The MOD has a major role to play in the management of any crisis involving national security, be it a terrorist incident, a regional conflict (as in the case of the Falklands or the Gulf) or transition to a major war. The Armed Forces also stand ready to help the Government respond to other sorts of emergency, like major accidents or natural disasters, at home or abroad.
In a period of crisis there is a balance to be struck between taking all measures necessary to provide adequate military defence, and taking steps which could themselves accelerate deterioration into conflict. The Government's crisis management machinery must be capable of this balancing act. It must cope with situations which could vary from tension drawn out over months to developments measured in hours. It must be able to offer Ministers a range of options for resolving the crisis. It must be able to bring together and assess rapidly information from a wide variety of diplomatic, political, economic, military and intelligence sources.
The Defence Costs Study wrought significant change to the MOD's contribution to the national machinery through the creation of a new Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) at Northwood on 3 April 1996. This has improved our ability to predict, plan and conduct joint, and potentially joint, military operations. The PJHQ is commanded by the Chief of Joint Operations (CJO), a three-star military officer.
At the grand-strategic level the national crisis management system is headed by the Cabinet which has political control over the various means at the Government's disposal: diplomatic, political, economic and others, of which military action tends to be the final resort. The Chief of the Defence Staff, as the principal military adviser to the Government, will attend meetings of the Cabinet or its committees as required.
The MOD HQ is responsible for the Defence aspects of crisis management, including the higher direction of operations. It gives the Government and Defence Ministers timely advice on the policy and strategic military aspects of situations that may require military involvement by the United Kingdom. It ensures that Ministerial decisions are translated into clear and unambiguous direction to military headquarters. The MOD does not normally command forces directly (except nuclear forces) nor involve itself in the day-to-day running of operations.
The CDS is the ultimate source of military advice to Ministers. He draws on the advice of the Chiefs of the Naval, General and Air Staffs as the professional heads of their Services, and of VCDS, normally through discussion in the Chiefs of Staff Committee. The CDS, VCDS and the single-Service Chiefs will meet as frequently as the situation demands, but a minor crisis may be discussed as part of a routine meeting of the Committee. The PUS, as the senior adviser on Defence policy, attends meetings of the Chiefs of Staff committee. Others in attendance may include DCDSs and DUSs from the Central Staff, the Chiefs of Joint Operations and Defence Intelligence, and representatives from other Government departments, particularly the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
Below the Chiefs of Staff Committee a Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO) prepares advice for Ministers and co-ordinates crisis commitments with logistic, resource and personnel policies and with other continuing business. The DCMO is made up of elements of the Central Staff and the Permanent Joint Headquarters, working in close partnership, together with the Defence Intelligence Staff and the single-Service operational Commands.
The Central Staff's Policy/Commitments area is integrated in an organisational structure which deliberately encourages flexible working methods, bringing together staff from different disciplines to tackle issues as they arise. Usually they will operate from their normal offices in the MOD Main Building but in major crises they are likely to use the Defence Crisis Management Centre, a secure, hardened facility within the Main Building.
The PJHQ is an integral part of the DCMO and plays a key role in the decision-making process at the military strategic level. It is responsible for the planning and execution of joint operations. Close contact is maintained with the supporting single-Service operational Commands to ensure that single-Service views are woven into coherent overall advice. Its commander, the CJO, will normally be appointed Joint Commander for operations assigned to the PJHQ, although a more senior officer might be appointed for a very large operation such as the Gulf War.
Within the Ministry of Defence, the Defence Intelligence Staff is responsible for providing strategic warning and formal intelligence assessment. It provides military capability studies and continuous reporting on political and military developments world-wide which may influence decision-making and the strategic direction of operations. It is also the focal point for the co-ordination of the Defence intelligence effort in support of operations.
THE COURSE OF A CRISIS
The procedures for handling a crisis are adaptable but would typically follow these stages:
* As a crisis develops which might need the deployment of British forces, staff teams are formed in the MOD HQ and the PJHQ. Working together these teams are the focus of the Defence Crisis Management Organisation for the particular crisis.
* A Current Commitments Team in the MOD HQ monitors the crisis and liaises with other Government departments, allies and organisations such as NATO and the Western European Union.
* A Contingency Planning Team in the PJHQ reviews any existing contingency plans, carries out initial planning as directed by the MOD HQ, and liaises with military planners overseas as necessary.
* Initial advice is offered to the Secretary of State for Defence and through him to the Cabinet. If Ministers wish to pursue the possibility of military operations, the CDS will issue a warning order to the Chief of Joint Operations and supporting commanders.
* The DCMO will work up a strategic estimate of the situation. This will advise Ministers on the feasibility of operations, the nature and size of forces required, the pol-mil implications and the costs; it will offer them options and recommend a preferred course of action.
* If Ministers agree that action be taken, the CDS will issue a strategic directive to the Joint Commander. This lays down the objectives and the constraints in a way which allows the PJHQ to detail the mission and campaign objectives. The CDS's Directive will usually also specify the forces allocated to the campaign and arrangements with allies. Sometimes it will give full authority to proceed with operations, sometimes it may only authorise preparations to be made.
* The Joint Commander and the PJHQ will prepare and issue a Mission Directive to the Joint Force Commander.
* The Joint Force Commander establishes his headquarters in the theatre of operations and conducts operations on the basis of his own campaign plan, which provides a common framework for the activities of his maritime, land, air and special forces. Alternatively he may contribute to an allied campaign plan.
* As the campaign unfolds the DCMO will continue to advise Ministers and give strategic direction to the Joint Commander as necessary.
The timescales for planning, ministerial consideration and issuing the CDS's Directive can vary from hours to months. Activity within the DCMO and the operational chain of command will always be concurrent rather than sequential.
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