Title: White Paper on Defence of Canada - Chapter VI: contribuing to international security
CHAPTER VI: CONTRIBUTING TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
Canadians are internationalist and not isolationist by nature. We uphold a proud heritage of service abroad. We take pride in Lester B. Pearson's Nobel Prize for Peace not simply because it did a great Canadian considerable honour, but because it was a reflection of our evolving international personality. More than 30 years later, Canadians could once again take pride in their contribution to peace as the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded in recognition of the work of peacekeeping personnel. Multilateral security cooperation is not merely a Canadian tradition; it is the expression of Canadian values in the international sphere. We care about the course of events abroad, and we are willing to work with other countries to improve the lot of all manner of peoples.
Canadians are not blind to the lessons of history. Although they recognize that states will want to devote resources to pressing domestic concerns, their experience of two world wars and the Korean conflict has made them wary of the peacetime temptation to believe that their security is assured - particularly when based on wishful predictions about the future. Canada's experience has also underscored the need to develop and maintain effective multilateral institutions that can address security and stability - and that can respond effectively to aggression should other measures fail.
As a reflection of the global nature of Canada's values and interests, the Canadian Forces must contribute to international security. We should continue to play an active military role in the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. We should develop our defence relationships with the nations of the Asia-Pacific region and Latin America, and contribute, where possible, to the security of the Middle East and Africa.
The complex security problems that confront the international community today defy easy solutions. Nevertheless, there is a strong desire to address these problems through multilateral institutions. This derives not only from the state of global political relations, but also from the sense that, at a time when many countries are reducing their military expenditures to devote more resources to domestic issues, multilateral cooperation represents a sound way to pool national resources and use these to the greatest benefit. Thus, now more than ever, multilateralism needs and deserves our support - not only in terms of our words and ideas, but also in terms of tangible Canadian contributions to international security and well-being.
A CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE ON MULTILATERAL OPERATIONS
Over the past few years, the nature of multilateral operations undertaken in support of the United Nations has changed enormously. Where, in the past, these operations were comprised largely of traditional peacekeeping and observer missions, the range of operations has expanded to encompass the complete range of military activity - from preventive deployments to enforcement actions such as the Gulf War. Indeed, the broader nature of these operations has been well-noted in the 1993 report of the UN Secretary-General, Agenda for Peace.
As operations in support of UN objectives have evolved, there have been both successes and failures. There have been some very successful operations, such as the mission of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group, which assisted Namibia's transition to independence. The multinational operation in the Gulf in 1990-91, in response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, enforced economic sanctions against Iraq and, when this failed to yield Iraqi compliance with UN resolutions, restored Kuwaiti sovereignty in a brief but effective military campaign.
There have been notable disappointments as well. The UN operation in Somalia began as a worthy and ambitious undertaking to restore order, deliver desperately needed humanitarian assistance, and facilitate national reconstruction. As the operation comes to an end, it seems clear that at least two of these three objectives have not been achieved. Similarly, UN operations in the former Yugoslavia have undoubtedly saved lives, but they have also underscored the challenge presented by mission mandates that undergo constant change, and the difficulty of bringing the resources of regional organizations, such as NATO and the European Union, to bear on UN objectives. In yet other cases, such as Rwanda, the UN has been simply unable to act in a timely fashion.
Canada - which has consistently been a strong advocate of multilateralism in general, and the UN in particular - has been an active player in the recent surge of UN operations. Canada will remain a strong advocate of multilateral security institutions. We also believe, however, that the objectives and conduct of multilateral missions in support of peace and stability must reflect a clear sense of perspective. Some of the considerations that need to be taken into account are common to all multilateral operations. Others pertain to the involvement of specific multilateral security organizations - in particular, the UN and NATO.
General Considerations
Canada's extensive experience with multilateral operations has led us to identify certain characteristics in the purpose, design and operational conduct of a mission that enhance its prospects for success. These missions should address genuine threats to international peace and security (as, for example, in the Gulf or the former Yugoslavia) or emerging humanitarian tragedies (such as the situations in Somalia and Rwanda). They must not become ends in themselves; they must be part of a comprehensive strategy to secure long-term, realistic, and achievable solutions (such as the UN's operations in Central America).
The design of all missions should reflect certain key principles:
* There be a clear and enforceable mandate.
* There be an identifiable and commonly accepted reporting authority.
* The national composition of the force be appropriate to the mission, and there be an effective process of consultation among missions partners.
* In missions that involve both military and civilian resources, there be a recognized focus of authority, a clear and efficient division of responsibilities, and agreed operating procedures.
* With the exception of enforcement actions and operations to defend NATO member states, in missions that involve Canadian personnel, Canada's participation be accepted by all parties to the conflict.
Canada's experience - which encompasses UN, NATO, and other multilateral undertakings - also suggests that successful missions are those that respect certain essential operational considerations.
The size, training and equipment of the force be appropriate to the purpose at hand, and remain so over the life of the mission.
There be a defined concept of operations, an effective command and control structure, and clear rules of engagement.
The UN and NATO
Canada's experience has also shaped the Government's perspective on the respective roles to be played in multilateral operations by the two most important multilateral security institutions to which Canada belongs - the UN and NATO. Canada's ongoing participation in both organizations reflects the belief that each has a valuable contribution to make in the evolution of international peace and stability. At the same time, each organization has its own strengths, weaknesses, and limits.
Historically, the UN has only rarely been able to achieve the level of consensus required to act militarily. As a consequence, it lacks the staff and the required experience in the planning or generation of multinational forces that would enable it to make use of the military potential of its member states in the most timely and effective manner. Indeed, that the UN even has forces at its disposal is subject to the willingness of individual member states to contribute such forces at the time.
The focus of NATO has been narrower: the Alliance is dedicated to the collective defence of its member states. Its restricted membership of 16 like-minded countries has made consensus easier to achieve. As a result, it has much more experience in the design and generation of multinational forces - for defensive purposes - as well as with the planning andexecution of joint operations. Moreover, the commitment to participate in the defence of an Alliance country is virtually automatic for all member states.
Canada is strongly in favour of a vigorous and effective United Nations, capable of upholding the political values and procedural means set out in its Charter, and believes that situations requiring international military action should be dealt with in accordance with the terms of the Charter. The UN's pre-eminent authority to conduct operations requiring the force of arms derives from its membership, which is nearly universal in its scope, and the terms of its Charter, which sets the existing ethical and legal context for relations between and, to some extent, within states.
Yet, the UN suffers from serious problems. The organization is plagued by a chronic funding crisis, owing to the failure of member states to honour their financial obligations, and the recent spate of very large, extraordinarily complex, and extremely expensive operations which have put a significant strain on its financial resources. In addition, the Security Council requires reform if it is to serve the international community adequately. Its decision-making needs to be made more transparent. Its resolutions should be more carefully drafted. Non-members of the Council - especially troop contributors - need to be consulted more systematically. In terms of the internal workings, the UN has not been able to discharge effectively its expanded post-Cold War role. Bureaucratic reform, streamlining, and cost-cutting are essential to restore its credibility.
Once the UN has determined its goals, identified the means to achieve them, and set its strategy on a given issue, it should be able to execute its decisions in a timely and effective manner. A standing UN force may provide one option to solve the UN's long-standing problems with respect to the ready availability of forces. The practical issues involved in the establishment of such a force are complex, and Canada intends to see the issue studied thoroughly. In the interim, we will, on a national basis, enhance our ability to contribute to UN operations. Within the limits of our resources, we will strive to respond expeditiously to UN requests for expertise, individual personnel, and entire field units.
Canada will also remain a strong supporter of a reformed NATO. Canada believes that NATO's reservoir of military competence and capabilities should make a greater contribution to UN operations. The Alliance will only do so, however, if its relationship with the global organization is clearly and appropriately defined and widely understood. NATO will make its most valuable contribution to multilateral operations by providing the UN with the vigorous military support that it currently lacks. In carrying out this role, the Alliance should resist the temptation to intrude on the provision of political and strategic direction for the mission; that responsibility must rest with the Security Council.
For its part, the UN needs to recognize that when it calls upon NATO to provide effective military support, the Alliance's proven chain of command and operating procedures should not be constrained by political or military guidance that is unclear, hesitant, or divisive. Such guidance impairs NATO's operational efficiency and effectiveness, does not advance the cause of UN objectives, and ultimately diminishes the credibility of both organizations.
National Considerations
Canada must remain prepared to contribute forces to a wide range of UN and other multilateral operations. Certain international scenarios will result in a prompt Canadian response, such as the need to come to the defence of a NATO state or respond to the emergence of a comparable threat to international peace and security. Although this general commitment is clear, under more normal circumstances Canada can and must be selective if it is going to remain in a position to play a meaningful role. Canada cannot, and need not, participate in every multilateral operation. Our resources are finite. We may not agree with the purpose or organization of a given mission. We may not be convinced of its prospects for success. We may be otherwise engaged. Moreover, Canada is not obliged to take on a major portion of every operation or to contribute forces for longer than seems reasonable. Nevertheless, Canada will maintain its specialization in multilateral operations. We will commit forces to such operations if suitable resources are available, and if our personnel can be appropriately armed and properly trained to carry out the task and make a significant contribution to the success of the mission.
THE RANGE OF CHOICE
Canada's record of commitment to multilateral operations is unsurpassed. While the number of operations in which Canadian Forces personnel have been involved is striking, what is equally important is that these operations have encompassed almost the complete spectrum of military activity. Subject to the principles outlined earlier, the Government is willing to commit maritime, land, and air forces (as well as support elements) to the full range of multilateral operations, including those set out below.
Preventive Deployment of Forces
This entails the deployment of forces between parties to an imminent dispute prior to the outbreak of conflict to defuse tension, enhance confidence, and prevent minor incidents from escalating inadvertently to full-scale hostilities. The Government sees great value in these deployments, as part of a broader diplomatic strategy to resolve a dispute peacefully and prevent the outbreak of hostilities. Indeed, Canada was one of the initial participants in the very first preventive deployment of UN forces, to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 1993, an operation designed to lend a measure of stability to a tense part of the Balkans.
Peacekeeping and Observer Missions
These missions represent the traditional kind of `peacekeeping', on the Golan Heights, or in Cyprus. They entail the positioning of impartial forces between the parties to a ceasefire, and involve the monitoring of agreements during the course of negotiations intended to lead to a political solution. In recent years, these operations have not enjoyed the same profile as other multilateral operations, including missions in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Cambodia. Nevertheless, where there is a desire to move from a situation of armed conflict to political resolution, traditional peacekeeping missions canmake a valuable contribution in assisting the transition. Canada's expertise in this field is unsurpassed, and the Government is committed to the continued participation of the Canadian Forces in such operations.
Enforcing the Will of the International Community and Defending Allies. The most ambitious operations of the past few years have used armed force, under multilateral auspices, to enforce the will of the international community - not only in cases of conflict between states, but within states as well. Recent examples of such operations have included:
the enforcement of economic sanctions or arms embargoes;
the use of armed forces to create secure conditions for the delivery of aid;
the denial of air space through which hostile forces could prosecute a military campaign or attack civilian populations (`no-fly zones');
the protection of civilian populations and refugees in `safe areas'; and,
the provision of deterrence or defence for a UN or NATO member state against armed attack.
The Canadian Forces have been involved in every type of operation listed above, requiring a wide range of military training and capability. Our personnel have helped enforce economic sanctions off Haiti and the former Yugoslavia. They have sought to restore order and ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid in Somalia. As part of UNPROFOR, they have done the same in Croatia, while supplementing this activity by helping to monitor the `no-fly zone' and participating in the protection of `safe areas' in Bosnia-Hercegovina. In 1990-91, the Canadian Forces were part of the multinational coalition that reversed Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Finally, throughout this period, the Canadian Forces have continued to train with NATO allies to preserve the Alliance's capability to defend against armed attack.
Ethnic and religious tensions, the increasing number of `failed states', and the persistence of inter-state conflicts over borders and resources, strongly suggest that the future nature of multilateral military operations must be multi-dimensional to address a full range of challenges. The goals of these missions - the protection of civilian populations and refugees, national reconstruction, upholding international law, and opposing aggression - are invariably unimpeachable. That does not mean, however, that they will always go smoothly or will not pose significant risks to Canadian Forces personnel - particularly in an environment where the proliferation of advanced weaponry is becoming the rule rather than the exception. Nevertheless, Canada will remain prepared to contribute forces to such operations, whether they are authorized by the UN, or as part of the efforts of regional organizations such as NATO or the CSCE.
Post-Conflict Peacebuilding
The rehabilitation of areas that have been the scene of armed conflict represents an important contribution that the training, skills, and equipment ofour armed forces can make to security abroad. Past instances of such contributions include the provision of humanitarian relief supplies and the use of engineers to rebuild infrastructure and remove land mines. Following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Canada took the additional step of training refugees to recognize and disarm land mines. These activities can make an invaluable contribution in building a more durable peace, and the Government will explore ways in which the Canadian Forces can contribute further.
Prior to taking office, the Government noted that the relationship between the military and civilian aspects of the new multilateral missions was an area that needed to be explored. The Government will build upon the excellent progress that has already been made. Our accumulated experience with such military-civilian coordination from missions in Ethiopia, Somalia, and Rwanda suggests that armed forces have a critical role to play at the outset of these missions in the establishment of a secure environment and the provision of basic support (such as transport, emergency medical assistance, logistics and communications). Over the long-term, however, reconstructive activities - be they the administration and enforcement of civil law, the provision of medical care, or the distribution of humanitarian aid - are best left to civilian organizations.
Measures to Enhance Stability and Build Confidence
Arms control and measures to build confidence represent an important way to prevent or limit conflict and foster stable relations between states. Over the past two years, for example, implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe destroyed over 7,000 tanks from the countries of the former Warsaw Pact - a total sufficient to equip 32 Soviet-style army divisions.
The ability to inspect and verify compliance remains crucial to the relative success or failure of these arrangements. The Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces have played their part in past operations of this type and, within the limits of their resources, this will continue.
One of the most interesting and productive means to enhance stability and build confidence has been through multilateral and bilateral contacts between the civilian and military staffs of various countries. Such contacts - which may range from brief visits to full-fledged staff talks and exchanges - serve to build transparency, confidence, and trust through direct personal contact and greater familiarity with differing perceptions of defence issues as well as military culture and doctrine. The Canadian Forces have used such bilateral and multilateral contact programs to discuss a variety of questions, from defence planning to civil-military relations. Exchanges with military forces from Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States have shown great promise. The Government will now expand this program of exchanges and extend its scope to include other countries. To this end, we will increase substantially the budget devoted to the Military Training Assistance Program to build up contact programs with Central and Eastern Europe, the Commonwealth of Independent States, Asia, Latin America, and Africa.
TRAINING FOR MULTILATERAL MISSIONS
The Government believes that combat training - undertaken on a national basis as well as with allies - remains the best foundation for the participation of the Canadian Forces in multilateral missions. In situations short of war, such training equips Canadian Forces personnel with the complete range of skills that may be needed to meet the varied demands of the unexpected situations they will encounter.
Canada will support and contribute to the enhancement of peacekeeping training.
- Recent experiences in UN operations have confirmed the value of cultural sensitivity, international humanitarian law, and dispute resolution training prior to deployment. Such training has always formed part of the preparation for Canadian peacekeepers sent abroad; it will be further enhanced.
- The Government has assisted in the establishment and funding of the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre at Cornwallis, Nova Scotia, under the auspices of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies. The Department will sponsor peacekeeping training at the Centre for military personnel from countries participating in NATO's Partnership for Peace and developing countries under the Military Training Assistance Program.
ORGANIZATIONS AND COMMITMENTS
Strengthening the United Nations
Canada - which has unfailingly lent its political and financial support to the United Nations - remains committed to UN reform. In the security sphere, Canada brings superbly qualified personnel, significant military capabilities, and a great deal of experience to UN operations. Other countries look to Canada for leadership. In addition to its solid record in the financial support of UN operations, Canada has already taken the lead in providing UN headquarters with military expertise to improve its planning and operational capabilities. Canada will continue to advocate that funding arrangements for UN operations be improved. We will also work toward the further enhancement of the UN's command and control system, as well as the development of its administrative and logistics capabilities.
Where the participation of the Canadian Forces in UN peacekeeping operations was once subject to a numerical `ceiling' or planning figure of 2000 personnel, our recent experiences suggest that we would be better served by a more flexible approach. As a matter of general principle, the Canadian Forces will remain prepared to deploy on UN operations contingency forces of up to a maritime task group, a brigade group plus an infantry battalion group, a wing of fighter aircraft, and a squadron of tactical transport aircraft. Were these forces to be deployed simultaneously, this could conceivably involve in the order of 10,000 military personnel.
Within this upper limit, Canada will increase its commitment of stand-by forces to the UN from a battalion, an air transport element, and a communications element to the vanguard component of its contingency forces - that is, two ships (one on each coast), one battle group, one infantry battalion group, one squadron of fighter aircraft, a flight of tactical transport aircraft, a communications element, and a headquarters element. If deployed simultaneously, this would represent a commitment of 4,000 personnel, which could then be sustained indefinitely.
The Forces will also remain prepared to deploy, for limited periods, selected specialized elements of the Canadian Forces - medical personnel, transport and signals units, and engineers - in humanitarian relief roles. Other Canadian contributions, such as the provision of observers and technical specialists will be undertaken as feasible.
NATO: Participation and Reform
Canada will remain a full and active member of NATO. The monolithic threat to Western Europe has disappeared and, for now, the principal responsibility for European defence must lie with the Europeans themselves. At the same time, the Government values the transatlantic link that NATO provides, and recognizes that, since 1990, the Alliance has made progress in adapting to a post-Cold War world. Those aspects that reflect a cooperative approach to European security relations, including the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), Partnership for Peace, and the development of the Combined Joint Task Force concept, are especially notable.
Canada will press for additional change. The Alliance's fundamental and primary role is to provide for the collective defence of its member states. NATO can, however, make a greater contribution to collective and cooperative security than is currently the case, and the Government will work toward striking an appropriate balance between the Alliance's traditional mission and its newer roles.
Canada will be an active participant in the Alliance's ongoing efforts to reach out to the countries of Central Europe as well as to those of the Commonwealth of Independent States. We give our full support to NATO expansion, but continue to believe that this question must be addressed very carefully - certainly, the process must not exacerbate Russian fears of encirclement or exclusion. Canada will participate in multilateral and bilateral programs that aim to integrate gradually our NACC partners into an effective security order for the Northern Hemisphere.
Finally, Canada will insist that the Alliance become a more efficient organization, in terms of its budgets and operating costs - in the same way that national defence departments in all member states have had to adjust to fiscal restraint. In particular, we will propose that NATO's large and costly bureaucracy be reduced, and that the military budget be spent on activities that are relevant to the new environment.
The Government's perspective on NATO underpins the future of Canada's Alliance commitments. In the event of a crisis or war in Europe, the contingency forces that Canada will maintain for all multilateral operations would immediately be made available to NATO. Should it prove necessary, Canada would mobilize further national resources to provide the additional forces required to fulfil Canada's commitment to the Alliance as set out under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.
Apart from this general commitment to contribute forces to the defence of Alliance territory, Canada will maintain a number of specific peacetime NATO commitments. Set within the context of Canada's earlier slate of Alliance commitments, there are three important changes.
First, Canada will terminate its commitment to maintain a battalion group to serve with Allied Command Europe's Mobile Force (Land) or the NATO Composite Force in the defence of northern Norway. The evolution of European security and of NATO's strategic posture suggests that this battalion group could make a more useful contribution to a NATO force designed to deploy rapidly anywhere within Alliance territory, including Norway. As a result, we would be willing to contribute an infantry battalion group to NATO's Immediate Reaction Force. The battalion group's equipment, which is currently prepositioned in Norway and is particularly well-suited to northern operations, will be returned to Canada to help offset the needs of larger Regular Land Force combat units and the Militia.
Second, Canada will supplement its contribution to NATO's Standing Naval Force Atlantic with the assignment, on an occasional basis, of one ship to NATO's Standing Naval Force Mediterranean. This initiative will further extend the benefits that our naval personnel gain from operating with allied navies, and is in keeping with NATO's broader geographic focus.
Third, Canada has been a major net contributor to the NATO Infrastructure Program. This program once provided a cost-efficient way to pool funds from the Alliance countries to construct infrastructure for collective defence. In light of changes in the European security environment, the full post-war recovery of Western Europe's economy, and the need to address cooperative security needs in Central and Eastern Europe, Canada will scale back its contribution to this program and devote some of these funds to the expansion of our bilateral contact programs with Central and Eastern Europe under the Military Training Assistance Program.
A Continuing Role in the CSCE
Canada has played an active role in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) since its inception in 1973. Our participation has included the signing of the original document (the Helsinki Final Act of 1975), the Stockholm Document on confidence-building measures in 1986, the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe in 1990, and the Vienna Documents of 1990 and 1992. Canada has also contributed forces to the European Community Monitor Mission in the Balkans (which wascalled for by the CSCE), and lent operational support to the CSCE mission in Nagorny-Karabakh.
The CSCE is the only organization addressing regional security concerns in Europe that includes Russia as well as virtually all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. This gives the organization a particular role in building confidence among its members. It also opens the possibility that the organization, which has played a significant role in forestalling conflict, can also play a role in resolving conflict - a role that could include a range of peacekeeping and related operations. To the extent that the CSCE arrives at a consensus in favour of performing these functions, Canada will be prepared to support such activities within the constraints imposed by budgetary considerations and the availability of suitable resources.
The CSCE lacks an effective decision-making mechanism. Indeed, despite recent measures to upgrade its administrative machinery, it remains more a process than an organization. Yet, through encouraging transparency between its member states and regional organizations (such as NATO and the WEU), as well as the gradual development of a pan-European code of conduct, the CSCE stands to make a valuable contribution to European security over the long term. Canada will remain an active participant in this forum.
Reaching out to Asia-Pacific
Aside from its role in the Korean War, Canada's participation in Asia-Pacific security affairs since the end of the Second World War has been largely limited to the commitment of forces to various peacekeeping and observer missions (including the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam, and the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia), along with participation in the `RIMPAC' air and naval exercises with the United States, Japan, Australia, and, on occasion, other Asia-Pacific countries. As our interest in Asia has grown over the past few years, Canada has become more active in a variety of regional security initiatives - particularly through the encouragement of regional security dialogues such as the Asia Regional Forum, the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific, and the Canadian Consortium on Asia Pacific Security. All of these activities will continue, and, as our economic stake in the region grows, Canada will play a more active role in its security.
To this end, we will expand the current program of bilateral military contacts we maintain with a variety of Asian countries, including Japan, South Korea, and members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). These contacts are currently limited to the presence of defence attaches in selected capitals and the conduct of periodic staff talks and conferences. Our activities in the Asia-Pacific region will be broadened gradually to include a more regular program of visits and exchanges in the area of peacekeeping, including programs at the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre.
A Continuing Role in Other Regions
In addition to its role in the Gulf War, Canada has taken part in more than thirty peacekeeping, observer and humanitarian relief missions in Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa since 1947. Canada's commitment to the stabilityof these regions through the UN and, where appropriate, regional organizations will continue. The Government will lend greater emphasis to the Latin American dimension of our security policy, both bilaterally and through the Organization of American States. We will assist Latin American countries in such areas as peacekeeping training, confidence-building measures, and the development of civil-military relations. In Africa, Canada will encourage the development of a regional capability to undertake peacekeeping missions, both on a bilateral basis and through programs being undertaken at the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre.
OBJECTIVES
The Government is renewing Canada's traditional commitment to participate in the military dimension of international security affairs. Canada will remain an active participant in the UN and NATO, but will push for additional reform within these institutions to make them more relevant, timely, efficient, and effective. Canada will continue to participate in the CSCE, and, within the limits of available resources, more fully develop defence relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America, the Asia-Pacific region, and Africa.
The dramatic expansion of UN operations - both in terms of number and scope -confronts Canada with some difficult choices. Owing to financial constraints, Canada will have to be selective in its commitments. Canadians will also have to accept that some missions will entail a considerable amount of risk. Nevertheless, by choosing to maintain a multi-purpose, combat-capable force, Canada will retain the capability to make a significant and responsible contribution to international peace and stability, within a UN framework, through NATO, or in coalitions of like-minded countries.
To this end, the Canadian Forces will:
* maintain the capability to assist the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in the protection and evacuation of Canadians from areas threatened by imminent conflict;
* participate in multilateral operations anywhere in the world under UN auspices, or in the defence of a NATO member state, and, to that end,
* be able to deploy, or redeploy from other multilateral operations, a joint task force headquarters and, as single units or in combination, one or more of the following elements:
* a naval task group, comprised of up to four combatants (destroyers, frigates or submarines) and a support ship, with appropriate maritime air support,
* three separate battle groups or a brigade group (comprised of three infantry battalions, an armoured regiment and an artillery regiment, with appropriate combat support and combat service support),
* a wing of fighter aircraft, with appropriate support, and,
* one squadron of tactical transport aircraft;
* provide:
* within three weeks, single elements or the vanguard components of this force and be able to sustain them indefinitely in a low-threat environment, and
* within three months, the remaining elements of the full contingency force;
* earmark:
* an infantry battalion group as either a stand-by force for the UN, or to serve with NATO's Immediate Reaction Force; and,
* have plans ready to institute other measures to increase the capabilities of the Canadian Forces to sustain existing commitments or to respond to a major crisis;
* also maintain the following specific peacetime commitments to NATO:
* one ship to serve with the Standing Naval Force Atlantic,
* one ship to serve, on an occasional basis, with the Standing Naval Force Mediterranean,
* aircrews and other personnel to serve in the NATO Airborne Early Warning system,
* approximately 200 personnel to serve in various NATO headquarters,
* participation, at a reduced level, in the NATO infrastructure program, and,
* the opportunity for Allied forces to conduct training in Canada, on a cost-recovery basis;
* in response to changing geographic priorities, expand bilateral and multilateral contacts and exchanges with selected partners in Central and Eastern Europe, the Asia-Pacific region, Latin America, and Africa, with a particular emphasis on peacekeeping, confidence-building measures, and civil-military relations; and,
* support the verification of existing arms control agreements and participate in the development of future accords.