzegovina. In late April, the Military Committee again met in cooperation with Chiefs of Defense Staff to discuss the possibility of NATO intervention in Bosnia should a peaceful solution fail.
Athens NAC/NACC, June 1993. The 10 June 1993 NAC ministerial communique noted the development of a "common understanding on conceptual approaches to peacekeeping [and] enhancing of cooperation in this field" Note 13 with Cooperation Partners. The 11 June 1993 Athens NACC adopted the Ad Hoc Group's detailed Report on Cooperation in Peacekeeping Note 14 and agreed to accelerate the Ad Hoc Group's practical cooperation to implement the program, including the sharing of experience in peacekeeping planning, training and exercises, and logistics. Note 15 As a result of the Athens NACC session, Prague hosted a high-level NACC seminar on peacekeeping from 30 June to 2 July to discuss conceptual and doctrinal issues of peacekeeping. Note16
In sum, it is evident that NATO has been quite responsive in a very short period of time. But has it been enough? The CEE countries clearly believe that more than meetings alone is necessary, if NATO is to serve an essential role in the protection of European peace and stability. Particularly as the NACC has broadened its membership so rapidly, it suffers the danger of becoming "neutralized" as a credible security institution. In concrete terms what will be NATO's and NACC's role in the event of a real crisis? These are the questions that are coming to the forefront particularly from the so-called Visegrad states--Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, and Slovakia. All have expressed the desire for a differentiated role within NATO/NACC. They want criteria and time-lines to become full members of NATO and have agreed to accept responsibilities for NATO's security concerns.
NATO's January 1994 Brussels Summit: A Watershed. Although it took NATO twenty-four years to adopt a new Strategic Concept in November 1991 to replace its Flexible Response strategy, one might argue that with Yugoslavia's and the Soviet Union's disintegration, Russia's recent efforts to reassert influence over the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and resulting insecurities in Central Europe, that NATO now needs a "new" Strategic Concept.
Whether the January 1994 NATO Brussels Summit actually will prove to be a such a watershed remains to be seen. The Summit did attempt to fuse together the more flexible force structure packages for peacekeeping requirements (the so-called Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)) with NATO's new need to stabilize the East by adopting the Partnership For Peace (PFP) plan.
In support of the development of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) and the strengthening of the European pillar of the Alliance through the WEU, the Summit agreed that in future contingencies "NATO and the WEU will consult...through joint Council meetings [and]...stand ready to make collective assets of the Alliance available...for WEU operations." Note 17 As a result, the Summit endorsed the CJTF as a means to facilitate contingency operations, including peacekeeping operations with participating nations outside the Alliance.
Though the Summit did not accede to Central Europe's desire for immediate membership, the Partnership for Peace (PFP) proposal did establish NATO's long-term commitment to expand, leaving vague both the criteria and time-lines for expansion. Note 18 Operating under the authority of the NAC, active participation in PFP is seen as a necessary (though not sufficient) condition to joining NATO. Partner states will participate in political and military bodies at NATO headquarters and in a separate Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC) at Mons that will:
. . .work in concrete ways towards transparency in defense budgeting, promoting democratic control of defense ministries, joint planning, joint military exercises, and creating an ability to operate with NATO forces in such fields as peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations... Note 19
While the goals of NATO's CJTF and PFP are explicit and can be seen as a hedging against possible future problems in the East, their implementation might have some more immediate, unwitting, and unwanted regional implications. If we are not careful, PFP could undermine: (1) Central East Europe's sub-regional cooperation by turning local actors into competitors; (2) domestic support for the region's democratic reformers; (3) the region's fragile civil-military relations; and (4) sub-regional security by attracting scarce defense resources from Central Europe's real defense requirements.
What Central Europe Has Done
Immediately after the 10-11 January 1994 NATO summit initiated PFP and CJTF, and announced that NATO was open to future expansion, President Clinton visited Prague (on 12 January) to meet with the presidents of the four Central European (Visegrad) states to explain the program. In advance, the Central European defense ministers (except the Czech Republic which sent First Deputy Secretary Jiri Pospisil) met in Warsaw to prepare for the forthcoming meeting with President Clinton. After the session, the defense ministers declared they expected the PFP program to open the way to permanent contacts with NATO and lead to full membership in the Alliance. Note 20
Poland. Following a 10 January 1994 cabinet session, Polish Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski appraised PFP as "too small a step in the right direction" and President Walesa noted that NATO is committing a "serious error" in bowing to Russian objections. Walesa also harshly criticized the Czechs for failing to support a coordinated Visegrad strategy toward NATO. Note 21 Although Polish Defense Minister Kolodziejczyk added that he understood the West's difficulty to put forward a precise date for integration, he noted "we expect NATO to come up with clear criteria in the short term for NATO membership." Note 22
After the NATO summit, Walesa went to Prague for talks with the other Visegrad presidents and President Clinton (on 12 January). Because the Czech Republic wanted the talks conducted on a bilateral basis, Walesa expressed anger with the Czech's course of action: "They are making a mistake that will cost us all something." Note 23 After the session with President Clinton, Foreign Minister Olechowski noted: "[W]e have many promises, political declarations, but we lack specific prospects." Note 24
Though Poland had initially exhibited reserve, it responded rapidly. One of the immediate requirements of the Partnership for Peace program was the need to find funding. Kolodziejczyk estimated that the Army would need an additional 500 billion zlotys ($23 million) to participate. (The overall 1994 Polish defense budget was only 47.8 trillion zlotys ($4.2 billion) or 2.2 percent of GDP).Note 25 On 2 February 1994 Prime Minister Pawlak was the third to sign documents in Brussels stating that Poland intended to participate in PFP. However, unlike his Romanian and Lithuanian predecessors, Pawlak stated that Poland was not really happy with PFP, but "[W]e can accept it if we are certain that Poland will ultimately be able to become a full member."Note 26
Despite its initial reservation, Poland's foreign and defense ministries in conjunction with Sejm committees on defense and foreign affairs worked out a response. Note 27 On 25 April 1994 Poland became the first partner to hand over a presentation document to NATO outlining the spheres of its intended cooperation with the Alliance. At the 25 May 1994 NATO and PFP defense ministers meeting in Brussels, Kolodziejczyk continued to voice concern that "something is lacking" that the program fails to define clearly how to move from partnership to membership. Note 28
Then on 5 July Poland became the first partner to sign an Individual Partnership Program (IPP). In addition to peacekeeping missions and joint exercises, Poland incorporated additional amendments to its IPP to include air defense, convergence of command, control, and communications systems, and democratic control of the armed forces. Note 29 The 32 page document contained 60 specific measures covering training, exercises, and information exchanges which would cost Poland 250 billion zlotys for 1994. Note 30
When President Clinton visited Warsaw and addressed the Polish Sejm on 7 July 1994, he noted that NATO expansion is "no longer a question of whether, but when and how." Note 31 Of the $100 million he pledged in U.S. support of the overall PFP program, Clinton committed $25 million to Poland.
Polish contacts with NATO began to mushroom. In mid-May 1994 a 96-soldier company from the British army began a small bilateral peacekeeping exercise with Polish troops at Kielce (Poland), that was billed as being "in the spirit of NATO's PFP plan." Note 32 The first real PFP ground forces exercise, "Cooperative Bridge-94" took place 12-16 September at Biedrusko near Poznan, Poland. Some 920 soldiers (of which 280 were Polish) from 13 countries were divided into five multi-national companies under Polish-American command. Note 33
Polish military contacts with Germany also began to flourish, particularly after 1 September 1994 when the last Russian troops had departed Germany and Poland. The Bundeswehr sponsored special ties with Polish units and exercises in the Polish border region. Note 34 On 1 September General Naumann and Polish Chief of Staff Wilecki signed a partnership agreement for individual units of the two forces. Note 35 Also during 1994, the Polish, German, and French (so-called Weimar triangle) defense ministers often met to discuss how to expand cooperation, Note 36 and German General Henning von Ondarza began to act as an adviser to the Polish defense minister. Note 37 Culminating the 1994 training year (16-23 September), Polish ground forces, a Danish mechanized platoon, and German air-landing company held a peacekeeping operation, "Tatra-94" in the Krakow Military District. Note 38
Hungary. Though Partnership for Peace had only become an official NATO policy on 10 January 1994, Csaba Kiss of the Hungarian defense ministry noted (on 13 January) that defense officials had been working on Hungary's plan since October 1993. Kiss noted that PFP would require Hungarian defense planning and spending to be more open and in line with NATO standards, and under more civilian control. He added that Hungarian soldiers would participate in future peacekeeping operations, that Hungary's air defense and airspace management needed to be converted to NATO formats (with IFF and ground radars overhauled to communicate with NATO aircraft), and that two military planners would go to Brussels.Note 39
On 8 February Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky signed Hungary's PFP presentation document, making it the fifth state to join; and on 15 November 1994 Hungary submitted its Individual Partnership Program in Brussels. Note 40
The Hungarian Parliament authorized holding a joint British-Hungarian PFP military exercise "Hungarian Venture" from 1-25 September 1994 on Hungarian soil. The exercise involved 140 British troops and 228 Hungarian soldiers, including its peacekeeping company. Note 41 One lesson Hungary learned from the exercise was that differences in staff-level work and linguistic problems rather than incompatibility of weapons hampered cooperation. Note 42 Because of the shortage of funds, this was the only exercise Hungary held during 1994; Hungary did not participate in the first large-scale PFP exercise "Cooperative Bridge-94" in Poland. Note 43
Hungary's fiscal constraints limited its participation. Defense Minister Keleti, regretting Hungary's inability to participate in PFP exercises in Poland and the Netherlands, noted the defense ministry would need 493 million forints for the individual tasks undertaken in PFP. Note 44 On 16 November the National Assembly Defense Committee approved the 1995 defense budget which would increase to 77.1 billion forints (up 8 billion from 1994).
Czech Republic. With NATO's introduction of Partnership For Peace (PFP) Defense Minister Antonin Baudys noted that all exercises undertaken by the Czech Army would be subject to the consent of parliament. On 29 April 1994, the Parliament approved the government proposal to permit short-term military training and exercises on Czech soil (5,000 foreign troops for up to 21 days) and for Czech units to participate abroad (700 troops for up to 30 days). Note 45
On 10 March 1994 when Vaclav Klaus signed the PFP general agreement making the Czech Republic the 11th country to join the project, Defense Minister Baudys noted that the program "is the maximum possible and the minimum desired." Note 46 The Czech's first joint exercise under PFP on Czech soil took place 15-25 March 1994, when 32 Dutch marines participated with 120 troops of the Czech Rapid Deployment Battalion. Then during 29 May-10 June, 130 French troops participated in exercises in the Czech Republic with 120 members of a company of the 23rd Czech Mechanized Battalion. Again during 9-19 September, a platoon of 40 soldiers of the Czech 4th Mechanized Regiment participated in "Cooperative Bridge-94." Note 47 Finally, the training year concluded with the first joint Czech-German military exercise of 400 troops, which took place during 7-11 November on both sides of the common border. Note 48
The new Czech Defense Minister Wilem Holan noted, in reference to NATO membership, that: "it is possible to anticipate that the conditions for NATO membership will be clearly defined in the near future--that is, certain standards will be drawn up...[adding the warning that] the 'cheap' phase of our decisions is coming to an end, and the phase that will cost us something is beginning." Note 49
Slovakia. The fundamental orientation of Slovakia is to obtain full NATO membership. The starting point for this objective is participating in NATO's NACC and Partnership For Peace (PFP). It signed its Presentation Document on 25 May 1994. Note 50 The ongoing process of building its defense ministry and armed forces from scratch and fiscal constraints have limited Slovakia's participation. The internal political struggle, causing government instability, also contributed to a slower start. Slovakia's first defense minister, Imrich Andrejcak, criticized his successor's (Pavol Kanis) changes to the PFP presentation document as too expensive; Andrejcak argued that the defense ministry would be required to spend 4.5 percent of its budget on PFP, rather than the one percent originally envisaged. Note 51
NATO Brussels Summit, 1 December 1994
When the NAC met in Brussels on 1 December 1994, 23 countries had so-far joined the Partnership (Belarus and Austria became the 24th and 25th in early 1995 and 10 IPP's had been signed), the Partnership Coordination Cell at Mons had become fully operational (11 Partners had already appointed liaison officers to the Cell), and three PFP exercises had been held in the Autumn of 1994.
The Brussels Summit communique reaffirmed that the Alliance:
remains open to membership...[and] expects and would welcome NATO enlargement that would reach to democratic states to our east. [Accordingly, they made a decision to begin an extensive study] to determine how NATO will enlarge, the principles to guide this process and the implications of membership. Note 52
The study to determine the principles for NATO expansion is to be discussed at the May 1995 NATO meeting in the Netherlands and will then be presented to the Partners prior to the next NAC meeting in Brussels in the Fall of 1995.
On 2 December 1994 the NACC foreign ministers convened (along with those members who had joined PFP but were not in NACC) and were informed about the NAC decision to initiate the study to determine the modalities for NATO expansion. Note 53 When informed at the session, Hungarian Foreign Minister Kovacs responded that NATO expansion should be gradual, predictable, and transparent.Note 54
Criteria for expansion. While we do not know precisely what the Alliance will approve as necessary criteria for expansion, it is likely that they will include: active participation in NACC and the Partnership program, the successful performance of democratic political institutions, a free market economy, and respect for human rights. It is also likely that effective civilian control of the military as well as some minimal degree of military capability and NATO interoperability will be necessary conditions.
NATO's challenge, though, will be how to define and determine what constitutes "effective" civilian control of the military recognizing that each state has its own history, culture, and unique set of institutions.
The purpose of this study is to assess the current state of civil-military relations among those Central European (Visegrad) states frequently referred to as the most likely to first join NATO. The study posits the following four conditions as being necessary for "effective" civilian oversight of the military:
(1) It is necessary either through Constitution and/or Amendments to establish a clearly-defined division of authority between the president and government (prime minister and defense minister). The law must be clear for peacetime authority (e.g., command and control of the military, promotions of senior military officers, and appointment of civilian defense officials); and for crisis (e.g., emergency powers), to include transition to war.
(2) It is necessary that Parliament exert oversight of the military by exercising effective control of the defense budget; and also its role in deploying armed forces must be clear in emergency and war.
(3) Government control of the military (General Staff and military commanders) must be exercised through its civilian defense ministry to include effective peacetime oversight of the defense budget, intelligence, strategic planning, force structure and deployments, arms acquisitions, and military promotions.
(4) Military prestige must be restored in order for the armed forces to be an effective institution. Having come from the communist period when the military was often used as an instrument of external or internal oppression, society must perceive the military as being under effective national control. Also military training levels and equipment must be sufficient to protect the state.
If NATO adopts these four conditions as necessary for effective civilian control of the military, then most of the Visegrad states would not currently qualify. Though Central Europe has already made enormous progress in civil-military relations since the 1989 revolutions, it is clear that much work still remains to be done!
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