Tuesday
11 April 2000
0830-1130 (IS)
The object in war is to attain a better peace--even if only from your own point of view. Hence it is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you desire. This is the truth underlying Clausewitz's definition of war as a continuation of policy by other means--the prolongation of that policy through the war into the subsequent peace must always be borne in mind.
Sir Basil Liddell Hart
What is essential in war is victory, not prolonged operations.... He who knows when he can fight and when he cannot will be victorious. He who understands how to use both large and small forces will be victorious.
Sun Tzu
War plans cover every aspect of a war, and weave them all into a single operation that must have a single, ultimate objective in which all particular aims are reconciled. No one starts a war--or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so--without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.
Carl von Clausewitz
The theater of operations is the whole chess-table of war...In times of peace the general staff should plan for all contingencies of war.
Antoine Henri Jomini
Purpose
The purpose of this lesson is to comprehend US joint doctrine for deliberate planning and crisis action planning, particularly in relation to joint campaign planning, and to evaluate their utility as a link between national security strategy and policy, on the one hand, and military operations, on the other.
Learning Objectives
1. Comprehend US joint doctrine for deliberate planning and crisis action planning, the difference between the two, and their role in joint campaign planning.
2. Recognize the roles of the Joint Staff, Service Staffs, supporting and supported unified command headquarters, and Joint Task Force headquarters during both deliberate planning and crisis action planning.
3. Evaluate joint campaign planning as a link between national security strategy and policy and actual military operations.
4. Comprehend US joint doctrine for joint campaign planning.
5. Analyze the implications of multiple campaign plans for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense and the US government.
6. Analyze campaign planning doctrine for its implications within an alliance.
Discussion
At the level of the theater CINC, deliberate plans are formulated to carry out military missions assigned by the Secretary of Defense in contingencies described by him and reflecting the President's policies. Almost all of these plans describe a military campaign that accomplishes the stated political ends given the threat. The design of campaign plans is a highly intricate process, familiarity with which is essential to the national security strategist who must appreciate the complexities of wielding military power. Campaign plans, of course, are the basis for the actual campaigns, should they occur, and thus are the beginning of a story that leads to victory or defeat, success or failure. But campaign plans also identify to the national command authority the military feasibility of its policies. They are the source of warfighting "requirements" that are or are not provided for in Service budgets. Because they must be formally reviewed and approved, they are an important element of civil control of the military; the military generally does not plan for missions it has not been assigned and, conversely, is accountable for a feasible plan for the missions it has been assigned.
The Joint Community employs two basic modes of operational planning as part of its Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES): deliberate planning and crisis action planning. Most campaign plans, particularly those anticipated well in advance, are initially developed via the deliberate planning process, put "on the shelf" as contingency plans, and then refined into operations orders via the crisis action planning process when the National Command Authority anticipates the need for near-term execution.
Joint Campaign Planning is far more an art than a science. However, approaches and procedures have been formalized in joint doctrine to promote unified action across all Service, sub-unified, and allied/coalition commands. Both the art and the process of campaign planning must be appreciated. Campaign planning is the critical link between national policy and strategy, such as we have studied to date, and the actual application of force. Such planning is at the core of military strategy. And its ultimate product are the orders issued by tactical leaders to American soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines, who must carry them out in harm's way.
Issues for Consideration
1. When is deliberate planning employed and what is the process to develop its products? What are the principal products?
2. When is crisis action planning employed and what are its associated outputs?
3. How are deliberate planning and crisis action planning interrelated in the execution of an existing joint campaign plan?
4. How is the concept of operational art related to the concepts of strategy, grand strategy, the strategic level of war, and the operational level of war?
5. What are the fundamentals of joint campaign planning? What constructs prove particularly useful in framing the campaign plan?
6. Archer - In late 1999, the President added a provision to the interagency contingency planning guidance that the National Security Council would initiate an interagency review of the non-military dimensions of plans. When CINCENT submitted his last plan for JCS approval, such a review was initiated. Because at the time the situation was hypothetical, no interagency agreement was reached on a major assumption in the plan, and so there is no approved, up-to-date plan for dealing with an Iraqi attack.
The assumption on which there was interagency disagreement has to do with the objective of destroying the Iraqi armed forces. The Department of State believed Iraq should be left with enough capabilities to balance Iran's military capabilities. The JCS believed it was time to end the long confrontation with Iraq by fighting the war through to destruction of Iraqi military forces, even if that meant destruction of the regime. The JCS believed that a presence by the United States could offset Iran.
Does this open issue affect how the United States will proceed militarily? What are the implications for your strategic risk calculation?
Required Readings
1. Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, Chapter IV, "The Joint Campaign" (Student Issue)
2. Joint Pub 5-0, Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations. Chapter III, "Joint Operation Planning and Execution" (Student Issue)
3. Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, Chapter II, "Fundamentals of Joint Operations"; Chapter III, "Planning Joint Operations"; Appendix B, "The Estimate Process" (Student Issue)
4. AFSC Pub 1, The Joint Staff Officer's Guide, 1997, Chapter 6, "Deliberate Planning"; and App G, "CINC's Strategic Concept" (Student Issue)
5. AFSC Pub 1, The Joint Staff Officer's Guide, 1997, Chapter 7, "Crisis Action Planning"; and Appendices H-N (Student Issue)
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