Title: Germany. White Paper 1994 - Chapter IV: german security policy - Areas of activity and influence
EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY
439. The European Union expresses the will of its members to also preserve their security interests collectively and to become capable of doing so. The Treaty on European Union which was signed in Maastricht and entered into force on 1 November 1993 broadens the European Community's objectives regarding foreign and security policy and defence. Besides the economic, monetary and social union, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is an essential element of the Political Union within Europe's unification structure. In addition to framing a Common Foreign and Security Policy, the WED member states agreed in Maastricht both to enhance Europe's ability to take military action by expanding the WEU's operational role and to help shape Europe's Security and Defence identity.
440. Plans are to make the WEU an integral part of the European Union and turn it into its defence component. This paves the way for what is envisaged in the longer term under the Treaty on European Union, namely, the framing of a common defence policy which in time will lead to a common defence. As the Union's defence component, the WEU is the Alliance's European pillar and thus strengthens the North Atlantic Alliance. The WEU allows the Europeans to assume greater responsibility for their security and to be capable of taking action in contingencies where NATO does not commit itself.
441. On 19 June 1992, the WEU member states issued the Petersberg Declaration in which they put the Maastricht resolutions into more concrete terms. They agreed that in addition to the contribution they make to collective defence under NATO, military units from member states may in the future al W~ be ordered into action under WEU command, such action being:
* humanitarian and rescue action,
* peacekeeping action, and
* combat action required to deal with a crisis, including peacemaking action.
Before action of this kind can be taken, certain requirements; must be met. These are:
* The action must be in harmony with the provisions laid down in the Charter of the United Nations.
* The WEU resolution must be unanimous.
* Each member state is free to decide on the basis of its constitution whether or not to participate in a WEU campaign.
* The plans for and conduct of a WEU campaign most be in keeping with the obligations of the Atlantic Alliance and the military precautions it is required to take under its collective defence strategy.
These resolutions have lent the WEU new defence and military quality NATO and the WEU are becoming partners of the UN and CSCE in international conflict prevention and crisis management.
442. Existing units will be used to perform WEU tasks. There are no plans to build separate WEU command and force structures. The member states have so far designated the following multinational major formations to discharge multinational functions under WEU command: The European Corps, the Multinational Division (Central) and the UKINL Amphibious Force.
443. The staff of the European Corps took up its duties on 5 November 1993 in Strasbourg, and the first unit to be placed under its command was the Franco-German Brigade established in 1988. The corps is due to be fully operational in 1995, with one division each from Germany, France and Belgium. Spain has declared its intention to provide units. The intention of the nations participating in the European Corps is to make a substantial contribution -in terms of both scope and the specific form of integration involved- towards shaping Europe's Security and Defence Identity.
It is for this reason that the terms under which the European Corps can be used in a NATO or WEU context were clarified in 1993. The corps not only serves the purposes of collective allied defence, but will also be available for humanitarian action and the support of peace missions.
444. On 20 November 1992, the signing took place of the protocol on Greece's accession to the WEU as a full member and of association documents with Iceland, Norway and Turkey. Ireland and Denmark were granted observer status. Once these documents are ratified, the cooperation of all the member states of the European Union and the European members of NATO in the WEU will be assured. The intention is for associated members to also be greatly involved in all WEU activities in the future. The new membership structure ensures that cooperation between all the European NATO member states will be close.
445. The "WEU Forum of Consultation" has been established with a number of states in Central Europe, Southeastern Europe and the Baltic region. The WEU particularly wished to address the states that have either already signed an association agreement with the European Union or at least intend to do so. It constitutes a further foundation for embedding these states in the process of European integration.
At the ministerial meeting in November 1993, the WEU considered granting states that have concluded an association agreement with the EU or are intending to do so an improved status in the WEU.
446. The Federal Government is committed to the idea that the WEU be just as capable of managing crises as NATO. The first step it would like to see the Europeans taking involves closely coordinating and harmonizing their commitment to the United Nations within the WEU framework. It is conducive to Europe's cohesion and capacity to act if the WEU partners begin and terminate humanitarian, peacekeeping and peacemaking operations together. This calls for clarity concerning the common political objectives pursued and a definition of the military tasks they involve. To achieve this, European military capabilities should be harmonized in such a way that they can be used with minimum resource expenditure, though to maximum efficiency. Such a move would also help strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance, promote the development of the European Security and Defence identity and enhance the United Nations and the CSCE in their peacekeeping functions.
FRANCO-GERMAN COOPERATION IN SECURITY AND DEFENCE
447. The friendship and cooperation that exist between France and Germany are of singular historical and political importance in Europe. This cooperation is the driving force behind European unification. It dates back to the Elysée Treaty of 22 January 1963 and to this day has generated an intensity yet unknown in the history of these nations. The cooperation that has taken place over the put thirty years has produced a close network of bilateral links, also between the armed forces. French and German troops have been serving in a combined major unit, the Franco-German Brigade since 1988. In that year, a protocol additional to the Elysée Treaty was signed, establishing the Franco-German Defence and Security Council. Its purpose is to ensure close coordination in matters of security military strategy and military life. It tends much important impetus to the building of Europe's security order. France and Germany see their cooperation as the foundation for a Common Security and Defence Policy in Europe.
448. Other aspects of Franco-German military cooperation include:
* regular meetings of ministerial working and expert groups, the purpose of which is to further develop common projects;
* an exchange of officers, including between staffs;
* intensification of leadership and language training by means of officer and officer candidate exchanges;
* cooperation in training and exercising, for instance, by temporarily establishing Franco-German exercise naval forces;
* use and development of training facilities, for instance, the combined Army Aviation training centre in Rennes/France;
* conduct of analyses and studies, for instance, in the field of air defence;
* promotion of friendly ties by way of over sixty affiliations;
* furnishing of mutual support in humanitarian operations, for instance, in the operations in Cambodia and Somalia, doing so at conceptual level by elaborating common airlift plans for providing humanitarian aid and by devising a common medical training concept for humanitarian operations.
449. Cooperation with France in the field of international armaments cooperation occupies a prominent position. Work is proceeding on something like one hundred common projects. The object is to sham the work in the armaments sector in Europe so as to avoid dual activities in development and procurement and ensure Europe retains an armaments base, an effort to which Germany must also make a contribution in order to maintain its capability for cooperation.
450. The resolutions made in Maastricht and the statements issued there by the WED states are explicit in underlining the will to step up cooperation in armaments. There is also a need for a common arms export policy. If responsibilities are shared wisely, the European market offers fine opportunities for economic quantities and production. This is provisional, however, on all the countries involved working for harmony. While the Federal Government remains committed to a generally restrictive course, Germany is intent on staying a predictable partner in cooperation programmes and being able to exert a responsible influence on European arms policy. But it will only be able to go on exerting influence on the worldwide arms trade and the efforts to reduce it in the medium and long terms if it retains its ability to cooperate within the Alliance and Europe even if demand from its own forces diminishes, maintains an arms base of its own and, to this end, continues to participate in the export of arms from Europe on a limited basis. Consensus on a wise arrangement for sharing responsibilities will not, however, be reached unless all the parties involved are fully assured they will get what they need.
451. One purpose of establishing a European armaments agency is to bundle Europe's armaments interests and resources. Another is to enable Europe to enter into dialogue with the USA in this field and to enhance armaments cooperation within NATO.
The product of a Franco-German initiative, the object of the European armaments agency is to combine national armaments responsibilities as far as possible in terms of organization and administration and to implement coprojects. The European armaments agency is meant to become a chief instrument for rationalizing Europe's efforts in the field of armaments.
To lend impetus to the development of a European armaments agency, France and Germany agreed at the 62nd summit on 1 December 1993 to step up their cooperation in armaments and armaments research. They will be taking action to make the management of present and future Franco-German armaments programmes more straightforward, more similar and more efficient and will be devising a concept for the location, responsibilities and structure of a common armaments organization. In addition to this, they will be working with their partners in the European Corps to standardize equipment.
Putting the ambitious European armaments agency concept into practice is a task for the years ahead. It is the logical answer to the fundamental changes in the armaments situation. Without exception, states need less and different military equipment and have far less money to spend on it. Concentrating Europe's armaments effort is an urgent necessity if common security and defence objectives are to be achieved.
THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
452. The CSCE is the political umbrella under which North America and Europe are linked on the basis of common values. It is the framework for comprehensive political, economic, social, cultural and environmental cooperation. The CSCE is being expanded into an operational instrument for preventing conflicts and managing crises. Even in the future, it will have a leading role to play in the building of cooperative security structures and in the promotion of democracy, the rule of law, human and minority fights. Germany is making every effort to enhance the Conferences powers.
453. Under the terms of the Final Act signed in Helsinki in 1975, the participating states of the CSCE undertake to respect and implement ten basic principles guiding their mutual relations: sovereign equality; refraining from the threat or use of force; inviolability of frontiers; territorial integrity, peaceful settlement of disputes; non-intervention in internal affairs; respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; equal rights and self-determination of peoples; cooperation among states; and fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law. In the days of the Cold War, the CSCE process was highly instrumental in reducing confrontation and stabilizing relations between states. The CSCE was one of the chief catalysts behind the changes in national systems that finally led to the overthrow of communist ideology.
In addition to this, the CSCE provided the umbrella under which successful negotiations were held on conventional arms control and disarmament in Europe. The Vienna Document of 1992 (VD 92) on confidence- and security- building measures, the 1992 Open Skies Treaty, and in particular the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) and the 1992 CFE 1a Agreement underline the CSCE's importance for enhancing confidence and cooperation as well as for ensuring security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic community.
454. The "Charter of Paris for a New Europe" of 21 November 1990 marks a new phase in the CSCE's development. It reaffirms the statement that the security of each single participating state is linked inseparably to that of all the others. At the same time, it states that international peace and security cannot be achieved without promoting democracy and having respect for, and ensuring the effective implementation of, human rights. The participating states undertake to cooperate in consolidating confidence and security among one another as well as in promoting arms control and disarmament. With this as their basis, they are working for a new quality in their security relations.
THE CSCE AS AN INSTITUTION OF CONFLICT PREVENTION AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT
455. Under the Helsinki Document, the CSCE in 1992 declared itself a "regional arrangement" in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations. Since then, it has been authorized to achieve the pacific settlement of local disputes on the basis of the UN Charter. The CSCE has thus taken the first step towards developing from a loose series of conferences to an international organization that also has the power to take on operational tasks. These tasks mainly include providing early warning, engaging in preventive diplomacy as well as preventing and managing crises and conflicts. They also include peacekeeping measures, that is to say, reconnaissance and observation missions, and the deployment of peacekeeping troops. To do so, the CSCE can fall back on assets and resources belonging not only to NATO and the EU/WEU, but also the CIS or individual states.
The CSCE has taken on long-term missions, deploying troops to the former Yugoslavia and the neighbouring states of Serbia/Montenegro, to Georgia, Moldova, Estonia, Latvia and Tajikistan. It is preparing a major observation mission in connection with its effort to mediate in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. The Bundeswehr is participating in the CSCE mission in Georgia.
Becoming an international organization has involved the CSCE building efficient working structures. The Council of Foreign Ministers, the Committee of Senior Officials, the Permanent Committee in Vienna, the CSCE Secretary General with his secretariat, the High Commissioner for National Minorities and the office for Democratic institutions in Warsaw are the elements of the new CSCE Structures. Once the appropriate agreement has entered into force, a CSCE Court of Conciliation and Arbitration will be set up in Geneva. The CSCE Parliamentary Assembly with its secretariat in Copenhagen is an important link to the parliaments of the various participating states.
456. The CSCE provides the setting for building a new cooperative order of security. The aim is to ensure lasting security and stability between all the CSCE states and reliably rule out the threat and use of military force. The intention is to satisfy the security needs of all the states from Vancouver to Vladivostok on a just and lasting basis without creating new security-related divides.
457. The CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) has been established in order to achieve this objective and marks the beginning of a new process of multilateral dialogue, cooperation and negotiations. The core function of this common body for arms control negotiations and cooperation in the Euro-Asiatic region is to identify potential conflicts in advance and prevent them from breaking out. The concern is not only one of being able to deal with acute conflicts effectively; what matters is that action is taken in advance to prevent crises and conflicts from breaking out in the first place.
The forum's work is focused on three areas: negotiating on concrete arms control and disarmament measures; conducting permanent, institutionalized dialogue on security; and strengthening conflict prevention capabilities. The Federal Government attaches particular importance to the framing of a CSCE code of conduct prescribing responsible forms of conduct for states in politico-military affairs. The intention of this is to produce a coherent set of rules on how to handle military power. The code of conduct can provide an important foundation for a workable cooperative security order within the CSCE and help promote both security-related integration, above all with regard to the states of Central and Eastern Europe, and stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic security area.
CSCE Institutions
GERMANY'S ROLE IN THE UNITED NATIONS
458. The international community has established the United Nations to maintain peace and security in the world. The objectives the member states have anchored in the Charter of the United Nations include taking collective measures to prevent or remove threats to peace, settling disputes by peaceful means and developing friendly relations among the nations. They have undertaken to cooperate in solving international problems of an economic, social or cultural character and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The end of East-West confrontation has provided an opportunity to achieve these ends. This demands a due sense of responsibility on the part of all the member states, not least, however, the support of the economically strong democracies.
459. When Germany became a member of the United Nations in 1973, it committed itself without reservation to the rights and duties associated with membership. Germany is involved in all the world organization's political, economic, legal, social and humanitarian functions. The principal aim of German foreign policy remains to help maintain peace in the world.
460. The increasing number of civil wars and conflicts between states poses difficult tasks for the United Nations:
* The large number of crises that exist and their intensity call for preventive diplomacy to stop them expanding into conflicts.
* In many conflicts, preventive action fails or is taken too late. As a result, intervention is necessary so as to prevent the violation of human rights and genocide or put an end to aggression and war.
* Severe violations of human rights can pose a threat to international peace and security. In such instances and when other solutions fall, the Security Council can make an exception to the rule and impose restrictions on the principle of non-intervention in a state's domestic affairs. Agreement should be reached on criteria for such a move.
* Due to the disintegration of political authority in many states, a situation may arise where the United Nations face the task of establishing a new political order and rebuilding government and administrative bodies.
461. There has been a sharp rise in the demands on the United Nations. There has also been a massive increase in the number, scope and cost of peacekeeping measures since 1988, the year the UN peacekeeping forces were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. From the end of the Second World War until the beginning of 1988, a mere thirteen peacekeeping missions were conducted. In the next four years, however, agreement was reached to conduct no less than another fifteen. In 1992 alone, the number of troops employed in peacekeeping operations rose fourfold. At the beginning of 1993, more than 80,000 "Blue Helmets" from seventy states were employed in a total of thirteen peacekeeping missions.
462. The Secretary General of the United Nations, in his report entitled "Agenda for Peace" and issued on 6 June 1992, put forward a comprehensive concept for preserving international peace:
Preventive diplomacy shall be conducted to prevent or check disputes between individual parties The use of armed forces may have the effect of checking conflict Peacemaking action is intended to settle conflicts between disputing parties peacefully. To keep peace, the concept provides for the local deployment of UN-controlled civilians, police and/or armed forces. Should all other measures fail, peace shall be enforced, even against the will of the conflicting parties, with military power being used if necessary. To attain long-term success, peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace enforcement measures mot be supplemented by action designed to build peace, cultivate confidence and pave the way for normal public life (peace-building). To achieve these aspirations, the "Agenda for Peace" also calls for a greater integration of regional arrangements such as the CSCE.
463. The "Agenda for Peace" could become a guideline for further developing the United Nations. Even in the future, political, economic and humanitarian measures will clearly be of priority for maintaining and enhancing peace. Military coercive measures will never be anything but die lost resort. They are only an option if the UN Security Council issues appropriate explicit mandates for solving the conflict and there is a clear political concept.
The Federal Government is committed to particularly enhancing the United Nations' peacekeeping powers.
Effective crisis management calls for the capability to react quickly. Germany supports the United Nations Secretary General's "stand-by forces" initiative. These forces should not be confined to military units or material, but should include civilians, police officers and election observers as well as the UN's general support, for example, services. They would not, however, be called up and ordered into action automatically. Approval would first have to be obtained from the nations providing the troops.
464. The United Nations should retain the character it has of a collective security organization. If it does so, it will not enter into competition with the alliances. However, to shoulder its increased responsibility, the United Nations is reliant upon the support of regional organizations and alliances. In Europe, NATO and the WEU are partners of the UN and the CSCE. The UN and CSCE can, agree on peacekeeping measures themselves; the decision to initiate military coercive measures rests solely with the UN. They can also issue peacekeeping mandates to the security institutions or individual members, who will then use their own assets to carry out the mandates.
465. To ensure that the United Nations has appropriate power to act, military capabilities must be refined. In many states, military training is geared solely to the traditional demands of combat. The specific tasks associated with peacekeeping, however also call for other capabilities. The way each nation prepares "Blue Helmets" for action should be coordinated more closely by the UN. Common guidelines must be agreed for training. Training and exercising together is also an important means of building confidence.
466. Germany has considered the humanitarian dimension a focal point of its United Nations activities from the very beginning. Germany is active in the Middle East, in Africa, in Southeast Asia, in the Gulf region and in the former Yugoslavia, providing humanitarian aid, transport and medical care, monitoring disarmament measures and repatriating refugees. Together with its partners in the European Union, the Federal Government supported the efforts made to install a Coordinator for Humanitarian Aid. This initiative was brought to a successful conclusion in 1991.
International humanitarian aid cannot be provided without a sense of solidarity and a sharing of the burdens. The countries wont affected on account of their being neighbours; or the countries to which refugees flee must not be left to look after themselves. The aim must be to provide shelter for civil war and other refugees as close to their home countries a possible so as to make it easier for them to soon return. Germany's commitment to humanitarian aid includes its preparedness to help civil war refugees in their need. For example, it has allowed more than 350,000 refugees from the former Yugoslavia into the country.
467. Peacekeeping is a major field of German activity in the United Nations. Germany considers one of the principle functions of its development policy to be the building of structures based on democracy, the rule of law and a market economy. Germany participates in election observation missions, provides economic experts and helps in building structures based on the rule of law for administrative, judicial and police systems.
468. The Federal Government is stepping up its commitment for human rights to also be made a central issue of the United Nations' preventive diplomacy and for them to be better enforced throughout the world. It made a substantial contribution towards the instalment of a High Commissioner of Human Rights at the United Nations so as to help the strength of the law prevail against the law of the strongest.
469. The most important decisions regarding security and peace are taken in the Security Council. Any country whose will it is to defend peace must strengthen the Security Council. Germany is prepared to also assume the responsibility associated with permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council. The credibility of the Security Council, however, can only be preserved and enhanced if due account is taken of the growing weight of the Third World in the Security Council reform programme.
470. Even after the question of conformity with the constitution has been settled, Germany's contribution towards the preservation of peace will continue to be primarily of a political and economic character, and not of a military one. Germany will not employ armed forces unless it is engaged in combined action with allies of partners or involved in a United Nations mission. It will conscientiously examine every single case against the background of German values and interests, political objectives, risks and potential consequences, and, conscious of its responsibility in the eyes of history, reach a decision.
BUNDESWEHR PARTICIPATION IN UN MISSIONS AND HUMANITARIAN AID ACTIVITIES SINCE 1991
Former Yugoslavia
The Sarajevo Airlift
The German Air Force has been participating in the international Zagreb-Sarajevo airlift since 4 July 1992. First of all, two Transall aircraft flew humanitarian relief supplies from Germany via Zagreb to Sarajevo. Some 350 tons of food, 100,000 field ration packs and large amounts of medical supplies have been taken from Bundeswehr stocks.
On 10 July 1992, an airlift control and support base composed of 34 airmen was established in Zagreb. United Nations supplies were flown from here to Sarajevo in up to four missions a day.
In February 1993, the airlift control and support base was relocated from Zagreb to Falconara in italy. By the end of 1993, some 6,400 tons of supplies had been flown to Sarajevo in around 800 flights.
Logistic Support of UNPROFOR
(United Nations Protection Force in the former Yugoslavia)
The Bundeswehr is providing support for the nations with troops in the UNPROFOR. The United Kingdom and Denmark are being provided funds to pay for the use of civilian land and air transport assets required to exchange personnel and deliver materiel. The Bundeswehr is providing the bulk of the materiel for the two Pakistani UNPROFOR battalions.
Support of Relief Organizations
Responsibility for coordinating the. activities of and providing financial support for the numerous private and public relief organizations administering humanitarian aid in the former Yugoslavia rests with the Federal Foreign Office. The Bundeswehr is assisting the Federal Foreign Office in this task and is providing practical help in organizing and conducting road and air transport operations. Not only is it providing personnel; it is also evacuating German citizens or others in need of urgent medical treatment from Sarajevo and bringing them to Germany.
Airdrop of Supplies over Eastern Bosnia
Since 28 March 1993, the German Air Force has also bee participating in the airdrop of supplies over Eastern Bosnia. This relief operation for the people in need who cannot be reached by road is being conducted jointly with French, US and Canadian air transport forces.
The German Air Force is operating an airlift base at Rhein-Main Airport in Frankfurt with a crew of about 40 airmen. It is from here that the multinational supply flights are conducted, with missions being flown almost every day. Up to three Transalls are stationed permanently in Frankfurt for this purpose. By the end of 1993, 22 missions had been flown and 1,200 tons of food and medical supplies had been dropped by cargo chute.
Monitoring and Enforcement of the Ban on Flights over Bosnia-Herzegovina
German personnel are among the crew of the NATO Airborne Early Warning force that has been engaged in the air surveillance mission since October 1992 and in the enforcement of the UN ban on flights over Bosnia-Herzegovina since April 1993.
Under the resolution of 2 April, 1993, the Federal Government honoured its international responsibility and preserved solidarity in the Alliance. Above all, however, the Federal Government reaffirmed its determination to assist efforts of the international community to restore peace in the former Yugoslavia and help the people in distress there. In the AWACS fleet, twelve nations use one airborne air surveillance system for the same purpose. This means that they must be able to rely on each other; otherwise it would be pointless to enter into a state of dependence. This is why the Federal Government's decision that German crew embers should not be excluded from aircraft operations was of fundamental importance and its confirmation by the Federal Constitutional Court so crucial.
Monitoring of the Embargo in the Adriatic
The German Navy has been supporting the NATO and WEU measures conducted to monitor the embargo on the former Yugoslavia since 18 July 1992. Having initially deployed one vessel, the Navy has had two ships (frigates/destroyers) with a total crew of some 550 men patrolling the maritime area around Otranto in the Adriatic since June 1993.
Three German maritime patrol aircraft have been operating in the Adriatic since 19 July 1992, contributing towards reconnaissance and situation establishment. The naval air detachment, manned by some 70 flight and ground personnel, is located in Elmas/Sardinia. By the end of 1993, around 290 surveillance flights had been carried out, each lasting something like ten hours.
Cambodia
From November 1991 to March 1992, a group of German medical officers and NCOs first took part in the United Nations advance mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) as "Experts on Mission". Their job was to provide medical care for the UNAMIC personnel, operate a dispensary in the Cambodian capital of Phnom Penh and prepare to provide medical care for the personnel employed in the subsequent UNTAC Mission (UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia).
On 8 April 1992, the Federal Government, acting in compliance with a request from the UN Secretary General, decided to support this follow-on mission by deploying Bundeswehr medical orderlies and civilian personnel to run a 60-bed hospital.
Work began on the German field hospital in Phnom Penh on 22 May 1992. It involved transporting more than 350 tons of material from Germany to Cambodia. The hospital, composed of two wards, one isolation ward, one emergency ward and seven specialist surgeries, opened on 8 june.
The intention was to use any free capacities to also provide medical care for Cambodians. As it was, this turned out to be the focal point of the German military medical personnel's humanitarian missions.
In just a short time, the "German Hospital" acquired an outstanding reputation, with the people of Cambodia calling it the "House of Angels".
The 448 members of all three German contingents treated some 110,000 outpatients and around 3,500 inpatients.
The hospital closed as planned on 30 October 1993, as the UNTAC mission came to an end. The last group of German military medical personnel returned to Germany on 12 November 1993.
Mineclearing Operation in the Arabian Gulf
After Operation DESERT STORM, which was conducted under the mandate of UN Resolution 678 of 29 November 1990 and whose purpose was to liberate Kuwait, the Federal Government agreed on 6 March 1991 to comply with a request from the United States and an appeal from the UN and order the German Mine Countermeasures Force Southern Flank to proceed to the Arabian Gulf where it was to participate in a humanitarian operation.
The object of this contribution to the international mineclearing operation was to remove the dangers for the shipping in the region. The operation was coordinated by the WEU. With German naval air support, the German force destroyed a total of lot explosive devices at sea from April to July 1991. Over 2,700 naval personnel were in action, including more than 700 conscripts in basic military service.
Kurdish Relief Operation
To mitigate the effects of the Gulf War, the Bundeswher conducted its hitherto largest humanitarian operation from 6 April to 15 June 1991. 2,000 soldiers were involved. In 70 days, some 1,900 tons of relief supplies were airlifted to Turkey and Iran and distributed locally to Kurdish refugees. German Army engineers built a village for 5,000 refugees. Medical personnel set up and ran a general hospital for 30 days before handing it over to the provincial government in Baktaran. Something like 25,000 people received medical treatment, some of them from airmobile medical team.
Iraq
The Bundeswehr has been supporting the United Nations Special Commission for disarming Iraq (UNSCOM) since August 1991, providing two Air Force Transall transport aircraft and three Army medium lift helicopters. The Transalls are stationed in Manama/Bahrain, together with fifteen German military personnel; the helicopters are based in Baghdad, together with thirty such personnel. Here, the Bundeswehr provides airlift support for the UN disarmament and verification experts in their search for weapons of mass destruction and their production sites as well as other possible Iraqi violations of Cease-fire Resolution 687 and the follow-on resolutions of the United Nations Security Council adopted in 1991.
By the end of 1993, the helicopters had clocked up a total of some 1,800 flying hours, the Transall in Bahrain some 1,900.
In addition to this, the Bundeswehr is assisting the United Nations Special Commission in Iraq by sending out experts on request to neutralize chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction and monitor the dismantling of missiles and ammunition.
Somalia
Germany participated in the United Nations' humanitarian operation in Somalia from August 1992 onwards, making a comprehensive contribution towards mitigating the famine in a country tom apart by civil war.
The transport the relief supplies, the German Air Force established an airlift base in Mombasa/Kenya in August 1992, first deploying two Transall transport aircraft, later three. It is from here that the relief supplies have been flown to the Somalian cities of Mogadishu, Bardera and Hoddur. From late October 1992, food for the starving people in inaccessible parts of the country was also airdropped. The airlift operations were ended on 21 March 1993. All in all, nearly 6,000 tons of supplies were transported from Kenya to Somalia in 655 flights.
From May 1993 onwards, Germany deployed a supply and transport battalion group in support of the United Nations operations to rebuild Somalia (UNOSOM II - United Nations Operation in Somalia). The German Composite Force in Somalia established operational readiness at its camp in Belet Uen in Central Somalia in August 1993 at its planned overall strength of 1,700 military personnel. To provide national support, an airlift control and support element and a logistic base manned by a total of seventy soldiers were set up in Djibouti. The Bundeswehr had eleven personnel and a nine-man liaison team at the UNOSOM II headquarters in Mogadishu.
In Belet Uen, the German force provided logistic support for around 500 Italian soldiers and furnished direct humanitarian aid. The logistic support for the Italian contingent included:
* the distribution of water, POL and general supplies;
* the treatment of water;
* the storage of food, water and POL (with supplies adequate for up to thirty days); and
* the provision of engineer services to help maintain supply routes, field aerodromes and supply points. As far as this aspect of its mission is concerned, the German Composite Force had, by the end of 1993, produced some 14 million litres of water, clocked up around 580,000 kilometres in road transport operations and transshipped just under 6,000 tons of material.
By the end of 1993, the force had furnished direct humanitarian aid by:
* rebuilding schools and establishing affiliations with eight schools;
* providing support for the re-opening of Belet Uen Hospital;
* repairing roads;
* closing gaps in embankments so as to ensure irrigation;
* repairing bridges along major roads;
* drilling wells up to 200 metres deep;
* repairing buildings used by the municipal authorities of Belet Uen;
* distributing water to the Somalis.
In addition to this, by the end of 1993, around 5,700 Somalis had been provided outpatient treatment at the force's general hospital, while more than 700 had received inpatient care. The medical support given to the civilian population at Belet Uen Hospital included some 7,500 cases of inpatient treatment and around 350 operations.
The German force also provided the civilian population sweeping support in establishing local administrative authorities. The district administration for the Hiran Region, for example, was sworn in on 28 October 1993 at the German force's camp.
In December 1993, the German Composite Force was adapted to the changes in the conditions under which it was employed. The Indian brigade which in agreement with the Federal Government was due to operate in the Belet Uen region and receive logistic support from the German force was ordered to another region in Somalia. The personnel strength of the force was therefore reduced by some 400 when the contingents were changed.
On 20 December 1993, the Federal Government decided to end the Bundeswehr's participation in the UNOSOM II mission by 31 March 1994. This step was taken in agreement with the United Nations, the other European countries with forces involved in the mission and the USA.
The last German serviceman left Belen Uen on 28 February 1994.
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
Composition of a German UN Force (Somalia)
471. The old threats to the peaceful coexistence of nations have largely subsided. However, new risk factors illustrate why it is necessary to continue to regard arms control and disarmament as integral components of Germ an security policy and of globally oriented preventive security measures.
There has been a significant enlargement of the fields in which arms control action can be taken. Against the background of the transformed political environment in Europe, arms control has new stabilizing functions to perform in order to counteract, with the tools and means at its disposal, the emergence of new military rivalries and the feeling that them is a security vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe. In keeping with the transformed international conditions and risk factors, arms control and disarmament will in the future, to a greater extent than in the past, be armed at incorporating non-European states into the arms control process, in order to counter risks to European security and enable the establishment of cooperative security relations in crisis regions.
In the years ahead, arms control will focus on the following concrete aspects:
* The implementation of agreed reductions;
* Disarmament assistance, i.e. the provision of support to those states that are overtaxed by having to carry out their disarmament obligations;
* The reorientation and continuation of the arms control efforts in Europe within the framework of the CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation;
* The further development of confidence- and security building measures;
Contributions to stability on a regional level;
* A worldwide stop to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT SUCCESSES
472. On 19 November 1990, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) was signed by the heads of state and government of the then 22 states parties from NATO and the Warsaw Pact. This treaty forms an essential basis for the future shape of Cooperative security efforts in Europe.
For the states parties (whose number has in the meantime risen to thirty) within the area of application from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains, the treaty stipulates, in a manner that is binding under international law and verifiable:
* The collective and individual, all-European and regionally differentiated reduction, limitation and restriction on the use of major weapon systems essential to the conduct of surprise or large-scale offensives (battle ranks, annoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and combat helicopters);
* The reduction of the total number of these weapons in Europe west of the Urals from over 200,000 to a maximum of 157,600 systems;
* The limitation of the (formerly) Soviet holdings to around one third of the total holdings of the then 22 states parties, which constitutes a drastic cutback of the (formerly) Soviet military potential;
* The prevention of force concentrations in specific regions;
* A hitherto unknown transparency of weapons arsenals and military structures through the exchange of detailed data and information;
* The checking of the information provided by means of a strict verification regime.
The break-up of the Soviet Union made it necessary to divide its rights and obligations among the Russian Federation and the newly independent states affected The CFE Treaty thus did not finally come into force until 9 November 1992. The obligation to observe binding national ceilings means that a major portion of the military potential in Europe is limited and controlled.
Germany's Reduction Liability under the CFE Treaty
473. The states parties have to carry out their reduction liabilities within 40 months after entry into force of the treaty. Because it had to take over the materiel of the former EGA, Germany has the second highest reduction liability - almost as much as Russia, and far more than any other state party. Germany started destroying its weapons on 3 August 1992, the first state party to do so. Upon conclusion of the reduction phase on 16 November 1995, the Bundeswerh will possess only 53 per =I of the weapons holdings that it had when the treaty came into force. By then, around 50,000 major weapon systems, i.e. one quarter of the 1991 holdings, will have been reduced in Europe.
The first reduction phase came to an end on 16 November 1993. By this date, 25 per cent of the reduction liability had to have been met. Almost all states parties were able to attain this target. By 16 November 1993, the Bundeswehr had reduced its major weapon systems by 1,236 battle tanks, 1,987 armoured combat vehicles, 766 artillery systems and 140 combat aircraft. This meant that, in all, 40 per cent of German reduction liabilities had been met, with this figure rising to 100 per cent in the case of combat aircraft.
By the end of 1993, over 1,000 on-site inspections had been conducted, some of them by multinational inspection teams, to verify reductions and holdings of treaty limited equipment. This was a significant confidence building measure.
Timetable for Reductions under the CFE Treaty
474. The "Concluding Act of the Negotiations on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe" (CFE is), signed by all CFE parties in July 1992, is the first treaty in the history of arms control to limit the personnel strengths of land and air forces in Europe. As a result, it was possible to include in a multilateral agreement the unilateral German obligations to limit the strength of its armed forces to 370,000, with the land, air and shore-based naval air forces accounting for 345,000.
475. The Vienna Document 1992 (VD 92) is, for the time being, the conclusion of a series of negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures by the 53 CSCE participating states. Following the break-up of the Soviet Union, its Central Asian successor states were involved in this process for the first time. The Vienna Document 1992, which further enhances transparency with regard to armed forces in Europe and the Central Asian republics and the predictability of their military activities, points the way ahead to further stages of confidence and security building.
Vienna Document 1992 - Overview of all CSBMs
476. The establishment of the CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation by the 1992 Helsinki Summit overcame the division of the arms control process into one series of negotiations involving only the members of the European and Euro-Atlantic alliance systems and another series of negotiations involving all CSCE states. In the short time that it has been in existence, the Forum has concluded concrete, politically binding agreements, thereby making important contributions towards the shaping of a new security order geared to the transformed security setting following the end of East-West confrontation. These are:
* CSCE principles to regulate the transfer of conventional weapons;
* Stabilizing measures for local crisis situations;
* Exchange of information on defence planning;
* Programme for military contacts and cooperation.
477. At the start of the CSCE Follow-Up Meeting in Helsinki on 24 March 1992, the foreign ministers of 25 states - from NATO, Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Georgia - signed the "Open Skies" Treaty, The object of this treaty is to open the airspace of the states parties to enable their territory to be observed by aircraft. Its area of application stretches from Vancouver to Vladivostok. Other states may accede if they wish.
The Federal Government view the "Open Skies" regime as an opportunity to make a contribution on a cooperative basis to more military transparency and confidence building. The "Open Skies" regime may also be applied to monitor compliance with arms control agreements and to prevent conflicts within the scope of the CSCE. There is the possibility of extending it to cover other spheres such as environmental protection. Preparations have commenced for the implementation of the treaty, which has not yet come into force.
478. After negotiations lasting almost ten years, 130 states, meeting in Paris from 13 to 15 January 1993, signed the Convention on a Worldwide and Comprehensive Ban on Chemical Weapons (CW). The breakthrough in the negotiations was achieved at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, chaired by Germany. The agreement, which has now been signed by 154 states, will probably enter into force in the spring of 1995. The major obligations arising out of the convention are as follows:
* Signatories will declare all their stocks of chemical weapons within 30 days;
* They will destroy all chemical weapons and their production facilities within 10 years;
* A comprehensive reporting system will be established, designed to prevent the misuse of chemical products of the civil chemical industry;
* Routine verification will be carried out to review the information provided;
* In suspicious cases, the states affected will allow challenge inspections to be conducted.
The chemical industry will be included in the review process. Thus, arms control and verification are leaving the military sphere and, for the first time, entering major civil industrial spheres. The convention also contains previsions relating to assistance and protection against a chemical attack and confidence-building measures, thereby making a major contribution to global cooperative security. The Chemical Weapons Convention is one of the core elements of cooperative international non-proliferation policy for weapons of mass destruction.
479. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), with currently 162 signatories, is of central importance to the international non-proliferation efforts. Germany advocates the unconditional and indefinite extension of the NPT, the accession of further states and the strengthening and widening of the possibilities for inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAFA).
480. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was founded in 1987 by the USA, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Japan and Canada. It regulates export controls for the delivery vehicles of weapons of mass destruction and the components of such vehicles. To this end, one of its major provisions is to prohibit the proliferation of delivery vehicle technologies for weapons of mass destruction (missiles) with a range of more than 300 km and a payload of over 500 kg.
The regime currently comprises almost 25 states - the OECD states with the exception of Turkey plus Argentina and Hungary. Other major supplier countries such as the CIS states and China are to be encouraged to voluntarily observe the MTCR guidelines, in order to further limit the proliferation of such delivery vehicles
481. On 9 December 1991, the 46th General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the draft resolution on the UN Arms Transfers Register, which had been developed by the EC and Japan. Germany had played a major role in developing this resolution. Since 1993, the member states have been providing information to the United Nations on the export of defence equipment. Information is also to be provided on a voluntary basis on arms holdings and national production.
482. On 10 August 1993, the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD) issued a mandate to its appropriate committee to negotiate a Treaty on a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban from January 1994. This is in line with the position of Germany, which has for a long time been striving for a universally applicable and adequately verifiable comprehensive test ban treaty to be concluded as early as possible.
483. In May 1991, the last American and Russian intermediate-range nuclear missiles were destroyed. For the first time, an entire category of nuclear weapons had been removed from the face of the earth. In the context of the INF Treaty (Intermediate Nuclear Forces), Germany has unilaterally renounced all its Pershing Ia missiles. They have been destroyed.
484. The radically transformed security situation in Europe has also led to far-reaching decisions regarding short-range nuclear systems. In his disarmament initiative of 27 September 1991, President Bush announced that the USA would withdraw all its ground-launched short-range nuclear weapons and destroy them in America. On 5 October 1991, President Gorbachev took up the American initiative. One of his most important announcements was that the Soviet Union intended to destroy all its nuclear artillery ammunition and all nuclear warheads for tactical missiles.
In the autumn of 1991, against the background of these initiatives, the North Atlantic Alliance, in its declarations issued at Taormina, Rome and Brussels (and partly influenced by the Federal Government), stated that all nuclear artillery shells and warheads for ground-launched short-range missile systems were to be withdrawn from Europe and destroyed. In addition, the Alliance resolved to reduce its air-launched tactical nuclear weapons by one half.
The withdrawal of the USA's ground-launched tactical nuclear weapons was carried out in close coordination with its allies in less than to months, and was completed by the end of June 1992. The Alliance has thus reduced its tactical nuclear weapons in Europe by around 80 percent.
With the consent of all the CIS states affected, the approximately 15,000 tactical nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union have been concentrated in Russia. This process was completed by mid-1992. On 29 January 1992, President Yeltsin announced that the production of ground-launched tactical missiles, nuclear artillery and nuclear mines would cease.
485. As a consequence of the fundamentally transformed security situation, the USA and the Soviet Union had agreed to effect drastic reductions of their strategic nuclear forces. The Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I), signed on 31 July 1991, regulates the reduction of strategic nuclear arsenals by about one third. In addition, specific types of nuclear weapons were prohibited and agreement was reached on modernization restrictions for existing systems. The objective of these regulations is a stability-oriented restructuring of the arsenals of the two sides. The limitations and prohibitions are supplemented and monitored by an intensive system of verification and an abundance of confidence-building and stabilizing measures.
With the break-up of the Soviet Union, it became necessary to integrate into the treaty those states of the CIS on whose territory strategic nuclear weapons were deployed. In an additional protocol to the START Treaty, signed on 23 May in Lisboa, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, as the successors of the Soviet state party, undertook to assume the START Treaty obligations and, moreover, to accede as quickly as possible to the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon states.
At that time, the strategic nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union were deployed as follows:
* Ukraine: about 1,800 warheads on SS- 19 and SS-24 missiles and for heavy bombers
* Kazakhstan: about 1,300 warheads on SS- 18 missiles and for heavy bombers
* Belarus 72 warheads on mobile SS-25 missiles
* Russia about 6,700 warheads on land-, air- and sea-based delivery vehicles (missiles and heavy bombers)
486. On 3 January 1993, the USA and Russia signed the START II Treaty. It provides for the continuing reduction of strategic arsenals to a maximum of 3,000 to 3,500 warheads on each side by the year 2003. Within ten years, total stockpiles of strategic nuclear weapons are thus to be reduced by about two thirds. Ground-launched multiple-warhead missiles will then have been eliminated completely.
The START II Treaty cannot enter into force until the START I Treaty has been ratified. START I has now been ratified by all the states parties. However, Ukraine initially expressed reservations regarding ratification; it has thus not yet been possible to exchange the instruments of ratification. For this reason, the START Treaties have not yet entered into force.
Following the trilateral declaration issued by the presidents of the USA, Russia and Ukraine on 14 January 1994, the prospects of nuclear weapons in Ukraine being eliminated have improved. The Ukrainian Parliament approved the trilateral declaration on 3 February 1994, at the same time stating that the initial reservations no longer exist. However, it deferred the decision on accession to the NPT.
Regardless of this, the USA, Russia and Ukraine have since begun to implement their disarmament obligations under the START treaties.
487. Russia and other CIS states on whose territory weapons of mass destruction are deployed will not be able, financially and technologically, to meet their disarmament obligations under safe conditions and within the periods specified unless they receive international assistance. Realizing this, Western states, including Germany, have decided to provide disarmament assistance. In 1993, for the first time, the German Bundestag approved DM 10 million to be used to provide assistance in the elimination of formerly Soviet weapons of mass destruction - nuclear and chemical weapons. Disarmament assistance agreements were concluded with Russia in 1992 and with Ukraine in 1993.
The international Science and Technology Centre (ISTC), founded in Moscow, is designed to prevent a "brain drain" of arms experts, in particular nuclear experts, and to promote the conversion of the armaments industry of the CIS states into civil manufacturing plants.
488. On 1 April 1991, the Federal Armed Forces Verification Centre was established to safeguard the rights and fulfil the obligations of Germany arising from the arms control agreements. Military and civilian personnel of the Centre perform arms; control measures abroad and escort foreign teams in Germany. They also perform tasks related to the implementation of the "Open Skies" Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention. The Federal Armed Forces Verification Centre mists the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union in setting up national verification organizations and implementing the arms control agreements. In addition, it provides personnel for observer missions under the auspices of the UN and CSCE.
START Limitation of the Strategic Nuclear Weapons of the USA and Russia
Strategic Nuclear Weapons of the USA and Russia (Warheads)
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT PERSPECTIVES
489. The radical changes in the security setting since 1989 also have implications for arms control policy. In the future, the political objective will continue to be to achieve stability in Europe at the lowest possible level of armed forces. However, the new security risks mean that a reorientation is also necessary in arms control and disarmament. The enhanced conflict potential at regional level, in particular, constitutes a challenge to which cogent arms control answers also have to be found. Negotiations on concrete measures to strengthen security and stability, a constant security dialogue plus efforts to strengthen conflict prevention capabilities we closely linked spheres of action. They are the expression of a new understanding of arms control - an understanding adapted to the requirements of a transformed political environment. Confidence building through cooperation between armed forces and efforts to ensure the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems are thus becoming increasingly important.
490. The "Forum for Security Cooperation" (FSC) is the first common umbrella organization for anus control negotiations and cooperation in the CSCE area, i.e. from Vancouver to Vladivostolk. The FSC's activities centre on:
* A constant, institutionalized dialogue on all aspects of politico-military security as a constitutive element in the establishment of cooperative security relations and for the preparation of concrete arms control negotiations;
* The elaboration of a CSCE code of conduct in the sphere of politico-military security as a point of departure and reference for a new cooperative security order between all CSCE participating states;
* The harmonization of existing arms control liabilities, with the objective of attaining, wherever possible, equal rights and obligations for all CSCE states;
* The further development of the conflict prevention and crisis management machinery,
* The provision of support to cooperative political conflict resolution in crisis regions and the formulation of regional arms control agreements;
* The intensification of cooperation in the sphere of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the exercise of restraint in the upon of conventional defence equipment.
491. The risk of continuing proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles makes stronger multilateral and worldwide cooperation imperative. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and modern defence technology jeopardizes stability and security regionally and globally. Moreover, economic development and social progress in these states are impeded. In the alliances and within a UN framework, the Federal Government thus advocates a development of the urgently needed concepts against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and weapons technology. This requires an all-embracing approach, encompassing the numerous -and diverse elements, from classic non-proliferation and disarmament through development aid to politico-military measures.
492. These elements include:
* Regional Security Policy
In the majority of cases, armament efforts and programmes for weapons of mass destruction are motivated by regional security problems. These can be countered by giving security guarantees to the countries at risk, by adopting political approaches to resolve conflicts and by providing economic incentives. Arms control and confidence building at a regional level are promising approaches.
* Export Controls
It is essential that national export control systems be harmonized, thereby enhancing their density and effectiveness. Above all, it is imperative that the new democracies in Eastern Europe, especially the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, be provided with rapid assistance to help them establish export control systems.
* Strengthening the Non-Proliferation
Regimes in particular, this involves the unlimited and unconditional extension of the NPT at the 1995 Extension and Review Conference and convincing these states of its security advantages which still take a negative view of this objective.
* Effective Verification
Strengthening non-proliferation efforts includes adequate opportunities for verification. Consistent use must be made of the possibilities of inspection by the IAEA, in particular the tool of "special inspections", and there must be comprehensive implementation of the reforms of the NPT verification system that were achieved within the IAEA in 1991/1992.
* Credible Sanctions
Any country that contravenes international non-proliferation standards has to expect sanctions. The Special Summit of the UN Security Council created an important foundation for this on 31 January 1992: for the first time ever, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is described as posing a threat to world peace and security. With this formula from Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council is indicating the possibility that it would exhaust all the means at its disposal, including coercive measures, in the event of a concrete instance of proliferation.
* Implementation of Nuclear Disarmament
From the point of view of Third World countries, in particular, the speedy implementation of the nuclear disarmament treaties (START I/II) and disarmament decisions of the major nuclear powers is an important condition for their support of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
* Economic integration
Numerous and diverse forms of aid, technology transfer and economic cooperation could be envisaged in order to create incentives for NPT member states in the Third World to remain members of the treaty and exhibit loyalty to it.
493. In addition, the January 1994 NATO Summit decided to intensify political and defence efforts against the further proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means. In this regard, it directed that an overall policy framework be developed in order to reinforce prevention efforts, reduce the proliferation threat and ensure protection against it.
494. Control over the upon of conventional arms, defence equipment and dual-use items will be exercised by the new Multilateral Forum, on the establishment of which the member states of COCOM (Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Strategic Export Controls) are reaching agreement. COCOM is to be disbanded after over 40 years of activity now that it is no longer consistent with the needs of the time following the profound changes in East-West relations.
495. The non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the limitation of conventional arms exports will be a priority task of security policy in the years ahead. Only if this task is accomplished will it be possible to guarantee that the transformation in international relations after the end of the East-West conflict does not lead to a phase of unpredictable global risks to security and stability.