THE Rt. Hon. GEORGE ROBERTSON MP
The Strategic Defence Review has been a uniquely open re-examination of Britain's defence requirements from first principles. Our aim has been to build on our strengths, remedy our weaknesses, and provide a framework for defence into the 21st century.
More than anything else, the Review has confirmed my conviction that effective defence depends fundamentally on people. It depends on the three hundred thousand military and civilian employees of the Ministry of Defence. Throughout the Review I have therefore been determined to ensure that the Armed Forces, the civilians who support them, and their families should be kept informed about its conduct. Now that the Review has reached its conclusions, I am equally determined that they should be told about its outcome as rapidly and fully as possible.
This pack of fact sheets forms a key component of that process. They should be used as the basis upon which commanders and managers discharge their obligation to explain the outcome of the Review to their staff.
These fact sheets can only go so far. Much work needs to be done to implement our conclusions. Although we have tried to answer all of the questions that people will ask, in some areas the implications will not become clear until that work has been completed. Where that is the case, we have been frank and said so.
The Strategic Defence Review provides a coherent long term vision for Britain's defence and the people who work in it. I firmly believe that it represents a good outcome for the Armed Forces, for defence, and the nation as a whole.
George Robertson
Ministry of Defence
July 1998
MODERN FORCES FOR THE MODERN WORLD
The Strategic Defence Review is a necessary response to a changing world. It has been an unprecedentedly open re-examination of British defence requirements from first principles by a Government committed to providing strong and modern defence in support of an active foreign policy. We have taken advantage of the widest possible range of experience and views, in the Armed Forces and beyond. The result has been a Review that should set a course for British defence well into the 21st century. Its main themes are designed to be flexible and robust against a range of eventualities. At its heart are high capability, usable, cost- effective and, above all, battlewinning Armed Forces, based on highly skilled and highly motivated people.
Britain's Security and Interests
The Government's first priority must be to ensure peace, freedom and prosperity for the United Kingdom and its people. But a modern, forward looking country cannot afford to be isolationist:
- our peace and freedom rest on European security, and hence on NATO;
- our prosperity rests on international trade and stability;
- we have responsibilities as a leading member of the international community, and a collective obligation to those whose condition is much worse than our own, to help promote peace, freedom and prosperity worldwide.
Britain must therefore be a force for good in the world.
The end of the Cold War made Britain safer. But it did not solve the world's security problems. Regional risks, such as that posed by Saddam Hussein, still exist. Instability including ethnic tensions and border disputes, is causing widespread suffering in Europe and beyond, and could eventually recreate a major direct threat to our security. And new problems are emerging, such as:
- the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons;
- terrorism and drug-related crime;
- environmental damage;
- vulnerability to technological dislocation and attack.
Yet although the post-Cold War world is complex and unpredictable, it also presents new opportunities to prevent and manage crises, to stop them escalating into conflict. We must seize these opportunities.
The Role of Defence
In Europe and beyond, the Armed Forces can play a much greater part in reinforcing our long term security by helping to build international trust and prevent conflict. Defence diplomacy activities, such as helping the new democracies in Europe to reform their armed forces, are an important priority in the modern world.
To support Britain's interests and discharge our responsibilities into the next century, our Armed Forces must be flexible. We will be working to strengthen the United Nations in peace support and humanitarian operations, and we will make more of our forces potentially available in this role. But to deter, and if deterrence fails to win, our forces must be able to fight successfully in the most difficult circumstances against the toughest opponents. And experience shows that by being the best in combat, our forces have the skills and capabilities to be the best peacekeepers as well.
Our planning must look beyond today's crises to provide insurance against the possibility, however remote it seems now, that Britain might once again face a major direct threat. We must be able to build up our forces in such circumstances. And while large nuclear arsenals and serious proliferation risks remain, our Trident nuclear deterrent must be part of this essential insurance. We are, however, absolutely committed to progress on arms control and we will be putting our principles into practice by:
- making significant reductions in our nuclear weapons so that we have no more than we need for credible deterrence;
- relaxing our day-to-day operating posture to reflect the current strategic background;
- being much more open about Trident and other nuclear issues.
Military Capability
At the heart of this radical and far-reaching Review is the creation of modern, high capability conventional forces. They must be able to meet our present commitments and adapt to evolving requirements if the international climate changes. They must be manned, equipped, trained and sustained for modern warfare. Operations are likely to be multinational and involve the deployment of forces over considerable distances, often without local infrastructure and other support.
To meet these challenges, we will modernise the Armed Forces by:
- creating a pool of Joint Rapid Reaction Forces drawn from all three Services to provide a quickly deployable and militarily powerful cutting edge in crises of all kinds;
- introducing a range of new capabilities such as larger aircraft carriers, an air manoeuvre brigade and improved nuclear, biological and chemical defence;
- providing our forces with the improved strategic transport, logistic and medical support, and deployable headquarters and communications they need to mount and, if necessary, sustain operations successfully;
- developing further the integrated or joint-Service approach to defence, both in the front line and support areas, to generate the maximum military capability from the combined resources of the three Services. Initiatives will include a joint helicopter command, the "Joint Force 2000" concept for Royal Navy and RAF carrier-based operations, and an enhanced role and responsibilities for the Chief of Joint Operations;
- rebalance our front line, in the United Kingdom and Germany, to match today's priorities and to ensure that it is properly manned;
- include for the first time our Reserve Forces fully in the process of post-Cold War modernisation. The Territorial Army will be given a relevant and useful role for today, and the tools and training to undertake it.
This is an ambitious programme. The size of our Regular forces will not change significantly; indeed, the Army will be bigger. We will, however, reconfigure our forces and this will involve changes in the balance of capabilities, with improvements in some areas and reductions in others, including in the overall size of the revitalised Territorial Army. The result will be a modern force structure to meet 21st century challenges.
People
Effective defence depends on well-trained, highly skilled and highly motivated people. People have therefore been at the very centre of this Review. Our long term personnel strategies include a range of initiatives to improve the attractiveness of Service and civilian careers, especially through training and development. We are tackling the problem of overstretch. The Review envisages a fully manned force structure which is matched to what we plan to be able to do. Our plans include:
- increases in the size of the Armed Forces where our people are being asked to do too much and changes in organisation to spread the load of operational commitments more sensibly;
- an increased recruiting effort, with particular emphasis on attracting good candidates from among the ethnic minorities and women;
- a major education and training initiative linked to the Learning Age initiative to encourage recruiting and retention;
- a task force to address the special problems faced by Service families and a unit for Veterans' affairs.
Equipment
Modern forces need effective high-capability equipment. The Strategic Defence Review has re-examined the equipment programme to establish what we need today and in the longer term. Key projects such as Eurofighter, the Apache attack helicopter and the Horizon frigate have been confirmed, and new requirements have been identified, including strategic air and sea transport, and the new generation of aircraft carriers. And because systems now being developed will transform the way in which battles are fought, we will invest sensibly to give our forces a decisive technological advantage in key battlewinning areas.
Smart Procurement
This is why the Government is committed to a strong and healthy defence industry in Britain and Europe. But the Ministry of Defence has often been unable to take full advantage of what industry can offer. Only a radical reappraisal of the way in which we procure equipment could hope to solve the problems of delayed and over-budget projects. With the help of industry and outside consultants we have produced a new approach - "Smart Procurement" - that cuts out bureaucracy, reduces the time taken to procure weapons and cuts costs. The Smart Procurement Initiative will take time to realise but we will get better value for money and operational advantages as a result.
Modern Support
The Review has also taken a radical approach to support, building on previous work on efficiency and innovation. Comprehensive examinations of stockholdings and the defence estate have identified major savings. Joint Service integration will be expanded significantly, including by the creation of a Chief of Defence Logistics. And there are many areas in which organisational change, based on experience not dogma, can produce major improvements.
Affordability
This has been a policy-led Review. But for our plans to be effective they must be affordable, and the public must see that we are spending money sensibly. Balancing the books has not been easy but our work has produced impressive results. In the new strategic environment we will be able to provide the modern and militarily effective Armed Forces that Britain needs more cost-effectively.
Modern Forces for the Modern World
The Strategic Defence Review puts into effect the Government's commitment to strong, modern defence for Britain. It builds on the strengths and successes of our Armed Forces, rectifies their inherited weaknesses and modernises their capabilities so that they can deal with new challenges in a changing world. It places the people on whom our defence depends firmly at the centre of our planning. And it gives defence a clear sense of direction as a vital means of protecting Britain's interests, discharging our responsibilities and acting as a real force for good. The Review is therefore good for Britain, good for defence and good for the Armed Forces. It will give us the modern forces we need for the modern world.
MESSAGE FROM THE FIRST SEA LORD
The Strategic Defence Review was set up last year to ensure that Britain's Armed Forces are shaped to meet the demands of the 21st century. The Review is now complete and I wanted to set out my personal view of what it means for the Royal Navy.
We have emerged from the Review with a much more clearly defined concept of operations, a plan for a powerful and balanced front line, increased funding for some aspects of support and a strategy for dealing with the problems of activity overstretch which have plagued us over the last few years. There will be some changes of emphasis. These reflect the Review's assessment of the forces we need to support the Government's foreign and security policy, and its strategic priorities, including some reductions in the front line which will inevitably be painful. Overall, however, the future plans for the Royal Navy and Royal Marines are entirely appropriate to take us into the 21st century.
Concept of Operations
During the Cold War the fundamental strategic assumption was that the enemy would come to us. In today's uncertain world, crises and threats to British interests can occur anywhere and we need joint, versatile and readily deployable forces which can respond quickly to them.
The contribution maritime forces can make is crucial and has been recognised in the Review. We must be able to undertake operations away from home in conjunction with the other Services and in cooperation with our Allies. Our major role in the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces exemplifies this, and other initiatives such as the development of an RN/RAF Joint Fixed Wing Force and the Joint Helicopter Command for battlefield helicopters will enhance the part we will play in future operations.
The Front Line
The Review has examined every aspect of the Navy's front line thoroughly and has called for some adjustments. The outcome of the biggest single debate in the Review is that we ntend to replace our current CVSs with two larger aircraft carriers. They will be capable of operating fixed wing aircraft from the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force, and helicopters from all three Services. Such a capability is particularly relevant to the demands of the next century, and this decision is of the greatest significance for the Royal Navy.
Further good news is the endorsement of a brigade sized amphibious force. In addition to HMS OCEAN, the two replacement LPDs, ALBION and BULWARK, and two replacement LSLs, a further four RoRo ships are to be added to the two RoRos that will be in service this year. This will be a truly impressive capability and will give us the sea lift which, together with improved heavy airlift, will enable us to move quickly and deploy tactically leading elements of the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces.
We will maintain continuous at sea nuclear deterrence with a force of four SSBNs, as we have for the last 30 years. Furthermore, all Trafalgar Class submarines will be capable of firing Tomahawk land attack missiles, thereby extending our ability to apply pressure in times of tension and our power to influence events up to 1,000 miles inland.
These enhancements are all good for the Navy. However, reflecting the change in emphasis across defence, we will reduce over time from 12 to 10 attack submarines, although the orders for three Astute Class and plans for a further two have been confirmed. We will also reduce from 35 destroyers and frigates to 32, and we will now increase the mine warfare force from the current 19 vessels to 22, rather than the previously planned 25. Furthermore, the total number of anti-submarine warfare Merlin helicopters will not be increased beyond the 44 already on order, although more Lynx helicopters will be converted to Mark 8 standard to ensure we maintain helicopter flights on all operational destroyers and frigates.
Future Equipment and Support
The Review has endorsed the Royal Navy's strategy to maintain a balanced Fleet in the years ahead. To realise that strategy we are going to sharpen up the way we buy equipment and spares and how we support and update our ships and equipment throughout their life.
In another major initiative, Ministers have decided to create a Chief of Defence Logistics. The aim is to bring together over the next two years the three single Service support commands under one organisation, to deliver best practice, avoid duplication and improve support to joint operations. No change of this magnitude can happen without some upheaval, but we must build on the good progress we have already made in tri-Service support rationalisation and within the Naval Support Command, and aim to realise further long term benefits from a single structure.
Much work has been done to identify and progressively put right logistics shortfalls in all three Services, especially with respect to our ability to deploy overseas. For the Navy this includes funding to address shortfalls in our weapon stocks. The Medical Services were recognised as a particular area of under- funding and a number of measures including a new 200 bed Primary Casualty Receiving Ship, increased medical recruiting, new equipment and improved medical support for operations, highlight the determination of Ministers to rectify the problems.
People
Finally, but most importantly, one of the Secretary of State's key aims in the Review has been to put people first. At each stage of the Review the impact on people has been assessed. Ministers are determined to tackle overstretch and unmanned complement billets, and so am I.
An example of this is our intention to adopt a much more flexible approach to programming ships and submarines to match our commitments and resources. We are shortly to introduce alternative arrangements for deploying our destroyers and frigates to the South Atlantic, the West Indies and in the Gulf, so as to reduce the overstretch involved while still providing a strong presence in all three areas. We have also decided to make changes to the attack submarine operational programme. The result will be that fewer ships and submarines will be called for to meet our tasks. Thus despite the reduction in hulls, the overall effect will be to ease the strain on the Fleet programme.
The reduction in destroyer, frigate and attack submarine hulls will allow us to redeploy some personnel, thus going some way in the short term towards easing gapping until the benefits of the improved recruiting and retention measures that are already in place bear fruit. There will be no requirement for a redundancy scheme as a result of the review, although there may be a limited need to target certain specialist categories on a voluntary basis.
Turning to both RN and RM Reserves, I welcome the substantial increase in the number of training days and, for the RNR, a useful increase of 350 personnel who may now be recruited.
The Review has placed a clear emphasis on providing practical help to servicemen and women including schemes to improve in-service education opportunities and the establishment of a Families Task Force to tackle some of the problems Service families can face. An initiative is also being pursued to provide better single living accommodation.
It would be wrong of me to raise expectations of quick fixes because results will take time to materialise, but it is quite clear to me that Ministers are determined to improve the lot of our people.
Summary
The Strategic Defence Review has been a rigorous and comprehensive analysis of the role of the country's Armed Forces and how that role should be carried out. In our case, the task for the Royal Navy and Royal Marines is clearly set out. The plans stand us in good stead and ensure that we remain one of the most powerful and effective navies in the world.
Admiral Sir Jock Slater
First Sea Lord
MESSAGE FROM THE CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF
The Government's Strategic Defence Review - the SDR - is now complete and I write to ensure that you and all those under your command understand the major issues and how they will influence the Army.
We entered the Review unable to properly meet our commitments and readiness requirements, with ignificant imbalance in both our Regular and Reserve orbats. Following the Review, I am optimistic that the Army will be considerably better placed to respond to the broad spectrum of security risks inherent in the post-Cold War world. The provision of responsive, well-trained, deployable and suitably equipped forces is the key product of the Review.
My principal goal has always been to preserve, and where possible enhance, the Army's capability across the whole spectrum of conflict, but particularly in high intensity conflict, and the SDR has recognised the importance of this. Our role as the framework nation within the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), providing the headquarters, communications and key corps troops, is vital, preserves our expertise at the operational level, and brings with it considerable influence in NATO. But that influence ultimately rests upon the fighting power that we bring to the Alliance.
The underlying assumption in the SDR calls for us to be able to deploy a brigade quickly as part of the new Joint Rapid Reaction Forces (or JRRF), to be able to mount two brigade-sized operations concurrently (and to sustain one of them indefinitely), to deploy a warfighting division for operations such as the Gulf War, and to maintain our overall contribution to NATO. To meet these requirements whilst still meeting our other commitments in peacetime we have developed a structure for the Army comprising two deployable divisions at realistic peace establishment, each of three brigades rotating through a three-year formation readiness cycle (the successor to our current formation training plot). To achieve this we need to form a sixth mechanized brigade and an additional armoured reconnaissance regiment. Once complete, these changes will enable the Army to meet the readiness levels demanded by the Review and fulfil its many other tasks in a coherent, balanced and sustainable way.
The revised training and operational cycle will be the key to meeting JRRF readiness requirements and at the same time restoring balance to the lives of our officers, soldiers and their families. Rotating the deployable brigades through a cycle of a year spent on primary role training, followed by a year at high readiness and in support of training, followed by a year on other tasks (such as deployments to Northern Ireland, Cyprus and Bosnia), should produce the balance and stability that is lacking at present.
Our capability will also be enhanced by retaining the utility but increasing the potency of airborne forces. We will brigade all our 'air-minded' forces, by embedding the smaller in-role parachute forces in a new air manoeuvre formation, together with the three aviation regiments that will be equipped with the Apache Longbow attack helicopter. This will have a number of advantages: the early entry capability of the Lead Parachute Battalion Group, combined arms support to complement the attack helicopter, and greatly increased tactical mobility and firepower in-theatre for parachute forces.
We are also improving the Army beyond the 'shop window' by reducing the gaps and risks that exist in our sustainability. To meet the SDR requirement to be able to conduct two brigade size deployments concurrently, we will establish a full second line of communication for which, amongst other improvements, we shall be adding some 3300 additional Regular personnel to the Army orbat. This will improve the tour interval significantly for some of our most heavily committed logistic units and personnel.
There are other significant changes proposed for the support area. The introduction of a Chief of Defence Logistics will bring together QMG and the other two single Service support commands into one organization in order to deliver best practice and to gain economies of scale. The supply and distribution agencies, as well as the strategic movements organizations, will be rationalized. In parallel, the implementation of the Smart Procurement Initiative, a reorganisation of the procurement organisation, will provide a clearer focus to managing support throughout the whole life of equipment.
The SDR has recognized the fundamental importance of the TA. It has also highlighted the need to modernise its structure in step with changes to the Regular Army - to meet the demands of the new strategic environment with a greater emphasis on force projection. Rapid reaction forces need high readiness reserves, particularly individuals properly trained at short notice to join Regular units. We will also need to be prepared to call out complete TA units, both when a war fighting division is required and, especially in the case of medical units, in less demanding circumstances. We are in addition examining the concept of using 'sponsored reserves' whereby support services, contracted out to commerce and industry in peace, would include some reserve liability to ensure that uniformed military support is provided in time of crisis or war.
One of the recurring themes of the SDR has been the emphasis on increasing the joint dimension of training and operations, particularly where it improves operational effectiveness and flexibility and removes unnecessary duplication. A joint helicopter force, centralized crew training for Rapier FSC crew and a joint air defence headquarters, and a joint Army / RAF NBC defence organisation all present opportunities for significant improvements in defence capability, and better ways of providing operational support to the deployed Army. But we need to distinguish between jointery where it makes sense and a uniform approach for its own sake. Where there are important differences between the Services, because of the way in which we fight, they will remain.
The Army that will emerge from the SDR will be better trained and more able to meet the readiness requirements of future operations. The formation readiness cycle should improve stability; it will be backed up by improved sustainability and a reserve component better matched to its tasks. Our continuing deployment in Germany will underpin leadership of the ARRC, through which we gain invaluable operational experience, whilst the return of some armoured units as part of the restructuring to achieve the sixth mechanised brigade will produce a better balance of opportunity for service in UK for those elements. Our range of capabilities from light, early entry forces through heavier components of the JRRF, to a full warfighting capability including Corps troops and backed up by appropriate reserve forces, should enable the Army to remain the best, most usable small army in the world.
The SDR will not bring a reduction in commitments nor a large increase in the size of the Army, which we could not sustain, but instead, a real improvement in the way we deliver our fighting power. We should be able to implement the organisational changes necessary to meet key readiness targets within the first few years, but improvements in manning and sustainability will take longer. Implementation will be phased, so that whilst we reorganize we can still prepare for and carry out operations.
Throughout the Review the needs of all our people including families have been a primary consideration. This is reflected in the emphasis it places on providing a rewarding career with improved vocational training. The improved balance that the new formation readiness cycle will bring should produce an improvement to the quality of life in the Army and so lead to better retention. The measures introduced to improve recruiting have already resulted in an increase in the numbers undergoing training and I am confident that this programme will be sustained. The combination of more recruits and better retention should result in a significant reduction in the widespread overstretch with which the Army contends today.
I believe that the outcome of the SDR for the Army is good, although I fully realise that there will be some disruption and instability caused by the necessary reorganisation. The SDR is another phase of the continuing process of change in our country. We should seize the opportunities with which it presents us, but not be daunted by the challenges. Above all we must all ensure that we preserve our ethos and our warfighting capability.
Sir Roger Wheeler
General
Chief of the General Staff
MESSAGE FROM CHIEF OF AIR STAFF
The Government's Strategic Defence Review has reached its conclusion and the decisions are contained in the White Paper which is being published by the Government. You will be aware that the SDR was a foreign and security policy-led Review, and that the aim was to define the missions required of the UK's Armed Forces and to identify the force packages necessary to achieve them.
As we approach the end of a turbulent decade for the RAF, the SDR set a demanding challenge. The staffs in MOD and the Commands were required to examine all aspects of our contemporary and complex activities and to recommend how they could be best developed in the future. The SDR thus presented me with a real opportunity to influence the direction of future investment, albeit finding headroom to finance new initiatives so as to rectify defence weaknesses has involved some difficult decisions.
In the context of force structures, the clear aim was to develop the required capabilities to meet the Government's foreign and security objectives. Jointery, deployability and sustainability emerged from the SDR process as themes that focused the search for improved flexibility and operational effectiveness, both necessary to meet the demands of the new strategic environment which is fraught with uncertainty. For our part, we contributed to all aspects of the debate by introducing the hard-earned lessons of operational experience to the deliberations of the committees and working groups engaged on SDR business.
I have given my full support to all initiatives which address overstretch, undermanning, education and welfare issues. There will be no redundancies in the RAF as a consequence of SDR, and, in overall terms, RAF core manning should be in balance within two years, although I acknowledge that some areas will remain in deficit for longer. In particular, the 'Policy for People' package puts clear emphasis on providing practical help to servicemen and women. Education and training, vocational and academic, will underpin the RAF's commitment to investing in people. Other initiatives are intended to ensure that RAF personnel and their families remain attracted to service-life and, importantly, that they will not be disadvantaged when they return to the civilian employment market.
New equipment is planned for the RAF that will see us well equipped for the challenges of the future. Some of the key issues are outlined below:
Equipment: Eurofighter remains the cornerstone of the RAF's future equipment programme and I welcome the Government's commitment to the purchase of 232 aircraft. Studies will continue into a Future Offensive Air System to replace the Tornado GR4 in about twenty years' time. It is planned that the RAF will share with the RN the operation of a single aircraft (the Future Carrier Borne Aircraft) to replace the Sea Harrier and Harrier GR7, for which the Joint Strike Fighter will be a strong contender. A collision warning system will be procured for the Tornado GR4 and the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System will be fitted to Nimrod R. All of these measures represent a considerable enhancement to our present capabilities.
Nuclear, biological and chemical defence: increased investment will be made available for new equipment which will include an additional buy of integrated biological detection systems and remote sensors, nuclear/chemical recce systems, vaccines and antibiotic packs, and medium scale decontamination equipment packs.
Strategic Lift: we intend, in the short term, to supplement our current air transport fleet with four C-17 aircraft or their equivalent. In the longer term, we also need to consider a suitable replacement for our remaining elderly transport aircraft. The Future Large Aircraft will be a contender for this requirement.
Logistics: there will be a significantly increased investment in logistics for the RAF. The main areas for investment are vehicles for fuel and transportation, Harrier GR7 and Tornado GR1/4 deployment packs, additional support manpower, engine and avionic spares packages, portable engineering and hangar accommodation, and additional support helicopter tactical fuel vehicles. In addition, the Tactical Communications Wing will be expanded. It is also proposed to unify the management of logistic support to all three services under a joint Chief of Defence Logistics, whose mission will be to drive forward rationalisation and convergence in the logistic arena.
Medical: there will also be additional resources to make radical improvements in RAF medical services. The provision of primary health care will be enhanced, and medical support to all deployed operations should be improved significantly.
Manpower: regular RAF manpower should be in balance once SDR is fully implemented and approximately 270 new reservist posts will be created.
A key SDR theme is 'jointery'. The prime initiatives will be the creation of Joint Rapid Reaction Forces, which will build on the current Joint Rapid Deployment force and encompass all high readiness forces; and the formation of a Joint Helicopter Command, which will draw together all RN, Army and RAF battlefield helicopters. The implementation officer and first commander of the Joint Helicopter Command will be an RAF two-star officer. We will, in conjunction with the Royal Navy, progress towards the formation of a RAF/RN joint fixed wing force. The Joint Force 2000, as it will be known, is the first step towards the goal of operating a common aircraft from land and from the future aircraft carriers. Future Rapier Field Standard C training for RAF and Army personnel will be conducted at RAF Honington and we intend to move towards a joint Ground Based Air Defence force, to be up and running when the Army and the RAF Regiment have common equipment. A joint NBC unit will also be formed which will lead to an establishment increase of 75 RAF personnel.
There will, however, be a reduction in fast jet numbers which reflects calculations of the number of airframes and crews needed to meet revised planning assumptions. It also takes into account the weight of effort likely to be necessary to accomplish a task and assumptions about the number of tasks which we might need to undertake concurrently. Twelve Tornado GR1s will be removed from the front line, a measure also necessary to enable the GR1/4 force to reach its out of service date, together with nine Harriers, thirteen Tornado F3 and two Jaguars. These reductions will result in the disbandment of one F3 and one GR1 squadron. It is anticipated that the Tornado GR1/4 will lose its anti-shipping role, but this does not imply any further reduction in airframe numbers.
The RAF's activities and plans have been thoroughly scrutinised within the SDR process, and while I very much regret the need to remove 36 fast jets from the front line, I do welcome the fact that we have avoided any redundancies which, along with other measures, will help to alleviate overstretch, and improve both logistic support and the quality of life for all ranks of the Service.
Throughout the lengthy process of SDR debate, my hand was greatly strengthened by the sheer excellence of the RAF's response to operational demands since the end of the Cold War - demands that have been always answered despite the turbulence and trauma caused by rapid reductions in the uniformed strength of the Service and major restructuring as a consequence of Options for Change and the Defence Costs Studies. In the early months of this year the RAF was sustaining six operational deployments and demonstrating the potency of air power with impressive skill and no small measure of courage. My delight in the Service and its accomplishments, your accomplishments, gave me strength and encouragement throughout the SDR, and I do hope you will agree that we now have a platform from which we can face the future with confidence and shared pride in our Service.
Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Johns
Chief of the Air Staff
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