United States. National War College. Course 4, Syllabus

Title: United States. National War College. Course 4, Syllabus - Region 1

REGION 1: ASIA

OVERVIEW

As the United States develops the security strategy and policy that will take it into the 21st century, the complexities of this vast region need to be understood and kept clearly in view. The diverse cultures, histories, political systems and ideologies that form the states and societies of the region, however, permit no broad statement defining what being "Asian" means. Cultural and religious histories extend back several thousands of years with Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism and Confucianism providing no regional unity. Regional economies are equally diverse, ranging from rich, post-industrial Japan through China's booming but erratic economic expansion to the poverty of Bangladesh. Nor does the mix of democratic, authoritarian and Marxist-Leninist political systems provide any regional homogeneity. Diversity rather than unity marks the civilizations and histories of the region, with only the common ordeal with European and Japanese colonialism providing any sense of a unifying Asian experience. And here there is a sense of unity as post-colonial Asia, even with its pockets of poverty and the current "Asian economic crisis," has transformed itself into the most economically dynamic region in the world. This transformation has created a new, self-confident Asia that resists any efforts it perceives on the part of the former colonial masters to insist that Western norms incorporated in international law, human rights coda, etc., provide the only acceptable basis for the post-Cold War international system.

Issues we will be addressing in this part of the course reflect both the necessary adjustments to the new Asian security environment and the enduring problems of the region itself. Resolving the Korean dilemma, creating a more open trade and commercial regime for the region, integrating China into a new Asian security pattern while sustaining U.S. alliances, resolving the China-Taiwan situation peacefully, and maintaining the U.S.-Japanese security relationship are core issues for U.S. regional policy. Indonesia's tenuous stability is also a matter of serious concern. U.S. interests have to be pursued within a region that, despite continuing reliance on trade and security ties with the United States, insists that its interests and values must be heard and respected.

American security policy, therefore, faces a delicate diplomatic task as it seeks to contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability in Asia, upon which the region's recovery from economic turmoil and continued economic development depends, and political transition to more open polities requires. The task is delicate because the newly self-confident Asian states do not wish to be seen as beholden to the United States even as they recognize that an American military presence is required to ensure regional security, especially in the shadow of a rising nationalistic China, and that the American economy is critical to Asia's continued growth. The task facing U.S. security policy is therefore to reassure the region of American good intentions without also being viewed as attempting to dictate the shape of Asia's emerging security and economic environments.

Block Objectives.

Understand the key political, economic, cultural, and military trends in East Asia

Examine U.S. interests and foreign policy goals in the region

Critically evaluate current U.S. strategy and propose alternative approaches for advancing U.S. interests in East Asia

Demonstrate the ability to craft national security objectives for this region and to develop a regional security strategy looking toward 2010.

TOPIC 7: THE SWEEP OF ASIA: U.S. INTERESTS IN THE REGION

Thursday,
13 January 2000
0830-1130 (LS)

In our study of Asia we will concentrate on that portion of the region where the most obvious U.S. interests lie -- East Asia. But we must remember that the United States has interests spanning the vast geographical area we refer to as Asia: from Pakistan and Southwest Asia to Japan, Korea and the Russian Far East. Professor Marvin Ott will discuss the sweep of the region, the dramatic changes that have taken place in this part of the globe, and the range of U.S. interests and concerns in the whole of Asia before we focus our attention on China and Northeast Asia.

Post-Cold War Asia presents a major challenge to the formulation and implementation of U.S. policy for the 21st century. On the one hand, U.S. trade with Asia exceeds that with Europe by more than 50 percent, reflecting the dynamic economic growth that has marked the Pacific rim for the past quarter century. Thus trade issues are a principal concern for U.S. policy, especially continuing trade deficits with China and Japan. At a time of increasing regional interdependence, however, Asia states still harbor fears about their neighbors. They rely upon a strong American military presence to ensure the peaceful and stable security environment that will assist in recovery from Asia's current economic turmoil and resume the region's economic expansion. While there is much that has changed in Asia with the demise of the Soviet empire, frictions that predate the Cold War remain. Balancing trade policy with security policy is only one aspect of the challenge. The other is to implement a security policy that performs its principal task of reassuring friends and allies without creating a self-fulfilling prophecy that turns potential security problems into actual conflict.

Across the region, U.S. relations with China and Japan are seen as critical to Asia's future security stability. Yet, Sino-American relations are strained, and Beijing views U.S. efforts to firm up its alliances with Japan and Australia as part of a long-term strategy to contain China. Similarly, the British Commonwealth's revitalization of the Five Power Defense Agreement in Southeast Asia and Australia's recent security relationship with Indonesia are seen as part of a such a potential containment. Thus U.S. security policies designed to reassure Asian allies and the region as a whole contain the seeds of a self-fulfilling prophecy where China's rising power and assertiveness leads to major conflict.

Efforts to create a new pattern of region-led security focus on the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), established in 1994 to provide a forum where regional powers can meet on a regular basis to discuss security issues. Although originally designed to bring China into multilateral security dialogues, the apparent success of ARF in this endeavor has caused it to become the principal venue for all regional security issues, with the exception of the Korean peninsula dilemma.

Topic Objectives.

- Review in broad sweep the major political, economic, and security developments in Asia over the past half century

Appreciate the key differences in political and economic structures within the region

Understand the evolution of multi-lateral Asia and Pan-Pacific institutions

Review U.S. interests in the region and challenges to these interests

Issues for Consideration.

What are the national security interests and objectives of the United States in Asia? How would you rank them in order of importance?

With the Soviet Union's disintegration and Moscow's military forces in Asia only a shadow of past strength, what rationale is there for a large American military presence in the region?

U.S. security relationships with Asian nations have been bilateral rather than multilateral as in Europe. Why hasn't a NATO-like multilateral alliance structure developed in Asia? What are the prospects that such a regional security structure will develop?

As the Mahbubani reading suggests, is there an "Asian model" of economic, social and political development that may have more appeal to developing countries than the "western model"? Has the appeal of "Asian values" dimmed considerably in light of the economic failures in Southeast Asia?

What are the causes of the Asian economic crisis? What reforms are being taken or need to be taken to put these economies back on track? What should be the role of the United States?

What might the economic turmoil in Southeast Asia, especially in Indonesia, mean for political reform and stability in the region? What can and should the United States and other key actors do to prevent the economic, political and social turmoil in that country from exploding into revolutionary conflict?

Required Readings.

a. Stanley Roth, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia, "Challenges in U.S.-Asia Policy," Testimony before the House International Relations Committee, (Internet) February 10, 1999, U.S. Department of State, 10 pp.

b. Scott Snyder and Richard Solomon, "Beyond the Asian financial Crisis: Challenges and Opportunities for U.S. Leadership," United States Institute of Peace Special Report, April 1998, pp. 1-19.

c. Donald K. Emmerson, "Americanizing Asia?" Foreign Affairs, vol. 77:3 (May/June 1998), pp. 46-56.

d. Lucian Pye, "International Relations in Asia: Culture, Nation and State," Asia Paper No. 1, The Sigur Center for Asian Studies, George Washington University, 1998, pp. 1-23.

e. Nicholas Kristoff, "The Problem of Memory," Foreign Affairs, Volume 77, Number 6, November/December 1998, pp. 37-49.

f. Robert Scalopino, "Asia in 1998," Asian Survey, Volume 39, Number 1, January/February 1999, pp. 3-11.

g. U.S. State Department Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, "Fact Sheet: Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)," October 26, 1998, 2 pp.

h. U.S. State Department Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, "Fact Sheet: Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)," October 26, 1998, 6 pp.

TOPIC 8: CHINA'S STRATEGIC CULTURE

Friday
14 January 2000
0830-1130 (LS)

In our examination of the role China plays in the security concerns of the United States, we will first analyze the strategic culture that drives Beijing's perceptions of the world and China's global and regional policies.

For nearly two decades China has been implementing a set of reforms that, if successful, will transform China into one of the world's most powerful states during the first half of the 21st century. They are designed not only to modernize China's economy, but also to create the military strength required of a great power. Today, Beijing implements a security policy intended to give China the capability to act independently from the United States, utilizing China's size, strategic location and potential power to play a "swing" role in international politics. Without a major change in the dynamics of international affairs, there is no reason to expect that Beijing's security policy will change as China becomes more powerful. The future, therefore, potentially holds a new great power in Asia with a set of values that predispose China toward a unilateral role in the international system rather than seeking cooperative, multilateral solutions.

Uncertainty about the kinds of security policies China will pursue, as its strength increases are now a major dilemma for Asia. Professor Paul Godwin's lecture will focus on the source of the current political-military elite's perception of China's future role and purpose in the international system and why apprehensions about China's future course exist.

Topic Objectives.

Understand the strategic culture that influences the Chinese leadership's view of the United States, of regional issues, and of global issues

Evaluate China's global and regional policies

Assess the implications for U.S. policy of differences in U.S. and Chinese perspectives

Issues for Consideration.

China's leaders and policy-makers often speak of the "100 years of humiliation", referring to the period from about 1842-1949 when China was subjected to disunity and foreign domination. This leads them to an almost paranoid view of the world. If China's economic success continues, and Beijing's fears prove unwarranted, will current and future generations of policy-makers have a more accommodating view of international politics? Has nationalism replaced ideology as the principal influence in the Chinese worldview?

What security policies is China likely to pursue as it grows in military and economic power? Will China seek dominance in East Asia, or will it pursue a more cooperative course? Will it be content to be a regional power or might Beijing pursue global ambitions? What can or should the United States try to do to influence the path China pursues?

If China does attempt to become the military "hegemon" of Asia, it will take at least twenty to thirty years for China to develop the military power required to support such an objective. What policies should the U.S. follow in the intervening decades to influence China's actions?

Required Readings.

a. Paul B. Godwin, "Force and Diplomacy: China Prepares for the Twenty-first Century," in Samuel S. Kim (ed.), China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), pp. 171-192.

b. David M. Lampton, "China," Foreign Policy, no. 110 (Spring 1998), pp. 13-27. (Internet version, pp. 1-7)

c. Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser, "Chinese Apprehensions About a Revitalization of the U.S.-Japan Military Alliance," Asian Survey, vol. 37:4, April 1997, pp. 383-402.

d. "China's Economy: Red alert," The Economist, October 24, 1998, pp. 23-26.

e. Bates Gill and Michael O'Hanlon, "China's Hollow Military," The National Interest, Number 56, Summer 1999, pp. 55-62.

f. James Lilly and Carol Ford, "China's Military: A Second Opinion," The National Interest, Number 57, fall 1999, pp. 71-77.

Supplemental Readings.

1. Allen S. Whiting, "Chinese Nationalism and Foreign Policy after Deng," The China Quarterly, vol. 142 (June 1995), pp. 295-316.

2. Harry Harding, "'On the Four Great Relationships': The Prospects for China," Survival, vol. 36, no. 2, (Summer 1994), pp. 22-42.

3. David Shambaugh, "China's Military: Real or Paper Tiger," The Washington Quarterly, vol. 19:2 (Spring 1996), pp. 19-36.

4. Thomas J. Christensen, "Chinese Realpolitik," Foreign Affairs, vol. 75:5 (1996), pp. 37-52.

5. Denny Roy, "The 'China Threat' Issue: Major Arguments," Asian Survey, vol. XXXVI: 8 (1996), pp. 758-771.

6. Paul H.B. Godwin, "Uncertainty, Insecurity and China's Military Power," Current History, vol. 96:611 (September 1997), pp. 252-257.

TOPIC 9: SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

Tuesday,
18 January 2000
1000-1130 (IS)

Two summit meetings in 1997 and 1998 seemed to improve dramatically the atmospherics of Sino-American relations, but events of the past year have done much to shake those relations. The American rejection in April 1999 of China's bid to enter the World Trade Organization, the Cox Committee, Report accusing China of espionage, the U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in May, and the statement by Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui in July, hinting at a sovereign Taiwan, have caused Beijing to review its relations with the United States. From Beijing's viewpoint, suspicion that the United States covertly supports independence for Taiwan, despite remarks by the past four U.S. presidents that the United States rejects Taiwan's independence, remains the most critical issue in Sino-American relations. The Taiwan issue shows no promise of an early resolution.

Despite Beijing's cooperation in many areas of mutual security interests, such as settlement of the Cambodian civil war, opposing Iraq's occupation of Kuwait, efforts to cap the Indian-Pakistani nuclear race, and attempting to calm the situation on the Korean peninsula, the United States remains deeply concerned about a number of Chinese policies. Although China has acceded to the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and accepted Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) parameters, the United States is not convinced that Beijing is being forthright on issues of nuclear proliferation and missile technology sales. China's human rights record and growing trade imbalance with the United States remain major stumbling blocks to full restoration of Sino-American confidence and have engendered a general, anti-Chinese attitude in the Congress. Beijing, meanwhile, remains suspicious of a United States it perceives as hegemonistic and bent on "containing" China's growth, although the Clinton administration's deal in November for China to join the World Trade Organization should lead to improved bilateral relations.

Topic Objectives.

Examine the key determinants of U.S. policy toward China

Review the major political, economic and military trends in China and the challenges they present to U.S. interests

Assess potential future Chinese foreign and security policies

Evaluate alternative U.S. strategies for dealing with different Chinese foreign and security policy orientations

Issues for Consideration.

How would you evaluate the significance of China for U.S. security policy in Asia over the next decade and beyond?

Beijing's cooperation with Washington has been important in areas where the United States has major interests (Cambodia and North Korea for example). Do these and other areas of potential cooperation require the United States to give high importance to China as Washington develops its post-Cold War security strategy for Asia?

How does/should the United States balance its concerns over human rights with other issues of importance in U.S. security policy, such as those raised in issue 2?

In light of the recent visit by Jiang Zemin and the differences between our two countries on matters such as human rights that came up during his visit, what goals would you set for these relations over the next two or three years?

What role should Taiwan play in Chinese-U.S. relations? Does the U.S. have a vital national security interest in the fate of Taiwan? Since 1972 the United States has acknowledged Beijing's position that there is only one China and that reunification of the island with the mainland is a matter for the Chinese themselves to settle. The only warning given Beijing is that reunification must occur peacefully. China appeared to challenge this U.S. interest in a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issues through its use of military coercion during the summer of 1995 and the spring of 1996. What should the United States do if China attempts to take Taiwan by force? What can or should the United States do to influence the course of events between Beijing and Taipei.

China and Japan are historic enemies. What can or should the United States do to influence the course of events between Beijing and Tokyo?

Required Readings.

a. William Clinton, "Remarks by the President on U.S.-China relations in the 21st Century, " Speech before the National Geographic Society, Washington, DC, June 11, 1998 (White House Press Release), pp. 1-7

b. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, "A Precarious Balance: Clinton and China," Current History, vol. 97:620 (September 1998), pp. 243-249.

c. Chas. Freeman, "Preventing War in the Taiwan Strait: Restraining Taiwan and Beijing," Foreign Affairs, vol. 77:4 (July/August 1998), pp. 6-11. (Internet version, pp. 1-5)

d. Susan Shirk, "The United States and Taiwan," Testimony before the House International Relations Committee, May 20, 1998, pp. 1-5.

e. Minxin Pei, "Is China Democratizing?" Foreign Affairs, vol. 77:1 (January/February 1998), pp. 68-82. (Internet version, pp. 1-8)

f. Gerald Segal, "Does China Matter?," Foreign Affairs, Volume 78, Number 5, September/October 1999, pp. 24-36.

g. Documents:

Joint Communiqu� between the PRC and the U.S.

Joint Communiqu� on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the U.S. and the PRC

U.S.-PRC Communiqu�

U.S. Statutes at Large

Supplemental Reading:

1. Chas. W. Freeman, "Sino-American Relations: Back to Basics," Foreign Policy, no. 104 (Fall 1996), pp. 3-17.

2. David Shambaugh, "The United States and China: Cooperation or Confrontation," Current History, vol. 96:611 (Sept 1997), pp. 241-245

3. Samuel S. Kim, "China as a Great Power," Current History, vol. 96:611 (Sept 1997), pp. 246-251.

4. Qimao Chen, "The Taiwan Strait Crisis: Its Crux and Solutions," Asian Survey, vol. 36:11 (November 1996), pp. 1055-1066.

5. Andrew Nathan, "China: Getting Human Rights Right," The Washington Quarterly, vol. 20:2 (Spring 1997), pp. 131-151.

6. Shirley A. Kan, "Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Current Policy Issues," CRS Issues Brief, August 19, 1997, 17 Pages.

7. Mark J. Valencia, "The Spratly Imbroglio in the Post-Cold War Era," in David Wurfel and Bruce Burton (eds.), Southeast Asia in the New World Order: The Political Economy of a Dynamic Regions (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), pp. 244-266.

TOPIC 10: THE JAPANESE SECURITY CONTEXT AND WORLDVIEW

Wednesday
19 January 2000
0830-1130 (LS)

In our opening session on Japan, we will try to gain an appreciation for how the world and the U.S. relationship appear from a Japanese perspective. American understanding of Japan is quite limited. Few Americans have visited Japan much less understand Japanese language, history or culture. Thus, American observers have had difficulty understanding Japan's particular perspective. That the Japanese themselves are engaged in a debate regarding Japan's proper role in the world may contribute to this limited knowledge of our ally of more than five decades. As with any state, the Japanese worldview, and its security perspective, are the products of a unique set of cultural, historical, and geographic factors.

Japan does, and indeed must, play a major role both regionally and globally. As with Germany, however, Japan's World War II legacy complicates and limits Tokyo's actions. Recognition of Japan's role as an international power, for example, has produced increasing support for a permanent Japanese seat on the United Nations Security Council. But, as Japanese leaders have attempted to define Japan's proper place in the post-Cold War environment, they have been beset by domestic events that have shaken the Japanese polity in fundamental ways. While still impressive, the Japanese economy--the very bedrock of Japan's power--has been troubled by a stubborn economic recession. And, the twin concerns of domestic terrorism and natural disasters have prompted many Japanese to ask themselves some discomforting questions about their system of governance. Collectively, these factors have caused many Japanese to look inward and perhaps to be less confident about the future than was the case a few years ago.

Topic Objectives.

Understand the Japanese perspective on regional security issues, on Japan's role in the international community, and on U.S.-Japanese relations

Evaluate how differences in perspectives between the U.S. and Japan may affect the bilateral relationship

Issues for Consideration.

How is Japan's view of the world different from that of the United States? What are the reasons for such differing perspectives?

From the standpoint of Japan's national interest, how can Japan best use its instruments of power to achieve its objectives?

Japan has been described as a "civilian power." What does this term connote? What does this power status mean for Japanese influence in global affairs?

Can Japan's economic power be translated into political power? What are the limits on Japanese influence regionally and globally?

Unlike Germany, Japan has only hesitatingly, reluctantly, and partially come to grips with its actions in the 1930s and 1940s. Why have Japanese leaders resisted acknowledging Japan's guilt?

Required Readings.

a. Peter Hartcher, "Can Japan Come Back?," The National Interest," Number 54, Winter 1998-1999, pp. 32-39.

b. Masaru Tamamoto, "The Privilege of Choosing: The Fallout from Japan's Economic Crisis," World Policy Journal, vol. 15:3 (Fall 1998), pp. 25-31. (Internet version, pp. 1-6)

c. Kenneth B. Pyle, "Japan's Immobilism," NBR Analysis, vol. 9:4 (September 1998), pp. 21-27.

d. "Japan's Economic Plight," The Economist, June 20, 1998, pp. 21-23.

e. Sadaki Numata, "The Role of Japan in Regional and World Security," RUSI Journal, vol. 142:4 (August 1997), pp. 12-16 (Internet version, pp. 1-6).

Supplemental Readings.

1. Sheldon Garon, Molding Japanese Minds (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).

2. Edwin O. Reischauer, The Japanese Today (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988).

TOPIC 11: THE U.S.-JAPANESE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP AND U.S. POLICY TOWARD NORTHEAST ASIA

Thursday,
20 January 2000
0830-1130 (LS)

There is no more important bilateral relationship than the one we have with Japan. It is fundamental to both our Pacific security policy and our global strategic objectives. Our security alliance with Japan is the linchpin of United States security policy in Asia. This alliance is seen throughout the region, as a major factor for security stability in Asia.

United States Security Strategy for East Asia-Pacific Region

As the above quotation indicates, the U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship is central to U.S. strategy toward East Asia. Half of the 100,000 American forces deployed in the Asia-Pacific region are stationed in Japan. Both politically and economically, there are strong forces pushing the United States and Japan toward a cooperative relationship. At the same time, there are obvious competitive aspects to the relationship that will pose difficult policy choices for both countries over the short and long term.

The issues that will give rise to these choices in U.S.-Japanese relations are many: Trade relations; economic competition in emerging markets; the U.S. military presence in Japan; Japan's role in the United Nations and in peacekeeping operations; the role of each country in various regional fora such as APEC; and policies towards China, Taiwan, and the Koreas. In post-Cold War Asia, as in Europe, concerns are raised about the durability of the American security commitment. And in the U.S. questions arise as to whether Japan can be counted upon to provide support for American forces during regional crises that do not directly threaten Japan.

Topic Objectives.

Review the U.S.-Japanese alliance and the main factors that may influence its future shape

Assess the rationale for and challenges to a continued American military presence in Japan

Critically analyze current U.S. strategy toward Japan and alternative approaches.

Issues for Consideration.

Should trade and security issues between the United States and Japan be addressed separately, or should they be linked? Can the United States use Japan's security dependence to leverage Tokyo on trade matters?

What rationale is there for a continued major U.S. military presence in Japan? What kind of threats are these forces designed to deter? Can we expect the Japanese to continue to foot much of the bill for these forces? And, what role should Japanese forces play in the region beyond defending Japan proper?

Why do the United States and Japan not always see eye to eye on Korean security issues?

How will U.S.-Japanese defense cooperation be affected by the September 1997 guidelines? How might Japan's Asian neighbors react to these guidelines?

Should the United States support a Japanese seat on the Security Council of the United Nations? Why or why not?

Required Readings.

a. "Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation," Joint Statement, U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, September 23, 1997, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense News Release (Internet version, pp. 1-15).

b. Yoichi Funabashi, "Tokyo's Depression Diplomacy," Foreign Affairs, Volume 77, Number 6, November/December 1998, pp. 26-36.

c. Mike Mochizuki and Michael O'Hanlon, "A Liberal Vision for the US-Japanese Alliance," Survival, vol. 40:2 (Summer 1998), pp. 127-134. (Internet version, pp. 1-6) (see ProQuest)

d. Mohiro Hosokawa, "Are U.S. Troops Needed?" Foreign Affairs, vol. 77:4 (July/August 1998), pp. 2-5. (Internet version, pp. 1-4)

Supplemental Readings.

1. Mike M. Mochizuki, "Toward a new Japan-U.S. Alliance," Japan Quarterly, vol. 43:3 (July-Sept 1996), pp. 4-11.

2. Kurt W. Tong, "Revolutionizing America's Japan Policy," Foreign Policy, no. 105 (Winter 1996-97), pp. 107-124.

3. Robert Manning, "Futureshock or Renewed Partnership?" The Washington Quarterly, vol. 18:4 (1995), pp. 87-98.

4. Kenneth Dam, John Deutch, Joseph Nye, Jr., and David Rowe, "Harnessing Japan: A U.S. Strategy for Managing Japan's Rise as a Global Power," The Washington Quarterly, vol. 16 (Spring 1993), pp. 29-42.

TOPIC 12: DILEMMAS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

Friday,
21 January 2000
0830-1130 (LS)

Several times this century, the interests of major powers have conflicted violently on the Korean peninsula. For the United States, the Korean War served as the catalyst for the Truman Administration's approval of the military buildup envisioned in NSC-68, resulted in over 140,000 American casualties, and led to direct conflict with Chinese forces. Today, over five decades later, the United States stations nearly 40,000 troops in South Korea and the regime in Pyongyang continues to be an enigma to U.S. policy makers. Not only does the U.S. find it very difficult to coordinate policy toward North Korea with Japan, China and Russia, but also must consider South Korean interests and sensitivities.

The Korean peninsula is likely to remain a difficult challenge for U.S. policy-makers, presenting security threats that are vestiges of the Cold War era and others that are more typical of the economic challenges of the new era. Several issues will dominate U.S. policy toward the Koreas for the balance of the decade and beyond: Can Pyongyang make the kind of political and economic reforms needed to right a sinking economy and reverse the precipitous decline in North Korean living standards? Will the North Korean nuclear framework agreement survive and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia? Can the Korean peninsula be reunified peacefully? South of the 38th parallel, can South Korea implement the economic reforms needed to recover from the severe recession of the past year and return to sustainable levels of growth? Does the government of Kim Dae Jung represent an abandonment of Seoul's authoritarian past, or might the reforms his government has undertaken be reversed if the economy does not improve soon? What should be the extent and role of the U.S. military presence on the Korean peninsula?

While our security treaty with South Korea remains the foundation of our bilateral relationship, this relationship has been undergoing change and is much different than in the past. In moving from a subsistence economy to advanced manufacturing in a single generation, the South Korean economic transformation rivaled that of Japan. As Korea's power grew, Korean leaders chafed at American paternalism and expect to be granted greater influence in decisions affecting their security, especially over relations with Pyongyang.

Mr. Selig Harrison will examine the internal situation in North Korea, challenges to and opportunities for the U.S. in Korea, and the triangular relationship among Washington, Seoul and Pyongyang.

Topic Objectives.

Review the political, economic, and security developments and trends on the Korean peninsula

Assess the challenges these factors present to U.S. interests

Evaluate current U.S. strategies for addressing the above challenges

Issues for Consideration.

Are there realistic prospects for peaceful reunification on the Korean peninsula? Can German reunification provide a model for the Koreas? If Korea is reunified peacefully, will there be any rationale for or prospect of continuing to station American forces on the peninsula?

To what extent, if at all, should the United States provide food aid to North Korea? What would be the impact on U.S.-South Korean relations of an improved relationship with the North? How can the United States balance its relations among Seoul and Pyongyang?

The 1994 U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework on North Korea's nuclear program, which provides for the supply of fuel oil and construction of light water reactors, is under attack in the Congress. How would you try to persuade critics that the United States should follow through on its part of the agreement? What actions should be required of Pyongyang? If you believe that the Agreed Framework is not meeting the objective of freezing a nuclear weapons program, what approach would you recommend to meet this goal?

Korea's neighbors may well prefer that the peninsula remain divided. Why? How does history affect the Korean-Japanese relationship?

Required Readings.

a. U.S. State Department, "Japan-Republic of Korea-United States: Agreement on the Establishment of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), March 4, 1995," International Legal Materials, Volume 34, Number 3, May 1995, pp. 608-616.

b. Nicholas Eberstadt, "The Most Dangerous Country," The National Interest, Number 57, Fall 1999, pp. 45-54.

c. Paul Bracken, "How to think about Korean Unification," Orbis, vol. 42:3 (Summer 1998), pp. 409-422.

d. Charles Kartman, "United States Policy Toward North Korea," Testimony before the House International Relations Committee, September 24, 1998. (Internet version, pp. 1-3)

e. Michael J. Mazarr, "Korea: Time to be Bold?" The National Interest, Issue 51 (Spring 1998), pp. 91-97. (Internet version, pp. 1-6)

f. Tohumari Doshita, "The Cost of a Unified Korea," Tokyo Asagumo, March 11, 1998, FBIS-EAS-98-070, 2 pp.

Supplemental Readings.

1. Steven Linton, "North Korea under the Son," The Washington Quarterly, vol. 19:2 (1966), pp. 3-17.

2. Nicholas Eberstadt, "Korean Unification," Foreign Affairs, vol. 76:2 (Mar-Apr 1997), pp. 77-92.

3. William E. Berry, Jr., North Korea's Nuclear Program: The Clinton Administration's Response, INSS Occasional Paper 3 (U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado: Institute for National Security Studies, 1995), 1-47.

4. Robert A. Manning, "The United States and the Endgame in Korea: An Assessment," Asian Survey (July 1997), pp. 597-608.

5. Marcus Noland, "Why North Korea Will Muddle Through," Foreign Affairs, vol. 76:4 (July/August 1997), pp. 105-118.

6. Selig Harrison, "Promoting a Soft-Landing in Korea," Foreign Policy, no. 106 (September 1997), pp. 57-75.

TOPIC 13: EAST ASIA STRATEGY: FUTURE TRENDS

Monday
24 January 2000
0930-1130 (IS)

For the past two weeks we have sought to evaluate the problems and prospects for U.S. security policies in East Asia. In this seminar we will review current policies and explore alternative strategies for the future. The questions raised by post-Cold War Asia are perhaps as important as those raised by our dramatic failure in Indochina two decades ago. Put simply, this seminar should focus on the following questions: What long-range objectives should the United States set for its future policies in Asia, and what strategies should be developed to secure these objectives?

For more than forty years, U.S. security policy toward Asia was anchored in the principle that Washington must sustain a coalition of allies and friends directed at containing Soviet and Chinese military power and political influence. In East Asia, considerable Russian military forces remain, but these forces are ill equipped and supported and there is every indication that their strength will continue to decline. In contrast to the reduced Russian role, China has become an important economic player in the region and globally over the past twenty years while building a more modern and capable military force and a more assertive political presence. Many analysts have concluded that China has replaced Russia as the primary and growing threat for the East Asia area.

In Asia as in Europe, the security focus that Soviet military might provided is gone. A new approach is required. The Secretary of Defense has announced his strategic plan for U.S. forces in Asia in the 21st century, but this applies only to the military instrument. Using this document as a starting point, in today's seminar you are asked to set objectives, priorities, and a strategy for U.S. Asian security strategy over the next decade.

Topic Objectives

Evaluate current U.S. strategy toward East Asia

Demonstrate the ability to craft national security objectives and formulate strategy for East Asia

Recommend revisions to current strategy

Issues for Consideration.

Do you find the logic behind the adjustments in the U.S. forward deployed force structure provided by the ISA document compelling? In your view, are the objectives for U.S. security policy provided in ISA's "Security Strategy" reasonable and appropriate? What changes would you recommend?

What, in your view, are the priorities for long-term U.S. policy objectives in Asia? What are the most serious challenges to U.S. interests in Asia? What policies should the United States pursue in an effort to overcome these challenges?

How salient should economic issues be in U.S. Asian security policy? What kinds of strategic objectives should be set in order to integrate economic goals with other objectives?

What forms of consultation would you recommend to ensure that U.S. objectives and strategy are coordinated with those of our friends and allies? How much weight would you give to their views? Should the United States use its current bilateral security ties to begin the process establishing a multilateral security "community" based upon an extension of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)?

In his 1993 confirmation hearing, Winston Lord outlined ten goals for U.S. policy in Asia and the Pacific. How well has the U.S. done in achieving those goals?

How would you apply the Course IV analysis framework to this region of the world? Looking out ten years, what goals would you set for the U.S. in East Asia and how would you attempt to achieve those goals?

Required Readings:

a. United States Security Strategy for East Asia-Pacific Region. Department of Defense Office of International Security Affairs, November 1998, read pp. 5-18, 59-68; skim remainder. (Issued separately)

b. Chalmers Johnson and E.G. Keehn, "The Pentagon's Ossified Strategy," Foreign Affairs, vol. 74: 4 (July/August 1995), pp. 103-114.

c. Joseph S. Nye, "China's Re-emergence and the Future of the Asia-Pacific," Survival, vol. 39:4 (Winter 1997/1998), pp. 65-79. (Internet version, pp. 1-10) (ProQuest)

d. Minxin Pei, "Will China Become Another Indonesia?," Foreign Policy, Number 116, Fall 1999, pp. 94-108.

Supplemental Readings.

1. Aaron L. Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for a Multipolar Asia", International Security, vol. 18, no. 3 (Winter 1993/4), pp. 5-33.

2. Douglas T. Stuart, "Toward a Concert in Asia," Asian Survey, vol. XXXVII: 3 (March 1997), pp. 229-243.

3. James A. Kelly, "U.S. Security Policies in East Asia: Fighting Erosion and Finding a New Balance," The Washington Quarterly, vol. 18: 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 21-35.