Tuesday
5 October 1999
0830-1130 (IS)
Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult.
Carl von Clausewitz
Introduction:
Clausewitz's understanding of the nature of war was based in great part on his study of military history, his own military experiences, and his profound appreciation for the social and political upheavals of Europe's revolutionary era that had fostered a corresponding revolution in military affairs. As you read the assigned material for this topic, recall it was written before Clausewitz evolved his refined theory of war as expressed in Chapter One, Book One. Thus, you should do some interpolation as you go along. Try to apply your understanding of the evolution of his theory to what you read, and decide if and how he might have revised these later portions of the book, based on his final thoughts concerning the nature of war.
Chapters 2 through 7 of Book One discuss the major factors that make war what it is. You should be able to discuss each of them. Note that the first characteristic of war Clausewitz discusses is the relationship of purpose and means. You discussed ends and means in Course 1 with respect to national strategy. In regards to military strategy, however, the "means" are different. Reread paragraph 25, "The Diverse Nature of War," from Chapter One, Book One, and reconcile it with Chapter Two, Book One, "Purpose and Means in War." These issues are fundamental to the mission of the National War College, and we will wrestle with them many more times during the year.
In Book Three, "On Strategy in General," note in the first chapter how Clausewitz defines strategy, the objectives of the engagement, and the importance of the military commander in determining strategic success. Much of the remainder of Book Three focuses on the moral factors of war. Pay particular attention to Chapter Eight, "Superiority of Numbers." There you will find the basis for Basil H. Liddell Hart's description of Clausewitz as the "Madhi of Mass," responsible for the slaughter of World War I. Also, in the short paragraph at the bottom of the first page of this chapter, you will find what Trevor Dupuy argues is Clausewitz's "Law of Numbers." Think about the thrust of this chapter in light of Clausewitz's final conception of his theory of war.
Objective:
- Analyze Clausewitz's principal ideas on the nature and conduct of war and their continued applicability today.
Issues for Consideration:
- How should Clausewitz's fully-refined theory of war influence the selection of political and strategic military objectives in war and shape the employment of military power to attain those objectives?
- Douglas MacArthur declared during the Korean War that "there is no substitute for victory." Yet, Clausewitz says, "Once the expenditure of effort exceeds the value of the political object, the object must be renounced and peace must follow." Why would Clausewitz suggest that a nation might want to terminate war by suing for peace without having attained its object? Under what conditions could that be the case? Whom do you think is correct: MacArthur or Clausewitz?
- Distinguish among Clausewitz's concepts of "uncertainty," "chance," and "friction." What is the importance and role of military genius in war with regard to those three concepts?
- What are Clausewitz's most important ideas on the conduct of war? How do those ideas compare with Jomini's principles? Do these ideas have relevance today and in the future?
Required Readings:
* Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 90-123 and 177-204. (Student Issue)
Supplemental Reading:
* Barry D. Watts, Clausewitzian Friction and Future War: McNair Paper 52 (Washington: National Defense University, 1996).
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