401. Germany is not only a member of the United Nations and a participant at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), but also a member of the North Atlantic Alliance, the European Union and the Western European Union. Its aim is to cooperate with its partners in linking these institutions together and turning them into a strong Security order in and for Europe. Each has its own particular strengths, and the intention is for them to complement each other and be used flexibly. They are helping to extend political stability to Central and Eastern Europe and into the Common-, wealth of Independent States.
402. The principles of the "Charter of the United Nations" (UN Charter), the standards set by the CSCE and the code of values contained in the Basic Law are the guidelines for Germany's foreign and security policy. The UN Charter bans the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. At the same time, it reaffirms the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence and also calls upon the member states to play an active part in the United Nations' endeavours for peace.
403. In compliance with the UN Charter, Article 24 of the Basic Law states that to maintain peace, the Federal Republic of Germany may become part of a mutual collective security system. The object of such a security system must be to establish and secure a peaceful and lasting order in Europe and between the peoples of the world. When it became a member of the United Nations, the Federal Republic of Germany agreed to observe all the rights and obligations set forth in the UN Charter. It is from this fact that it derives the right to actively participate in tasks and missions undertaken by the international community. The military preventive security measures taken by our state can therefore no longer be confined solely to national -and Alliance defence.
404. The Federal Republic of Germany has been a member of the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) since 1955. In the preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty of 4 April 1949, the member states reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the United Nations. They undertake to "safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law" and to settle my international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means. This does not impair the right of legitimate self-defence by armed force. One of the main provisions of the NATO Treaty is that an armed attack against one or more allies in Europe and North America or against their armed forces will be considered an attack against all the NATO countries and, in such an event, the allies will come to each other's assistance. Furthermore, the allies have undertaken to consult together whenever; in the opinion of one partner, their territorial integrity political independence or security is threatened. The object of the Alliance is and remains the establishment of a lasting and just order of peace in Europe.
405. The aim of the Brussels Treaty of 23 October 1954 on the Western European Union (WEU) is "to afford assistance to each other, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, in maintaining international peace and security and in resisting any policy of aggression". The parties to the Treaty express their will to promote the unity and encourage the integration of Europe. The core of the WEU Treaty is the article under which the allies pledge to tender mutual assistance if one of them should be the object of an armed attack in Europe.
406. The Maastricht Treaty of 7 February 1992 on European Union establishes a perspective binding under international law for a European political union based on and determined by common values and similar principles. It includes a common European foreign and security policy and the framing of a common defence policy with the prospect of a common defence.
407. The Transatlantic Declarations of 22 and 23 November 1990 are the outcome of an effort by Canada and the USA on the one hand and the European Community on the other to put their proven security partnership on a broader footing, and thus to pave the way for more intensive contacts and consultations between the two sides and to offer long-term perspectives for the transatlantic relations. The growth in European integration is reflected in the principle of equal partnership with North America. These declarations are the basis for supplementing the traditionally close transatlantic consultations in matters of security with a step-up in cooperation in the fields of trade and industry, science and culture. Both sides also declare their willingness to share responsibility for dealing with global tasks, especially the fight against terrorism, the fight against drug-related crime, the common fight against international crime, as well as the fight against pollution and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The common security and defence policy is hence embedded in a concept of comprehensive cooperation between Europe and North America based on common values and similar interests.
408. The CSCE has created a framework for state conduct in which chief importance is attributed to human rights, the right of self-determination, the renunciation of force and respect for territorial integrity. The "Charter of Paris for a New Europe" signed on 21 November 1990 rounds off this framework and turns it into a programme for an all-European and transatlantic community of shared values and cooperation. Its core elements are a form of democracy based on human rights and fundamental liberties, prosperity due to economic freedom and social justice, and equal security for all the states participating. Combined with the principles set forth in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, it forms the "constitutional order" for a united Europe. In addition to its normative function, the CSCE has been increasingly called upon since 1990 to perform operational functions, particularly in the sphere of preventive diplomacy and the building of democratic structures, for which it meanwhile has permanent working institutions and the rudiments of an organizational structure.
409. Together with its partners in the European union, the WEU and the North Atlantic Alliance, the Federal Government is committed to quickly adapting European and transatlantic institutions and organizations to the changes in security requirements in the European region. The attempt to establish security and stability is seen as an overriding and common approach that is a concern of every state. According to Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations a regional arrangement, the CSCE is - in terms of the number of participants and the tasks it performs - the largest all-European institution and has an important role to play in the concept of mutually reinforcing institutions. Under the sweeping notion of security traced out in the Helsinki Final Act, the task is one of integrating the political, military, economic, social and environmental aspects of security into a general stabilization, conflict prevention and crisis management strategy. Such a concept combines the preservation of peace with respect for and the promotion of democracy, human rights and the rule of law.
Membership in institution of the Euro-Atlantic security structure
THE TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP UNDER FUTURE CONDITIONS
410. The North Atlantic Alliance remains the foundation for Germany's security. It embodies the strategic unity that exists between the allies in Europe and North America. The political and strategic ties between Europe and North America an due notably to the fact that they uphold the same values and have similar interests. The transatlantic link and close relations with the United States assure the common security of all the allies. The combination of American and European forces has a stabilizing function that covers the whole of Europe and for which them is no substitute.
The ability to mount a collective defence remains one of the Alliance's core functions, but NATO cannot confine its activities to this task if it is intent on meeting the security challenges of the future. NATO's role and functions are being reappraised; its political and military structures are being brought into line with the changed parameters. The crucial challenge facing the Alliance today is that of how to deal with the wide range of crisis and conflict potentials which exist throughout Europe. The war in the former Yugoslavia is just one example of how then crises and conflicts produce risks that threaten stability and security in Europe. Besides the ability to mount a collective defence, to respond to a crisis - and in particular to prevent a military conflict-, the Alliance's ability to support international conflict prevention and crisis management efforts and preserve peace is becoming increasingly important.
NATO's STRATEGIC CONCEPT
411. The "Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation" issued by the heads of state and government of the member countries of the Alliance at the summit held in November 1991 in Rome and the "New Strategic Concept" approved in Rome added the element of "Cooperation" to the two classical elements of the Alliance's strategy, "defence capability" and "dialogue".
NATO has thus accepted its responsibility for the whole of the newly weighted tasks.
The New Strategic Concept reaffirms NATO's fundamental security-related tasks as defined by the NATO foreign ministers in Copenhagen on 6 and 7 June 1991. The concept thus forms the basis for responding to the radical changes in the situation in Europe by implementing a broad approach to security and stability which combines the political, economic, social and environmental aspects with the indispensable dimension of defence.
The Alliance's military dimension remains an essential factor. What is new, however, is the fact that this dimension will be used more than ever before in support of a broad concept of security. The Alliance will remain purely defensive in purpose. Even in the future, it will base its ability to take collective action on the integrated military structure and cooperation and coordination agreements and, in the foreseeable future at least, maintain an appropriate combination of conventional and nuclear forces.
412. The forces are being adapted to their new tasks, becoming smaller and more flexible. As the conventional forces undergo substantial cuts, the readiness levels of many units and formations are being lowered. They are being tendered more mobile so that they can respond to a broad spectrum of crises. The way they are structured will enable them to conduct both crisis management and defence operations, if necessary using their capability for flexible augmentation. Multinational units will figure more prominently in the integrated military structure.
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THE ALLIANCE'S NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT AS AGREED IN ROME 1991 (EXCERPTS)
-The means by which the Alliance pursues its security policy to preserve the peace will continue to include the maintenance of a military capability sufficient to prevent war and to provide for effective defence; an overall capability to manage successfully crises affecting the security of its members; and the pursuit of political efforts favouring dialogue with other nations and the active much for a cooperative approach to Europe. Security, including in the field of arms control and disarmament.
To achieve its essential purpose, the Alliance performs the following fundamental security tasks:
I. To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in Europe, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, [...]
II. To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as a transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on my issues that affect their vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members security, and for appropriate coordination of their efforts in fields of common concern.
III. To deter and defend against my threat of aggression against the territory of my NATO memberstate.
IV. To preserve the strategic balance within Europe.
Other European institutions such a the EC, WEU and CSCE also have roles to play, in accordance with their respective responsibilities and purposes, in them fields, the creation of a European identity in security and defence will underline the preparedness of the Europeans to take a greater share of responsibility for their security and will help to reinforce transatlantic solidarity. [...]
The Alliance's active pursuit of dialogue and cooperation seeks to help manage crises affecting the security of the Allies; and to expand the opportunities for a genuine partnership among all European countries in dealing with common security problems.
[...] This policy of cooperation is the expression of the inseparability of security among European states.
In the new political and strategic environment in Europe, the success of the Alliance's policy of preserving peace and preventing war depends even more than in the past on the effectiveness of preventive diplomacy and successful management of crises affecting the security of its members. Any major aggression in Europe is much more unlikely and would be preceded by significant warning time.
Alliance strategy will continue to reflect a number of fundamental principles. The Alliance is purely defensive in purpose none of its weapons will ever be used except in self-defence, and it does not consider itself anyone's adversary. The Allies will maintain military strength adequate to convince any potential aggressor that the Use of force against the territory of one of the Allies would meet collective and effective action by all of them and that the risks involved in initiating conflict would outweigh my foreseeable gains. The forces of the Allies most therefore be able to defend Alliance frontiers, to stop an aggressor's advance as far forward as possible, to maintain or restore the territorial integrity of Allied nations and to terminate war rapidly by making an aggressor reconsider his decision, cease his attack and withdraw. The role of the Alliance's military forces is to assure the territorial integrity and political independence of its member states, and thus contribute to peace and stability in Europe.
The security of all Allies is indivisible: an attack on one is attack on all. Alliance solidarity and strategic unity are accordingly crucial prerequisites for collective security.
The collective nature of Alliance defence is embodied in practical arrangements that enable the Allies to enjoy the crucial political, military and resource advantages of collective defence, and prevent the renationalization of defence policies, without depriving the Allies of their sovereignty. These arrangements are based on an integrated military structure as well as on cooperation and coordination agreements. Key features include collective force planning; common operational planning; multinational formations; the stationing of forces outside home territory, where appropriate on a mutual basis; crisis management and reinforcement arrangements; procedures for consultation; common standards and procedures for equipment, training and logistics; joint and combined exercises; and infrastructure, armaments and logistics cooperation.
To implement its security objectives and strategic principles in the new environment, the organization of the Allies' forces must be adapted to provide capabilities that can contribute to protecting peace, managing crises that affect the security of Alliance members, and preventing war, while retaining at all times the means to defend, if necessary, all Allied territory and to restore peace.
In the new security environment and given the reduced overall force levels in future, the ability to work closely together, which will facilitate the cost-effective use of Alliance resources, will be particularly important for the achievement of the missions of the Allies' forces. The Alliance's collective defence arrangements in which, for those concerned, the integrated military structure, including multinational forces, plays the key role, will be essential in this regard. Integrated and multinational European structures, as they are further developed in the context of an emerging European Defence Identity, will also increasingly have a similarly important role to play in enhancing the Allie's ability to work together in the common defence."
413. By founding the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), the Alliance has put cooperation with the CIS states and the countries of Central Eastern and Southeastern Europe on a stable footing. The NACC was established on 20 December 1991 with the aim of promoting cooperation in the sphere of security policy and the building of cooperative security structures. Thirty-eight member states are currently represented in the NACC. It has marked out the field for comprehensive and deepened cooperation in political and military matters. Regular meetings have taken place to this end between the North Atlantic Council and the cooperation partners both at ministerial and ambassadorial level and in important NATO committees, including the Military Committee.
By working together on a project basis, the Cooperation Council has helped to create transparency and confidence and support the processes of democratic reform in the partner states. Its main achievement, however, has been to help integrate the armed forces into the new democracies and generate new security concepts.
414. The role and importance of NATO's nuclear arsenal have changed. The presence of North American troops in Europe and an appropriate combination of conventional and nuclear forces at a much reduced level remain essential cornerstones of a collective and integrated defence based increasingly on multinational force structures.
The former Soviet Union's nuclear weapons have been withdrawn from Central Europe. The likelihood of NATO ever having to fall back on nuclear weapons has diminished considerably. In view of this, it has been possible to withdraw all NATO's ground- and sea-launched tactical nuclear weapon systems. The number of tactical nuclear weapons remaining on European soil has been cut by something like 80 percent, compared with the figure at the end of the Cold War.
The joint declaration issued by the allies on the prevention of war, the credible demonstration of Alliance solidarity and the nuclear force potential will continue to demand German participation in collective nuclear functions, a matter involving the deployment of allied nuclear forces on German soil and participation in the planning process, consultations and the provision of delivery means.
415. The Alliance documents on nuclear planning during the Cold War era have lost their validity. At the meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) at Gleneagles/UK on 21 and 22 October 1992, the Alliance agreed on a new set of principles for nuclear planning and consultations. They underline the political role of the remaining nuclear potential and emphasize the political principles of nuclear planning and consultation. Nuclear plans are not geared to a concrete threat. The basic purpose of allied nuclear forces remains unchanged and purely political by character. Nuclear weapons are there to provide protection against incalculable risks and are an effective deterrent against possible aggression. They help maintain strategic stability in the Euro-Atlantic region.
THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE FACES
NEW CHALLENGES
416. NATO's chief task remains that of working together with other institutions to help establish a lasting and just order of peace in Europe. There has been no let-up in the dynamism of change in the field of security policy since the NATO summit in Rome at which the Alliance agreed on a new course, it is adapting to these challenges by systematically reframing its functions and structures. Decisive steps were made for this at the 1994 NATO summit in Brussels, where answers were given to three core issues:
* NATO is facing the tasks of international conflict prevention and crisis management.
* The projection of stability eastwards is a chief common strategic task for all the partners in the European-Atlantic region.
* The European Security and Defence identity that is emerging and the further development of closer cooperation between NATO and the WEU on the basis of transparency and complementarity are fundamental factors in the issue regarding the Alliance's further transformation.
417. One of NATO's tasks which will become more important in the future is that of defusing crises in time and thus preventing conflicts from arising or even of helping to settle them. Although conflict prevention and crisis management are political tasks, it may also Prow necessary to resort to military power to accomplish them. NATO is well-suited for this, disposing as it does of efficient means, structures and procedures and having the powerful democracies of the West behind it. The Alliance has on several occasions displayed its willingness to support the United Nations and CSCE in peace missions. NATO's ability to assist in effective crisis management programmes is one of the chief factors that help minimize risks for the Alliance and bring about a lasting peaceful order in a united Europe.
418. The most effective way of taking preventive security measures in Europe is by maintaining stability and projecting it to Central and Eastern Europe, judging by how the European Union has developed since the signing of the Treaty of Maastricht, it is only natural to work for political, economic, cultural and defence-related integration. The deepening and widening of European integration go hand in hand. The Federal Government is concerned that having overcome the ideological divide, Europe should not be once again split up, this time into different security zones. It acknowledges the historical obligation that exists to lead the young democracies towards the Western institutions.
419. The West cannot enjoy lasting prosperity if Germany's neighbours in the East are forced to endure lasting hardship. The whole of Europe will benefit from gaining stable, democratic, strong and equal partners in the East. It is therefore in Germany's interest to extend the western zone of prosperity and stability beyond its frontiers and encompass the neighbours in the East. This coincides with the wish of several states not only to join the European Union and the WEU, but also the North Atlantic Alliance.
In 1993, "Association Agreements" were concluded with Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, the Slovak Republic, Romania and Bulgaria. At their trilateral meeting on 11 and 12 November 1993 in Warsaw, the foreign ministers of Germany, France and Poland submitted a proposal for leading the states of Central and Eastern Europe towards the WEU. This proposal formed the basis upon which the WEU Council of Ministers, at its meeting on 22 November 1993, promised to grant the states that have concluded association agreements with the European Union or will be doing so an improved status vis-à-vis the WEU.
At its meeting in Copenhagen, the European Council granted the states that have concluded association agreements the prospect of joining the European Union. Membership of the European Union will also provide these states the prospect of WEU membership. Since it is clear that there can be no zones in the European Union where degrees of security vary, all the members of the European Union and the WEU should in principle also have the option of joining NATO.
420. Russia and Ukraine are decisive factors in the issue of lasting stability in Europe. Stability can be achieved only with the consent and support of the two states, not against their will. The Federal Government is committed to the idea of the European Union and the North Atlantic Alliance entering a partnership with the two states which matches the importance of these states for European security.
421. The transatlantic link is indispensable for security and stability in Europe. As Europe undergoes radical change, it is now of all times that the continent needs the continuing commitment of the USA in particular to maintain its inner balance. The vitality of the transatlantic link is also in the interest of North America, as this link enables it to deal with global challenges in cooperation with a Europe that is a stable and predictable partner capable of taking action. A lasting and substantial US military presence in Europe is an important expression of this solidarity.
422. The Europeans must take on a greater share of the common responsibility and team up to become partners of America that are capable of taking action when necessary. The European Union and the Western European Union make up the European foundation of the transatlantic security order. NATO is also strengthened if the WEU is capable of taking action. The Federal Government is committed to the idea of both the WEU and NATO becoming capable of conducting conflict prevention and crisis management missions, with the two alliances complementing each other effectively and requiring a minimum of resources. Although this is highly provisional upon basic congruence in political objectives and decision-making procedures, responsibility for the military tasks related to collective defence will continue to rest solely with NATO.
423. Relations between the two alliances were put on a new footing at the WEU Council of Ministers meeting in November 1993 and the NATO Summit on 10 and 11 January 1994. In the future, NATO and the WEU will agree with each other on what measures are to be taken in a contingency. Should NATO, however, opt against going into action in a crisis, the WEU is also meant to be able to act on its own, if necessary. Once appropriate consultations have taken place, it will in future also be able to fall back on NATO's collective military resources for operations of its own in Europe.
Cooperation must also be possible with non-members of NATO. As a result, the Alliance and the WEU could become effective partners of the United Nations and the CSCE in international conflict prevention and crisis management, the common preventive security measures in Europe could thus be enhanced; and new partners could be led step by step towards the Western alliances.
NATO and WEU functions, structures and procedures must be complementary and preclude duplications. NATO's structures must be adaptable enough for them to also be used by the Europeans alone in a WEU context. This would not only promote the unanimity of Europe and the North Atlantic Alliance and their credibility; it would also be a major contribution towards strengthening the United Nations in its peacekeeping function. It would furthermore avoid redundancies among force elements no-one is able and willing to afford.
424. At the meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 10 and 11 January 1994 in Brussels, the heads of state and government, acting in view of the historic changes that are embracing the entire European continent, resolved to renew the Alliance. Building on the decisions made in Rome and on the Strategic Concept agreed there, they issued a declaration containing initiatives designed to help bring about lasting peace, stability and well-being in the whole of Europe.
DECLARATION ISSUED BY THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT IN BRUSSELS (1994) (EXCERPTS)
"We reaffirm our strong commitment to the transatlantic link, which is the bedrock of NATO. The continued substantial presence of United States forces in Europe is a fundamentally important aspect of that link.
Today, we confirm and renew this link between North America and a Europe developing a Common Foreign and Security Policy and taking a greater responsibility on defence matters. [...]
We reaffirm that the Alliance is the essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreements on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of Allies under the Washington Treaty.
We give our full support to the development of a European Security and Defence identity which, as called for in the Maastricht Treaty, in the longer term perspective of a common defence policy within the European Union, might in time lead to a common defence compatible with that of the Atlantic Alliance. [...]
We [...] stand ready to make collective assets of the Alliance available, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations undertaken by the European Allies in pursuit of their Common Foreign and Security Policy.
In pursuit of out common transatlantic security requirements, NATO increasingly will be called upon to undertake missions in addition to the traditional and fundamental task of collective defence of its members, which remains a core function. We reaffirm our offer to support, on a case by case basis in accordance with our own procedures, peacekeeping and other operations under the authority of the ON Security Council or the responsibility of the CSCE, including by making available Alliance resources and expertise. Participation in any such operation or mission will remain subject to decisions of member states in accordance with national constitutions.
Therefore, we direct the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session, with the advice of the NATO Military Authorities, to examine how the Alliance's political and military structures and procedures might be developed and adapted to conduct more efficiently and flexibly the Alliance's missions, including peacekeeping, as well as to improve cooperation with the WEU and to reflect the emerging Europe Security and Defence identity. As part of this process, we endorse concept of Combined Joint Task Forces as a means to facilitate contingency operations, including operations with participating nations outside the Alliance.
The Council, with the advice of the NATO Military Authorities, and coordination with WEU, will work on implementation in a manner that provides separable but not separate military capabilities 11 could be employed by NATO or the WEU.
Our own security is inseparably linked to that of all other states Europe.[...]
We remain deeply committed to further strengthening CSCE which is the only organization comprising all European and North American countries, as an instrument of preventive diploma conflict prevention, cooperative security, and the advancement democracy and human rights. We actively support the efforts to enhance the operational capabilities of the CSCE for early warning, conflict prevention, and crisis management.
As part of our overall effort to promote preventive diplomacy, welcome the European Union proposal for a Pact on Stability Europe, [...]
Building on the close and long-standing partnership among North American and European allies, we are committed to enhancing security and stability in the whole of Europe. We therefore wish to strengthen lies with the democratic states to our East. We reaffirm that the Alliance, as provided for in Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, remains open to membership of other European states in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. We expect and would welcome NATO expansion that reaches to democratic states to our East, as part of an evolutionary process, taking into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe.
We have decided to launch an immediate and practical programme that will transform the relationship between NATO and participating states. This new programme goes beyond dialogue and cooperation to forge a real partnership - a Partnership for Peace.
Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means constitutes a threat to international security and is matter of concern to NATO. We have decided to intensify and expand NATO's political and defence efforts against proliferation, [...]"
425. In a separate declaration, the heads of state and government reaffirmed that NATO is undergoing an evolutionary process of expansion and is open to new members. It also offered the states participating in the ACC and other CSCE states a "Partnership for Peace".
PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE - INVITATION - (EXCERPTS)
"...We invite the other states participating in the NACC, and other CSCE countries able and willing to contribute to this programme, to join with us in this Partnership. Active participation in the Partnership for Peace will play an important role in the evolutionary process of the expansion of NATO.
The Partnership for Peace, which will operate under the authority of the North Atlantic Council, will forge new security relationships between the North Atlantic Alliance and its Partners for Peace. [...] The Partnership will expand and intensify, political and military cooperation throughout Europe, increase stability, diminish threats to peace, and build strengthened relationships by promoting the spirit of practical cooperation and commitment to democratic principles that underpin our Alliance. NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if the partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security. At a pace and scope determined by the capacity and desire of the individual participating states, we will work in concrete ways towards transparency in defence budgeting, promoting democratic control of defence ministries, joint planning, joint military exercises, and creating an ability to operate with NATO forces in such fields as peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations, and others as may be agreed.
To promote close military cooperation and interoperability, we will propose, within the Partnership framework, peacekeeping field exercises beginning in 1994. To coordinate joint military activities within the Partnership, we will invite states participating in the Partnership to send permanent liaison officers, to NATO Headquarters and a separate Partnership Coordination Cell at Mons (Belgium) [...]
Since its inception two years ago, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council has greatly expanded the depth and scope of its activities. We will continue to work with all our NACC partners to build cooperative relationships across the entire spectrum of the Alliance's activities. [...]
426. The NATO summit in Brussels was of fundamental importance for the future: The transatlantic link is being enhanced. America has reaffirmed its responsibility for security in and for Europe. The reform of NATO and the process of European integration are now closely associated with each other. As Europe moves towards unification, it has been acknowledged by the United States as an equal partner in the Alliance. The Western European Union is being strengthened as the European pillar of the Alliance. In the future, it will be able to fall back on NATO Structures and forces. This will render Europe capable of taking strategic action and at the same time prevent the building of dual structures that no-one is able and willing to afford. This both reduces the burden on America and paves the way for a lasting US commitment in and for Europe. Even in the future, US military presence in Europe will be indispensable for keeping the strategic balance.
NATO has declared the stabilization of Central, Southeastern and Eastern Europe a common task of the highest standing. The "Partnership for Peace" initiative is based on the tried and tested programme of cooperation pursued within the NACC and takes it a step further. The idea is for the armed forces of the NATO states and their partners to pool their resources in planning, training and exercising for conflict prevention and crisis management operations in Europe.
The "Partnership for Peace" is an important and useful step along the road to leading new partners towards the West's security institutions. It is no substitute for expanding the Alliance. The "Partnership for Peace" contains a programme that allows cooperation among the partners to be deepened at every level and at the same time provides scope for flexibility in handling the differences in interests between the various states. It underlines how right it is to perceive cooperation and integration as elements of an overall concept designed to bring stability to Central and Eastern Europe.
FORCE AND COMMAND STRUCTURES
427. The Alliance is adapting its force and command structures to the changes in the security situation. Its forces are divided into three categories; reaction forces, main defence forces and augmentation forces.
428. The reaction forces -are operational multinational units particularly suited for crisis management missions. Elements are held as immediately available reaction forces. They are composed of mobile and flexible ground, air and naval forces and can be deployed to any region of Alliance territory in a matter of days. To increase the options for political action in a crisis management operation and to optimize operational flexibility, reaction forces are divided into two categories: Immediate Reaction Forces (IRF) and Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF). As the first forces to be employed, they are the ones who help mount a national defence and extended national defence operations conducted under the auspices of NATO. In the event of an immediate threat, they secure the build-up of the partly active and skeletonized main defence forces. The reaction forces can be augmented by elements of the national or multinational main defence forces.
Allied Command Europe
429. The Alliance has concentrated its reaction forces for Allied Command Europe (ACE) and Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT) under combined command staffs. The Allied Reaction Forces Planning Staff for Allied Command Europe (ARFPS) reports directly to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and is responsible for operational planning and exercise coordination for the reaction forces in Allied Command Europe. Responsibility for command and control in an operational environment remains with the cognizant NATO commanders.
430. The largest element of NATO's reaction force component is a corps (ARRC) to which units from twelve nations are assigned. Major formations are assigned to the ARRC from different countries, depending on the situation that has to be dealt with. In an operational environment it can command and control up to four divisions with the appropriate shares of corps and division troops. One of the divisions concerned is the airmobile Multinational Division Central Europe (MND (C)) whose headquarters is already under ARRC command in peacetime. The MND (C) is composed of units from the Netherlands, Belgium, the United Kingdom and Germany and can also be ordered into action on its own - it is not dependent upon the ARRC. Another multinational division is being built up for Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH), with units from Greece, Turkey and Italy. These forces will he supplemented by an immediately available airmobile brigade (AMF).
431. NATO's air reaction forces are being concentrated under a combined staff (RF(A)S) operating under German command. The responsibilities of this staff are to coordinate, plan and support forces deployment and restaging operations, in an operational environment, these forces will be incorporated into the regional integrated NATO command structure.
432. The Alliance's maritime immediate reaction forces are combined in standing naval forces (STANAVFORLANT, STANAVMINFOR and STANAVFORMED). In peacetime, they are deployed in the Atlantic, in the waters of Northwestern Europe and in the Mediterranean. In crises, they are used in response to the situation at the discretion of the political leaders, irrespective of where they are deployed in peacetime. The immediate reaction forces constitute the core of the Multinational Maritime Fore, (MNMF). The force can also be augmented by the maritime rapid reaction forces whenever the situation calls for such a step.
433. Germany has units from all three services in the Alliance's reaction force component. Some 25 percent of the Army's combat forces, together with the proportional corps and division troops, are currently earmarked for it. The Air Force provides up to a third of its reconnaissance, air defence and counterattack capacities. The Navy assigns elements of varying strengths to all the standing naval forces. The immediately available maritime forces can augment to become maritime task groups. The Navy therefore keeps up to forty percent of its units afloat and flying units at the ready for reaction force operations.
434. Most of the main defence forces are dependent upon augmentation. They must mobilize for weeks and months to establish full operational strength. In an operational environment, main defence forces will be under the command of a multinational major formation. NATO's ground forces in Central Europe now mainly have just multinational corps:
* a GE/US corps under German command in Ulm,
* a US/GE corps under US command in Heidelberg,
* I GE/NL Multinational Corps, initially comprising forces from the Netherlands and Germany and operating under alternating command in Münster;
* a GE/DK corps under alternating command in Rendsburg;
* the European Corps, comprising forces from France, Belgium and Germany and operating under alternating command in Strasbourg; Spain has declared its intention to provide units for the European Corps;
* the NATO Reaction Cop (ARRC) under UK command in Mönchengladbach-Rheindahlen.
435. Multinationality underlines the allies' resolve to act in a spirit of solidarity and on a common basis. What is more, multinational decision-making, command and force structures are important steps on the road to a European defence and at the same time strengthen the links with the partners in North America. They not only ensure that each ally has political influence and a voice; they also make each one face the same risk and shoulder responsibility.
Despite cuts in national force strengths, multinational command and force structures ensure that NATO and the WEU remain capable of taking military action. They create a framework within which smaller nations can continue to bring their limited force contingents effectively to bear in these alliances. The forces that complement each other in an alliance lessen the dangers inherent in dwindling resources by removing the need for each nation to cover the entire spectrum of military action and accordingly to keep its forces up to date. Multinationality is the prerequisite for maintaining the military capability required in the best possible way with what resources are available.
436. It is chiefly form from the USA and Canada that are earmarked as augmentation foxes. They can be joined by contingents from European allies. They augment the troops already in place. As they are on the whole limited in their availalbility, they are not altogether suitable as an instrument of crisis management. The only augmentation forces Germany provides are naval forces.
437. The Alliance has changed its command structure and now has two commands: Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT) and Allied Command Europe (ACE). The former Allied Command Channel has been disbanded. Allied forces Northwestern Europe (AFNORTHWEST) has been established in the Northern Region of Allied Command Europe. In the Central Region, the former Allied Tactical Air forces and Army Groups in Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT) have been combined to become commands known as AIRCENT and LANDCENT. Allied Forces Baltic Approaches (BALTAP) is also part of the Central Region. In the Southern Region, a subordinate command (LANDSOUTHCENT) has been added to Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH).
438. The Alliance's command structures must be adapted to cater for the tasks of "conflict prevention and crisis management". The first steps to do so were taken at the NATO summit in Brussels in January 1994. Under the staff reorganization plans, the current headquarters will be supplemented by core elements of operational staffs intended to be extractable and mobile. The idea is for them to act as allied combined joint task force HQs (CJTF HQ) capable of commanding and controlling ground forces of anything up to corps strength as well as whatever maritime and air forces the situation demands. In addition, they must be able both to allow states not covered by the integrated command structure to participate as well as to cooperate with non-NATO States in UN or CSCE operations and to accommodate their command and liaison elements. Cooperation under the "Partnership for Peace" programme is of particular importance. This new command structure must also be assured for European ends. The WEU must have the opportunity to use these headquarters.
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