Thursday
30 March 2000
0830-1030 (L)
By carrying destructiveness to a suicidal extreme, atomic power is stimulating and accelerating a reversion to the indirect methods that are the essence of strategy-since they endow war with intelligent properties that raise it above the brute application of force.
Sir Basil Liddell Hart
Someday a terrorist group will have the bomb. That's the best argument yet for responsible nations like Russia and the U.S. to retain nuclear weapons for their own defense.
Russian Missile Designer Viktor Nefedov
To reach the decision required, strategy will have available a whole gamut of means, both material and moral, ranging from nuclear bombardment to propaganda or trade sanctions. The art of strategy consists of choosing the most suitable means from those available and so orchestrating their result that they combine...to achieve the required moral effect.
General Andre Beaufre
Before nations possessed nuclear weapons, they might gain worthwhile objectives consonant with the sacrifices of war.... But now, the stupendous destruction accompanying all-out nuclear war makes it hard to conceive of such a war serving any rational purpose, except the continued existence of the nation as a political unit-and, perhaps, the salvage of the remnants of civilization-in the midst of the wreckage.
Robert E. Osgood
The means of destruction are approaching perfection with frightful rapidity.
Antoine Henri Jomini
Purpose
The purpose of this lesson is to evaluate current US nuclear strategy, force structure and joint doctrine in view of the global nuclear threat projection and create and devise military strategic concepts for nuclear forces for the future.
Learning Objectives
1. Comprehend the size, composition, organization and capability of the US nuclear arsenal and current US policy regarding nuclear weapons.
2. Evaluate the strategic utility of current arms limitation agreements with respect to nuclear strategy and force development.
3. Evaluate the strategic purposes and military utility of the US nuclear arsenal in the current and projected security environment.
4. Evaluate nuclear proliferation as a national security risk.
5. Create and devise military strategies for a US nuclear capability for the next twenty years.
Discussion
Deterrence of nuclear attack against the United States and its allies has been-and remains-the highest priority task of our military strategy. Even as we pursue arms reductions and counter-proliferation efforts, we seek to maintain a mighty, survivable triad of strategic weapons: Land-based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), and Air Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs) and gravity bombs. Indeed, the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review was designed to produce a strategy of "leading and hedging"-that is, striving for further arms control measures, while hedging against the reversal of reform in Russia and other adverse developments. The compatibility of this dual-track approach-reaffirmed in the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review-and the overall suitability of our current nuclear posture are at the center of our discussion today.
For all its dangers and challenges, the Cold War presented strategists with a relatively simple and symmetric equation. We always knew whose nuclear weapons posed the greatest threat to us, and we understood the basic purpose of the most powerful nuclear weapons in our arsenal. The Soviets were our constant, dominant adversary. By investing vast amounts of fiscal and intellectual capital in the effort, we successfully deterred them from using their nuclear weapons-which is ironically the same result when viewed from the Russian perspective.
Deterrence is predicated upon the perception, generated in the mind of one's adversary, as to your capabilities, intentions, vulnerabilities, and resolve. Therefore one can only surmise-or assert-that one's actions have served as a deterrent. Because one cannot prove a negative proposition, all we know for sure is that nuclear weapons have not been used for the past 53 years-for whatever reason. Moreover, the mere fact that something has not occurred thus far does not, by itself, preclude it from happening in the future.
Regardless, the threat to U.S. security posed by Russia and China has not disappeared with the end of the Cold War, though it is now generally perceived as less immediate and less intimidating. At the same time, new, more diverse, less familiar threats loom on the horizon. Our response to these old and new challenges will define a key aspect of our future national military strategy.
Issues for Consideration
1. What is the relative value of nuclear weapons in our overall strategy? Do we need nuclear weapons at all? To do what? Against whom?
2. Under what circumstances would you recommend employment of nuclear weapons? To what end?
3. To what extent should we size and posture our nuclear forces in relation to those of other states? Should the United States lead, follow, or go its own way? Is there an irreducible minimum we should sustain, regardless of what other nuclear powers are doing? What are the risks and benefits?
4. How relevant are bilateral and multi-lateral arms control agreements to the problem of nuclear weapons proliferation? In this context, is there value in "leading by example"? What are the alternatives?
5. Would we be more secure in a non-nuclear world? If so, how do we get from here to there?
6. Archer - What guidance should the JCS give the CINCs in Korea and SWA about nuclear targeting and employment by the United States? Why?
Required Readings
1. Joint Pub 3-12, Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, Chapter II, "Employment of Forces"; Chapter III, "Integrated Operations"; App A, "Treaty Obligations." (CD-ROM) (Student Issue)
2. Leon Sloss, "The Current Nuclear Dialogue," Strategic Forum, Number 156, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington, DC, January 1999. (Reprint)
3. Edward L. Warner III, "Nuclear Deterrence Force Still Essential," Prepared statement before the Strategic Forces Subcommittee; Senate Armed Services Committee, 31 March 1998, Defense Link, Volume 13, Number 34. (Reprint)
4. Andrew F. Krepinevich and Stephen M. Kosiak, "Smarter Bombs, Fewer Nukes," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol 54, no 6
(November//December, 1998), pp. 26-32. (Reprint)
5. Lee Butler, "Zero Tolerance," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol 56, no 1 (January/February, 2000), pp. 20-21 and 72-75. (Reprint)
6. G.F. Giles and J.E. Doyle, "Indian and Pakistani Views on Nuclear Deterrence," Comparative Strategy, vol 15, no 2 (April, 1996), pp. 135-155. (Reprint)
7. Hans Binnendijk and Richard Kugler (eds), Strategic Assessment 1999: Priorities for a Turbulent World, Chapter XVIII, "Strategic Forces and Deterrence: New Realities, New Roles?," Institute for National Security Studies, National Defense University, Washington, DC, 1999, pp. 277-288. (Student Issue)
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