Wednesday
29 September 1999
0930-1130 (IS)
If the art of war consists in bringing into action upon the decisive point of the theater of operations the greatest possible force, the choice of the line of operations (as the primary means of attaining this end) may be regarded as fundamental in devising a good plan for a campaign.
Baron Antoine Henri Jomini
Introduction:
It did not take long for military scholars and theorists to begin analyzing the Napoleonic wars and publishing their findings. One of the earliest and most influential was a Swiss officer, Baron Antoine Henri Jomini, who rose to the rank of general of brigade in Napoleon's army and then, disappointed over lack of further promotion, switched his allegiance to Russia in 1813. Jomini began publishing histories of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars in the 1820s, but his most influential and theoretical work was The Art of War, which first appeared in 1838.
Jomini is often acclaimed as the father of the science of war. As a product of the Enlightenment and the Age of Reason, he was intrigued by the scientific approach to an analysis of human affairs. He consciously applied the scientific method, as he understood it, to his study of military history. As a result of that study, he discovered what he believed were common patterns of behavior in military operations. Those common patterns of behavior he codified into axioms and principles to better instruct other officers how to organize, plan, and conduct "modern" warfare. In truth, he developed what today the U.S. Army would call operational military doctrine.
In the eighteenth century before Jomini, most military thinkers focused their attention on describing battle formations and how forces should be deployed in the battlefield. Jomini, however, focused his attention on understanding how operations were conducted. He saw in Napoleon a man who succeeded because he understood how to employ military forces on a large scale and who could do that because he could envision through time and space how to plan a military campaign. In other words, Jomini made the leap from eighteenth century's focus on tactics--actions conducted on the battlefield to achieve a specific objective there--to what he called "the science of strategy." Jomini's life work was a search, through scientific analysis of military history, for those universal principles that brought success in strategic military operations. Jomini did the evolution of military thought a tremendous service in lifting his sights from the tactical level of war to levels that are operational (focused on achieving the overall objectives for a particular combat theater, such as Western Europe or the Southwest Pacific) and strategic (focused on achieving the overall war aims of a nation, such as "unconditional surrender" in World War II). In trying to reduce the theory of war to a systematic science of neatly classified elements, governed by universal immutable principles, however, he may have misled generations of subsequent students as to the true essence of war.
In the first reading for this lesson, John Shy summarizes the place, the substance, and the implications of Jomini's work. He concludes that no matter what weaknesses you find in Jomini's theory, there is no denying the enormous influence his writings have had, and continue to have today. The second reading consists of several extracts from The Art of War itself. From these, you should get a clear idea of both Jomini's method and message. It is substantial food for thought.
Objectives:
- Comprehend and analyze the principal ideas from Jomini's The Art of War and assess their influence on military thinking and operations today.
- Comprehend Jomini's concept of a strategic theater of operations and analyze its relevance to modern military doctrine.
Issues for Consideration:
- Does Jomini's The Art of War represent a persuasive analysis and interpretation of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars?
- Are Jomini's characteristics of a theater of operations and principles for the employment of military forces applicable today? Why or why not? What, if any, Jominian concepts do you think were employed in the Gulf War?
- Defend or refute the contention that Jomini's characteristics of a theater of operations are equally applicable in campaign planning regardless of which branch of service you represent.
- Justify your thoughts on whether war is an art or a science. What is the proper role and influence of the operations research community on contemporary military thinking and operational planning? Have concerns with sortie rates, division equivalents, readiness indicators, million ton-miles, etc., distracted military planners from concerns of objective and moral factors in war?
Required Readings:
* John Shy, "Jomini," Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 143-185. (Student Issue)
* Baron de Jomini, The Art of War, trans. G. H. Mendell and W. P. Craighill (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott and Co., 1862; rpt. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press), pp. 11-13, 26-31, 34, 37-39, 46-54, 59-64, 65-76, 80-83, and 91-116. (Reprint)
Supplemental Readings:
* Michael Howard, "Jomini and the Classical Tradition in Military Thought," The Theory and Practice of War, ed. Michael Howard (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1975).
* Crane Brinton, Gordon A. Craig, and Felix Gilbert, "Jomini," Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler, ed. Edward Mead Earle (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971).
* Hew Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct of War (London, UK: George, Allen, and Unwin, 1983).
 |
 |
 |