Title: United States. National War College, Course 5 - Part 1: Foundations - Topic 1: Introduction

TOPIC 1: INTRODUCTION
Monday
6 March 2000
0830-1130 (LS)
In war, more than in any other subject, we must begin by looking at the nature of the whole. For, here more than elsewhere, the parts and the whole must always be thought of together.
Carl von Clausewitz
Like a painter, the strategist must have an all-embracing view, which represents the beginning and the end, the whole and each part, as one instantaneous impression... held in the mind.
Sir Winston Churchill
Strategic thinking is a mental process, at once abstract and rational, which must be capable of synthesizing both psychological and material data. The strategist must have a great capacity for both analysis and synthesis. Analysis is necessary to assemble the data on which to make his diagnosis, synthesis in order to produce from these data the diagnosis itself--and the diagnosis, in fact, amounts to a choice between alternative courses of action.
General Andre Beaufre
Knowledge in war is very simple...but this does not make its application easy.
Carl von Clausewitz
Purpose
The purpose of this lesson is to link the course to the NWC curriculum and especially to the discipline of national security strategy; to define key terms; and to provide an overview of the course sequence and requirements.
Learning Objectives:
1. Comprehend the purpose, organization, objectives and standards of Course 5605 in terms of their relationship to the mission and core curriculum of the National War College.
2. Comprehend the terms, and analyze the relationships between, military strategy, national military strategy, theater military strategy, doctrine and operational art.
Discussion
This and the next three lessons establish the foundation for the rest of the course. Before we begin to look at military strategic issues in detail, we want to connect this discipline to the core discipline of national security strategy. We want to remind ourselves of the connections between national power and military power and of the civil-military interface that determines the relevance of military strategic advice. We will examine our national military strategy documents closely, so that we can continue their critique throughout the course. And we will remind ourselves of the profound ethical implications of military strategy.
Military strategy is both an art, demanding intuition, talent and "genius" in the Clausewitzean sense; and a science, that is, a structured intellectual process based upon principles that can be studied and understood. It requires us to have some ideas about how force and violence work on the material and psychological resources of an opponent to cause his defeat, a matter which we will investigate at some length.
Further, military strategy is dynamic. The objectives, intentions, actions, and reactions of other participants-both allies and opponents-are variable and often obscure. This requires constant adaptation of ends, ways and means to shifting conditions, in an environment where chance, uncertainty, fog, friction, and ambiguity can lead to great risk.
Political goals play a critical role, of course, as do diplomatic, economic, military, and informational resources. Other factors-such as geography, history, culture, and government - also influence strategy in important ways. One's strategy must survive scrutiny and potential compromise within the military and civilian bureaucracies of government, as well as political debate, both domestic and international.
Perhaps the most important consideration for a military strategist is that strategy must be executable. A successful strategy is one that actually achieves its ends. Practical considerations of time, space, terrain, weather, logistics, weapons ranges and effects, and the capabilities and limitations of troops and equipment dominate military strategy. Military strategy must pass the ultimate test "in the field."
These realities require a broad, integrated conceptual approach as well as rigorous analysis and dispassionate judgment. The essence of strategic thinking and planning is that it connects seemingly disparate activities and considerations into a coherent whole. Because of the complexity of these interlocking and often competing issues, we want you to consider strategy as a "holistic" discipline, that is, a field of study which always must consider both the whole and its constituent elements.
The focus for this course is military strategy. We will endeavor to come to grips with the specifically military dimensions of the national security agenda, and then reconsider them in light of all the considerations that bear on the broader discipline of national security strategy. We hope to foster an approach that captures both the whole and its parts; grasps multi-dimensional, dynamic relationships as they are today and as they might evolve tomorrow; yet does not assume-nor expect-perfect coordination or clear-cut answers. Absent a holistic approach, the discipline of military strategy would be little more than a series of disconnected loose ends. Absent the recognition that military strategy must be executed, it would amount to little more than an academic exercise.
Issues for Consideration
1. Having just completed an extensive study of the geo-strategic context, what is your view of the ensuing military imperatives? Where do you see the key threats and opportunities? What are the implications of your vision for the ways in which we think about, and budget for, the use of force?
2. Is the definition of military strategy provided in this course sufficient for now and the near future? Is the military essentially an instrument of violent force? Why or why not?
3. What are the main ideas about how force and violence act on the will and capabilities of an opponent to bring about political change? Do these ideas seem to hold true today? Why or why not?
Required Readings
1. Course 5605 Syllabus and Archer Scenario (Student Issue)
2. Joint Doctrine Capstone and Keystone Primer. "Joint Pub 1 Commander's Overview" and "Joint Pub 0-2 Commander's Overview" (Student Issue)
3. Joint Pub 3-33, Joint Force Capabilities. Chapter I, "Overview." (Student Issue)
4. Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., "Defining Military Strategy," Military Review (January - February, 1997), pp. 183-186. (Reprint)
5. "A Framework for Military Strategy," Course 5602 Student Aid (Student Issue)