101. General
There is no direct or immediate conventional military threat to Canada. Moreover, the risk of a such a threat emerging is very low. Nevertheless, many countries suffer from poverty and insecurity and experience internal difficulties. These global realities are constant reminders that the international security situation is fluid and potentially dangerous.
102. International Considerations
1. Across the international system, a number of key trends and considerations will influence future developments and contribute to an increasingly complex security environment.
2. Regional considerations. The world continues to be unstable, perhaps more so than ever. There are more than 60 countries involved in inter-state or intra-state conflicts at this time, and perhaps as many as 20 more where sufficient tension exists today to warrant potential international intervention. Currently, members of the Canadian Forces are involved overseas in 20 different operations, and there is every prospect of Canadian participation in new multi-lateral military missions in the future.
3. Non-traditional security challenges. These pervasive and complex challenges, which are difficult to resolve and often transnational in nature, include terrorism, organized crime, drug smuggling, illegal migration, weapons proliferation (including weapons of mass destruction) and humanitarian crises.
4. Defence trends. The world remains a heavily armed and potentially dangerous place. While in some regions countries are moving to modernize their conventional forces and acquire weapons of mass destruction, other states are pursuing more sophisticated options. Some developed nations are increasingly adopting high-tech "quality" forces over low-tech "quantity" forces, as well as procuring long-range strike assets and considering strategies for fighting asymmetric conflicts. Other developments are leading to the reformulation of traditional notions of how armed forces are best organized to exploit the single integrated battlespace and the growing strength of information and intelligence capabilities. As in the past, advances in technology, both current and anticipated, will continue to pose significant challenges for the equipping, organizing and training of armed forces.
103. Fiscal Context
1.The fiscal outlook of DPG 2001 is conditioned by the 2000 Federal Budget announcement:
"Funding for the next three years has also been increased to improve National Defence's ability to participate in peacekeeping activities, upgrade capital equipment and address quality of life issues within the military."
2.This announcement added significantly to the Defence Services Program, providing annual incremental funding increases of $400, $550 and $600 million over the next three years. Positive precedents have also been established with regard to two other issues that are critical to the integrity of the Defence Services Program:
a. the explicit recognition of and compensation for price level changes, both over the full program and for personnel economic adjustments; and
b. additional funding for operational activities where the costs in any one year exceed an agreed level.
3. In terms of absolute dollar spending, Canada is and will remain in the middle of the pack of 19 NATO members, along with the Netherlands and Spain. The United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy and Turkey - in that order - are the six largest NATO spenders, based on 1999 estimates. The announced increases will stabilize Canadian defence funding at approximately 1.1 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This is significant in that the decade-long decline in Defence funding has been halted, and is, in fact, keeping pace with the strong real economic growth which Canada has enjoyed for the past decade.
4. Table 1-1 portrays the outlook for the total program over the DPG planning period.
|
($ Millions) Budget Year |
2001-02 |
2002-03 |
2003-04 |
|
Total for Planning |
11,119 |
11,305 |
11,525 |
104. DND/CF Situation
1. Defence policy. Current defence policy is articulated in the 1994 Defence White Paper. Six years after it was issued, the key tenets of this policy remain sound:
a. The world remains unstable and unpredictable.
b. The requirement for the maintenance of multi-purpose, combat-capable maritime, land and air forces - the core of Canada's defence policy - has been reinforced over the past six years.
c. As demonstrated repeatedly in Canada and in international operations, the roles established for the Canadian Forces remain valid.
2. Operational tempo. However, some of the underlying assumptions of the White Paper related to the deployment of the Canadian Forces have changed. Most significantly, the current tempo of Canadian Forces operations was not foreseen by the 1994 Defence White Paper. The policy had planned that the Canadian Forces would be selective in their international commitments and envisioned that we would deploy early to allow others to replace us. In fact, while CF strength has dropped from 88,000 in 1989 to 60,000 today, the number of missions has increased dramatically and the Canadian Forces have had to deploy on 65 operations since 1989 compared to 25 operations in the whole period of 1948 to 1989. In addition, it was not envisaged that the Canadian Forces would continuously deploy up to 4,000 personnel on far-flung operations for extended periods.
3. Nature of military operations. The character of military operations is changing. Operations are becoming more complex, demanding and dangerous. As witnessed in Kosovo, new technologies such as the Coyote reconnaissance vehicle and precision-guided munitions are having a dramatic impact on how military operations are conducted. When serving abroad, the Canadian Forces are increasingly at the centre of large networks of players involved in conducting enforcement operations, supporting law and order, and providing emergency relief and humanitarian aid. Whether with the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, coalitions of like-minded states or a growing number of non-governmental organizations, the Canadian Forces are increasingly operating as part of a multinational team.
4. Strategic capabilities. The Government has clearly indicated Canada is to play an active and independent role in the world, and that it will give increased prominence to advancing human security in our foreign and defence policy. The recent operations in the Balkans and Southwest Asia illustrated the importance of rapid response and global deployability capabilities in addressing conflict and alleviating human suffering. At present, the Canadian Forces lack the range and lift capacity required to rapidly deploy forces globally, as well as a strategic air-to-air refuelling capability.
5. Personnel, capital and infrastructure. Defence is facing significant challenges in the areas of personnel, capital and infrastructure. The competition for skilled labour is increasing, the rapid pace of technological change requires constant training and development, and the high operational tempo is taking a toll on military and civilian personnel alike. On the capital front, significant portions of the Canadian Forces equipment inventory are facing "rust out", leading to increased downstream costs as equipment ages, technologies become obsolete and maintenance costs rise. The extensive Defence infrastructure is another area of concern. A growing portion of the infrastructure is aging beyond its useful economic life, as Defence has recently been unable to devote sufficient funds to adequately maintain it in the longer term.
105. Summary
1. Though the direct or immediate military threat to Canada remains small, international security remains fragile and numerous issues threaten, or have the potential to threaten, Canada and Canadian interests. The Canadian Forces remain a critical part of the Government's efforts to maintaining peace and security at home and abroad.
2. After a decade of intense institutional change, Defence has begun to turn the corner. Defence has made substantial progress in addressing a number of issues and challenges it faces, including quality of life improvements, a sweeping set of institutional reforms, communications, and capital equipment modernization. Though these initiatives have been important steps forward, more will have to be done in the near term to maintain Defence's capabilities and relevancy into the future.
3. If Canada is to continue to work for the well-being of Canadians and international peace and security, it must have modern, combat-capable, multi-purpose and globally deployable Forces, properly equipped with advanced capabilities that target leading edge doctrine and technologies relevant to the 21st century. Making this happen in a viable, achievable and affordable manner will be the greatest challenge, especially in light of the rapid doctrinal and technological advances. These advances and the evolving international environment will require us to continually adjust the mix of capabilities of the Canadian Forces. Building the Canadian Forces of the future means, therefore, changes to the status quo. Simply spending more money will not give Canada the military it needs. Our modernization program must result in a force structure that meets Canada's defence needs as we prepare to confront the new international challenges of the 21st century. This will continue to require hard choices. With new funding, we now have more flexibility in the trade-off process.
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