19 October 1999
0930 - 1130
"We have pride in ourselves and in our past but we do not rest our case on any presumed ground of gratitude owing us from the Nation. The bended knee is not a tradition of our corps. If the Marine as a fighting man has not made a case for himself after 170 years of service, he must go."
General A. A. Vandegrift, USMCLike war itself, our approach to Warfighting must evolve. If we cease to refine, expand, and improve our profession, we risk becoming outdated, stagnant, and defeated.
General A. M. Gray, MCDP-1, WarfightingNot son of Desert Storm, but Stepchild of Chechyna and Somalia...
Lt Gen Martin Steele, USMC, commenting about the future of war....
Overview:
The United States Marine Corps has participated in joint operations since its inception in 1775. From amphibious landings in the Bahamas in 1776 to the present, Marines have supported American national security policy as part of a multi-service or coalition force. As intended by Congress, rapid response in peace and war has been the trademark of the Corps. Today, at 172,000 active and 39,000 reserve strength, the Marine Corps remains an adaptive force for the present and into the future. This syllabus and the associated lecture are organized to illustrate how the Marine Corps supports the National Military Strategy approach to "Shape, Respond, and Prepare Now."
Objectives:
- Comprehend the major capabilities and limitations of United States Marine Corps forces.
- Comprehend the Marine Corps' essential organizational structure and how its forces and operations fit into the larger joint command and control structure.
- Comprehend the Marine Corps' fundamental doctrinal precepts and its fundamental approach to warfighting.
- Understand how the Marine Corps supports the National Military Strategy approach to "Shape, Respond, and Prepare Now."
Discussion:
The Marine Corps' existence today reflects one of the fundamental dilemmas underlying American defense: the President's need for a means of protecting national interests in the world's daily strife without committing the Nation to War. This challenge, combined with the United States' geographic position as a maritime nation, persuaded Congress to pass the Marine Corps Act in 1798 which authorized the Marines to be used for "any duty on shore, as the President may direct." This authority was reaffirmed by Congress in 1819, 1862, 1947, and 1952.
The roles of the modern Marine Corps were established by Congress in 1947 and descend almost directly from the original purposes. Those roles are:
* provide forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet...for the conduct of land operations essential to...a naval campaign.
* provide detachments for service on armed vessels of the Navy.
* provide security detachments for the protection of naval
stations/bases.
* provide forces for such other duties as the President may direct.
In defining Service functions--since the Key West Agreement in 1948-- Secretaries of Defense have specified that Marine Corps functions do not contemplate the creation of a second land army. Instead, the Marine Corps exists to respond to unexpected and often simultaneous crises (short of war), while allowing the mass of America's fighting force to prepare and stand ready for their primary role--waging war. This role was reaffirmed and strengthened by Congressional legislation following the nation's experience with the outbreak of Cold War era hostilities in Korea. The strategic concept for the Marine Corps, as elaborated in the National Security Act of 1952, includes:
* a versatile, expeditionary force in readiness
* a balanced force for a naval campaign and a ground and air striking force
* a force always at high state of combat readiness
* a force ready to repress or contain international disturbances short of war
* a force to be the most ready, when the nation is least ready.
Unlike other Services whose structure is undefined by legislation, Marine Corps structure is mandated in law. Title 10 US Code, Ch 507 states: "The Marine Corps... shall be so organized as to include not less than three combat divisions and three air wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic therein...."
The Marine Corps' operating forces are assigned to two Combatant Commanders (USACOM and USCINCPAC) on a day to day basis. However, operational control of a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) may be transferred to another Combatant Commander for short duration requirements. Marine Forces Atlantic (including II MEF on the east coast) is the Marine component of USACOM, while Marine Forces Pacific (including I MEF on the west coast and III MEF in Japan) is the Marine component of USCINCPAC. These forces are organized to operate as "Marine Air-Ground Task Forces" (MAGTFs) that can be tailored in size and capability to support specific operational missions. Normally, there are three basic MAGTF organizations--a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) (2200); a MEF Forward (13,000-16,500); and a MEF (up to 60,000). A smaller force, a Special Purpose MAGTF, may be organized if the mission dictates. All MAGTFs possess four common elements--Command Element, Ground Combat Element, Aviation Combat Element, and Combat Service Support Element--fully integrated under one commander. Starting in 1988, MEU training has included selected special operations skills, which has resulted in the designation of a "MEU (SOC)"--Special Operations Capable. A MEU (SOC) totals about 2200 personnel and is built around a reinforced infantry battalion and a composite helicopter squadron. A MEF, organized with one or two Marine Divisions as its base, supported by a Marine Aircraft Wing, can be as large as 60,000 personnel. MAGTF's are an integrated, combined arms force, self-sustaining and mobile by virtue of sea-based logistics and are flexible for integration into a joint or combined force. MAGTF's are capable of executing the following missions: 1) forcible entry from the sea; 2) seizure of advance naval bases, airfields, or facilities critical to the joint force commander's theater requirements; 3) amphibious/expeditionary operations across various levels of conflict; and 4) noncombatant evacuation operations/humanitarian assistance programs.
Regardless of the size force required, the Marine Corps has been utilized throughout history as a rapid reaction force, to the point that expeditionary is not only a part of their vocabulary, it is an inherent characteristic of all Marines. Joint Pub 1 defines the term "expeditionary force" as "an armed force organized to accomplish a specific objective in a foreign country." Marines are expeditionary by their very nature, which means deploying quickly with adequate sustainment. Power projection is another inherent capability of naval forces, which is invaluable during crisis response. Amphibious ships allow deployment of a MEF Forward consisting of about 13,000 Marines - one from each coast of the U.S.
Additionally, the Defense Department established the Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) program as a strategic mobility enhancement initiative in the early 1980's to conserve resources, yet provide another rapid response capability for the Marine Corps. This program provides three squadrons of specially configured commercial ships, each containing a MEF Forward's worth of equipment and 30 days of supplies (for about 16,500 Marines) prepositioned at three strategic locations around the world. During a contingency, personnel and selected equipment are flown to a benign location near the objective area. A force-multiplier, MPS complements the traditional amphibious assault capability required for forcible entry on hostile shores. During peacetime, Marines--like their Navy shipmates--are forward deployed in accordance with the global naval force presence policy, creating an operating and training cycle that defines Marine Corps life. Currently, three Amphibious Ready Groups (ARG), consisting of three to four ships each with an embarked MEU (SOC), are strategically positioned around the world. Six-month deployments are preceded by a standard work up training cycle of six months, during which a habitual relationship develops with the Navy--generating a high state of readiness responsive to a wide variety of missions. Additionally, Marine operational units rotate to forward bases in Japan every six months. About a quarter of Marine operational forces are deployed at any one time (afloat/WESTPAC)--totaling about 23,000 - 27,000 personnel. These deployments afford the President the option of demonstrating U.S. resolve by promptly moving Navy and Marine forces to trouble spots. In this capacity, Marines have been repeatedly called upon to respond to our National interests--over 200 times since 1945 (often to the relief of military planners preoccupied with the Soviet threat). Since Desert Storm, Marines have already responded to 23 crises throughout the globe.
During periods when America is committed to waging war, Marines can and have been incorporated into the national effort--along side the Army when war is confined to land, contributing to the Air Force in executing an air campaign, or with the Navy in prosecuting a Naval Campaign.
The operational culture of the Marine Corps (constant deployments and high state of readiness) offers the Nation a true force in readiness. They are well suited for the unexpected - the certain force for the uncertain future.
Issues for consideration:
- Should future Quadrennial Defense Reviews, Congressional initiatives, and the CJCS requirement to review Service roles and functions take seriously what some have suggested--diminish or abolish the Marine Corps? If so, for what reason--too costly, irrelevant, duplicative of other Services?
- The structure and size of the Marine Corps has been debated for years. The Marine Corps Warfighting Lab is currently conducting the Sea Dragon program and Advanced Warfighting Experiments to determine possible future operational concepts and organization of the Marine Corps. Does DOD and the defense establishment have an appropriate transformation strategy to ensure that the Marine Corps and the other services will be effectively organized to meet the future needs of the Combatant Commanders and the National Command Authorities.
- What are the differences in the Army/USAF and Marine cultures that have caused previous decision-makers to conclude that the Marine capability is complementary rather than redundant? How do Marine capabilities complement the capabilities of other Services? How does this uniqueness interface with other Service cultures? Are there potential planning and command relationship issues created when the MAGTF is integrated into joint/combined operations (i.e. if a joint force is organized by function rather than by service component, where should the MAGTF be assigned?)
Required readings:
* Joint Force Quarterly, Spring 1999, "Operational Maneuver From the Sea", 78-86. (Student Issue)
* "Operational Maneuver from the Sea", Marine Corps Capstone Concept Paper, 4 Jan 96, pp. 1-22 (Student Issue)
* MCDP-1, "Warfighting", Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication, 20 June 97, "Preparing for War," Chapter 3, pp. 51-68. (Student Issue)
Supplemental readings:
* Marine Corps Capabilities Plan, Vol 1, pp. 1-31.
* "Forward from the Sea", Navy-Marine Corps Strategic Concept Paper, Dec 94
* "Ship to Objective Maneuver", Marine Corps Concept
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