2 Nov 99
0900-1100
"As it looks to the 21st century, the Navy is redefining sea power: to shape the strategic environment, fight through any opposition, and project and sustain enough power ashore---carrier air, gunfire, missiles, and Marines---to deter a conflict, stop an aggressor, or pave the way for heavier joint forces. Simply put, the U.S. Navy will influence, directly and decisively, events ashore from the sea-anytime, anywhere."
Admiral Jay Johnson Chief of Naval Operations1957)
Overview:
In order to understand the capabilities of the United States armed forces, we will look at each of the services, their culture, how they are organized, and how they fight. Today we will look at the Navy its vision and how it supports the National Military Strategy, SHAPE, RESPOND and PREPARE.
The first question we have to ask is; why do we have a Navy, and do we need one? As the Armed Forces of the United States are reduced, are navies still useful instruments of national power? What do we do with our Navy? As a super power, with global security and economic interests, the United States maintains a worldwide presence in support of those interests, day-in and day-out, with its Navy.
Expeditionary by design, naval forces maintain a dispersed yet integrated disposition, constantly moving and ready to respond when needed. The character of war at sea and from the sea is different. Sailors think and operate on the sea differently than land-based soldiers and airmen. We will look at some of the reasons why navies are different and how they fight.
The Navy's white papers, From the Sea, followed by Forward...From the Sea, and most recently Forward...from the Sea, The Navy Operational Concept (required reading for course5605) focused naval strategy on power projection from the sea into the littoral. Although the strategy changed, the force composition did not. For the foreseeable future, the large deck aircraft carrier and associated battle group (CVBG) as well as the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) will remain the central elements for naval combat power projection.
As technology and information improve, naval power projection will depend on networked sensors and long range, precision weapons more than on massing fleet platforms and firepower. The Navy calls this type of warfare Network-Centric Warfare.
The strategic environment continues to change, new threats emerge, and economies become global, but traditional naval missions endure. A Maritime Strategy for the 21st Century is a draft strategy paper that builds on the previous white papers and reaffirms that the Naval service is on the correct heading landward, emphasizing the unique contributions of the naval forces operating forward, from peacetime presence through war. The vision for the 21st Century is built upon command of the seas and focuses naval power on exerting influence directly ashore in support of our national interests.
Objectives:
- Comprehend the major capabilities and limitations of United States Navy forces.
- Comprehend the Navy's essential organizational structure and how its forces and operations fit into the larger joint command and control structure.
- Comprehend the Navy's fundamental doctrinal precepts and its essential approach to warfighting.
- Be familiar with the U.S. Navy's contributions to executing the National Military Strategy.
Discussion:
The modern U.S. Navy has its roots in two defining periods: World War II and the Cold War. World War II was a watershed event because it involved extensive open-ocean warfare against highly capable and aggressive enemies. Aircraft became the decisive naval weapons system, enabling opposing forces for the first time to engage each other "over the horizon." As a result, the aircraft carrier supplanted the battleship as the capital ship of the navy and became the centerpiece of offensive power from the sea, which it remains today. Global war on the high seas set the stage for the navy that we have today. The concepts and force structure of fast carrier task groups (today called battle groups), large-scale amphibious operations, offensive use of submarines, afloat logistics forces, and a very robust anti-submarine warfare capability were all refined during World War II and remain central elements of today's balanced navy.
Following World War II, having swept enemy fleets from the seas, the Navy was confronted with the argument that in the nuclear age it no longer had a relevant mission. There were no more fleets to fight, and many thought defense resources could be better applied in other areas. Two things transpired in the 1950s that clearly shifted this debate. First, the Korean War demonstrated once again the value of aircraft carrier task forces, amphibious assault, and naval gunfire support -- the key forms of power projection from the sea. Second, the growth of the Soviet submarine threat coupled to the Soviet military threat in Europe demanded a navy capable of getting our army and air force safely to Europe.
As the Cold War evolved, naval forces were deployed to regional theaters to deter communist adventurism and support formal alliances against Soviet aggression. Wartime operations were envisioned as open-ocean and global, with the ever-present threat of nuclear escalation. The organization of naval fighting forces established during World War II was refined, but with the addition of the ballistic missile submarine force. Rapid technological advancements led to an increased emphasis on state-of-the-art weapons systems, all of which necessitated highly skilled officers to oversee and quality sailors to maintain. Yet, as the Korean and Vietnam Wars demonstrated, the employment of naval forces to influence events ashore by projecting conventional combat power remained an essential part of America's national security strategy.
Today, the U.S. Navy has focused its operational orientation towards projecting power and influence from the world's oceans. This shift is most recently articulated in the Navy's strategic concept paper entitled "Forward...from the Sea." Consistent with the National Military Strategy, the Navy's primary peacetime focus is on overseas presence and power projection, while contributing to strategic deterrence. Sea control, maritime supremacy, and strategic sealift are primary Navy missions.
Finally, the very nature of life at sea has qualities that transcend historical trends and technological development to form the foundation of contemporary American naval culture. The sea is an unpredictable and harsh environment that demands independent, flexible officers and sailors to master it. The autonomy and authority of a ship's Captain, along with commensurate accountability, are legendary. The Navy continues to place great value on demonstrated operational performance and judgment at-sea. The Navy continues to believe that those entrusted with command at sea should be tested by years of experience at sea.
As of 1 September, 1999, the U.S. Navy consists of 321 ships and 371,000 active Sailors, with 189,700 Sailors in the reserve force. The U.S. Navy is organized into two unified fleets, the Pacific and Atlantic Fleets. The U.S. Pacific Fleet is naval component for PACOM, while the Atlantic Fleet is the naval component for USACOM and SOUTHCOM. The Pacific Fleet is comprised of the Third Fleet, which operates in the mid and eastern Pacific Ocean, and the Seventh Fleet in the western Pacific and Indian Oceans. The Atlantic Fleet is comprised of the Second Fleet in the Atlantic Ocean and the Sixth Fleet stationed in the Mediterranean Sea (under the operational control of EUCOM). Fifth Fleet, in the Persian Gulf, reports operationally to NAVCENT, the naval component for CENTCOM. The Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Fleets are the Navy's primary warfighting commands.
Within each numbered fleet, the warfighting entities are the Carrier Battle Groups (CVBG), centered around an aircraft carrier and embarked airwing, and the Amphibious Ready Groups (ARG), consisting of two to four amphibious ships. The ARGs embark a Marine Expeditionary Unit of about 2200 Marines. There are five carrier battle groups and five amphibious ready groups based on each coast of the continental United States, and an additional battle group and ready group forward-based in Japan. These "building-block" forces normally train under Second or Third Fleet prior to commencing extended deployment under the operational control of Fifth, Sixth, or Seventh Fleets.
Battle and amphibious ready groups typically train in tandem and then deploy nearly simultaneously to a theater, bringing a self-contained, integrated maritime team. Other members of a battle group include cruisers, destroyers, amphibious landing ships, logistics support ships, attack submarines, and Marine Air Ground Task Forces necessary for both offensive and defensive operations. Additionally, Navy assets supporting these forces may include land-based air, special operations forces (SEALs), and mine countermeasure units.
It is important to keep in mind that one-third of all naval forces are forward deployed every day of every year. These forces are present in the Mediterranean Sea, the Persian Gulf and north Arabian Sea area, and the Western Pacific. This warfighting dominance at sea translates into an ability to move virtually unencumbered via the high seas to bring firepower with staying power to bear in support of national interests . This capability, obvious to the nations in each region, plays a key role in maintaining political stability in areas of importance to the United States.
As with all military forces, however, there are limitations in employing naval forces that a Joint Force Commander should consider. Forces at sea can be vulnerable to attack at selected geographical "choke" points and extended sea lines of communication (SLOCs) by concentrated enemy air, surface, subsurface, and/or mine forces. Operations at sea will be affected by extreme weather patterns. And depending on the threat, some portion of the battle group's offensive air capability may be required for direct support operations to defend against attack from land or sea based opponents. Nevertheless, especially when orchestrated with the operations of land and air forces, U.S. Navy forces constitute a crucial element in our joint warfare team.
Issues for consideration:
- What capabilities does the Navy bring to the Joint Force Commander's arsenal?
- What provisions has the Navy made to ensure interoperability with the other Services?
- How does the Navy's air interdiction, Tomahawk, surface/subsurface-to-surface missile, and surface-to-air missile capabilities support a Joint Force Air Component Commander's operations and the overall joint campaign?
- How does the Navy factor its Reserve Component into its warfighting capabilities?
- How are the various naval warfare components challenged as the fleet moves closer to land (operating in the littorals) from the open ocean? What strategic, operational, and tactical problems must be overcome to project power ashore?
Required readings:
* FORWARD...FROM THE SEA (Student Isssue)
* FORWARD ...FROM THE SEA, The Navy Operational Concept, March 1997 (Student Issue)
* Naval Doctrine Publication 1 (NDP-1), Naval Warfare (www.nwdc.navy.mil/navigation1/navpub8.htm)
Supplemental readings:
* DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 1999 POSTURE STATEMENT, America's 21st Century Force (Student Issue)
* VISION PRESENCE POWER, a Program Guide to the U. S. Navy 1999 edition (Student Issue)
* Forward...From The Sea, The Navy Operational Concept; March 1997(reprint)
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