Wednesday
20 October 1999
0830-1130 (SE)
We, the United Nations, demand from the Nazi, Fascist, and Japanese tyrannies unconditional surrender. By this we mean that their will power to resist must be completely broken, and that they must yield themselves absolutely to our justice and mercy.
Winston Churchill
Introduction:
Many scholars argue the Second World War in Europe was just a continuation of World War I, separated by 20 years of nervous peace. Clausewitz offers a possible explanation. He says, "Even the ultimate outcome of a war is not always to be regarded as final." (See p. 483.) What Clausewitz suggests is that although the enemy may be defeated physically, even forced to surrender, his will may not be broken. The enemy may smolder within and await the opportunity to rearm--clandestinely if necessary-and strike back at a later time. The argument Clausewitz makes is that until and unless the will of one of the antagonists is altered, thereby eliminating the desire for war, the potential for continued conflict remains.
Liddell Hart, on the other hand says, "The object in war is a better state of peace--even if only from your own point of view." He elaborates by saying, "History shows that gaining military victory is not in itself equivalent to gaining the object of policy." Liddell Hart's point is that military victory may not by itself ensure attainment of national objectives. Thus, he draws the distinction between military objectives and national objectives in war and suggests that decision-makers must always keep their higher objectives in mind. They must always be aware of what we have called both conflict-termination objectives and objectives for the subsequent peace. In other words, they must know both how they want to end the war and what domestic and international conditions they want to exist after the war. If total defeat and unconditional surrender of the enemy are not conducive to creating the state of peace desired, then political leaders must curtail the pursuit of military victory. One purpose of this lesson is to examine critically the strategic debates that shaped aims and operations on both sides of the war in Europe and judge how effectively military victory was pursued.
An in-class exercise during this lesson offers you the chance to participate in the strategic debate from the vantage point of an American or British staff officer two weeks after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Victory is by no means certain for the Allies in late December 1941; in fact, the circumstances facing them are grim. Many courses of action were available to the Americans and the British, and applying the Framework for Military Strategy to the situation will help to illuminate the possibilities. You are likely to find, however, that working through the Framework to define such elements as political objectives and centers of gravity is no simple task--despite the vast amount of historical analysis devoted to the subject matter.
As you develop possible courses of action, do not neglect the role of the Soviet Union. The USSR entered World War II still suffering mightily from the effects of the Bolshevik Revolution and of Lenin's, Trotsky's, and Stalin's subsequent efforts to consolidate that revolution. During the war, the Soviet Union transformed itself into a formidable military-industrial power, certainly the most powerful in Europe, and second, perhaps, only to the United States. Many would argue that the Soviet Union played the principal role in the defeat of the Axis, and few would dispute that, whatever the relative weight of their contribution, along the way the Soviets developed a distinct approach to and a unique form of warfare. This Soviet style of warfare then became a preoccupation of American and NATO planners throughout the Cold War.
Objectives:
- Analyze and critique the application of military power in Europe during World War II in light of the theories studied thus far in the course.
- Gain experience using the NWC Framework for Military Strategy to develop courses of action for a crisis situation.
Issues for Consideration:
- From the Allied perspective, what was the center of gravity of the Axis powers? In late December 1941, what would you have selected as the strategic military objective? In order to attain your objective, what form of military strategy would you have selected--annihilation, attrition, or disruption--and would you have selected a direct or an indirect approach? Be prepared to explain your strategic military concept of operation.
- Which theories for the use of air power, sea power, and land power guided their employment by the various nations during World War II in Europe? What conclusions were drawn about the potential contributions of air, land, and sea power to the conduct of future wars? Was any one element of military power more decisive than the others? If so, why?
- What were the principal elements of the Soviet style of warfare that emerged during World War II and how did these differ from the American approach to war?
- World War I bred new emphasis on the benefits of the indirect approach. How effectively was the indirect approach employed in Europe during World War II at the strategic level? How might it have been more effectively employed?
- How significant was the use of Ultra intelligence to Allied victory in Europe? Do you believe that the absence of Ultra would have made a difference in the war's outcome? Why or why not?
Required Readings:
* Larry Addington, "The Second World War, 1939-1945," The Patterns of War since the Eighteenth Century, 2nd ed. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994), pp. 195-240. (Student Issue)
* Michael Geyer, "German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare, 1914-1945," Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 572-597. (Student Issue)
* Maurice Matloff, "Allied Strategy in Europe, 1939-1945," Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 677-702. (Student Issue)
* David M. Glantz and Jonathan House, When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1995), pp. 282-290. (Reprint)
* F. H. Hinsley, "The Influence of Ultra in the Second World War," in F. H. Hinsley and Alan Stripp, eds., Codebreakers: The Inside Story of Bletchley Park (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 1-13. (Reprint)
Supplemental Readings:
* Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World at Arms, A Global History of World War II (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
* H. P. Willmott, The Great Crusade: A New Complete History of the Second World War (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1989).
* Kent Roberts Greenfield, ed., Command Decisions (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1971).
* Samuel Eliot Morison, The Two-Ocean War: A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War (New York, NY: Ballantine Books, 1963).
* R.J. Overy, The Air War, 1939-1945 (New York, NY: Stein and Day, 1980).
* Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1973), pp. 29-56.
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