Thursday
13 April 2000
0830-1130 (S)
The unresting progress of mankind causes continual change in weapons; and with that must come a continual change in the manner of fighting.
Alfred Thayer Mahan
We cannot expect the enemy to oblige by planning his wars to suit our weapons.
Vice Admiral Charles Turner Joy
It is not so much the mode of formation as the proper combined use of the different arms which will ensure victory.
Antionne-Henri Baron de Jomini
Purpose
The purpose of this lesson is to comprehend force planning as a dimension of national security strategy and military strategy and to appreciate the importance of the CJCS' Joint Vision and the Service Chiefs' visions as long-range "strategic" documents which decisively shape such planning.
Learning Objectives
1. Comprehend the statutory responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Chiefs, and unified commanders for force planning.
2. Analyze force planning as a dimension of national military strategy.
3. Evaluate the role of "vision" statements like Joint Vision 2010 and the various Service Chiefs' visions in force planning.
4. Evaluate US plans for future forces in the context of the National Security Strategy and the 21st Century security environment.
5. Comprehend the influence of science and technology on US force planning.
6. Create and devise concepts of future forces more appropriate to the 21st Century security environment than those currently envisioned.
7. Appreciate the anxieties experienced by allies and potential coalition partners in connection with JV 2010 and our Service visions.
8. Comprehend the increasing momentum for joint experimentation and the emerging role of US Joint Forces Command in this arena.
Discussion
The 1995 Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM) recommended that, to enhance the development of joint capabilities, the CJCS articulate a vision of the armed forces' longer term development. The first such vision statement was Joint Vision 2010, published in 1996. Since 1996, the CJCS and Service Chiefs (and some CINCs) have published their vision statements in fairly close coordination with each other. In the 1997 QDR, Secretary of Defense William Cohen embraced Joint Vision 2010 as the key to the "prepare now" element of the national strategy and to the "transformation" of the armed forces. These vision statements have enjoyed a relatively long half-life, although a number are now under revision. It is increasingly clear that such visions can serve as enduring frameworks for force planning and, as such, are "strategic documents" in their own right.
These visions also serve to promote a common approach to jointness that was sorely lacking before 1996. Many see the continued development of joint doctrine, the growing impetus for joint experimentation under the auspices of US Joint Forces Command, and expanded operational coordination within the Interagency as the path to the next level of jointness.
Issues for Consideration
1. What role does Joint and Service "visioning" play in the way we approach force planning? Why is this so?
2. How does Joint and Service visioning differ from what existed before 1996? How significant is the difference? Are the Service visions and Joint Vision 2010 compatible? Should they be?
3. How would you alter Joint Vision 2010 or any of the Service visions to prepare for future threats, challenges, and opportunities? To what extent are the ramifications "strategic?"
4. Is Joint Vision 2010 predominately a "high-tech" approach suited only to operations at the high end of the conflict spectrum? Explain.
5. Why is US Joint Forces Command being thrust into the lead for joint experimentation? Why don't the individual Services handle this and compare notes? What Service equities are at risk?
6. What role does the Joint Strategic Planning Process (JSPS) play in force planning?
7. What impact, if any, do documents like Joint Vision 2010 have on other nations?
Required Readings
1. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2010, 1996. (Student Issue)
2. Chief of Staff of the Army, Army Vision Statement, 1999. (Student Issue)
3. Commandant, Marine Corps, Operational Maneuver from the Sea, 1996. (Student Issue)
4. Chief of Naval Operations, Forward from the Sea, 1997. (Student Issue)
5. Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Global Engagement (under revision),
6. Robbin Laird and Holger Mey, The Revolution in Military Affairs: Allied Perspectives, McNair Paper, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1999. (Student Issue)
7. Senator Dan Coats, "Joint Experimentation: Unlocking the Promise of the Future," Joint Force Quarterly (Autumn-Winter, 1997-98), pp. 13-19 (Reprint)
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